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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Center for Urban and Regional Affairs

**INSTITUTIONALIZING ORGANIZED  
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:  
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

by  
**Karen M. Hult**

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## PREFACE

This paper was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, March 21-24, 1984, Portland, Oregon.

I am grateful for the advice and comments of Thomas Scott and Charles Walcott at several stages of this study. The initial phase of the project was supported by the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Data analysis was made possible by a grant from the University of Minnesota Computer Center.

"These changes will sound the death knell for citizen groups." The remark was perhaps the only point of agreement between Minneapolis community activists and several members of a city council pushing hard to prune back what they saw as an overgrown system of government-sponsored citizen participation.

Did the resulting "reforms" indeed signal the end of the "backyard revolution" (Boyte 1980), with the defeat of community groups at the hands of local elected officials? Or, was this only one of many skirmishes? And, in either case, what insights into the future of citizen participation in other cities might the Minneapolis experience provide?

This paper seeks to address such issues by exploring the extent to which involvement by citizen groups in Minneapolis community development politics can be said to be "institutionalized," or incorporated into routine policy processes. If community organizations are part of "politics as usual," one might expect the impact of, say, a hostile city council to be less devastating than if the groups occupied more tenuous, less legitimate positions. Considered as well is the significance of such inclusion, directing attention to the mechanisms for and consequences of participation.

The first section of the paper sets out criteria for assessing the degree and nature of institutionalization. A discussion of the design and focus of the study follows. Then, after a brief introduction to the arena of community development policy, the current status and recent evolution of organized citizen participation in Minneapolis are examined. The results are decidedly mixed. While community involvement has become a routine part of development politics, groups have had, at best, marginal impact on policy outcomes. Still, organizations not only survived a period of threat, but both broadened their range of contacts with local actors and expanded their strategic repertoires.

Underscored are both the possibilities for and limitations of efforts to incorporate citizen input into routine politics. And, as the concluding section suggests, these findings have implications for the character and impact of organized citizen participation, not only in Minneapolis but in U.S. cities in general.

### INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Once it has tasted success, an organization typically becomes concerned with sustaining its activities. For a citizen group, this may involve pressing to keep particular issues on the public agenda, to steer government decisions, to forge or continue links with relevant government officials, and, not incidentally, to maintain itself. From the vantage point of the relevant political system (for example, the city) or policy arena (for example, community development), it is possible to speak of the extent to which such groups play

institutionalized roles (see, for example, Huntington 1968, Parsons 1954, Polsby 1969). One might examine, for example, the degree of regularized participation of citizens in policy-making and the level of acceptance or legitimacy accorded to such involvement by other actors. Important, too, would be the ability of citizen organizations to survive over time and to adapt to change. Also critical would be the nature of such institutionalized roles. One would want to know at what points (planning, adoption, implementation, evaluation) in which fashion (as consultants, veto groups, deliverers of services) and with what effects citizen organizations were incorporated into the structures and processes of decision-making.

Quite clearly, institutionalization of citizen involvement in local politics need not be an untarnished good from the perspective of other claimants, governmental actors or the polity. Civil rights groups may perceive the growing activism of community organizations to be diverting public attention and resources from their concerns. Elected officials often resist what they see as the exploding volume and increasingly irreconcilable demands placed upon them by community groups, while bureaucrats concentrating on attaining "technical rationality" complain that citizen involvement reduces program efficiency and effectiveness. And, on the one hand, democratic theorists and citizens alike insist on opening access to the political system to all who desire to participate. Yet, increased involvement may slow or even stymie governmental action, fostering "street fighting pluralism" (Yates 1978), neighborhood autarky, or "beggar thy neighbor" orientations. Moreover, institutionalized participation by organizations may make it harder for other groups to gain access in the future, as the newest actors come to share an interest in maintaining the boundaries of the system (Lowi 1979—the "Peachum factor").

Regardless of the normative interpretation, however, the level and nature of institutionalized involvement are key to an understanding of the roles and impact of citizen groups in local politics. These groups have featured prominently in the urban landscape for at least two decades. And, they have been the subject of often acrimonious debate at all levels of government. Today, community groups are painted as increasingly beleaguered, confronted with the elimination of some federal requirements for citizen participation and reductions in available local, state and federal monies. At the same time, in many cities, groups are becoming involved in the coproduction of services. Still open for exploration, then, are both the staying power of citizen organizations and the range of roles they can be expected to perform.

Here, these issues are addressed through an examination of several aspects of the institutionalization of citizen participation in Minneapolis. Considered first is the



minimal requirement for institutionalization--survival. Following major changes in the structure and funding of organized citizen participation, how many and which types of groups persisted, disappeared and emerged? Second, given survival, one can look at the range and degree of use of regularized channels for input into local policy processes. Of interest are the existence, strength and character of the relationships linking community groups with council members, the mayor and bureaucrats. Perhaps most important, though, is the level of governmental responsiveness to the demands of citizen organizations. Are the links merely window-dressing, reducing involvement to "pseudo-participation" (Pateman 1970) or "formal cooptation" (Selznick 1966)? Or, is there discernible citizen influence over policy decisions?

In the course of the analysis, it will be important to recall, as well, that not all citizen organizations are alike. The problems their neighborhoods confront often vary dramatically as do the interests and demands of residents, and resources like time, energy, money and political knowledge and skills. Nor, not surprisingly, are these differences distributed randomly. Lower income neighborhoods with the greatest needs may find it more difficult to mobilize and maintain organizations as well as to exercise effective influence over city officials (O'Brien 1975, for example). Raised, in turn, is the issue of the inclusiveness of whatever mode of citizen participation becomes routine in a city. To complete the picture of institutionalized activity, one must consider whether involvement by citizen groups serves as an alternative channel for input that would not otherwise reach city officials or whether it tends to reinforce the advantages of certain residents.

### STUDYING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN MINNEAPOLIS

These three aspects of institutionalization and the crosscutting issue of inclusiveness structure the discussion of organized participation in Minneapolis. Limiting examination to one city immediately raises the question of generalizability. While one must view the findings of any case study with caution, Minneapolis appears to be a favorable setting for assessing the significance of community groups. The city often has been hailed as an exemplar of citizen involvement (Boyte 1980, Henig 1982 and Kotler 1969). If community organizations are weakening or have little evident impact in such an environment, they are not likely to wield much influence under less favorable circumstances. To the extent groups are important, both a standard for comparison and contrast is set, and important variables contributing to that success may be identified for exploration elsewhere. In addition, of course, focusing upon one city permits more

intensive analysis. It allows one to "get a feel for" the texture and dynamics of local politics and to track change processes more closely.

## DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY

This paper examines organized citizen participation in community development politics in Minneapolis from 1980 to the present. As detailed below, this has been a period of controversy and flux.

Concentration on the arena of housing and economic development in part reflects the major concerns of community groups in many cities, and certainly those in Minneapolis. Moreover, (Gittell 1980, p. 49) argues that these "community development" organizations are the "most viable" citizen groups. If they are found to be fragile or weakening, then the prospects for other sorts of citizen organizations (those dealing with, for example, schools or police departments) may be expected to be even bleaker. In contrast, indication of at least limited success may suggest fruitful pathways for these other groups.

The data for the analysis come primarily from mail questionnaires sent to citizen groups during the summers of 1980 and 1983 (117 were sent in 1980 and 83 in 1983, with response rates of approximately 59 percent in both cases), and from semi-structured interviews with city officials and community leaders (fourteen in 1980 and seventeen in 1983). These sources are supplemented by materials garnered from public hearings and meetings, documents and news reports. (Further details are provided in the appendix). Since citizen organizations, officials and development structures and procedures changed over the period, the data do not permit comparison on a group-by-group or individual-by-individual basis. Still, they do allow one to get a sense of the evolution of organized citizen participation over the four years.

## THE SETTING

By 1980, citizen organizations crowded the Minneapolis political terrain. An active "natural system" of community organizations (Minneapolis City Coordinator 1982) included groups more than a decade old. Federal requirements added to the number of groups, mandating the creation of project area committees and neighborhood strategy area committees. In 1976, the city established eleven planning district citizen advisory committees (PDCACs) to channel input into the allocation of Community Development Block Grants monies and the formulation and implementation of various city and community plans. PDCACs also elected representatives to the city-wide Capital Long-

Range Improvements Committee (CLIC) which recommended priorities for capital improvement projects to the city council.

Few found the formal advisory process completely satisfactory. As will be elaborated later, the 1980 mail questionnaire revealed significant discontent. "[The process] is a paper ideal," replete with "double talk, red tape and loopholes," leading to "frustration" and "disillusionment." Council members complained about the proliferating demands on their time and energy. The council president created an uproar by commenting: "Real citizen participation comes once every two years, on election day" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 24 March 1982; her emphasis).

The growing dissatisfaction coincided with three other factors that arguably served to produce significant changes in organized citizen involvement. First, HUD loosened some of its requirements for citizen participation and eliminated neighborhood strategy areas (NSAs). Second, like many cities, Minneapolis faced revenue shortages in the early 1980s, as federal and state aid dropped and property tax receipts dwindled. Third, after several years of debate about the performance of the city's three economic development units (the Housing and Redevelopment Authority, the Industrial Development Commission, and the Economic Development Division of the City Coordinator's Office), they were joined in 1981 to form the Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA).

Following federal action, the city council in 1982 stopped funding NSA committees and the Neighborhood Services Generalists in the MCDA who staffed the groups. Also dismantled was the formal process involving the planning district citizen advisory committees. Instead, groups desiring to be consulted by the city when a proposed project affected their neighborhood were directed to register with the new Center for Citizen Participation and Communication. Neighborhood appointments to CLIC were cut in half. Eliminated, too, were the positions of the community planners who assisted the PDCACs. And, the council slashed the budget for citizen participation activities within MCDA (which like one of its predecessors, the Housing and Redevelopment Authority, used the funds mainly to staff citizen groups) from \$300,000 in fiscal 1982 to \$62,000 the following year. This triggered a mayoral veto which the council promptly overrode, despite loud citizen outcry. Moreover, council members stressed allocating funds according to the merits of proposed neighborhood projects. In effect, groups were to enter into "performance contracts" with the city, agreeing to use public monies to engage in clearly specified activities and to be held accountable for producing particular results. In general, council members justified the shift by contending that direct neighborhood funding was inequitable since all organizations did not receive money, that the monies

frequently were used to mount attacks on city hall, and that revenue shortages dictated many of the cuts (interviews).

Creation of the MCDA produced still other changes. Established in 1981, the new agency undertook an internal reorganization in early 1982. Eliminated was the Neighborhood Services Division of the former Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA), the main source of information and staff assistance for community groups, particularly those in lower income areas. As already noted, staff help largely disappeared, while the liaison function was transferred to the Agency Relations Office. In addition, two of MHRA's three neighborhood offices were closed, with a corresponding staff reduction from nineteen to four.

Throughout the period, citizen participation remained a volatile issue. By fall 1983, as city council elections approached, some council members joined with Mayor Fraser and MCDA to push for increased money for citizen groups. This time, they were successful; effective June 1, 1984, funding will be boosted to \$300,425. Meanwhile, the elections produced five new council members, all of whom received support from neighborhood activists in their wards.

## **FINDINGS: INSTITUTIONALIZING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION**

The implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of community involvement may be examined using the analytical categories introduced earlier.

### **GROUP SURVIVAL**

Following groups through time can be more difficult than it might seem initially. Ad hoc organizations may emerge to join the public debate on a particular issue (a school closing, regulation of pornography) and then disband. Others turn out to be merely "paper" organizations.

In Minneapolis, registration of organizations desiring information about city activities provides a rough indicator of the number of community organizations. In June 1980, the planning department listed 117 such groups. By June 1983, the list compiled by the Center for Citizen Participation and Communication contained eighty-three organizations. The differences are largely accounted for by the dissolution of government mandates for thirty groups. None of the nineteen NSA committees functioned after 1982. However, seven of the eleven PDCACs continued to function despite severed "official" ties to the city government. The survivors tended to be the more active of the planning district bodies, located throughout the city in areas with varying per capita income. In

northeast Minneapolis, for example, the PDCAC assumed nearly all of the responsibility for linking the community with city government; other organizations concentrated efforts on more "neighborhood-focused" activities. In contrast, the PDCACs that ceased operating were in communities with other, more prominent citizen organizations.

The changes of the early 1980s had no major impact on the number or range of citizen groups. Organizations in blighted neighborhoods that had been tagged "strategy areas" lost staff assistance and mission and faded away. In nearly all instances, though, members of the NSA committees had been selected from groups serving a larger area, so some organizational mechanisms remained (albeit with reduced funding). Moreover, PDCACs remained in operation when there were no alternative organizations and disappeared when there were. Overall, then, citizen groups meet the de minimis test for institutionalization: survival.

## REGULARIZED CHANNELS FOR PARTICIPATION

Yet, mere survival reveals little about the routineness or character of participation. Several possible avenues for involvement are discussed next. First, regularized inclusion of citizen groups is explored in light of the abandonment of much of the formal advisory process. Then, neighborhood participation in the sphere of development policy is examined more closely and organizational links with bureaucrats and elected officials assessed. Lastly, cooperation across neighborhood boundaries is mentioned as an emergent form of citizen involvement.

### The Formal Advisory Process: Loss or Draw?

Dismantling the PDCACs may appear to have been a major blow to organized citizen participation. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that the formal advisory process was never viewed as particularly valuable.

The 1980 mail survey asked respondents to describe the primary "benefits or advantages" of the process as well as its "main problems or disadvantages." Forty-five groups reported fifty-three benefits. As Table 1 indicates, the majority of the groups (52 percent) considered the process useful as a means of interjecting citizen opinion into city decision-making. The PDCACs, according to this view, were "forums" for "common person input." They "legitimized" citizen involvement. As the official group in the community, the PDCAC also communicated important information to city officials, especially in response to the initiatives of local government. Of particular note, however, is that, except for the groups listing distribution of funds as a benefit, increased information flows and improved communication, not concrete outcomes, were described as the chief advantages.

**TABLE 1. BENEFITS OF THE FORMAL ADVISORY PROCESS**

"What, if any, do you see as the primary benefits or disadvantages of the formal citizen advisory process?"

Benefit	Percent of Groups Reporting
Serve as a means of citizen input	52.0
Provides a flow of information between PDCACs and the city	10.1
Promotes communication between PDCACs and neighborhood groups	8.7
Allocates funds	5.8

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1980.

More varied and more strongly stated were statements of the problems with the advisory process. Forty-seven organizations mentioned sixty-four negative points (reported in Table 2). The most frequent criticism (made by almost one-third of the respondents) was that few tangible results had been obtained because the PDCACs lacked real power. Participants had only the "illusion that they are making decisions." Indeed, one respondent argued that the process "diluted true citizen involvement by channeling too much energy into a process that is not very powerful." PDCAC recommendations frequently were "ignored" by "dependent, city-funded staff," making the process "not worth the bother." Others complained that PDCACs were "unrepresentative." Several respondents claimed the organizations were not "reflective of the community groups that exist" and that the creation of PDCACs relegated "private neighborhood groups and their concerns to second class status."

Overall, most groups were highly critical of the formal advisory mechanism. Lack of satisfaction surfaced again in public hearings on restructuring formal citizen participation (3 March 1982). Elected officials tended to agree, though for different reasons. They argued that PDCACs failed to adequately represent communities whose residents were the officials' "real constituents" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983, Minneapolis Tribune 17 August 1981, interviews).

**TABLE 2. PROBLEMS WITH THE FORMAL CITIZEN ADVISORY PROCESS**

"What, if any, are the main problems or disadvantages of the formal citizen advisory process?"

Problem	Percent of Groups Reporting
Few benefits or concrete results	30.0
Unrepresentativeness of PDCACs	21.7
Insufficient resources	18.8
Low citizen commitment to the process	10.1
Lack of citizen knowledge of the policy issues PDCACs deal with	7.3
Factionalism on the PDCACs	4.4

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1980.

Nor has reduced neighborhood representation on the Capital Long Range Improvements Committee provoked significant outcry. "CLIC has been, and remains, a sandbox in which citizens are allowed to play" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983, community p. 2).

Thus, while citizens have lost one channel of input into the policy-making arena, it is not clear it was ever an especially popular or useful one. Indeed, to the extent PDCACs served to siphon off activists and resources from other citizen groups, their disappearance in some areas ultimately may enhance the level and perhaps the consequences of organized activity.

#### Development Politics

Perhaps instead, important citizen activity can be discovered where most governmental attention has been directed: the arena of housing and economic development. Minneapolis is involved in a host of "community development" activities, ranging from construction and management of public housing units to subsidization of below-market rate loans for moderate income housing to rehabilitation and resale of

homes to small business assistance and neighborhood economic development to the issuance of industrial revenue bonds and provision of tax increment financing for larger scale business development. Development is a "high stakes" policy sphere, characterized by high salience and considerable controversy over priorities. Not only have citizen organizations sought doggedly to exercise influence in this arena, many of the changes in the 1980-1982 period were aimed at shaping the extent and character of such access.

Formal procedures for approving and executing city-assisted development projects are studded with guarantees of citizen participation. State legislation enabling Minneapolis to reorganize its development agencies mandated that community groups be involved in all stages of activity, "including policy establishment and implementation, assessment of performance and policy amendment" (Chapter 595, Laws of Minnesota for 1980, pp. 1105-1113). The ordinance creating MCDA devoted an entire section to citizen participation; it directed that organizations be given "adequate opportunity to participate in an advisory role in planning and implementing projects and programs" (Minneapolis City Council 81-Or-017, 16 January 1981). And, amendments directed at streamlining development procedures and strengthening council control of development highlighted consultation with community groups throughout the life of a project (Ibid., 11 February 1983).

The extent to which these goals are being attained is less clear. Many groups complain that cuts in staff and funding prevent them from taking meaningful part in discussions of particular projects. As importantly, they contend, loss of the technical assistance of community planners and neighborhood-based city staffers deprive them of the capacity to formulate feasible projects of their own. MCDA officials and board members tend to side with the organizations, but members of the city council insist that possibilities for citizen involvement increased with the "streamlining" and coordination of development procedures (interviews).

One can better assess these divergent claims by examining the evolution of the links between citizen groups and government actors in development politics.

#### The Bureaucratic Connection: Citizen Groups and MCDA

Relations between community organizations and local agencies date at least to the days of the Community Action Program and Model Cities. Links became considerably more cooperative over time as groups developed ties with the Planning Department and Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA). By 1980, community planners maintained that "agency staff are starting to ask what neighborhoods think and to involve them in policy." And, representatives of citizen groups spoke highly of the assistance they



received from "their" planners. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of the organizations surveyed reported "cooperative" links with MHRA and described a range of joint activities.

Thus, citizen groups reacted to the termination of the community planners and, to a lesser extent, the merger establishing MCDA with anger and dismay. Community groups, the HRA board of commissioners and top staffers objected loudly to the reorganization (interviews; Mayor's Task Force, minutes, 1980). Community activists feared diminution of MHRA's concern with citizen involvement. Neither of the other agencies to be merged had citizen participation requirements, and both were perceived to be particularly responsive to downtown business interests. And, some worried that economic development activities would take precedence over housing programs. Moreover, the consolidation reduced the independence of the MHRA board, bringing the new agency into the city's budget process and allowing the mayor and council to appoint not only board members but "special designees." Given mounting council hostility, citizen groups were especially wary.

More difficult to assess is to what extent these fears have been realized. Early on, discontent was evident. The MCDA board selected an executive director who was not a resident of the city and who had "no known neighborhood record," without public hearings or any systematic effort to solicit the advice of community groups. And, the transition team for the new agency dropped citizen participation from the agenda of its planning meetings.

As time passed, however, the record becomes more mixed. The executive director, James Heltzer, drew considerable criticism for closing MHRA's neighborhood offices and centralizing activities in a "shiny new downtown office building" to which neighborhood residents "are uncomfortable going." Yet, Heltzer also received favorable comments as "hardworking, honest... a vast improvement." And, he publicly advocated increasing links between the agency and community groups and supported restoration of funding for citizen participation (interviews; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983, community p. 3).

Nor was there agreement on whether the 1980-82 changes led to a loosening of ties between MCDA and citizen groups. Some agency board members and community activists insisted links had attenuated. "Communication has dropped considerably. We have no MCDA representative attending our meetings and no funding..." (mail questionnaire). Yet, agency staffers and representatives of other groups disagreed. Responding to the mail survey, organizations reported sixteen instances of increased contact since the creation of MCDA, seventeen of decreased contact, and twenty-two of no change (see

Table 3). Similarly, as Table 4 suggests, groups could not agree whether the flow of information from the agency had risen or declined. However, groups in "inner city" communities were more likely to perceive a decline in contact (asymmetric lambda = .06, asymmetric uncertainty coefficient = .11)<sup>1</sup> and information (asymmetric lambda = .22, asymmetric uncertainty = .25), no doubt reflecting the cuts in city funding which affected organizations in poorer areas most.

**TABLE 3. CONTACT WITH CITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES BEFORE AND AFTER MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP**

"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's contact with a city development agency?"

Contact	All Predecessor Agencies		MHRA	
	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups
Increased since merger	16	4	10	4
Decreased	17	6	8	3
Remained the same	22	10	12	8
$\chi^2$	1.135	2.8	.8	2.8

$\chi^2$  is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the equiprobable distribution. Variations in distribution are not significant here.

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983.

**TABLE 4. FLOW OF INFORMATION TO CITIZEN GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP**

"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in the amount of information your organization receives from city development agencies?"

<u>Amount of Information</u>	<u>All Predecessor Agencies</u>		<u>MHRA</u>	
	<u>All Groups</u>	<u>Neighborhood Groups</u>	<u>All Groups</u>	<u>Neighborhood Groups</u>
Increased since merger	19	9	11	7
Decreased	14	7	9	5
Remained the same	18	4	9	3
$\chi^2$	.825	1.9	.28	1.6

$\chi^2$  is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the equiprobable distribution. Variations in distribution are not significant here.

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983.

Meanwhile, the range of links expanded somewhat. Citizen participation requirements were applied for the first time to the economic development activities of the former Industrial Development Commission and the Economic Development Division of the City Coordinator's Office. And, neighborhood economic development--focusing on smaller commercial districts serving geographically limited areas--emerged as a new focus for the agency. Yet, citizen groups did not always respond vigorously to the new opportunities. An agency official observed:

[T]he primary interest of neighborhood groups is still in housing. If you go to elections at neighborhood meetings, you'll find they rarely want to be on economic development committees... The city staff doing industrial projects have groups review each of the developments before they do it... Yet, normally, they're just not that interested (interview 6 September 1983).

And, a council member criticized the low quality of proposals for neighborhood economic development funds (interview 12 September 1983). Neighborhood activists retort that the dearth of technical assistance limits their ability to design projects.

The nature of the ties have changed in another way as well. In the past, community groups received funds from MCDA and then determined uses for the money. According to the notion of performance contracting, in contrast, organizations must submit specific proposals for funding. Likely involved is a move toward increased agency control, a shift from "political" decentralization to "administrative" decentralization (Yates 1973).

Despite the mixed evaluations of the strength of the links between citizen groups and MCDA, more consensus appeared on the overall assessment of participation procedures. The 1983 mail questionnaire asked groups whether their satisfaction with the procedures had increased, decreased or remained the same following the merger. Table 5 shows that, among the organizations that reported links with MHRA (the only predecessor agency requiring citizen participation), most were less satisfied following consolidation. Organizations throughout Minneapolis shared this view, although those from poorer areas were slightly more likely to report dissatisfaction (asymmetric lambda = .1, asymmetric uncertainty = .22). Indeed, when given the opportunity to respond to an open-ended question on the disadvantages of the merger, fifteen of the forty-one responses (and half of those from inner city organizations) had to do with a decrease in citizen input. One respondent noted flatly: "Citizen participation has all but disappeared." No group listed enhanced involvement as an "advantage or benefit" of the merger.

An MCDA board member concurred with these evaluations.

A lot of our fears about citizen participation have come to be realized... The board and agency are a lot less accessible. They closed the neighborhood offices. The perception [in the neighborhoods] is that the access is not there... Now the agency is in a hard to find place, and all the doors are locked (interview 26 August 1983).

And, an MCDA official conceded: "[Groups] don't trust us. We're caught in the crossfire between groups and the council on citizen participation" (interview 18 August 1983). Perhaps even more telling, he added: "Citizen participation complaints don't have much impact on us. They don't affect [what the council does with] our budget."

Community activists echoed this, with complaints about the degree of council "interference" with MCDA activities. Several agreed with the sentiments of one respondent: "The city council has tighter control and MCDA is at the mercy of its whims. MCDA has no control over its budget." A sympathetic board member elaborated:

Now I can't vote the way I think best... I have to consider that that alderman does not like that group and will vote against the budget if I vote to fund it. More of the votes are becoming politicized (interview 26 August 1983).

**TABLE 5. CHANGES IN SATISFACTION WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PROCEDURES, BY TYPE OF GROUP**

"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's satisfaction with the citizen participation procedures?"

Satisfaction	Groups Reporting Links with MHRA	
	All	Neighborhood
Increased since merger	4	2
Decreased	19	11
Remained the same	6	3
$\chi^2$	13.69*	9.3*

$\chi^2$  is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the equiprobable distribution.

\*Significant at .05.

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983.

In sum, while the changes of 1980-82 have not been the unmitigated disaster many advocates of citizen participation feared, links between community groups and the city bureaucracy have been altered, and the organizations are less than satisfied. Clearly critical to a full understanding of that discontent is the Minneapolis City Council, to which attention now turns.

City Council Members and Community Groups

In the early 1980s, the attitude of key city council members toward citizen groups changed with almost breathtaking speed, shifting from fairly supportive to hostile and combative. This not only led to the specific council responses already mentioned, but it also raised the possibility that an important channel to city government was closing.

Responses to the 1980 mail questionnaire suggested that citizen organizations were most apt to rely upon council members as access points into the governmental arena. Virtually all of the groups surveyed indicated some contact with council members. And, there was limited evidence of a "hierarchy of participation." Reports of interaction with

governmental actors formed a weak Guttman scale, with links with council members most frequent and "easiest," those with HRA commissioners next, followed by ties with city staff and the mayor.<sup>2</sup> Among respondents to the 1983 questionnaire, over half of the groups involved in discussing the creation of MCDA reported contacting council members; less than one-fourth communicated with the mayor and even fewer with state legislators or the special task force set up to study the changes.

The council members responsible for the shift in orientation tended to represent poorer, inner city areas. In more than one case, the members themselves originally entered politics by way of neighborhood activism. By 1980, however, their support for citizen participation had eroded. Participants and observers offered a range of explanations. "The groups are beating up on aldermen" (interview 18 August 1983).

Advocates [of citizen participation] sought decentralization of decision-making power through the PDCACs... The council resisted... They were elected by 20,000 voters as opposed to planning district members who were elected by 50-100 people. And PDCACs became a vehicle for opponents to build political bases against council members (interview 25 August 1983).

One of the aldermen involved added:

These organizations and the outcry about them has little to do with neighborhood needs and more actually to do with paid staffers losing their jobs... [Neighborhoods] want to keep eating at the public trough (interview 12 September 1983).

Regardless of its roots, council hostility triggered a spiral of deteriorating relations with citizen groups. As will be seen shortly, community organizations began to work more closely with the mayor, sought aid from sympathetic state legislators, and formed a city-wide coalition of neighborhood groups. Among the primary foci of the Coalition for the Defense of Neighborhood Priorities were the 1983 council elections. Although there was activity in all the wards, most was concentrated in inner city areas.

The first systematic foray by citizen groups into the electoral arena, the strategy evidently had some impact. As the election approached, some council members joined with Mayor Fraser and the MCDA to push for increased funding for community groups (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 2 September 1983), a plea to which the full council ultimately acceded. And, November 1983 saw the election of five new Democratic council members (four incumbents decided not to seek reelection and another was defeated). Each had roots in neighborhood organizations and strong citizen group backing. Of particular note were two instances in which the local party came head to head with community opposition. In the primary, one neighborhood activist unseated an incumbent endorsed not only by the ward organization but also by the Democrat mayor, governor and

attorney general. Moreover, she won the contest twice, after a state court voided the first race because of unfair campaign practices. In a neighboring ward, citizen activists rallied around the incumbent who lost party endorsement; he too beat his primary opponent and won the general election.

Thus, while the relationships between citizen organizations and council members are not as amicable as they once were, the hostility evidently has not blocked citizen access. Indeed, the cuts and changes in structures and procedures may have broadened the scope and increased the intensity of group activity, which in turn evidently helped citizen groups reverse at least some of the setbacks.

### Links with the Mayor

Community organizations found a much friendlier reception in the office of Mayor Donald Fraser. Long an advocate of citizen participation, he vetoed the funding cuts and continued to propose higher budgets for community groups, referring to the 1980-82 changes in citizen participation as "the single biggest disaster that has occurred since I've been mayor" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983).

At the same time, Mayor Fraser's vision of citizen participation does not coincide completely with that of many groups. The mayor conceives of citizen groups as "communication vehicles, telling communities what MCDA programs are available to them. They should pinpoint specific projects and advocate them" (interview 26 September 1983). Community organizations become service providers and catalysts for particular projects. Receiving less stress are potential roles for groups in, for example, interjecting broader concerns into public debate or influencing the policies dictating the pursuit of particular projects.

### State Legislators

Finally, links between community groups and state legislators assumed new visibility. After the initial round of funding cuts, the Coalition in Defense of Neighborhood Priorities appealed to members of the Minneapolis delegation in the state legislature to write stronger guarantees for citizen participation into state law. Although that has not happened, in early 1983, Democratic legislators held several local bills "hostage." They were released after council members agreed to require inclusion of citizen groups in all phases of MCDA's activities. And, at various times, individual legislators have intervened on behalf of citizen groups in their districts (interview 18 August 1983; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 12 May 1983).

## ASSESSMENT

Several noteworthy changes in the level and character of participation had taken place by early 1984. One source of citizen input disappeared with the dismantling of the system of advisory groups. More importantly, elimination of staff assistance and funding cutbacks evidently reduced citizen capacity to participate in the development process, despite formal guarantees. Meanwhile, links with city bureaucrats attenuated somewhat, and battle lines were drawn with the city council. At the same time, however, community groups ultimately persuaded the council to reverse the budget cuts. They also strengthened ties with other governmental actors. Furthermore, citizen organizations went beyond mere "forum shopping." They also undertook new activities, entering the arena of electoral politics and forging links across neighborhood lines. Groups also appeared more likely to engage in "adversary" as well as "advisory" advocacy (Sharp 1981), with the former directed toward enhancing and securing meaningful opportunities to engage in the latter.

In the face of rather severe environmental threat, one can discern evidence of institutionalization in these changes. Citizen groups were able not only to survive as organizations but also to maintain access to the policy-making arena. And, this adjustment to externally imposed change involved expansion and elaboration of some activities as well as contraction and loss of others. Although the situation remains unsettled and by no means fully satisfactory, there appears to be little reason to sound the alarms over the "virtual wipeout" of citizen participation in Minneapolis.

## GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS

Still, for observers and participants alike, the "bottom line" in assessing citizen involvement is its effect on governmental decisions. "Institutionalized" participation means little if community groups regularly advise local officials who just as routinely ignore them.

Influence over outcomes is, of course, particularly difficult to isolate. Suitable counterfactuals are elusive. What would decisions have been without the involvement of citizen groups, or with a different configuration of organizations and strategies? Is the existence of outputs consistent with the demands of groups sufficient evidence of impact, or the absence of such policy a sure indicator of no influence?

Below, some tentative conclusions are advanced. At the outset, though, some caveats are in order. The sphere of development policy is extremely fluid. Not only may findings be transitory, but conventional "objective" indicators of performance are hard to



come by. With the creation of MCDA and its inclusion in the city budget process, collection and dissemination of a variety of performance measures was halted at least temporarily. The discussion, therefore, relies heavily on subjective evaluations garnered from the mail questionnaire, interviews and press reports.

#### ACCOMPLISHING POLICY GOALS

First, governmental performance can be compared with "policy benchmarks" relevant to citizen groups. One important concern is housing. Yet, success in increasing the supply of "affordable" housing has been limited at best. Virtually no change can be detected in the proportion of family to elderly residents in public and subsidized housing from 1978 to 1983, leaving many poor, minority families unable to find suitable housing (Office of the Mayor, State of the City, indicated years). The Minnesota Tenants Union argues that only 10 percent of the housing revenue bonds issued by the city in 1981 and 1982 were used for "affordable" housing (suitable for those with incomes 80 percent of the median for the metropolitan area) (Minnesota Daily 28 January 1983). And, citizen groups expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of MCDA's marketing of its subsidized units (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 20 September 1983). Meanwhile, the privately financed Minneapolis-St. Paul Housing Fund (which MCDA administers) made available below market rate loans for those with moderate incomes. Project Renovate provided low interest loans for major housing improvements. And, in September 1983, policy-makers hammered out an agreement to place renewed emphasis on housing rehabilitation (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 24 September 1983).

A second concern of many citizen groups revolves around city efforts to create and preserve jobs. However, not only is it hard to gather employment information from affected businesses, but assessing which jobs city aid was instrumental in keeping or causing to be created is almost inherently problematical. All that can be advanced with confidence is that the study revealed no reports of city interference with employment preservation or creation. MCDA began negotiating first source employment agreements (linked to sales of industrial revenue bonds), generating 338 jobs for Minneapolis residents in 1983 with as many as 1,500 projected for 1984 (interview 6 September 1983). Moreover, Table 6 shows a slight increase in the total number of new jobs created through the sale of IRBs. Even so, representatives of inner city neighborhood organizations expressed dissatisfaction with the marginal nature of the efforts (Minneapolis City Council, CDC, public hearings 22 August 1983).

**TABLE 6. JOBS CREATED THROUGH SALES  
OF INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS**

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Jobs Created</u>
1979	606
1980	923
1981	1138
1982	not available
1983	1548
1984 (projected)	1400

SOURCES: Minneapolis, Office of the Mayor,  
Priorities: The Mayor's Budget (Minneapolis:  
 selected years); interviews.

More easily demonstrated is the city's increased emphasis on neighborhood economic development. There was virtually no activity in this area until mid-1981. Since then, a common bond reserve fund and the Neighborhood Small Business Revolving Loan Fund have been created to provide financing to small developers unable to get money at feasible interest rates. Neighborhood commercial groups are eligible to receive grants from the Neighborhood Economic Development Fund; the fund rose from \$350,000 in 1982 to \$680,000 in 1983 (Office of the Mayor, Priorities). While neighborhood business and residents' groups as well as MCDA board members spoke favorably of the program, its future status is unclear. MCDA requested \$550,000 for the fund for fiscal 1984, but the mayor recommended only \$250,000, and the council approved \$245,869. An alderman, hedging on his commitment to further funding, described both ongoing and proposed projects as "not very impressive" and "quite costly" (interview 26 September 1983).

Finally, there were some efforts to link economic development and housing activities. In 1983, the city council required the developer of a large downtown office building receiving city subsidies to construct 100 units of low and moderate income housing in a nearby neighborhood (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 18 August 1983). Citizen groups responded enthusiastically, but policy-makers refused to commit themselves to negotiating such linkages in the future. In general, some groups complained that government officials failed to examine the impact on and potential contributions of large

development projects to nearby neighborhoods (Minneapolis City Council, CDC, public hearings 22 August 1983).

It is important to underscore, as well, that not all citizen organizations viewed these activities with equal enthusiasm. One angry respondent wrote: "In all truth, the homeowner has been abandoned, and left to 'go it alone,' while rental properties and flashy downtown developments have become the 'hula hoops' for which funds are expended." This reflected a more general division between inner city groups advocating policies directed at renters and the unemployed, and those in north and northeast neighborhoods who were more interested in rehabilitating owner-occupied homes and revitalizing small businesses.

### POLICY DIRECTION

Raised, in turn, is the question of priorities. Perhaps, despite some limited responsiveness, the overall direction of development policy in Minneapolis is turning away from that desired by many citizen organizations.

Certainly, that is the perception of some community activists. In their eyes, large-scale downtown development is benefiting from increased attention, while neighborhood concerns are being neglected. Groups point for evidence to city support for Symphony Place, a downtown apartment building (interviews; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 12 November 1983). Dubbed "Subsidy Place," project developers received tax exempt bonds, a \$3.6 million federal grant, and \$4 million in tax increment funds in return for promising to reserve twenty percent of the apartments for lower income people. Yet, the cheapest units will rent for nearly \$500 per month, requiring a yearly income of more than \$15,000. Blame is harder to apportion. Some accuse Democratic aldermen of "selling out." A "maverick" MCDA board member is harsher: "Agency staff and the board are pimping for developers... The council does not have full information" (interview 19 September 1983).

Not all agree. One representative of an inner city neighborhood group wrote:

The new director of MCDA... has no close ties with private development interests. Many of his predecessors at the old MHRA were deficient... As a result, the Agency's policies tended to favor large, profit-making developers... We find the staff much more responsive.

In general, however, respondents to the mail survey noted little overall change. Agreement with MCDA's actions tended to remain the same following merger (Table 7), as did overall satisfaction with the city's development policies (Table 8). Organizations from inner city areas were only slightly more likely to express rising dissatisfaction (asymmetric lambda = .1, asymmetric uncertainty = .17).

**TABLE 7. CHANGE IN AGREEMENT WITH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY'S POLICY, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP**

"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's agreement with the agency's policies and decisions?"

Agreement	All Predecessor Agencies		MHRA	
	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups
Increased since merger	6	2	4	2
Decreased	10	4	7	4
Remained the same	32	11	18	9
$\chi^2$	24.5**	7.89**	11.22**	5.2*

$\chi^2$  is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the equiprobable distribution.

\* Significant at .1.

\*\*Significant at .05.

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983.

**TABLE 8. SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT POLICIES BEFORE AND AFTER MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP**

"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's satisfaction with the results of the development process?"

Satisfaction	All Predecessor Agencies		MHRA	
	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups	All Groups	Neighborhood Groups
Increased since merger	11	1	4	0
Decreased	13	5	6	4
Remained the same	24	12	18	10
$\chi^2$	6.12*	10.34*	12.3*	10.85*

$\chi^2$  is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the equiprobable distribution.

\*Significant at .05.

SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983.

In addition, concerns of citizen groups that the changes of the early 1980s would lead to a diversion of government attention from housing to economic development appear to be unfounded. MCDA officials, for example, evidently strove to balance the two in setting internal priorities. Inside the agency, the prevailing sense was that housing and economic development were inviolable spheres. In interviews, officials had a difficult time responding to questions about the relative weight given to economic development and housing. One replied simply: "[They] operate on different wavelengths (18 August 1983). And, using allocation of CDBG funds as a barometer of prevailing priorities, little change in the proportion flowing to housing and economic development can be discerned (Table 9). A planning official cautions, though: "Economic development issues are coming to the fore... These things take time to change... But the shift has taken place in the minds of elected officials" (interview 28 September 1983). At least two aldermen agree.

**TABLE 9. ALLOCATION OF CDBG FUNDS, BY DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Housing</u> (percent)	<u>Economic</u> <u>Development</u> (percent)
1980	80	20
1981	79	21
1982	87.5	12.5
1983	75	25
1984 (agency request)	84	16
(mayor's recommendation)	86	14

SOURCE: Minneapolis, Office of the Mayor, Priorities: The Mayor's Budget (Minneapolis: selected years).

Within each of the spheres, some shifts in priorities can be identified. Again, though, none seems to signal a major policy departure. As already mentioned, the city has paid more attention to neighborhood economic development (though emphasis is declining). However, that emphasis does not appear to be coming at the expense of large-scale, typically downtown development. Indeed, more prevalent seems to be the notion that links between the two might be created.

More change can be detected in the housing arena. There, low income rental, moderate income subsidized homeownership and market rate housing programs often find themselves juxtaposed, competing for scarce resources. Increasingly, emphasis seems to be on the middle category of "shallow subsidy" programs. Certainly, that is the perception of citizen groups in poorer, inner city neighborhoods as well as some members of the council (Hult 1983; interview 26 September 1983; mail questionnaire). One should not push the conclusion too far, however. In June 1983, for instance, the MCDA budget for single family housing programs was cut from \$2.3 million to \$1.3 million, while that for cooperative and rental units increased from \$3 to \$5 million. Moreover, in 1982 and 1983, programs for rental and owner-occupied housing received approximately equal shares of CDBG monies. In his 1984 budget, the mayor proposed that \$3.1 million be devoted to rental housing and \$2 million to homeownership programs (Priorities 1984). As in the development realm as a whole, housing priorities are fluid and ambiguous.

## ASSESSMENT

Government responsiveness to citizen groups, then, evidently did not decline precipitously over the period of interest. That is hardly to suggest, though, that citizen organizations exercise significant influence over policy decisions. Perceptions that big developers benefit at the expense of neighborhood interests abound. Relatively little progress has been made toward expanding the volume and improving the quality of low income housing or reducing unemployment.

Still, as noted at the outset, decision-makers labored under increasing fiscal constraints. Perhaps most critically, however, policy-makers seemed both unable and unwilling to fix priorities in the development arena and then follow them. For example, while the city's comprehensive plan encourages homeownership and stresses increasing the supply of market-rate housing, the council has allocated the bulk of CDBG funds to programs for subsidized and rental housing. The mayor vetoed a proposed policy to approve downtown development projects when the developer promises to build lower income housing elsewhere in the city, even though he supported such linkage in a particular case. Citizen organizations likely contribute to the shifting, sometimes

opposing large-scale development, often disagreeing among themselves. To that extent, community groups helped shape development policy. Significantly, though, elected officials continue to grasp the reins of decision-making rather firmly, insisting on frequently exercising direct control in such a high stakes policy arena.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fears of many, citizen participation in Minneapolis has weathered potentially devastating changes introduced in the early 1980s. The survival of most groups and their evident ability to adjust to outside threat by developing new links and undertaking new activities suggest that citizen participation has become an "institutionalized" part of local politics. Community groups are not just the "mornin' glories" of which George Washington Plunkitt spoke so contemptuously (Riordan 1963). And, with regularized involvement of community groups, "the [resulting] network structure becomes a fact of social existence with which all organizations must contend" (Knoke and Wood 1981, p. 164).

Neither, however, have citizen organizations dramatically altered the face of local politics. The direction of development policy has changed little. Community groups have won key battles, and they have helped keep issues visible (and arguably out of the sole control of big developers or large financial institutions). Statutory guarantees, ongoing relationships with governmental officials, and the threat of electoral retribution have provided groups access to the governmental arena. Yet, once there, organizations for the most part continue to react to proposals formulated elsewhere, tendencies heightened at least in the short run by reductions in funding and staff assistance.

One must be wary of extending these conclusions too far. As stressed repeatedly, the situation remains unsettled. Moreover, only organized citizen involvement in the arena of urban development has been examined. In other spheres, groups may be more (or less) influential. Much of the recent emphasis on regulating pornography in Minneapolis, for example, came at the prodding of neighborhood groups. Moreover, by restricting attention to "government-focused" efforts by citizen groups, other significant realms may be ignored (see, for example, Hult 1983). And, of course, this study's attention has been confined to changes in a single city over a relatively short period of time.

Despite these cautions, the analysis evidently has implications for organized citizen participation more generally. First, it suggests that budget cuts and loss of formal mandates need not render community groups powerless. Indeed, external threat may trigger and intensify mobilization among citizen organizations. Whether such activism can be sustained, however, must remain an open question.

Underscored, too, is the importance of the level of organizational skill and infrastructure when hostility begins. As Henig contends, a "structural headstart" may provide groups with important resources during crises (p. 155). To that extent, the federal requirements for citizen participation in the 1960s and 1970s may have lasting impact. Yet, while certain organizations (representing perhaps particular sorts of interests) will survive and possibly prosper, others will have difficulty forming or maintaining themselves. And, this will reflect in large part the timing of the "crises." Moreover, given scarce resources and resistant government officials, existing citizen organizations may be especially loath to see new groups granted access to the decision arena.

The findings also support the hypothesis that cities' interest in coproduction will rise as budgets tighten (Ahlbrandt and Sumka 1983). Clearly, too, the prevailing notions of coproduction--held by council members, the mayor, and MCDA officials alike--entailed fairly close governmental regulation. Seemingly strengthened are the fears of many (for example, Gittell 1980 and Katznelson 1981) that coproduction may transfer the burdens of service provision from government to neighborhood organizations with little corresponding boost in citizen influence over policy content or direction.

Highlighted, second, is the continuing importance to community groups of dealing with elected officials. "Bureaucratic enfranchisement" (Fainstein and Fainstein 1980) often may be insufficient as a means for organizations to secure influence over outcomes. The critical decisions may have already been made by the time groups prepare to assist in service delivery. Furthermore, despite reduced friction between urban administrators and citizens (Thomas 1983), bureaucrats may find their attention powerfully directed elsewhere--perhaps, as in Minneapolis, to watchful council members with controls over funding, legislative authority, and structures and procedures. To the extent bureaucracies are more permeable to the demands of elected officials--as they may be expected to be in arenas of high stakes and considerable flux and uncertainty--they are likely to be less permeable (and thus responsive) to citizen groups.

Of course, like many council members in Minneapolis, elected officials may be less than receptive. And, there need not always be more sympathetic ears, as there were in the state legislature and the mayor's office. In addition, though, community groups may heighten the visibility and increase the conflict over particular issues, they less often can sustain interest long enough to influence overall policy (Stone 1976). Even so, Minneapolis organizations succeeded in generating enough controversy that they received some concessions.

Most important, however, examination of the Minneapolis case underlines the relevance of the electoral arena. Citizen groups can do more than threaten officials with



defeat: they can seek to place their own representatives in office. If, as Stone (1976) and Davidson (1979) contend, elected officials tend to be "interest advocates" rather than "neutral brokers," then concentrating on electing an "official of one's own" becomes attractive. Not all organizations can manage this, but as local parties continue to fade and coalitions of citizen groups emerge, the strategy may be increasingly feasible. The Minneapolis case also suggests some of its limits. Once elected, new officials are introduced to a host of additional pressures and concerns. The steady stream of demands from community groups may produce overload and eventually alienation.

Relatedly, the findings seem to indicate that the utility of mandated input mechanisms diminishes as governmental structure becomes more fragmented and/or relevant policy arena more fluid. That is, citizen groups may discover they have increased influence if, rather than being confined to formal roles, they are able to shift, say, between electoral, advocacy and advisory strategies and between mayor, council and administrators, as key actors, prevailing influence configurations and primary problems change. The existence of mandated advisory groups may divert energy from more important tasks or spheres, or make the pursuit of other activities appear less legitimate. In contrast, in more stable policy spheres or more closed political systems, such formal mechanisms may be more critical in guaranteeing at least some degree of access. Citizen groups strive to maintain a precarious balance, seeking to avoid slipping into formal cooptation, on the one side, and becoming persona non grata, on the other. Sharp points out:

"Adversary advocacy" may enhance pursuit of "advisory advocacy" provided involvement in the former is limited, directed primarily to getting visibility so elected officials "take [a group] seriously"... without establishing a reputation with city officials as a "troublemaking group" (p. 426).

There is tension from the vantage point of the urban political system as well. Institutionalized involvement by citizen groups may increase openness by expanding the range of interests and type of participants in the governmental arena. Yet, it also carries the risks of balkanizing cities and devaluing the inputs of residents with other interests. Council members in Minneapolis did not distance themselves from citizen groups merely out of exhaustion or because they had "sold out" to others. Many spoke as well of the "parochialism" of community groups and the need to consider the often competing concerns of broader constituencies in their wards or in the city as a whole. Exactly where an "appropriate" balance is to be struck is perhaps inherently uncertain. But the complexities are clear. It is striking to recall that a major complaint of citizen groups in Minneapolis is that elected officials have tightened their control over city bureaucrats.

The activities and achievements of community groups in Minneapolis pale when measured against the lofty hopes and cataclysmic fears expressed by advocates and opponents of citizen participation in the 1960s. Yet, that era left an important legacy. For, though organized citizen participation by no means completely transformed the prevailing allocation of public benefits and burdens, it has become a relatively routine, legitimate part of local politics, with at least marginal influence over the dynamics and outputs of development policy. Moreover, organizations have survived a period of relatively severe environmental threat. And, they have adjusted by expanding both their range of relationships and their strategic repertoires. The "death knell" for citizen participation has not yet sounded.

## APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION

### I. 1980

#### A. Mail Questionnaire

Questionnaires were sent to 117 groups drawn from an inventory of local organizations compiled by the Minneapolis Planning Department in June 1980. PDCACs received slightly different questionnaires from the other groups, with the surveys for the former more closely tailored to their city-mandated roles. After two follow-ups, sixty-nine organizations returned the questionnaire, a response rate of 59 percent. The distribution of respondents was as follows:

Type of Group	Area of the City*											
	North		North-east		South		"Inner City"		Down-town		Total	
Neighborhood Citizen	7	(18)	6	(8)	13	(24)	13	(20)			39	(70)
Neighborhood Business	1	(4)	4	(5)	4	(8)	2	(6)	3	(3)	14	(26)
NSA Committee		(2)	2	(2)			1	(2)			3	(6)
PAC			1	(1)			2	(2)	1	(1)	4	(4)
PDCAC	1	(2)		(1)	4	(4)	4	(4)			11	(11)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>(26)</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>(17)</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>(37)</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>(34)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>(117)</b>

Entries refer to the number of questionnaires received (sent).

\*Classification by "area" is based on the concept of "community" or "planning district," designations created by the Minneapolis Planning Department over thirteen years ago. The city is divided into eleven communities. The four categories used here combine those areas on the basis of demographic characteristics like family income and housing condition as well as by the extent of social-cultural "homogeneity" in a particular geographic area (see Hult 1983, note 37).

The poorer response rate from organizations in north Minneapolis (characteristic of the 1983 survey as well--see the next section), where most of Minneapolis' small black population lives, cautions one to consider the conclusions drawn from the survey as tentative. Interview evidence did suggest that groups in this area tended to share the views of citizen organizations from other parts of the city.

B. Interviews

Fourteen semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted in the spring, summer and fall of 1980. Respondents included neighborhood activists and staff in the Housing and Redevelopment Authority and the Planning Department. Since they were assured of the confidentiality of their remarks, comments are not attributed to specific individuals.

II. 1983

A. Mail Questionnaire

The mail questionnaire (this time, part of a larger study of the implementation of governmental mergers) was sent to eighty-three citizen organizations. Potential respondents were selected from a list of organizations registered with the city's new Center for Citizen Participation and Communication. Among the respondents this time were several "city-wide" groups. Forty-nine of the groups returned the surveys (again, after two follow-ups), a response rate of 59 percent, virtually identical to that of the 1980 questionnaire. Responses were distributed in the following fashion:

Type of Group	Area of the City								Total	
	North		North-east		South		"Inner City"			
Neighborhood Citizen	0	(6)	1	(3)	11	(17)	15	(23)	27	(49)
Neighborhood Business			0	(1)	3	(5)	2	(4)	5	(10)
Neighborhood Social Service	2	(2)	1	(1)	1	(1)	0	(2)	4	(6)
Citywide Public Interest									7	(9)
Citywide Business/Professional									2	(3)
Downtown Business									4	(4)
Citywide Racial/Ethnic									0	(2)
TOTAL	2	(8)	2	(5)	15	(23)	20	(32)	49	(83)

Entries refer to the number of questionnaires received (sent).

B. Interviews

Seventeen interviews were conducted in the summer and fall of 1983. This time, however, more problems were encountered. The executive director of MCDA declined an interview, noting a heavy schedule. A vocal city council critic of citizen participation also refused an interview as did a labor representative on the MCDA board of commissioners. Still, six officials from all but one subunit in MCDA and the agency's executive director consented to interviews. So did two council members prominent in the citizen participation debate. Also, among the respondents were three MCDA board members, the city coordinator and the mayor and deputy mayor of Minneapolis. Two officials from the Planning Department filled out the interview list. Again, respondents were promised that their remarks would remain confidential.

## NOTES

1. The asymmetric lambda and asymmetric uncertainty coefficient are measures of association used with nominal level data when direction of causality can be hypothesized. Both are interpreted as the proportion of variance in the dependent variable which can be explained by the independent variable. They range between 0 and 1. See, for example, Reynolds (1977).
2. The degree of "cumulative participation" was not strong, however; the coefficient of scalability was .55, with improvement over minimum marginal reproducibility only 7 percent. Additional problems are created by having only four items with which to construct the scale. On this and interpreting Guttman scales, see Todd (1977).

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