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ABSTRACT

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS IN MINNESOTA

In recent years an expanding literature on comparative state politics has attempted to link socio-economic, political, and public policy variables, but little has been done to explore the decision-making process within this framework. The literature on gubernatorial-legislative relations is especially slight. This dissertation attempts to analyze this relationship within the cooperative state systems framework.

The basic purpose of the dissertation is to identify and test those variables that might explain variations in gubernatorial program success. The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part attempts to identify the major variables. Following a bargaining approach to legislative-executive relations, one would expect that the governor's success would depend ultimately on the resources at his disposal compared to those possessed by potential competitors. Five sets of resources were considered: legal-constitutional, institutional, partisan, popular support, and personal. The strength of these resources should change depending on the environmental and political setting of the state. Seven setting variables were identified: industrialization, cultural affluence, political culture, party competition, party organization, participation, and malapportionment. Although the states did cluster on these variables, there was no systematic relationship between the setting and power resources, nor did the power resources cluster in such a way that governors in a given state would be unequivocally strong or weak. The resources available in a given state would seem to be a partial indicator of gubernatorial style than program success.

The second part used Minnesota for an in depth testing of the power resources.

Based on comparison with other states one would have expected that a Minnesota governor should have only moderate resources and modest program success. More specifically, the following propositions were tested. The governor should have a high public opinion potential and moderately high formal powers. The party organization contribution to gubernatorial power should be weak. The formally non-partisan legislature would contribute to this weakness. The legislature should have moderately high professionalization, but only moderate to weak leadership. Because of non-partisanship legislative caucus cohesion would be very modest. Divided control should then be of small concern to the governor.

The actual power of Minnesota governors was measured by using the seven governors who held office from 1945-1970. Each governor was ranked on the power resources. A "raw score" of legislative program success was computed and each governor was ranked on that. The rankings on the two measures were compared. Legislative operations were measured by committee memberships and roll call votes. To discover how changing conditions influence gubernatorial power, the pre 1954 period was compared to the post 1954 period. Since party competition increased greatly, it was hypothesized that partisan resources would be greater in the later period. Primary information sources included interviews, secondary works, and government documents.

The propositions were not confirmed to a very great degree. Minnesota governors did have moderate power resources and program success, but not for the reasons expected. The power resources decreased 40% in a group profile difference in terms of success with the seven governors. Further success was only changed modestly from the earlier to the later period. The best single predictor of program success was the proportion of key appointments made by the governor. The second best predictor, especially after 1954, was caucus control.

DFL caucuses supported DFL and liberal governors. Conservative caucuses opposed them. Finally, neither an activist nor a low key personal style was appreciably more beneficial for a governor. The most successful approach seems to be a low key style coupled with unified control ( a DFL governor with a DFL legislature or a Republican governor with a Conservative legislature).

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LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS IN MINNESOTA

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## Preface

This thesis will focus centrally on the relationship between the governor and the legislature in Minnesota. More specifically I examine the governor's program success and attempt to explain variations in that success. Such a broad topic will inevitably draw in other side issues. Legislative-executive relations are at the heart of the state decision process. But the party system, the bureaucracy, the environment and a host of other forces impinge upon the relationship. This brief introduction is to justify the topic selected. It will also provide the reader with a "road map" for the work.

Professor James A. Robinson observes, "On the whole it seems fair to say that we lack evidence about how scientists investigate one topic rather than another."<sup>1</sup> He then speculates that, consciously or unconsciously, three major criteria govern the choice. These criteria are: 1) scientific considerations 2) individual factors 3) institutional factors.<sup>2</sup> The second criterion clearly dominated my own choice. First, my personal professional interests have long centered neither on political structures, nor on policy outcomes, but on the political process. The most fascinating process is that by which communications and decisions are transmitted between executive and legislature. Further, since my earliest graduate days this fascination has been held predominately at the state level. Secondly, although not a native son, my delight in the state politics of Minnesota is certainly the central motivating force for this study. This delight is reinforced by an irritation with the relative neglect Minnesota has received in general state politics literature. Work by G. Theodore Mitau, Thomas Flinn, and Charles Backstrom<sup>3</sup> should have alerted scholars to Minnesota's place in the political spectrum. Still, most studies conclude that Minnesota has a non-partisan legislature, is therefore not comparable to other states, and is of no further interest.<sup>4</sup>

Aside from personal interest, there are legitimate scientific criteria for pursuing this study. First, since at least the late 1950's interest in a comparative state politics has increased tremendously. There is a growing literature that attempts to compare all states on gross economic, political, and policy variables.<sup>5</sup> This literature has a general theoretical model in systems analysis. It also uses statistical procedures and techniques (i.e. rank order correlation and factor analysis). This study will use the systems model as an organizing guide. It will also use the results of these previous studies. However, my main contribution will be in filling "gaps" in the literature. These general comparative studies have not been accompanied by detailed systematic studies on specific political systems. This is surprising since these studies, operating on linear relationship assumptions, explain a relatively low proportion of the variance among states. We will attempt to test these general

hypotheses by comparing them to Minnesota's experience contemporaneously and longitudinally. Secondly, the study seeks to fill in gaps in the literature on legislative-executive relations. In this area our knowledge is relatively slight. The general comparative studies have largely ignored the operations between decision-making agencies. Few sophisticated techniques, except roll call analysis, have been developed. Every textbook lists the major gubernatorial powers, but few studies indicate specifically how these function. Empirical studies on actual executive-legislative relations are rare. Coleman Ransone's The Office of the Governor in the United States (1956)<sup>6</sup> is our last general study on the governor. As far as I know there is only one monograph on a specific state's executive-legislative relations.<sup>7</sup> In addition there are more limited studies on gubernatorial powers such as veto and budgeting.<sup>8</sup> This study cannot build a general knowledge of legislative-executive relations, but it can add an increment to a woefully slim literature.

The following plan will be used in attacking the problem. Chapters One through Three are essentially introductory. Chapter One discusses comparative state politics, systems analysis, and current hypotheses about state socio-economic environments and the political system. Chapter Two focuses more specifically on executive-legislative relations. It begins with a brief discussion of approaches to the subject and concludes with a list of hypotheses on both the state governor and the legislature. The Third Chapter presents the methodological research design. General hypotheses are applied to Minnesota along with the techniques used to test them. Chapters Four through Nine are the heart of the thesis and present the principal evidence gathered on Minnesota's social and political system, the governor, the legislature, and the governors' programs. In the concluding chapter findings are summarized and we come back the full circle to ask where Minnesota fits into a comparative state politics.

## Introduction- Footnotes

1. James A. Robinson, "The Major Problems of Political Science" in Politics and Public Affairs, (ed.) Lynton K. Caldwell, (Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962), p. 162.
2. Ibid., pp. 162-4.
3. See G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), especially Chapter 3; Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget, (University Alabama: Interuniversity Case Program, University of Alabama Press, 1961); Charles H. Backstrom, The Minnesota State Legislature, (mimeographed background paper prepared for Minnesota-Dakotas Assembly on State Legislatures in American Politics, 1967).
4. For example see Richard Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States", Journal of Politics XXV (1963), p. 268, fn. 8; Malcolm Jewell, The State Legislatures, Politics and Practice, second edition, (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 12; Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics" in the American States, (eds) Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965).
5. Some representative examples would be Charles F. Cruddle and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 858-66; Richard Dawson and James A. Robinson, op. cit.; Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 867-79; and Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States", American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 880-899.
6. Coleman B. Ransone, The Office of Governor in the United States, (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1956).
7. Roy D. Morev, Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, Institute of Government Research, 1965); A few other monographs constitute practically the entire literature. These include David G. Allen, New Governor in Indiana (Bloomington: Institute of Public Affairs, Indiana University Press, 1965); Fred Gantt, The Chief Executive in Texas (Dallas: University of Texas Press, 1964); Assembly on the Office of Governor, The Office of Governor, Final Report and Background Papers, (Champaign-Urbana: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1963); and Duane Lockard, The New Jersey Governor (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964).

8. Some examples are: Robert Highsaw, "Southern Governors: Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme" Public Administration Review, XIX (1959), 7-12; Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party" American Political Science Review LX (1966), 923-42; Frank W. Prescott, "Executive Veto in the American States", Western Political Quarterly III (1950), 97-111; Bennet M. Rich, State Constitutions - - The Governors, (New York: National Municipal League State Constitution Study Project No. 3, 1960); Joseph M. Schlesinger, How They Became Governor (East Lansing: Government Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957); and Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Governors' Support, and Budget Success in the State Legislatures" American Political Science Review LXIII (1968), 1220-1231.

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## CHAPTER I

### COMPARATIVE STATE POLITICS

This chapter lays out one of the two major analytical modes that provide the framework for the study. The bargaining model, more directly related to executive-legislative relations, will be discussed in the next chapter. Here we will establish an overall context. This context contains two parts. First, Minnesota politics can be most usefully viewed from a comparative political analysis. Secondly, the systems approach will be the simplest and most convenient method for organizing the variables relevant to that analysis. Since systems analysis postulates a direct relationship between environment and the political system, attention must also be directed to this relationship between environment and the political system, attention must also be directed to this relationship. Therefore, the chapter will conclude by reviewing state economic, social, and cultural environments, major political system components, and hypotheses linking the two.

#### I. The Study of State Politics

The study of state politics, once considered a dying field, experienced a revival during the 1960's. The causes are twofold. First, scholars concluded that the states have again become significant political units. Herbert Jacob argues that state pursuits have a great impact on the body politic: He writes:

The fate of most domestic programs and policies is settled in state capitals. Most of them are supervised in whole or part by state governments. Even when a

program is a national one, states must often decide whether to participate or what local policies to adopt for administering the program. Education, public health, regulation of business and professions, and policing are functions that are primarily under the control of state governments and their subsidiaries.<sup>1</sup>

Clearly state and local governments far exceed the national government in domestic spending. The states continue to innovate in substantive programs such as antipoverty, tax administration, and anti-discrimination laws as well as government structure and procedure.<sup>2</sup> Finally, states are politically significant both in the intensity of their political processes and the fact that most political careers are made or broken within them.

However, the second force, the revival of comparative method, had a far greater impact on the rekindled interest in state politics. Scholars concluded that comparative politics did not necessarily have to mean "foreign" governments. Within the United States they had fifty political systems to which the method could be applied. The comparative method provides several benefits for systematic political research. First, it supplies the perspective of many political experiences rather than just a few. Indeed Thomas Dye argues that all meaningful explanation is comparative because facts can only be perceived when contrasted with other facts.<sup>3</sup> Our ability to explain depends fundamentally upon our ability to generalize. Secondly, comparative method presupposes some uniformity among the elements studied. If every political behavior is discrete, the scope for a generalizable science would be minimal. Further, since no man can

evaluate many variables at one time, it is essential that most variables be held constant, actually or analytically, so that the impact of remaining variables may be more clearly perceived. The states would appear to meet this requirement for relative uniformity among most variables.<sup>4</sup> Finally, there must be some variation, at least among the variables essential to the concern under study. This is especially true since the opportunity for controlled experiments in social science is greatly circumscribed. We must be able to take advantage of natural situations that exist. At least on some system factors the states also meet this criterion. Economic, social, and political process characteristics are commonly viewed as providing sufficient contrast for viable comparisons.<sup>5</sup> Even the political structures, very similar in surface appearance, may differ in context and performance.

Dye has argued that "our commitment to comparative analysis requires that explanatory hypotheses be tested with reference to all fifty states. Since the object of comparative study is to develop general explanations which will apply to political systems universally, the universe of American state politics must include all the states."<sup>6</sup> On this point this author fundamentally disagree. For many aspects of state politics this requirement is both unnecessary and impossible. Single system case studies, if they are set within a broader context, and if they are accompanied with proper caution about generalization, can make useful contributions to comparative political knowledge.<sup>7</sup> Undeniably comprehensive studies relating environment,

political process, and policy have contributed vastly to our knowledge. However, repeated studies of this type have still not resulted in complete generalizable agreement. Moreover, both Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert recently concluded that variables used in these comprehensive studies do not explain a large proportion of the variation found among the states.<sup>8</sup> Also, there are deviations from the general findings that do exist that may be explained by extraordinary or idiosyncratic features in particular states. Individual governors, legislators, and administrators may have policy impacts not encompassed by the hypotheses being tested. Detailed studies in particular states may reveal new variables hitherto untested in the more comprehensive works. More significant for my interests is the relative dearth of any knowledge concerning the actual political processes surrounding the governorship.<sup>9</sup> Finally, comparative analysis need not be restricted to cross-state comparison. Malcolm Jewell feels that valuable comparisons may be made within a state over time as conditions change.<sup>10</sup> This is precisely what this study proposes to do as a counterpart to the broader focus of comparing Minnesota with its sister states.

#### Political Systems

A conceptual model can materially aid our explanation of gubernatorial program success. Following Dye, by a model we mean an abstraction or representation of political life that simplifies and orders our thinking about politics.<sup>11</sup> To be useful for our purposes such a model must simplify reality without


excluding variables essential to understanding program success. It should illuminate possible significant relationships between the governor and the legislators, and between these and other political entities, that will have major impacts on policy success. It should be adaptable to the comparative method previously described. Finally, hypotheses suggested should be subject to empirical verification.

The systems approach has become the dominant framework used by political scientists.<sup>12</sup> As presently developed the approach does not provide a sophisticated theory of executive-legislative relations. Basically the writer simply finds it to be an intellectually clarifying way of ordering the data. It has other virtues. The political system, and by extension the executive-legislative relations as a subsystem may be considered as analytically separable from other phenomena. This sharpens and narrows ones focus. Still, it also precludes viewing each item in a completely piecemeal fashion. This feature has special utility for the present study. The separation of powers concept has traditionally viewed the governor and the legislature as two separate, isolated entities. Systems analysis directs one to look for the possibility of relationships between the two. It should suggest that some aspects of the total political and environmental systems may also have great consequence for program success.

The term system generally refers to an integrated group of interacting elements designed jointly to perform a given function.<sup>13</sup> A political system refers to that group of inter-

acting structures and processes that authoritatively allocates values in a state. The system concept encompasses several variables: 1) inputs--conflicts and demands presented for authoritative allocation; 2) authoritative decision agencies or activities (governor, legislature, administrators); 3) outputs--statutes, informal rules, decisions; and 4) the environment--physical, social, economic, political culture. The assumption has been that these variables are most directly related in the following manner: the external environmental forces most directly shapes the political process and this in turn most directly influences policy outcomes.<sup>14</sup> The relationship appears in diagrammatic form in Figure I-1.

Figure I-1 The Political System




Source: James A. Robinson, "The Major Problems of Political Science", in Politics and Public Affairs, Lynton K. Caldwell, (ed.) (Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962)

The above conceptualization does differ slightly from those of other authors. The main difference lies in showing the structure and process separately, but this division appears consistent with the basic definition for a political system. Primary influence relationships follow from work done both by James A. Robinson and Thomas Dye. The diagram also shows secondary relationships from environment to process and policy, and from structure to policy.

While political structure (by which is here meant formal relationships established by constitution or statute) does not completely determine the actual process, it certainly channels the process or establishes a presumption as to how activities should be conducted.

A second diagram will illustrate more specifically the relationships among elements directly connected with this paper.  
15

Figure I-2 Relationships within Political Systems



Source: Marion Irish and James Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1967)

Here the attention centers on decision-making agencies more than on the policy outcomes that chiefly concern most state political systems research. Whether or not the political process has great significance for policy outcomes, it is still important to know what goes on in the "little black box" in the center. We will need to know how a political system transfers inputs into policy outcomes. Although policy outcomes, in the form of governors' programs, will not be ignored, they are of concern more as a process measuring device than as the end of research. Following the path suggested by the model, we will examine first the structure and then the process of both the governors' office and

the legislature before exploring relationships between the two. We will also examine not so much the inputs themselves as the mechanisms by which demands are transferred to the decision agencies.

The system model shapes the plan of attack. We must first examine the environmental setting and its relationship to those input processing structures and processes. These environmental patterns should also govern our expectations about the variable relationships between governor and legislature. The rest of the chapter discusses those variable relationships between environment and politics before we turn to the governor and the legislature in the text.

## II. The Political Environment

### Social-Economic Environment

Whether labeled environment, ecology, social development, or economic development, socio-economic variables are commonly perceived as having a great impact on both the political process and public policies. Extensive empirical studies have given credence to this perception.<sup>17</sup> Industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education are four frequently used development components. And they appear to be functionally inter-related in the development process.<sup>18</sup> A state's developmental level gives a particular cast to its people's life styles, needs, and political demands. In turn distinctive political processes develop in response to these differing demands. The degree of industrialization and wealth especially creates a minimal base for supporting government operations and public policy.

These four factors have been measured in a great variety of ways. Wealth is usually measured by per capita income. Industrialization indicates the proportion of the labor force not engaged in agriculture, forestry, or fishing. Urbanization reflects the proportion of the state's population lives in urban areas. The standard Census Bureau definition considers incorporated places of 2500 or more, or the urban fringe of cities of 50,000 or more population, as urban. Finally, education is most commonly measured by the median school years attended by those 25 years old or over.

Two other variables should be considered. These are not as frequently used as others so we do not have as extensive empirical information on their impact. First would be the proportion of black citizens in a states. Extensive evidence from Southern states at least demonstrates this variable crucial impact on competition and participation.<sup>19</sup> Second would be the state's ethnic character. Ethnicity is defined as the percentage of the population foreign born or with foreign born parents. While this factor has gradually declined in importance, it does have particular significance in the Northeast and Midwest.<sup>20</sup> At least this variable should indicate one source of conflict and cleavage within a system.

Generally recent studies have not bothered to classify state environments. They have concentrated on gross relationships measured through correlating variables for all states. Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert express skepticism about this approach.<sup>21</sup> They argue that too much variance among the

Table I-1 Ordinal Rankings of U.S. States:  
Industrialization and Cultural  
Factors; 1960

Industrialization Factor		Cultural Affluence Factor	
State	Rank	State	Rank
New Jersey	1	Nevada	1
Connecticut	2	California	2
New York	3	Wyoming	3
Massachusetts	4	Colorado	4
Illinois	5	Oregon	5
Pennsylvania	6	Washington	6
Rhode Island	7	Montana	7
Delaware	8	Nebraska	8
Ohio	9	Kansas	9
California	10	Utah	10
Michigan	11	Connecticut	11
Maryland	12	Delaware	12
Indiana	13	Idaho	13
Wisconsin	14	Florida	14
Missouri	15	Iowa	15
New Hampshire	16	Arizona	16
Washington	17	MINNESOTA	17
North Carolina	18	New York	18
Virginia	19	New Jersey	19
Tennessee	20	Massachusetts	20
MINNESOTA	21	Illinois	21
Georgia	22	Ohio	22
South Carolina	23	Michigan	23
Louisiana	24	New Mexico	24
Iowa	25	South Dakota	25
Maine	26	Oklahoma	26
West Virginia	27	Texas	27
Oregon	28	Indiana	28
Texas	29	Maryland	29
Vermont	30	New Hampshire	30
Alabama	31	North Dakota	31
Florida	32	Wisconsin	32
Kentucky	33	Pennsylvania	33
Kansas	34	Missouri	34
Colorado	35	Vermont	35
Utah	36	Rhode Island	36
Nebraska	37	Maine	37
Oklahoma	38	Virginia	38
Mississippi	39	Kentucky	39
Arkansas	40	West Virginia	40
Arizona	41	Georgia	41
Nevada	42	Tennessee	42
Idaho	43	Louisiana	43
Montana	44	Arkansas	44
New Mexico	45	Alabama	45
South Dakota	46	North Carolina	46
Wyoming	47	South Carolina	47
North Dakota	48	Mississippi	48

Source: Richard Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of American States: 1890-1960", Midwest Journal of Political Science XII (1968).

political variables is left unexplained by the economic variables used. Although gross analysis suggests some important variables, this must be supplemented by more detailed work. Moreover, the large number of variables used do not readily lend themselves to a simple classification scheme. Although industrialization, wealth, urbanization, and education may be related, the states do not rank the same on all four and sometimes the discrepancies are large. Therefore, the classification scheme used here will be based on two factor sets developed by Hofferbert.<sup>22</sup> He subjected twenty-one different variables to a factor analysis for each census year 1890-1960. The analysis revealed two factors that accounted for 60% of the total variance. The first factor encompasses patterns of economic and occupational activity and was called the "Industrialization" factor. Inspection reveals that the major variables included manufacturing, urbanization, ethnic groups, and population size.<sup>23</sup> The second factor heavily reflects characteristics of modern affluent societies and so was called "Cultural Enrichment". Principal variables include education, personal income, communications, and black population (negatively related).<sup>24</sup> The last relationship was interpreted to reflect the general economic deprivation of non-white Americans.


These two factors summarize the relevant variables previously discussed into a more compact and usable form. All states are ordinally ranked on both factors. Since there are separate ordinal rankings for three separate years during the period under study, we can examine shifts in relative state positions over this time. The rankings are presented below for

comparison.<sup>25</sup> At least these rankings establish Minnesota's relative position among all state systems. Crude categories can be established simply by dividing each rank ordering into quartiles. These can be compared to political categories to see if characteristic variations appear. Since Hofferbert found that each factor is virtually independent (.023 correlation coefficient), and that each factor correlates highly with a different set of political variables, they will be treated as separate entities here.<sup>26</sup> (For a visual interpretation of their relationship, see Graph I-1.)

#### The Political Culture

Political culture is the habitual modes of thought and behavior characteristic of a given society about how politics should operate. If ideas have any consequences, they surely should affect the way political institutions behave. Daniel Elazar has developed the only typology of American state political culture to date.<sup>27</sup> He discusses three basic cultural types, the individualistic, the moralistic, and the traditionalistic. The individualistic political culture views the democratic order as a marketplace. That is, public life is viewed as a bargaining process among individuals for their own self-interest. There is no governmental concept of the good life. Community intervention in private activities is limited to encouraging access to the market place. People participate in politics for individual material compensation. Therefore party regularity is encouraged. Politics is left to professionals who are motivated by a favor

Graph I-1 Relationship Between Cultural-Affluence and Industrialization, Forty-eight States, 1960



Rank on Cultural Affluence

$p = .02$

Center line represents the perfect ordinal correlation

system. By contrast, the moralistic culture takes a "common wealth" approach. In the political system citizens unite in a common effort to promote the good life. Community power is used to promote the public interest. It is the duty of all to participate. But party regularity and personal gain is not valued. Politics should be issue oriented. Honesty and merit in government would be honored. The traditionalistic culture is founded on a hierarchical social system. Mainly the small group of top elites participate in government. General citizen activity is minimized. Maintaining the existing order is the political system's chief function. Political organization is based mainly on personal and social ties, not party or merit. The culture legitimates political participation for personal gain.

Table I-2 The Political Cultures of American States

Moralistic	Individualistic	Traditionalistic
California	Connecticut	Alabama
Idaho	Delaware	Arizona
Iowa	Illinois	Arkansas
Kansas	Indiana	Florida
Maine	Maryland	Georgia
Michigan	Massachusetts	Kentucky
MINNESOTA	Missouri	Louisiana
Montana	Nebraska	Mississippi
New Hampshire	Nevada	New Mexico
North Dakota	New Jersey	North Carolina
Oregon	New York	Tennessee
South Dakota	Ohio	Texas
Utah	Pennsylvania	Virginia
Vermont	Rhode Island	West Virginia
Washington	Wyoming	
Wisconsin		

Source: Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View From The States, p. 108.

Minnesota is definitely placed within the moralistic culture.

It shares this classification with other midwestern, western, and upper New England states. Clearly all three classifications have

this regional cast. This regional clustering will be a trait to look for in other variables.

### III. The Political Process

#### Party Competition

An office holder's decisions are molded in great degree by the conditions under which he gains and retains office. His decisions are likely to reflect those forces to which he owes his greatest loyalty. Political parties constitute one force responsible for policy formation and political recruitment. Party and party organization should affect the relationship between the legislature and the governor. Its impact may be purely on the symbolic level. Or both may have a common interest in a strong party organization. Party competition and party organization appear to be related but not necessarily identical variables. As a prelude to understanding organization, we shall first discuss competition.

No aspect of state politics has been more thoroughly studied than party competition.<sup>29</sup> Most students agree that a party classification system must contain three elements: 1) a time period 2) the electoral offices included 3) some measurement of competition. Beyond agreeing on these elements, however, most studies follow divergent lines. And no classification scheme is thoroughly accepted. To a degree this divergence appears immaterial. Most states fall in relatively the same competitive location no matter which scheme is used. Still, anywhere from eleven to fifteen states will receive different classifications depending on the study used. Several things produce this result.

One obvious reason is that different time periods and offices are used. State party systems are not static. Although there seems to be a long range trend toward greater competition, not all states are moving in the same direction or at the same speed. Also, as Joseph Schlesinger so amply documented,<sup>30</sup> competition varies greatly from the office of Senator, to governor, to minor state-wide offices, to the legislature. Indeed, he questions whether any state has a single competitive system, or whether party as an organization has any significant meaning in most states. After reviewing most of the literature on state party competition one wonders whether "party" has any clear conceptual meaning in the discipline. The final, and greatest, problem involves the measuring device. Although election data is readily available, combining that data into an overall index still leads to a relatively crude measuring device. For example, competition for the upper legislative house differs from the lower house, and this in turn from the governor. Or two parties may have a fairly even distribution of legislative seats, but one of them may never control the legislature.

The preceding should serve as a warning against expecting precise measurement from any classification system. The one used in this study is designed primarily for the needs most important for the research focus of this paper. As such it is as arbitrary as all the rest. The study concerns executive-legislative relations for the period 1944-1968, election data from this period will be used. Also, the classification is based on party competition for the governor and both legislative bodies. Other

offices will not be considered because they should have only an indirect impact on the relationship of primary interest. This may not hold true when political organization is considered. A governor may derive power directly from a strong party organization. And the strength of this organization may depend little on contests for the legislature. Access to U.S. Senate and Congressional seats, and lower state-wide offices, may have greater organizational significance. However, competition for these offices is partially accounted for by the gubernatorial classification.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, competition for each office will be measured both by party control of the office (proportion of success) and the margin of support. For each state the percentage of years from 1945 to 1970 that the majority party held the governor's office is computed. Secondly, the average percentage of the two party vote for the majority party is computed. These two percentages are averaged to get the state's final competitive score. A figure close to .50 indicates high competition. A figure close to 1.00 represents low competition.<sup>32</sup> For the legislature one first computes the percentage of years the majority party held each house. Then one computes the average percentage of seats held by the majority party in each house. These four percentages are averaged for the overall legislative competitive score. The different competitive systems may be seen in Tables I-3 and I-4.

The table on gubernatorial competition affords few surprises. Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, and North Dakota appear to be

more competitive than is generally thought. New York and Oregon appear to be less competitive. No attempt is made to break the states into two party versus one-party groupings. Clearly there is a continuum that may be broken into arbitrarily at almost any point. In cross comparing competition with other variables one can divide the continuum into quartiles. If this is done, Minnesota appears in the second quartile and is clearly competitive.

Table I-3 Gubernatorial Competition, 1944-1968 Elections

High	Moderately High	Moderately Low	Low
.510 Arizona	.560 Iowa	.625 Oklahoma	.770 Florida
.515 Colorado	.565 New Mexico	.630 Nebraska	.780 Missouri
Illinois	.570 Maryland	.640 Montana	.790 Arkansas
Massachusetts	.575 MINNESOTA	.645 W. Va.	.810 Virginia
Michigan	Wyoming	.650 N.H.	.815 N.C.
.520 Delaware	.585 Maine	Wisc.	.865 Tenn.
Ohio	.595 North	.655 Kansas	.900 Texas
.525 Washington	Dakota	.670 Vermont	.915 Ala.
Indiana	.610 Conn.	.695 N.Y.	.945 Miss.
.540 Utah	.615 Calif.	.705 Ky.	.950 S.C.
.545 Nevada	.620 Idaho	.750 S.D.	.955 La.
.555 New Jersey	Penn.	.755 Oregon	.962 Ga.
	R.I.		

Competition is based on percentage of victories and percentage of the two party vote for the majority party.

Source: Computed from statistics in The Book of the States, 1945-1969.

The same procedure was followed for the legislative competition continuum. Although there are some similarities, legislative competition is not necessarily at the same pitch as gubernatorial competition in any given state. Especially marked discrepancies are found in Arizona, Maryland, and

Oklahoma. Just as obvious is the overall higher level of competition for the governorship. This relationship can be more clearly perceived in Graph I-2. Generally, states more competitive for the governorship are also more competitive for the legislature. In all but six states, the governorship is markedly more competitive than the legislature. Minnesota follows this pattern. It may be a presumption to use caucus competition in place of party competition for the Minnesota legislature. However, it does give one a general idea of the competitive level. Later both the assumption that Minnesota is genuinely non-partisan, and that the caucus has at least party-like organizations within the legislature, will be tested.

Table I-4 State Legislative Competition, 1944-1968 Elections


High	Moderately High	Moderately Low	Low
.519 Conn.	.678 Indiana	.835 Maine	.925 Okla.
.525 Montana	.703 Ohio	.836 N.H.	.949 N.C.
.542 Delaware	.704 N.J.	.851 Ky.	.961 Va.
	.707 Mo.	.851 N.M.	.962 Fla.
.545 Calif.	.708 Ill.	.861 W. Va.	.982 Ga.
.548 Nevada	R.I.	.868 S. Dak.	.993 S.C.
.596 Mass.	.720 Mich.	.874 N.D.	.994 Ark.
.602 Oregon	.721 N.Y.	.883 Tenn.	.995 Texas
.604 Colo.	.763 Wy.	.888 Md.	.997 Ala.
.647 Wash.	.764 MINNESOTA*	.889 Kansas	.999 La.
.668 Idaho	.800 Wisconsin	.891 Vermont	Miss.
Penn.	.808 Arizona		
	Iowa		

Competition is based on the average percentage of times the majority party controlled the legislature, and the average percentage of seats held by the majority party.

\*Minnesota's rank is based on caucus competition. Later chapters will explore how justifiable this is.

Source: Computed from statistics in The Book of the States, 1945-1969.

GRAPH I-2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE GOVERNMENTAL AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION, 1944-1968.



STATE GOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION; AVERAGE 5 YEARS IN CONTROL AND POPULAR VOTES FOR MAJORITY PARTY, 1944-1968

$r = .75$

center line represents regression line

### State Party Organization

It has generally been hypothesized that the stronger the state's party competition, the stronger the party organization.<sup>33</sup> The assumption behind this is that parties are essentially electoral organizations. Members are motivated primarily by a desire to win office. When another party can muster a serious electoral challenge divisions within one's own party will be self-defeating. Therefore, normally party members in two party states will accept stronger discipline in order to win. This proposition is difficult to confirm partly because political scientists agree on organizational classifications less than they do on competition. No one even agrees very well on the meaning of organization and party membership. It may include some or all of the following: party office holders, campaign workers, and fund raisers, party contributors, party identifiers, and party voters.<sup>34</sup> This identification problem could be partially eased by accepting a legal definition. Most states clearly and rigidly define party by law. However, this apparently easy definition leads one to erroneous conclusions. The apparent structural uniformity among states merely covers over an actual diversity.<sup>35</sup> Since comparative data on even formal party characteristics are difficult to obtain, precise measurement of informal organization is even more difficult. The final judgement must be largely impressionistic. This should be kept in mind during the ensuing discussion. Precise measurement is not absolutely necessary as long as we can establish generally comparative categories.

That judgement will be based on the following characteris-

tics: 1) the nature and structure of party leadership 2) control over promotion to party and public office 3) campaign operations 4) party impact on policy-making.<sup>36</sup> Essentially we wish to know how unified and cohesive the party organization is. This involves gradations from an organization despotically run by a few leaders to a situation where the party is so weak and fluid as to be meaningless as a political organization. This judgement is made in a context where party organization is not usually strong. Both formally and informally parties are decentralized in the American states. Most parties are not hierarchies but organized from the bottom up.<sup>37</sup>

The leadership dimension involves several traits. First, how many leaders or leadership groups are there and is there any continuity in the leadership? An organization could essentially be run by one leadership clique over a long time period. Or perhaps there might be two leadership groups whose relative power rises and wanes over time. Or possibly a party may in effect have no leaders. Party office may carry no power and the party label may be only a label pasted over a hollow shell. Aside from numbers we should also be alert to leadership power bases. Leaders may be men who worked their way up the party hierarchy and wield power through its machinery. Other parties may be merely a conglomeration of public office holders. American state politics, especially in less industrialized states, tends strongly toward office-holder politics.<sup>38</sup> Of course there may be overlap and cooperation between these two leadership types which can lessen party tension and promote cohesion. Finally,

homogeneity in membership characteristics and motivations should give a clue to party unity. Are leaders motivated primarily by patronage, personal office holding, and political advancement, or by policy goals? If large groups joined the party for widely divergent reasons, we should expect some disunity among them. If goals are congruent, unity should be greater. Another characteristic is ideological unity. Do Republican and Democratic leaders have distinctly different policy positions that follow the national divisions?<sup>39</sup> Or do policy divisions criss-cross party lines and create cleavages within each?

A second dimension is control over political ambitions. Party organization is likely to have a meaningful impact on politicians' decisions to the degree that it can control their access to public office. Actually most party organizations do not have this life and death power. To some degree all states now use the primary for political nominations.<sup>40</sup> And over a decade ago V.O. Key demonstrated the deleterious effects of primary on party organization. Subsequent studies confirm, in whole or in part, his conclusions on this point.<sup>41</sup> State legislative nominations especially are controlled on the local level almost everywhere. And this local control is not always be a party. Now a primary system does not necessarily cause party weakness. A long standing leadership may retain control by manipulating the primary. Or the organization may be strong enough to agree on a candidate slate before the primary and enforce its will with sufficient frequency to make the primary meaningless. There are two clues to the actual promotion process. One is to

examine the degree and structure of competition in the primaries.

Duane Lockard says:

When contests for nominations for governor and other major offices are frequently two way battles, this suggests bi-factionalism; races constantly showing crowds of candidates contending indicates multifactionalism; of course the absence of contests may show the existence of organizational leadership. None of these is conclusive proof that any of these patterns exist; . . . caution is advised about making inferences where incumbents are running, since incumbency tends to depress challenge.<sup>42</sup>

Lockard's cautionary admonition is amplified by Joseph

Schlesinger in his extensive study on political opportunity.<sup>43</sup>

His study of career patterns over a forty year period shows a considerable variation among states in the structure of promotional patterns. Most have a moderate to high consistency in promotional patterns from one office to another. However, this does not show organizational strength but more likely an expected career pattern established by dominant incumbent office holders. Schlesinger argues that a lack of office promotional patterns may reflect strong organization because it means that party officers can step in and break up an expected pattern.

Party influence in campaigns is a third organizational dimension. Once the candidate has the party nomination what help can he expect, or does he need, from what party to assure his election? Are campaign workers, funds, and promotional activities channeled through the party? Or does a coalition of groups back candidates? Or does the candidate run on his own personality and personal supporters? Usually the candidate creates his own campaign organization.<sup>44</sup> Normally, candidates

for different offices, even when from the same party, attempt little campaign cooperation. A second facet of the campaign dimension is each party's electoral base and the electorate's response to party. Organizations are likely to be cohesive when each has an internally homogeneous, and externally differentiated, electoral base. This occurs when Democrats appeal to urban lower class, lower educated, ethnic and minority groups. The Republicans would appeal largely to small town and suburban, middle class, well educated, and Northwestern European groups. But all state party systems do not follow these electoral divisions. Voting for party may be purely a habitual action untempered by either group or ideological policy interest. Here parties are less likely to be cohesive. Certainly the cohesion they do have is unlikely to be reflected in policy. In some party systems it is questionable whether party has much electoral significance even as a symbol. Electorate decisions are so attuned to candidate personality and personal independence that party ceases to have substantive meaning.<sup>45</sup>

The final organizational dimension encompasses party impact on official decision-making. Actually, this is the core of our concern with party. A detailed discussion of this will be deferred until the next chapter. Briefly, party impact is generally measured by party cohesion in the legislature. Again, cohesion is not based solely on party competition and organizational strength, but appears to be most frequent when the legislative parties represent distinct constituencies.<sup>46</sup> In one-party states party is meaningless for legislative decisions.

There are no apparent voting patterns. Occasionally a bifactional pattern will emerge for one of two sessions but it is seldom enduring.

Combining these different dimensions, we may roughly conceptualize party organizational strength as follows:<sup>47</sup>

(modifying Lockard's scheme)

### I. Competitive States

A. Cohesive and Strongly lead organizations, characterized by one or more of the following:

1. clearly identified and continuous leadership
  - a) relatively homogeneous on motivation and ideology
2. leadership control over promotional ladder
3. centralized party finance and party campaign operations
  - a) differentiated and party oriented electorate
4. great party influence on legislative policy-making

B. Moderate Factionalism characterized by:

1. Two fairly stable factions with some continuity
  - a) probably based on different motivation, ideology, or constituency
2. Factions usually contest primaries; there are two serious candidates
3. Party organization usually, but not always, at the disposal of primary victor
4. Legislative parties may be internally divided and lack strength

C. Splintered and Weak Organization characterized by:

1. Wide factional cleavages
  - a) fluid leadership patterns resulting from the meaninglessness of party
2. Frequent nominations conflict- primaries are "free-for-all" with many candidates
3. Party probably has little meaning for campaign support or electorate voting behavior
4. Little party influence in the legislature

### II. One Party States

A. One Faction predominant characterized by:

1. One faction continuous and well organized, others vague and transitory
2. Dominant faction leaders control nominations and assist in campaigns
3. Dominant faction leaders have some impact on legislative policy

- B. Bi-factional structure characterized by:
  1. Two factions more or less continuously in competition with one another.
  2. Some policy questions debated in primaries limited to two serious candidates.
  3. Moderate to minor legislative policy identification of factions.
- C. Multifactional Structure characterized by:
  1. Many factions, discontinuous and vague in composition.
  2. Many primary candidates for most offices; personality contests.
  3. Confused policy-making; no relationship between legislative and campaign factions.

Each category is obviously an ideal type. Few actual party organizations would definitively fit each one. The main difference between groups I and II would be that in the second case the general election would have little meaning and so party campaign assistance and electorate identification is not crucial to the definition. Recently, election contests are becoming more important in erstwhile one-party states. This campaign dimension may then increase in importance. A deficiency of the scheme is that it does not easily account for party systems in an intermediately competitive situation.

The next step is to assign specific state party systems to the categories. This procedure is highly impressionistic. It is largely based on the author's survey of all available literature dealing with individual or regional party systems.<sup>48</sup> Again, classification for many states is uncertain. Some seemed not to fall in any definite category. For others information was insufficient to make a definite placement. In order to give the reader a better idea of each category, we should discuss examples typical for each. Without a doubt Connecticut best typi-

ties category I.A. Indeed it may be the only pure example of this type.<sup>49</sup> Both parties are tightly cohesive under a centralized leadership. Leadership is collegial, being homogeneous both on ideology and motivation. Both parties have strong local organizational roots in all counties. Even with a new limited primary system, the leadership dominates nominations. Each party has a quite distinct electorate along the lines previously described. Finally, in both legislative parties decisions are made by the leadership rather than the rank and file party members.

Table I-5 State Party Organization

I. Competitive States

A. Cohesive-Conn., Ind., R.I., Mich.

B. Moderate Factionalism

Pa., Del., Mass.\*, N.J.\*,

Ohio\*, Ill., Md.\*, Wis.\*,

MINNESOTA\*

C. Weak and Factionalized

Cal., Col., Idaho, Utah,

Ariz.\*, N.M.\*, Ore., Wash.,

Wy., Nev., Mont., S.D.,

Iowa\*, Kan.\*, N.D.\*, Neb.\*

II. One Party

A. One Party Cohesive Virginia

B. Bi-factionalism La.

Ga., Tenn., N.C., Tex.,

Vt.\*, N.H.\*, Mo.\*

C. Multi-factionalism Fla., Miss., Ala.,

Ark., Ky., W. Va., S.C., Me.\*,

Ok.\*

\*Note that the classification for 18 states is uncertain.

Source: A variety of studies on state politics, see footnote 48.

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No state really typifies category I.B. One or both parties are not as tightly organized as in the first category. The

degree of internal factionalism is greater. Illinois may serve as an example.<sup>50</sup> The Republican party is fairly tightly organized, although not so much under a continuing leadership as under a Republican governor when there is one. When there is not, power becomes more dispersed among competing centers. The Cook County-Daley organization gives the Democratic party direction, but there are divisions between it and downstate rural Democrats. However, and this appears to be crucial, both regular party organizations can pretty well control nominations for state wide office. And each party is supported by relatively homogeneous constituencies. A key difference between Illinois and the rest of this group is that Illinois has only very moderate cohesion in the legislature. Minnesota and Wisconsin are placed in I.B. only provisionally. Neither has the discipline found in more patronage oriented states, yet neither has as loose an organization as the Western states. One suspects that they moved from the weak to the moderate category during the period under study. Originally they probably had much in common with the modified one-party states in the weak organization category.

Finally, California may be taken as an example of states in category I.C. It differs from other states here in being more highly economically developed. As development progresses it could readily shift to another group. Still its party organization has largely been weak and factionalized.<sup>51</sup> In the 1940's and early 1950's it had almost no party organization. Governor Warren's personal organization did give some direction to the Republicans. However, both parties were mainly run by

shifting, diverse volunteer groups. Cross-filing practically destroyed any party stake in nominations. Candidates were mostly on their own during elections. Or they were backed by interest groups. Party voting in the legislature was extremely weak. The organization apparently solidified some during the 1960's. Descriptions of other Western states uniformly impress one with party weakness and extreme electorate independence.<sup>52</sup> Indeed organizationally these appear to be almost "no party" systems. Finally, there are some modified one party states in this group. Their status is uncertain because they have definitely been changing during the period under study. The majority party organizations in these states may be somewhat stronger than in the Western states. However, they were subject to bi- or multi-factionalism. The minority party organizations are extremely loose or the creations of personally strong office holders. Legislative discipline is weak because at one time there was no minority party to speak of. Lately, the larger minority groups do not particularly owe their positions to party organization as such.

Among one-party states only Virginia fits the strongly organized category. An oligarchical, gentlemanly machine under Senator Harry F. Byrd virtually ran the Democratic party for over three decades. Its roots struck far down into the county level and it controlled nominations almost absolutely. Other groups challenged the machine with infrequent success. These groups never were very stable.

Louisiana is probably the only pure example of a bi-factional

state.<sup>54</sup> Huey Long created antagonisms that developed two distinct and enduring factions, one pro-Long, the other anti-Long. Leadership is fairly continuous. Both factions run slates for many state offices, including the legislature. Finally, these factions have a fairly distinct constituency base. Of the modified one-party states, Vermont leaned toward the Virginia model at one time but now seems to operate more under bi-factionalism. New Hampshire clearly had bi-factionalism in the majority party.<sup>55</sup>

Florida best typifies the completely "free-for-all" state.<sup>56</sup> Campaigns are completely personalistic and localistic. Any factions that do exist do not carry over into the legislature. Alliances shift radically from election to election. Alabama, Arkansas, West Virginia, and Kentucky are slightly more organized than this to the extent that governors may serve as factional focal points while in office.

#### Electoral Systems

Thomas Dye designates two variables as electoral system characteristics.<sup>57</sup> One is participation. The other is malapportionment. Presumably these are electoral characteristics because they reflect the kinds of constituencies the governor and the legislature represent. Participation levels determine the size and probable socio-economic characteristics of that constituency. Malapportionment determines how closely the legislative constituency represents the social, economic, and regional characteristics of the entire state. It probably also reflects the degree to which governor and legislature share the

same constituency.

Table I-6 Average percentage turnout for gubernatorial elections in non-presidential years, 1944-1968.

High	Moderately High	Moderately Low	Low
64.9% Idaho	56.5 N.H.	51.5 Neb.	30.4 Ark.
62.9 Conn.	55.4 N.D.	51.3 W. Va.	25.6 N.C.
61.7 Ind.	55.1 Pa.	51.1 Wis.	21.5 Fla.
	54.7 Cal.	50.7 Mich.	20.4 Tenn.
61.2 Mont.	53.3 Col.	49.5 Iowa	19.9 Ala.
60.7 Wyo.	Nev.	49.2 N.M.	18.9 La.
	53.2 Ore.	48.0 Vt.	18.2 Va.
60.1 S.D.	52.5 N.J.	47.0 Me.	17.2 S.C.
59.2 Ill.	52.2 N.Y.	45.8 Mo.	16.9 Tex.
58.4 Dela.	51.9 Ohio	44.7 Ok.	16.2 Miss.
58.3 MINNESOTA	Wash.	44.2 Ariz.	15.7 Ga.
57.8 Utah	51.7 Kansas	43.6 Ky.	
		42.3 Md.	

Source: Derived from statistics in The Book of the States, 1945-1969.

Political participation encompasses a wide variety of behavior from mere exposure to political stimuli to holding public office.<sup>58</sup> How does the participation level relate to the governor's power? This will be discussed in more detail subsequently. It would appear that the larger and more active the state's "attentive public" is, the more effective would be the governor's public opinion power. He would have a larger audience to focus on legislative policy. This audience would be more disposed to contact political officials. Participation levels may also have significance for party organization. A participant society should provide a larger potential pool of organizational activists.

One cannot easily measure the participant activity just discussed for all fifty states. Consequently, voter turnout is

accepted as a valid comparative measure. Not all who turned out would be party activists. But most potential activists and gubernatorial supporters are included in this group. The measure will be based on the average percentage turnout of eligible voters for off-Presidential elections years from 1944-1968.<sup>59</sup> Non-presidential election years are used to hold constant influences extraneous to the state political system. For those states that only have gubernatorial elections during Presidential years, off-year Senatorial elections are substituted. This follows the practice established by Lester Milbrath. Turnout levels for two high state-wide offices should be quite similar.<sup>60</sup> The results are presented in Table I-6. Categories may be established simply by dividing the distribution into quartiles. Minnesota ranks quite high in turnout, placing in the top quartile.

Malapportionment rates attention as part of the electoral system for a number of reasons. The apportionment system might affect competition, party strength, legislative voting, and policy. The last relationship has been the most vigorously challenged.<sup>61</sup> Numerous studies correlating environment, apportionment, and policy outcomes conclude that most policy differences among the states.<sup>62</sup> On this point the evidence is not all in, however. Some very recent studies do challenge the earlier conclusions. For example, Jack Walker found that policy innovation is affected by state apportionment.<sup>63</sup> Apportionment's impact on legislative voting and party competition also has been disputed.<sup>64</sup> However, most negative studies deal with gross

Table I-7 Index of Urban Underrepresentation for 48 state legislatures, 1960

Well Apportioned	Moderately Well Apportioned	Moderately Poor Apportionment	Poor App.
1.05 La.	.83 Vt., Md.	.63 Cal.	.49 Tenn.
1.02 Mass.	.81 Me.	.61 Ark.	.48 Idaho
.99 N.H.	.76 N.J.	Del.	.45 Texas
.92 Wis.	.75 Conn.	N.C.	.36 Iowa
.91 Ill.	.74 Mich.	.60 Ky.	.34 Miss.
.88 R.I.	.73 Va.	N.D.	.30 Kans.
Wash.	.70 Col.	.59 S.C.	N.M.
.87 Ohio	.69 Ind., Mo., W. Va.	.55 MINNESOTA Wy.	.28 Nev.
.86 N.Y.	.68 Utah	.53 Mont.	.27 Ok.
.85 Ore. Pa.	.66 Neb., S.D.	Ariz.	.25 Ala. .16 Fla. .12 Ga.

Source: Glendon Schubert (ed.) Reapportionment (New York: Charles Scribners, 1965).

#### IV. Environment and Politics

So far we have reviewed the nature of state, social, economic, and cultural environment, party competition, party organization, participation, and malapportionment. Before concluding this chapter, all of these variables should be tied together. Recent literature on state systems clearly establishes expectations for relationships among these. Generally, the two-party states should: 1) be more urbanized, 2) have a higher median income, 3) have a higher median education, 4) have the highest ration of foreign-born and Roman Catholics, and 5) have relatively low black populations.<sup>67</sup> The industrialization-urbanization variables do not correlate as highly with competition as does the cultural-affluence dimension. This is because two party states fall into two distinct types. The urban-industrial states in the Northeast and Great Lakes region are


largely two-party. But so are the highly educated, relatively low industrialized Western states. As we shall see later, competition means different things in each of these areas. States at the bottom of the cultural-affluence spectrum are uniformly one party. Modified competitive appear to be "middle-ground" in two senses. First, they are largely moderate to low in both cultural and industrial development. Also, they occupy transitional regional zones. Graph I-3 shows the general relationship ( $p = .59$ ).

Why should this relationship exist? Heinz Eaulau concludes that competitive attitudes are a function of size, density, and heterogeneity conditions that are met only in an urban environment.<sup>68</sup> It is assumed that a society must have a certain level of diversity to produce sufficiently different needs that will sustain more than one political alternative. The diversity resulting from a complex society will produce conflict. The Western states, however, demonstrate that this reasoning is not necessarily true. They simply do not have the ethnic-class differences that serve as a base for political conflict in the Northeast. If cleavages do exist, they exist for other reasons. Perhaps those states have populations with sufficient education to be interested in political participation. This participatory attitude sustains political competition, but not necessarily a politics of conflict.

As the preceding suggests, a state's cultural-affluence level is also associated with participation. We know that individual participation is related to personal socio-economic

GRAPH I-3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL AFFLUENCE AND GUBERNATORIAL COMPETITION, 1944-1963

RANK ORDER ON CULTURAL AFFLUENCE, 48 STATES, 1960



STATE GUBERNATORIAL COMPETITION; RANK ORDER FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST COMPETITION, 48 STATES, 1944-1963

$p = .59$

center line represents perfect correlation


status and education. These factors are apparently also associated with system-wide participation.<sup>69</sup> This environment-participation relationship depends heavily on a North-South cleavage. The Southern states rank low on every variable associated with high participation. (See Graph I-4) Other regional relationships appear as well. These are not as clear. Milbrath argues that the Plains and Mountain states rank among the highest participatory systems.<sup>70</sup> This is true enough. However, he ignores the fact that many Eastern industrial states, such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island rank just as high. States ranking in the third quartile are generally in transitional regional areas.

Only modest relationships exist between environment and apportionment.<sup>71</sup> The closest correlation is found between the industrialization level and specifically urban under-representation. Urban areas were not treated quite so well in those states with less developed economic systems. Graph I-5 shows the correlation ( $p = .62$ ). Plains and Southern states generally had the most malapportioned legislatures.

Daniel Elazar's discussion of Political culture clearly establishes connections between those cultures and political competition. Moralistic and individualistic states should have high political competition. States with traditional cultures will have low competition. This is tested in Table I-8 below. Although the hypothesized relationship does exist, its strength is only moderate. Again the correlation depends largely upon the Southern states. Surprisingly, individualistic states appear

GRAPH I-4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL AFFLUENCE AND PARTICIPATION IN NON-PRESIDENTIAL GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1944-1969

RANK ORDER ON CULTURAL AFFLUENCE,  
1960




RANK ORDER PARTICIPATION IN STATE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1944-1968

p= .61

center line represents perfect correlation

I-5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZATION-URBANIZATION AND URBAN UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN 48 STATE LEGISLATURES, 1960

RANK ON INDUSTRIALIZATION  
48 STATES, 1960



to be more competitive than moralistic ones. A commonwealth society does not necessarily foster extremely high competition.

Table I-8 Relationship between Political Culture and Gubernatorial Competition, 1944-1968

	Political Culture		
	Moralistic	Individual- istic	Traditionalistic
1st quartile	Mich., Col., Utah, Wash.	Mass., Ind., N.J., Ohio, Del., Ill., Nev.	Arizona
2nd quartile	MINNESOTA Me., Idaho, Cal., Ia.	R.I., Pa., Md., Conn., Wy.	N.M.
3rd quartile	Wis., Ore., Vt., Mont., N.H., S.D., Kans.	N.Y., Neb.	Ky., W. Va., Ok.
4th quartile		Mo.	Fla., Tex., Va., Tenn., N.C., Ga., Miss., Ark., S.C., Ala., La.

Interclass correlation coefficient = .63; significant at the .001 level. See Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 267-8.

Source: Political Culture - Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View From The States; Competition, See Table I-3.

to be more competitive than moralistic ones. A commonwealth society does not necessarily foster extremely high competition.

The political culture, as Elazar describes it, should be even more highly related to participation than to competition. The essential feature of a moralistic culture is its emphasis on citizen duty. An individualistic culture leaves its participation to patrician politicians. Table I-9 tests this. Traditionalistic states are clearly low on participation. However, individualistic states rank slightly higher than moral-

istic ones. On this the proposition is clearly in error. Highly disciplined Northeast organizations can get their voters out as well as the "citizen-oriented" West. Also, a number of moralistic states are not very competitive.

Table I-9 Relationship between Political Culture and Average Percentage Turnout in Gubernatorial Elections, 1944-1968.

	Political Culture		
	Moralistic	Individual- istic	Traditionalistic
1st quartile	MINNESOTA	Wy., Ind., R.I., Mass., Ill., Del., Conn.	
2nd quartile	Col., Wash., N.D., Kans., N.H., Ore., Cal.	Pa., N.J., Nev., N.Y., Ohio	Ariz., Ok., W. Va., N.M., Ky.
3rd quartile	Vt., Mich. Wis., Me., Ia.	Mo., Md., Neb.	
4th quartile			Va., S.C., Fla., Tenn., Ark., N.C., Tex., Ga., Ala., Miss., La.

interclass correlation coefficient = .64; significant at the .001 level. See Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 267-8

Source: Political Culture - Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View From The States; Political Participation, See Table I-6.

istic ones. On this the proposition is clearly in error. Highly disciplined Northeast organizations can get their voters out as well as the "citizen-oriented" West. Also, a number of moralistic states are not very competitive.


This brings us to relationships among political variables. Consistently, researchers have found a fairly strong relationship between party competition and participation.<sup>72</sup> This

relationship is partly a function of co-relationship with environment. However, competition seems to exert an independent influence as well. As competition increases, political participation usually increases in the state as well. A visual expression of this relationship may be found in Graph I-6. The relationship does exist. As in so many cases this relationship depends very heavily on the Southern states. There is a very clear break in both participation and competition between these states and the others. The relationship between participation and competition for the more competitive states is not so impressive. This is true partly because the range in competition and participation is not great at this point. The top twenty-four states in competition have almost identical participation levels. The theory is that more stimuli are available to voters in a highly competitive system as both parties search widely for the marginal votes needed to win. Also, the voter is more likely to feel that his vote counts in a closely contested election where there is at least a choice between ins and outs. This does not explain major deviants such as South Dakota, which has too high a participation level, and Arizona and Michigan, which are too low. Michigan especially is a puzzle since it also has a moralistic culture and a well organized party system.


There is apparently no strong relationship between competition, participation and malapportionment.<sup>73</sup> (See Graph I-7) When discussing executive-legislative relations, we will have to treat this variable in isolation as an independent force.

Party competition and political organization are supposedly

Graph I-6 Relationship Between Gubernatorial Competition  
And Participation, 1944-1968



GRAPH I-7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUBERNATORIAL COMPETITION AND LEGISLATIVE MALAPPORTIONMENT



GUBERNATORIAL COMPETITION; AVERAGE % YEARS OF CONTROL AND POPULAR VOTE, MAJORITY PARTY, 1944-1968

r = .35

center line is a regression line

related. Political scientists like to think that strong competition produces strong organization.<sup>74</sup>

Table I-10 Relationship between Industrialization, Political Culture, Party Competition, and Party Organization, 1944-1968

Industrialization				
	1st Q*	2nd Q	3rd Q	4th Q
1st Quartile	"IA", IB, IB, IB, IB	IA, "IC"	"IC", "IC"	IC, (IC)
2nd Quartile	IA, IA IB, IB, "IC"	"IB"	"IC", "IC"	IC, "IC" "IC" (IC)
3rd Quartile	IB	"IB" "IIB"	"IC", "IC", "IIB", (IIC) (IIC)	IC, "IC" "IC", (IIC)
4th Quartile		IIB, (IIA), (IIB), (IIB), (IIB), (IIB), (IIC)	(IIB), (IIC), (IIC)	(IIC), (IIC)

\*Quartile

IA=competitive, cohesive organization

IB=competitive, moderately cohesive

IC=competitive, weak organization

IIA=One party, single faction

IIB=One party, bi-faction

IIC=One party, multi-factional

no sign = individualistic political culture

" " = moralistic culture

( ) = traditionalistic culture

Source: Industrialization - Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of American States", Midwest Journal of Political Science XII, (1968). Political Culture: Elazar, American Federalism: A View From The States; Competition - See Table I-3; See Table I-5.

However, the tendency is slight. A strong opponent and the necessity to scramble for votes does not necessarily impel

party members to unify for the common good. Even when all dimensions considered in this chapter are used, no few simple patterns explain organizational strength. Considering industrialization, political culture, and competition together does reveal some patterns. By cross-tabulating the dimensions one can visually pick out several clusters. (See Table I-10)

Neither competition nor culture are absolutely associated with strong party organization. New York and Wisconsin, though in the third quartile of competition, have moderately strong organizations. The two top quartiles are divided almost evenly between strongly or moderately organized party systems, and weak-factionalized ones. Most moralistic states do have weak party organization, but this is not entirely true. Michigan is a prominent exception. And three individualistic states, Nebraska, Nevada, and Wyoming, have weak organizations. Most traditionalistic states at best have a strong or bi-factional organization within a one-party system. There does seem to be the strongest relationship between organization and industrialization. Of the highly industrialized states, only California and Washington have weak organizations. Even among the one-party traditionalistic states the more highly industrialized generally have the stronger organizations. Keep in mind that the industrialization factor includes industrial wealth, urbanization, and high ethnicity. These states also largely fall in the Northeastern area. The party systems there were historically more based on big city ethnic and class politics. The patronage organizations developed by these systems, though weakened, give

a surer base for organizational discipline. Progressivism, with its anti-organizational bias took deeper roots in the Plains and the West. In South and Border states organizational differences are perhaps more explained by competition. Republicanism is generally stronger in the urban industrialized areas. Democratic states with a higher urban-industrial concentration probably need the slightly greater organizational stability to combat the growing Republican threat.

#### V. Summary

This chapter will conclude by sketching a very rough classification encompassing all of the variables discussed so far.

I. Two Party States	Examples
A. Strong Party Organization	
1. Moderately high cultural-affluence	Connecticut, Indiana Rhode Island (Michigan)
High industrialization	
Individualistic culture	
2. High participation	
3. Low malapportionment	
B. Moderate Party Organization	
1. Moderate cultural-affluence	Mass., N.Y., N.J., Ohio
moderate to high industrialization	
Individualistic culture	Penn., Del.
2. Moderate to high participation	Illinois
3. Low to moderate malapportionment	(MINNESOTA)
C. Weak, Factionalized Organization	
1. High cultural-affluence	Mont., Utah Oregon Colo., Idaho
Moderate to low industrialization	
Moralistic culture	Cal., Wash. Nevada Wyoming
2. Moderate to high participation	N.D., S.D., Kansas
3. Moderately high malapportionment	

## II. One Party States

- |                                      |                  |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| A. Bi-factional or Cohesive          |                  |
| 1. Low cultural affluence            | La., Ga.         |
| Moderate industrialization           | N.C.             |
| Traditionalistic culture             | Tenn., Tex.      |
| 2. Low participation                 | Va.              |
| 3. Moderate to high malapportionment |                  |
| B. Multi-factional                   |                  |
| 1. Low cultural affluence            | Alabama,         |
|                                      | Ark.             |
| Moderate to low industrialization    | Miss., South     |
| Traditionalistic culture             | Carolina, (Fla.) |
| 2. Low participation                 | (Kentucky)       |
| 3. High malapportionment             |                  |

## III. Mixed

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| A. Two party, weak organization                            |             |
| 1. Moderate cultural affluence                             | Iowa, Ariz. |
| Moderately low industrialization                           | New Mexico  |
| 2. Moderately low participation                            |             |
| 3. High malapportionment                                   |             |
| B. Weak competition, moderate or bi-factional organization |             |
| 1. Moderately low cultural affluence                       | Vermont,    |
| Moderate industrialization                                 | Maine       |
| Moralistic culture   | N.H.        |
| 2. Moderately low participation                            | Wis.        |
| 3. Low malapportionment                                    |             |
| C. Weak competition, weak organization                     |             |
| 1. Moderately low cultural affluence and industrialization | Okla.,      |
| Traditionalistic-individualistic culture                   | Mo.         |
| 2. Moderately low participation                            | W. Va.      |
| 3. Moderate malapportionment                               | (Nebraska)  |

The classification is meant neither to be definitive nor final.

The relative lack of good comparative data on these basic variables is indicative of how far the discipline is from a true comparative state politics. Comparative method presupposes

several units that vary on essential characteristics while being similar for characteristics while being similar for characteristics not under study. It is easy to see why correlation analyses using all states have found relatively low relationships. Many states do not have a consistent pattern of similarities and differences on the variables being compared. That is, many states can not be easily used in a comparative analysis because they do not meet the assumptions of that analysis.

A strictly systems approach is also hampered because of this. The environmental and political process variables do not fit together as hypothesized for all states. That is, although each state may be viewed as a system, the relationship between environment and the state's political subsystems are not the same for every state.

Fortunately, some states do meet the assumptions of comparative and systems analysis. Based on three environmental variables, industrialism, cultural-affluence, and political culture, and four political system variables, competition, participation, malapportionment, and party organization, most states cluster into three to five broad groups. Two party states fall into three basic types. Those with high industrialization, individualistic cultures, high participation, and low malapportionment have very strong party organization. When the industrialization, participation, or apportionment is somewhat less, one or both parties within the systems have a more moderate organizational strength. States with high cultural

affluence, but low industrialization and a moralistic culture, have high participation with weak party organization. One-party states are all quite similar. They have low cultural affluence, low participation, traditionalistic cultures and moderately high malapportionment. Those that have a slightly higher industrialization level tend to have a more stable bifactional organization system within the general one party atmosphere. Those with lower industrialization tend to be highly fluid and multi-factional.

Because Minnesota does not readily fit any one category, comparative analysis on a nation-wide basis may not be particularly fruitful. At least the method can specify with some confidence those states that are not similar to Minnesota. And it can narrow down similar states to a relatively small number. On the gubernatorial level Minnesota is definitely two-party. In other respects it seems to fall somewhere between the moderately and weakly organized competitive states. Because it also has similarities to some "mixed" states, comparison may be more useful on subsystem than on a total system basis.

## Chapter I- Footnotes

1. Herbert Jacob, "State Political Systems" in Politics in the American States, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.) (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1965) p. 3.
2. Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States, (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968) p. 28.
3. Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and The Public, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 11; see also Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States", Journal of Politics XXV (1963), p. 265. However, which system aspects are uniform and to what degree appear to be a matter of opinion; see Sharkansky, op. cit., pp. 27-33.
5. Sharkansky, op. cit., pp. 29-33.
6. Dye, op. cit., p. 43.
7. Even Dye does not include all fifty states in his analysis. Nebraska and Minnesota are excluded because they have non-partisan legislatures for example.
8. Sharkansky, op. cit., pp. 131-2, 141-2; Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960", Midwest Journal of Political Science XII (1968), p. 402, 418.
9. Robert Crew, State Politics, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967) pp. 19-20.
10. Malcolm Jewell, The State Legislatures, Politics and Practice, second edition, (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 4.
11. Dye, op. cit., pp. 2-5.
12. Crew, op. cit., pp. 1-3; the following discussion of state political systems relies on Crew.
13. Dawson and Robinson, op. cit., p. 267.
14. This conceptualization is modified from several sources. See Dye, op. cit., pp. 3-5. James A. Robinson, "The Major Problems of Political Science" in Politics and Public Affairs, Lynton K. Caldwell (ed.) (Bloomington, Indiana: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962) pp. 169-82; Marion Irish and James Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 6.
15. Irish and Prothro, op. cit. p. 9.
16. Dye, op. cit., p. 259.
17. For a good sampling of this literature, especially concerning environmental variables, see Dawson and Robinson, op. cit., pp. 279-81; Dye, op. cit., pp. 7-10, pp. 28-34, Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States" American Political Science Review, LXIII, (1969) pp. 861-2; Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality in the States", American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969) pp. 157-60; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States" American Political Science Review LX (1966) pp. 81-3,

17. (continued) and "Ecological Development and Policy Changes in the American States", Midwest Journal of Politics, X (1966), pp. 481-3. Sources that deal more directly with economic variables and competition include: Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength" Western Political Quarterly XL (1958) pp. 502-11; David Gold and John R. Schmidhauser, "Urbanization and Party Competition: The Case of Iowa", Midwest Journal of Political Science IV (1960) pp. 65-8; and Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics" in Politics in the American States, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds) (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) pp. 67-70.
18. Dye (1966), op. cit. p. 33.
19. See Donald R. Matthews and James R. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966) and V.O. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Random House, 1949).
20. See Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) and John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966).
21. Sharkansky, op. cit., p. 94; Hofferbert (November 1966) op. cit. pp. 480-1, 465; Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy", American Political Science Review LXIII (1969), p. 877.
22. Hofferbert (1968) op. cit.
23. Ibid., p. 406.
24. Ibid., p. 409.
25. Ibid., See tables pp. 410-3. This data does not perfectly fit my study, which covers 1945-1970. However, 1970 census data, presently unavailable, would be necessary for complete coverage.
26. Ibid., pp. 414-5; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 877.
27. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From The States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), pp. 85-123.
28. Loc. Cit.
29. Austin Ranney and Wilmore Kendall, "The American Party Systems" American Political XLVIII (1954) pp. 477-85; Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Interparty Competition" American Political Science Review XLIX (1955) pp. 1120-1128 and "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States", Behavioral Science, V (1960) pp. 197-209; Golembiewski, op. cit.; Dawson and Robinson, op. cit., esp. pp. 271-3; Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: MacMillan, 1963) Ranney, op. cit., and David G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Interparty Competition and Systemic Stability", American Political Science Review, LXI (1967).
30. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme" (1955) op. cit.; "The Structure of Competition" (1960) op. cit.; and Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

31. Compare Pfeiffer (op. cit.) on the President, Senate, Governor, and state-wide offices to Lockard's data (op. cit.) on just the governor.
32. This method follows that used by Austin Ranney (op. cit.) p. 63. For the sources on gubernatorial control and popular vote, and legislative control and seats, see Bibliography.
33. Ranney, op. cit., p. 63, p. 99.
34. Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States" in Politics in the American States, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.) (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965) p. 28.
35. Ranney, op. cit. p. 63.
36. Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government second edition (New York, MacMillan, 1969), p. 180.
37. Ranney, op. cit. p. 63; Thomas R. Dye, Politics in the States and Their Communities (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969) p. 92.
38. Schlesinger (1966) op. cit., p. 108.
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44. Ranney, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
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46. Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors" American Political Science Review LVIII (1964) p. 60-71; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature", Western Political Quarterly, XIV (1961) pp. 473-80.
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53. V.O. Key (1949) op. cit., pp. 19-35; G.T. Mitau, op. cit., pp 224-5.
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57. Dye, (1966) op. cit., p. 260.
58. Milbrath (op. cit.) pp. 27-29.
59. The measurement follows the practice used by Milbrath, Ibid., p. 140; For the sources see bibliography.
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72. Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 50.
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## CHAPTER TWO

### APPROACHES TO LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

In 1787 the Founding Fathers deliberately chose a Constitutional system with three main branches of government. The relationship among these branches has a major interest for students of American politics ever since. Every state government, as it came into being, mimicked the national separation model at least in its formal elements. Therefore, although this study concentrates on state practice, a brief review of national performance is also necessary.

#### I. STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Most scholars conclude that the Presidential-Congressional relationship is one of ceaseless struggle. Constitutional provisions legitimate this struggle and, in a sense, make it inevitable.<sup>1</sup> Immediately one should be alerted to the high conflict potential in any separation of powers system.

Sources of conflict are numerous. But they can be divided into three basic factors. First, the two great popular branches constitutionally share functional powers. In fact Richard Neustadt has argued that we have not a separation of powers system, but separated institutions, sharing powers.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, the institutional setting leads to different needs, time perspectives, and relations with the career bureaucracy.<sup>3</sup> For example, the President theoretically directs the executive branch. However, political policy and group interests do not neatly follow executive-legislative lines. J. Leiper Freeman convincingly documents the complex alliance structure that includes groups, administra-

tors, and particular Congressional leaders. Thirdly, each branch reflects, and probably over-represents, its own distinctive constituency.<sup>4</sup>

Now, even those who believe that conflict primarily characterizes the American system do perceive opportunities for cooperation. The very fact that constitutionally both must participate in policy decisions creates situations where cooperation may be needed.<sup>5</sup> Common party affiliations could provide a common "glue" binding the two together.<sup>6</sup> This bond may exist from loyalty, policy agreement, or electoral necessity. Party discipline is far from absolute however. And party may have negative consequences when control is divided. Finally, Congress and the President could view their decision-making problems as similar. Both branches focus on incremental, immediate, and acute problems. And both have common interests as elected officials against a permanent bureaucracy.<sup>7</sup>

While these opportunities for cooperation do exist, historically most Presidential-Congressional relationships have been conflict oriented. In most periods either the President or the Congress dominated.<sup>8</sup> During Congressional dominance the legislature was often aided by extremely strong leaders, a prevailing veneration for party, and a "Whig" orientation by the incumbent President. Presidential dominance followed three basic patterns: 1) the war "dictatorships", 2) a strong party leader who controlled legislative leaders, and 3) the post World War II period with progressive institutionalization of legislative liaison and public opinion techniques. Presidentialism then has been

characterized by crisis, able Presidential politicians, and men who had a will to power.

Historically, gubernatorial-legislative relations have also been characterized by conflict. However, gubernatorial power has been much less prevalent than Presidential power. As the powerful representative of the absentee English king, the colonial governor had been under popular suspicion from earliest times. These governors combined under their authority almost all governmental powers including appointment, law enforcement, judicial control, veto, and the power to adjourn or convene the assembly.<sup>9</sup> The assembly possessed only one great power, the power of the purse.

During the revolution, the people placed their faith in the legislature. So the early state constitutions reflected the apogee of legislative supremacy.<sup>10</sup> The governor became a mere figurehead with short terms and limited powers. Not until the nineteenth century were legislative powers gradually undermined. Increasing public distrust led to greater Constitutional restrictions and a more marked separation of powers. The governor received longer terms, veto powers, and popular election. During the second half of the nineteenth century the legislatures rival was still not the governor, but a multi-headed state executive. Numerous elective officials received authority directly from the constitution. New programs were given to regulatory agencies, independent boards, and commissions.<sup>11</sup> By 1900 the governor's renaissance was not as chief executive, but as a chief legislator who might combat the political bosses.<sup>12</sup> From his state-wide constituency he commanded a direct popular appeal. He moved to take

over party leadership. And he asserted a policy power reinforced by the veto.

Increasingly during the twentieth century governors have assumed a positive role with broader formal and informal powers. The executive reorganization movement strengthened his hand over administration. Recently fiscal controls have been emphasized. Finally, the chief executive has been accepted as a more active agent in the legislative process.<sup>13</sup> Although most governors do not have a President's powers, their potential more nearly approximates his now than in the recent past.

## II. APPROACHES TO EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

According to Roy Morey there have been two basic reactions to this conflict relationship between the governor and the legislature. The first he calls the "hard line" and the second the "soft line".<sup>14</sup> The hard line assumes that they are natural enemies. However, this adversary relationship has detrimental effects since a divided leadership is ill equipped to cope with critical problems. Separatism produces inefficiency and irresponsibility. Hard liners generally sympathize with the executive as the agent best suited to resolve the impasse. They believe the executive should vigorously exercise his formal powers while molding public support where necessary. In contrast the soft line accepts separatism as natural and potentially beneficial. Both branches have a legitimate policy role. Compromise and cooperation are both necessary and desirable. On the other hand this view holds that some conflict may contribute to the vigor of decision-making. Further, the institutional fragmentation simply

reflects an underlying social, economic, and political pluralism. We will very briefly discuss three models of executive-legislative relations. The first two are generally hard line, the third soft line.

#### Administrative Reorganization

The reorganization movement postulates an essentially prescriptive model that believes government may be changed for the better through the use of correct principles. The principles pursued are neutral competence and executive centralism.<sup>15</sup> Initially the movement was a reaction against the sprawling administrative machinery that resulted from the nineteenth century solutions to legislative abuses. The central goal was full executive responsibility over an integrated administrative structure. As Herbert Kaufman argues, neutral competence in some ways undermined this goal, but this did not become apparent until much later. Rationality and efficiency in the administrative system can be attained by the merit system, executive budget, functional departmentalization, and executive hierarchical command over a few department heads.

Since the reformers concentrate on the governor, favoritism toward that office is hardly avoidable. Although not necessarily hostile to the legislature, they rapidly perceive the relationship as a conflict situation. For one thing, legislatures rather jealously guard their own prerogatives and are reluctant to enhance the governor's administrative powers. Also, legislative interference in administrative decisions, a prevailing practice, is contrary to the reformers basic principles.<sup>16</sup> Further, the reformers

assume that the governor should be chief policy-maker, and the literature stresses this attitude. The legislature is given an essentially generalist and policy review role.

#### Party Responsibility

The second approach deals with a different aspect of the relationship. While the reorganization movement was concerned chiefly with administration, party responsibility looked directly at politics.<sup>17</sup> These reformers believe that separatism obstructs majority rule and responsible government. Legislatures are plagued by feeble leadership and diffused decision-making. Institutional separation and weak party discipline hinder executive leadership. Seeking cooperation rather than conflict, the party responsibility view believes that only a viable party system can bridge the constitutional gap that may become a political chasm.

So separation breeds irresponsibility. But what is meant by irresponsibility? The word has many and varied uses. As used by party reformers the concept contains four elements: 1) popular choice among candidates 2) popularly understood party programs 3) electoral opportunity to defeat undesirable office-holders, and 4) a meaningful continuity in government.<sup>18</sup> A model system should find two parties alternating control with both fielding candidates in all districts. A party's gubernatorial and legislative candidates would ensure a majority mandate for one party. A strong party leadership would create considerable party unity on the program.

The party responsibility theory also assumes a dominant gubernatorial role. It believes that the modern governor should

take the initiative on developing programs and press vigorously for their adoption. For this reason party responsibility also fits in the hard line category. In practice most states do not follow this pattern. In one-party states there is no possibility for criticism from the opposition. Legislators from the governor's party may see no connection between administration success and their own survival. The constitutional framework, in conjunction with political practice, more frequently produces divided control than unified party government in the competitive states.<sup>19</sup>

#### The Bargaining Approach

A number of recent approaches, although dissimilar in some respects, have three things in common that distinguish them from previous approaches. For want of a better term these will be called bargaining approaches.<sup>20</sup> First, they demonstrate greater sensitivity to the multi-variate nature of executive-legislative relations. Neither party nor institutional influences should be neglected. However, neither encompasses the whole relationship. Secondly, the bargaining approaches are not overly prescriptive. They purportedly seek to understand operating systems. Finally, although they acknowledge that separatism is essentially a conflict situation, they find nothing abhorrent in this. Neither branch should necessarily dominate, but the very conflict system may force them to cooperate. As Roy Morey concludes:

A governor is not a traitor to the executive tradition simply because he is willing to compromise with the legislature. Granted the modern governor has a legitimate role in policy initiation, but this should not be mistaken for a natural monopoly. Both branches can, and indeed should, lay rightful claim to this function.<sup>21</sup>

These approaches emphasize two basic points. First, they

consider the interaction between institutional and behavioral forces. The Legislative System by John Wahlke, et. al., is based on this. Roy Simmons developed a systems interaction approach for the executive branch.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, they consider the situational nature of influence. That is, the governor's power and leadership role may only be accepted within certain contexts.<sup>23</sup> Crisis situations increase his influence. Highly popular governors have greater political leverage. It is on this point that Joseph Schlesinger challenges what he calls the basic classical theorem of competition ( and party responsibility ).<sup>24</sup> He argues that voters perceive each state official differently, and that there are in fact different electorates for each office. Only one party states would fit the party ticket assumption. In sum, the executive power varies with legal factors, institutional factors, environmental setting, party majorities, and changes in personnel.

Finally, the bargaining approach believes that the highly fragmented state government only parallels the highly fragmented social, political, and economic systems found within even the fairly small confines of a state. Political systems present a constellation of influences that direct their demands and supports through differing channels, some through the legislature, some through the executive, some through the administrators, some through the courts.<sup>25</sup> Naturally, this produces feudal decision-making patterns. Under these conditions success depends upon coalition politics, compromise, and bargaining.

This approach will largely guide the methods used here. It suggests that the relationship must be regarded as situational,

varying with place, time, and policy. Second, the most important components to study will be the resources available to each actor. But few resources are absolute. If each actor has strengths, he probably also has limitations. The rest of this chapter will further explore these potential resources. Gubernatorial resources would include constitutional, institutional, political, and personal powers. Legislative resources include constitutional and institutional powers organizational setting and caucus cohesion. Combining this analysis with the previous chapter we shall attempt to assess various situations under which gubernatorial power might vary.

III. GUBERNATORIAL RESOURCES

Today more than ever before there is an expectation for executive leadership. The governor must combat the growing complexity, expense, and diffuseness of state government. Historically, he was perceived as a spokesman for the common man; recently he has become a spokesman for the urbanites. It is from his responsibility for initiating major state-wide programs that the governor's role as legislator derives. At least this is apparently the expectation among both public and scholars.<sup>26</sup> Coleman Ransone and Malcolm Jewell insist that most, if not all, bills come either from the governor or the administrative agencies.<sup>27</sup> Sarah McCally, in her recent study of gubernatorial program success, argued that the governor plays a relatively greater legislative role in the states than does the presidency on the national level.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, there is not much hard evidence to show either that the public universally expects this role or that the governors

perform it. However, to the extent that the expectation does exist, that in itself is a potential resource for the governor.

Legal-Constitutional Resources

The governor has a few miscellaneous constitutional powers that add only small increments to his total influence. He plays a ceremonial role as chief of state that makes him a unifying force. As a result of cooperative federalism he may exercise some leverage as his state's "ambassador" to the national and other state governments.<sup>29</sup> The governor is also commander-in-chief with control over the state police and the national guard. This generally does not directly aid his legislative position. But his response to a natural disaster, university riot, or labor strike may add to his public stature. Most governors have the power to call special legislative sessions. The special session's chief value lies in its potential for focusing public attention on a particularly significant issue, especially when the governor has sole power to determine session business.<sup>30</sup> Finally, the biennial (or annual) message is the basic document through which the governor outlines his policy program and sets the legislative agenda.<sup>31</sup> The message's actual impact is uncertain. It may be a symbolic duty or serve as a rallying point for adherents. At least it offers a legitimate excuse to press a legislative program. All of these resources are only the beginning of power. Their actual impact depends on how they are used.

The veto power can be a potent potential weapon. All states but North Carolina permit a governor to reject a bill. Seventeen states also grant the pocket veto whereby the governor can deny a

bill after the legislative session

Table II-1 The Governor's Veto Power, 1960

Very Strong(4)*	Strong(3)*	Medium(2)*	Weak(1)*
Alabama	Arizona	Arkansas	Indiana
California	Georgia	Connecticut	N. Carolina
Colorado	Idaho	Florida	Rhode Island
Delaware	Illinois	Iowa	Tennessee
Louisiana	Kansas	Kentucky	W. Virginia
Massachusetts	Michigan	Maine	
Missouri	MINNESOTA	Maryland	
Montana	New Mexico	Mississippi	
New Jersey	North Dakota	Nebraska	
New York	Oregon	Nevada	
Oklahoma	South Dakota	New Hampshire	
Pennsylvania	Texas	Ohio	
Virginia	Utah	South Carolina	
	Washington	Vermont	
	Wisconsin		
	Wyoming		

\* Points will be used for the general power index.  
Table is adapted from Joseph Schlesinger in Jacob and Vines, Politics in the American States.

is over when the legislature has no chance to over-ride him. Thirty-eight states allow an item veto for appropriation bills. This gives the governor more potential budgetary power than the presidency. How does the veto power vary from state to state? Frank W. Prescott believed that the crucial factors were: 1) the time the governor may consider a bill after passage 2) the fraction of legislative votes required to over-ride 3) possession of the pocket veto and 4) item veto.<sup>32</sup> Joseph Schlesinger, using Prescott's criteria, divided the states into four categories.<sup>33</sup>

The governor's potential veto power does not say very much about its actual use and impact. On this point there is widespread disagreement. I suspect that no one really knows what the practices are in all fifty states. Prescott's study was completed twenty-five years ago. Recent supplementary information is avail-

able for only about a dozen states. Some argue that the veto is an over-rated tool of minimal value. Frequent use may be a indication of weakness, not strength.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand others claim that the veto is a potent weapon, particularly in a negative sense. Once a veto is used it is seldom over-ridden. Also, the potential of a veto as a threat is incalculable.<sup>35</sup> We do have frequency figures from some states.<sup>36</sup> In the South about 3.5% of bills were vetoed. For the nation as a whole the figure would average from 5 to 7%. There does seem to be a rough relationship between veto potential and use. In Iowa and Nebraska the veto is used almost never. In Florida vetoes are frequently overriden. In strong states like Texas and Michigan there will be from 18 to 22 vetoes a session. And in California, New Jersey, and New York governors averaged from 90 to 290 vetoes a session. However, there are enough exceptions to make this pattern inconclusive. For example, in Arizona, a strong veto state, it is useless as a practical tool. Perhaps frequency does not vary so much by state as by situation. Governors may use the veto more frequently when their legislative parties are in a hopeless minority. There is limited evidence that divided control promotes veto use. However, in general so little is known about the veto power that we will have to use veto potential, not veto use, for comparative purposes.

American governors are, by and large, amateurs at their trade. In three-fourths of the states the average tenure for governors is less than five years.<sup>37</sup> Two related influences apparently promote this high turnover rate. Many states constitutionally limit the governor's tenure. Fifteen states forbid consecutive re-election

to office. Eight others impose a two term limitation. Also, gubernatorial office is more competitive than any other in the states.<sup>38</sup> Re-election comes hard. Table II-2 demonstrates the formal tenure potential for U.S. governors.<sup>39</sup>

Table II-2 The Governors' Tenure Potential, 1960

Four Year Term, No Restraint on Re-election (5)\*

California	Illinois	Utah
Colorado	Montana	Washington
Connecticut	Nevada	Wyoming
Idaho	New York	

Four Year Term, One Re-election permitted (4)\*

Delaware	Maryland	Ohio
Maine	New Jersey	Oregon

Four Year Term, No Consecutive Re-election Permitted (3)\*

Alabama	Louisiana	Pennsylvania
Florida	Mississippi	South Carolina
Georgia	Missouri	Tennessee
Indiana	North Carolina	Virginia
Kentucky	Oklahoma	West Virginia

Two Year Term, No Restraint on Re-election (2)\*

Arizona	Michigan	Rhode Island
Arkansas	MINNESOTA	Texas
Iowa	Nebraska	Vermont
Kansas	New Hampshire	Wisconsin
Massachusetts	North Dakota	

Two Year Term, One Re-election Permitted (1)\*

New Mexico	South Dakota
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\* The points are used for the construction of the General Power Index.

Source: Joseph Schlesinger in Jacob and Vines, Politics in the American States.

Actual gubernatorial turnover very closely follows the potential. An inspection of Joseph Schlesinger's opportunity rate tables show a very high correlation between opportunity for office and tenure potential.<sup>40</sup>

What impact does limited tenure have? The significance lies largely in the governor's experience relative to his potential

rivals.<sup>41</sup> Most state-wide elective officials can expect significantly longer tenure than can the governor. Most have no legal limits on tenure and they are far less competitive electorally. Although the legislative career is transitory for most, the effective leaders are often men of considerable seniority. Most appointive administrators are under civil service and have also served many years in their positions. Other officials regard the governor as a "new boy" who won't be around long enough to affect their long range careers. Moreover, the governor's inexperience is likely to be accentuated by transition practices in most states. They are expected to submit a legislative program, budget, and major appointments within 90 to 100 days of their election.<sup>42</sup> Most do not have staff, funds, and office space as governor-elect. They are under severe time pressure. Even in one party states political friction between the out-going and the in-coming governor may reduce pre-job training to zero. A new man usually submits the old governor's budget and works with his appointees. However, as a governor has longer tenure potential, time to gain experience, and can give an impression of future permanence, his potential power should increase.

The executive dominance approach saw the governor as the prime coordinating force in state government. Most observers agree that the governor does not hold this position. Otto Kerner, former Illinois governor, argues that no gubernatorial power is more important than appointment.<sup>43</sup> Joseph Schlesinger explains why this is assumed to be so.

The most widely appreciated means of controlling officials is the power to name them. Presumably, if a person can name an official, not only is the official beholden to him, but that person can also help to affect the administration by naming someone whose values are close to those he wishes to implement.<sup>44</sup>

Many officials are not beholden to the governor in this fashion. Numerous elected officials owe nothing at all to the governor. With these he is merely first among equals. Even non-elective officials may escape gubernatorial direction. Of all policy officials examined by Deil Wright in all 50 states, the following appointment methods were used: a) by the governor alone (16%) b) by the governor and one or more legislative bodies (29%) c) by a board with governor's approval (11%) f) other (8%).<sup>45</sup>

Even when the governor can appoint department heads or board members, they may serve staggered terms that overlap with his. He then must serve several terms before he can control an entire board or all departments. Finally, governors cannot even remove all of the officials whom they appoint. Only Indiana grants a general removal power. Obviously the governors are not uniformly weak. Joseph Schlesinger has also constructed an index that shows the appointment potential. This is based on appointment procedures used for sixteen major offices.<sup>46</sup>

Table II-3 The Appointive Powers of the Governor, State Rankings, 1960

5 points*	4 points	3 points
79 Tennessee	54 Michigan	49 Iowa
71 New Jersey	54 Vermont	49 New Mexico
68 Pennsylvania	53 Missouri	49 Utah
65 Maryland	52 Oregon	48 Rhode Island
61 New York	51 MINNESOTA	46 California
57 Idaho	51 Washington	46 Nebraska
56 Illinois	50 Connecticut	45 Alabama
	50 Kentucky	45 West Virginia
		43 Arizona
		42 Wyoming
2 points		
41 Nevada	35 Alaska	26 Texas
40 Arkansas	33 Maine	25 South Carolina
39 Kansas	33 Mississippi	23 Delaware
39 Louisiana	31 New Hampshire	20 Oklahoma
39 Montana	29 Massachusetts	18 North Dakota
39 South Dakota	27 Georgia	15 Colorado
38 Wisconsin		
37 Florida		
37 North Carolina		

\* The Points are used for the General Power Index.  
 Source: Joseph Schlesinger in Jacob and Vines,  
Politics in the American States.

What significance does such a formal index have? After all, even if the governor has the legal power to remove an official, in practice he may not wish to risk a showdown with an experienced veteran administrator. Alternatively, an elective official may not necessarily battle the governor at every turn. Also, many elected officials, such as secretary of state, do not have significant contemporary policy powers.<sup>47</sup> Deil Wright presents some evidence that shows the operational significance of formal arrangements. He asked top administrators who exercised greater control over them and who they would prefer to be controlled by. He then compared this to the formal appointive method for each agency.

Results are shown below.<sup>48</sup>

Table II-4 Control and Control Preferences, Administrative Officials, Fifty States

	Present Appointment				
	Governor	Governor and Senate	Board and Governor	Board	Elective
Greater Control					
Governor	57%	41%	28%	15%	9%
Same	18%	26%	30%	30%	11%
Legislature	25%	33%	42%	55%	80%
Control Preferred					
Governor	68%	67%	31%	27%	18%
Ind. Commission	20%	17%	47%	53%	18%
Legislature	13%	16%	22%	20%	65%

Source: Deil Wright, "Executive Leadership in State Administration", Midwest Journal of Political Science XI (February, 1967).

He concluded that there are great pressures undermining central control. Less than a majority preferred gubernatorial control, but they would prefer that to the legislature. However, more felt that the legislature exercised greater control under the prevailing circumstances. A survey of the literature on some twenty states produces less sure confirmation of the classification's reliability.<sup>49</sup> Over half appear to be correctly placed. Some are far off. Indiana has by far the strongest system of gubernatorial control. The governor appoints heads for 150 agencies that report directly to him. They serve at his pleasure and there are no policy conflicts. This power is used to enhance his control over the state legislature. In every administration members of the assembly are appointed to administrative positions. However, it is questionable whether Illinois, Michigan, and Washington are as strong as indicated by the index. In Illinois the governor may have great difficulty with elective heads and with legislative confirmation. Former Governor G. Mennen Williams emphasizes the

great political difficulty with elective officials in Michigan. Arizona, Florida, and Texas can be cited as weak governor states. Former governor (now senator) Paul Fannin vigorously documents the frustrations encountered in the office. Arizona has 99 separate agencies. Only four are appointed by the governor to serve at his pleasure. Sixty agency heads serve longer terms than the governor. An average of 7% of appointments are rejected by the Senate. Florida and Texas governors do make many appointments. However, in Texas the governors power is limited by a well established senatorial courtesy rule. In Florida the elective officers exercise conclusive dominance over the "chief" executive. He is regarded as a junior member in a cabinet where "old hands" exercise considerable legislative leadership. These officials have the most significant patronage power and have built powerful independent personal machines. We can, then accept the appointive power index as relatively valid, but not with as much confidence as the tenure power index.

Aside from the appointment power, what hierarchical control does the governor have? According to the administrative reorganization movement, the governor should head a unified, integrated structure that operates through chain of command. All control and communication channels should be under his jurisdiction. Coleman Ransone characterizes actual administrative organization as a chaotic tangle.<sup>50</sup> There are many departments with overlapping functions, terms, and formal control patterns. Many are independent structurally and financially. Better than any other York Wilbern has characterized the forces that promote this

separatism.<sup>51</sup> Agencies normally desire autonomy and have a long tradition of independence. Clientele, groups, and, especially professionals, seek "non-political" status for their pet functions. The national grant-in-aid systems extends financial and personnel autonomy.

What leverage can administrative control give a governor if he does possess it? Clearly technical and professional information will be of great importance. Increasingly legislative policy problems are highly technical in nature. Few, if any, state legislatures can draw upon the informational sources that Congress has. If the governor has strong administrative backing, few legislators possess the expertise to challenge him. On the other hand autonomous departments can certainly offer friendly legislators alternative data to that provided by the governor. A second source of leverage, patronage, may come more readily to mind. Patronage encompasses a great variety of rewards. Malcolm Jewell includes jobs, state contracts, services (roads, parks, colleges, and buildings), and local legislation.<sup>52</sup> These benefits could be supplied to the legislators' constituents, backers, or to the legislator himself. Eighteen states do not have comprehensive merit system. Fifteen other states added such a system only during the period we are studying.<sup>53</sup> Governors in states such as Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island find patronage to be highly significant. Governors in less developed one party states such as Texas, North Carolina, Kentucky, and West Virginia find patronage a crucial substitute for strong administration control. Such tools are just not available in Wisconsin, Colorado,

Wyoming, Utah, and Washington.

The executive reform movement expected that strong fiscal controls would be the chief executive's most important tool in enforcing administrative coordination. Appointment might indebted a man to the appointer. But, especially where removal is extremely limited, this influence might not persist once the man has the position. On the other hand fiscal controls are a recurring and, to a degree, continuing force. A department's program options are limited by the funds at its disposal. Ideally fiscal tools included budget preparation (with an extensive personal staff), item veto, a single general fund (no earmarking), pre-auditing and accounting, allotment control, and central purchasing.<sup>54</sup> The governor could control all agency requests by requiring central clearance through his personal staff, and could also control the speed and nature of expenditures. These budgetary powers have more than administrative significance. Budgeting is policy-making. In some respects the governor's budget is the single most important measure of his legislative program.<sup>55</sup> Formally the executive budget has been widely accepted, although few governors possess the fiscal controls available to the President. However, neither implementation nor impact are uniform. There are three serious weaknesses. First, most states do not have a single general fund. Most states use special funds so that up to 90% of the revenue may be beyond gubernatorial control.<sup>56</sup> Second, most governors do not have sufficient staff or time to thoroughly consider agency requests and present independent recommendations. Third, potentially the legislature has the unlimited authority to

alter the governor's requests. Thomas Anton concludes that these severe restraints reduce state budgeting to a form of play acting.

A peek into the decision-making black box in most states, I submit, would probably reveal a system in which operating heads consistently request more funds, executive and/or legislative reviewers consistently reduce agency requests, governors consistently pursue balanced budgets at higher expenditure levels, and legislatures consistently approve higher appropriations while engaging in frequent disputes with the governor over revenues.<sup>57</sup>

He asserts that if anyone has effective power in the budget system it is the agency officials and perhaps budget reviewers who follow a mutually understood "pad-cut" pattern. The governor has little influence because he lacks experience, staying power, time, and perspective to overcome the labyrinthian channels of state budget-making. Legislative impact, for much the same reason, is non-existent. In fact, states do not really control their budget systems and any change will necessarily be in small increments to an on-going, self-sustaining mass.<sup>58</sup>

Anton's conclusions are based almost solely on research in Illinois. Ira Sharkansky conducted more comprehensive research on a large number of states. He confirms the conclusions that budgeting is incremental and the legislative role minimal.<sup>59</sup> The governor and the legislature will not raise the agencies' budget unless they ask for it. They probably will cut large requested increases, but some increase remains all the same. Any gubernatorial impact is quantitatively small since agency budgets don't deviate by more than 15 per cent from appropriation to appropriation. Sharkansky does point out, however, that some budgets do differ markedly from the past. Presumably some

abnormal influences are at work at those times.<sup>60</sup> Such forces may be environmental (depression or federal program) or individual (legislative or gubernatorial).

Sharkansky and Anton both find that the legislature plays a minimal budgetary role. In light of this Deil Wright's findings are curious. He asked a nation-wide sample of top state administrators who cut their budgets most frequently. The results were: governor-25%, legislature-60%.<sup>61</sup> There appears to be discrepancies between perception and reported practice. However, whether the perception is accurate or not, it could certainly influence the relative deference that the agency gave to the governor as opposed to the legislature.

How much do the governors vary in their budgetary powers? Again the measuring device will be categories prepared by Schlesinger.<sup>62</sup> He based his categories mainly upon the degree to which the governor formally shared the budget preparation powers with others.

Table II-V The Governors' Budget Powers, 1960

Full Responsibility (5)*		Shares with Civil Service Appointee or with person appointed by someone else (4)*	
Alabama	New Hampshire	Colorado	Maine
Arkansas	New Jersey	Connecticut	New Mexico
California	New York	Kansas	North Carolina
Georgia	Ohio	Louisiana	Rhode Island
Illinois	Oklahoma		
Iowa	Oregon		
Kentucky	Pennsylvania	Shares with another popularly elected official (2)*	
Maryland	South Dakota	Arizona	Vermont
Massachusetts	Tennessee		
Michigan	Utah		
MINNESOTA	Virginia	Shares with several others with independent sources of strength (1)*	
Missouri	Washington	Delaware	North Dakota
Montana	Wisconsin	Idaho	South Carolina
Nebraska	Wyoming	Florida	Texas
Nevada		Mississippi	West Virginia

\*The points are used for the General Power Index.

Source: Adapted from Joseph Schlesinger in Jacob and Vines, Politics in the American States.

Formally, the reorganization movement's principles have been highly successful. Both Sharkansky and Wright found that the governor's actual influence did correspond to his formal power.<sup>63</sup> However, the relationship is modest. Even where the governor has strong formal power, the legislature most frequently is perceived as having the greater negative impact. And where we know a great deal about the budgetary process, as in California and Illinois, the governor's position does not appear to be so formidable.<sup>64</sup>

Potentially the Illinois governor can be the single most important budgetary actor. Formally, he has centralized power over estimates, preparation, allotment, and auditing through a very strong Department of Finance. Although the legislature has an independent budgetary commission, it largely plays a symbolic role. In actuality, however, the participants do not perceive the governor

as a powerful policy force. The most significant actors are the budget superintendent, a twenty year veteran, and the agency budget officials. In California, the governor unquestionably has informal control over the departments. However, the legislator is a greater competitor because of its strong, adequately staffed, legislative analyst. In California, as in Illinois, the greatest check on the governor is the extensive earmarking and special funds. One might conclude that the formal budget categories do reflect the governor's actual preparation powers, especially in relation to the legislature. They probably do not reflect his total power over all administrative fiscal decisions.

Rather than consider each formal power as an isolated variable one should attempt to consider its overall impact as a single index. These measures appear to be cumulative. Joseph Schlesinger concluded that their adoption by a state reflects

Table II-6 A Combined Index of the Formal Powers of the Governors, 1960.

Strong (16-19 points)	Moderate (13-15)	Weak(11-12)	Very Weak(7-10)
New York	Alabama	Iowa	New Hampshire
Illinois	Connecticut	Nebraska	Rhode Island
New Jersey	Ohio	Wisconsin	North Carolina
Pennsylvania	Tennessee	Georgia	Vermont
Virginia	Kentucky	Massachusetts	Arizona
Washington	Michigan	Indiana	Delaware
California	MINNESOTA	Arkansas	West Virginia
Maryland	Nevada	South Dakota	Florida
Missouri	Colorado	New Mexico	Mississippi
Oregon	Idaho	Kansas	South Carolina
Utah	Louisiana	Maine	Texas
Wyoming	Oklahoma		North Dakota
Montana			

Source: Joseph A. Schlesinger in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, Politics in the American States, p. 229.

a unified view of the governor's role.<sup>65</sup> Again remember that form-

al administrative power is not the same as actual power. Deil Wright found a moderate relationship. Where a governor had strong formal powers, administrative heads perceived him in a power standoff with the legislature. That is, strong powers gave him an even chance. Where a governor had weak powers, he occupied a subordinate role in actual power and as a control type.<sup>66</sup>

### Institutional Powers

The Executive Office of the President provides the nation's chief executive with tremendous personal research and control facilities.<sup>67</sup> No state governor even approaches this kind of assistance. Although the trend has been toward larger and more competent staffs, most remain small and informal.<sup>68</sup> Actually, we know even less about the governor's staff than we do about his legal/formal powers. Ransone's survey, done fifteen years ago, showed a range of from 3 to 42 staff members. Most staff members perform clerical-secretarial functions however. Professional advisors range from one to twelve in number. Generally, the larger and more complex the state, the larger the staff. It is difficult to specify exactly what staff people do or how important they are to gubernatorial program success. This varies tremendously with each governor's personality and work style. Generally, the following tasks are performed. One or more persons work on policy oriented tasks. These involve program and budget development, party liasion and patronage, and legislative liasion. Also someone needs to do administrative liasion. Even if all departments cannot be coordinated, someone must deal with the department heads' routine problems. A public relations man acts as

a buffer between the governor and the public. He arranges publicity, press conferences and speech writing. Every governor also needs expert legal advice to check on bill drafting, vetoes, and pardons. Finally, someone must handle routine office house-keeping duties such as supervising clerical assistants, answering mail, and making appointments. In large offices these tasks may be specialized by person. In small ones one man wears many or all hats. Perhaps more important than tasks performed are the functions served. Alan J. Wyner interviewed staff members in fourteen states on this point.<sup>69</sup> In order of significance the functions are: organize information for the governor, create a favorable image, handle details, take the blame for failures, and coordinate the executive branch. Surprisingly legislative liaison functions are not mentioned at all. This seems unbelievable but, if true, would not enhance executive-legislative relations.

As with White House Office people a staff member's outstanding characteristic is his personal loyalty to the governor. Wyner comments on the uniformly intense personal loyalty expected by the staff. This results largely from the selection process. Appointments are neither by administrative merit nor party service but because the governor has confidence in them. Most were either active in his campaigning time personal associates, or served him as staff members in his previous capacity. They are also selected for ideological compatibility with the governor.

How significant are they in the governor's success? How well do they do their jobs? Wyner found that most members were highly satisfied with their jobs.<sup>70</sup> However, outside observers were

uniformly negative. Lobbyists, reporters, and state house people (administrators and legislators) rated staffs high neither on respect nor on effectiveness. Perhaps this is inherent in the job. Wyner comments that while staff members are preoccupied with serving the governor, outsiders want something from the governor for themselves. Such demands cannot always be satisfied. When there is dissatisfaction staffers must be the lightning rods. Aside from this when a staff is very small it is inconceivable that an individual can do all the tasks expected of him. David Allen relates the duties expected of an administrative assistant in Indiana.<sup>71</sup> He drafts bills, reviews, reviews fiscal, personnel, and state contracts, advises the governor on extradition and other quasi-legal problems, maintains legislative liaison, maintains party liaison, and keeps tabs on one hundred departments, agencies, boards, and commissions. He does this with one assistant for routine matters. And this is in an office with ten professional staffers. Of course departments of administration and other agencies may provide additional assistance. But they do not necessarily see matters from the governor's perspective. One would expect that a relatively large and able staff could give the governor at least incremental power. This power factor cannot be classified and compared across state lines. It is simply an item to be considered and checked.

Most scholars assume that the governor has the primary responsibility for preparing, promoting, and executing a legislative program. From the public viewpoint the governor has the best known legislative record. Legislative reaction to this

assumption is uncertain. Although the program might be the cement that binds the governor's administration together, he does not develop it entirely on his own.<sup>72</sup> His role is to draw in, coordinate, and perhaps put his stamp on ideas from many sources. Common sources include administrative agencies, interest groups, party platforms, journalists, legislators, legislative reference services, and previous governors' programs. Assistance in presenting these ideas also comes from many sources. Most rely heavily on their personal staff, especially the legal counsel, for drafting. But because the staffs are so small, he must use outsiders as well. Next in importance would be the department of administration (if any), budget agencies, and administrative departments. He may also receive assistance from party committees, groups, citizens committees, or the university.

As, or more, important as the bill drafting stage is the follow up legislative liaison. There are more possible pitfalls at this stage. Limited staff presents a greater obstacle. First, the governor must convince a friendly legislator to introduce the bill. Desirable sponsors have several important characteristics. He should be a ranking committee member and respected specialist in the substantive policy field. Senior floor leaders are helpful. However, since party lines are not absolute in most states, the governor also seeks as much bi-partisan sponsorship as possible. Defusing the bill as a partisan issue may facilitate passage. All of these desirable steps are not always possible. Also, few outsiders really know intimately the actual power structure within a legislative body, especially as this might change subtly from

session to session. Once the sponsor is chosen, the better organized liaison staffs will supply detailed briefings to them and keep tabs on every bill as it progresses through the legislative process. Usually there are daily strategy meetings during the session.

It is extremely difficult to measure actual program success. Most chief executives are measured by their "batting averages", the percentage of bills or programs that pass the legislature. Of course, not all bills are of equal importance to the governor. Many programs pass in highly altered form. Still, inadequate as these are, the box scores are the only comparative measure yet derived. Even in this form no really systematic comparative work has been done on the governors. The knowledge available is based on diverse studies from individual states. Based on these fragmented reports, most governors that we know about have high success rates.<sup>73</sup> Few governors fall below 50% success and up to 90% success has been reported. Most Southern governors pass 75% or more of their bills. Data on program success is very spotty however. We have little information outside the Southern states. Wisconsin and Arizona are exceptions to this. In Wisconsin program success during the 1950's ranged from 46% to 85%. But Arizona is a far different story. There, the governor is practically helpless. In the legislative sessions from 1921-1963 the governors' success rate was 23%. Success ranged from a high of 40% to a low of 10%. There is little truly comparative data from the West, Midwest, and Northeast. Factors linked with program success are also uncertain. Various scholars speculate that party competition,

divided control, and patronage powers make a difference.<sup>74</sup> Sarah McCally concluded that among two party states degree of competition had little to do with success. The governor was most successful when his party had a small majority or a strong minority in the legislature. A governor's personal popularity in the primary correlated more strongly with success than general election victory. From this she concluded that the governor's personal organizational strength was the key. However, in one party and modified one party states Ransone felt that the governor had a freer policy hand because he was not bound to a party. Here also presumably personal strength would be the key to success.

#### Political Resources

Students of gubernatorial politics unanimously conclude that the governor's state wide constituency constitutes a potent potential resource. Some even assert that this image as the representative of all the people is his greatest asset.<sup>75</sup> No single legislator has as wide and heterogeneous a constituency. Particularly where the legislature was extremely malapportioned the governor likely over-represented an urban constituency, the legislature a rural one. Certainly the governor has superior access to popular publicity channels. As an individual he stands out more in the public eye than a legislator.<sup>76</sup> Most governors capitalize on this potential. A Council of State Governments survey done in 1961 gives some data on public relations use.<sup>77</sup> All hold press conferences and produce news releases. Forty-one have radio programs. And Forty-six make T.V. appearances. Thirty-four keep one or more public relations people on their

staff. The frequency with which these devices are used is not as constant. Seventeen to twenty-three governors used press conferences and news releases only intermittently (less than on a weekly basis). Only eighteen had regular monthly or weekly radio addresses. Sixteen used T.V. on a regular basis. One would hypothesize that frequency of use would increase with competition, the participant quality of the society, and perhaps, the office's formal weakness. No such relationship is readily apparent from the data collected by the Council.

Although most commentators assume that public appeals have a potent legislative impact, there is scant evidence to document this. Public appeals may not have the effect anticipated. If the governor's and the legislature's constituencies diverge too greatly, the legislators may feel no need to heed his appeals. Some governor's constituency may limit as well as aid him. His constituency does contain some specific groups and their very heterogeneity may weaken coalition support on specific bills. Finally, he may dramatize his stand, but there is no assurance that people will contact legislators on any particular issue. Jewell speculates that the impact is more indirect through a sense by local community leaders that the governor personally, and his general program, are popular in the district.<sup>79</sup> Again, one would think that people would be more likely to contact the legislature in a highly participative state. We have no evidence so far to support this.

We have already prepared the groundwork for a discussion of the governor as party leader. This role varies greatly depending

on party competition and organization. Most try to make a sharp distinction between competitive and one-party states.<sup>80</sup> Jewell, apparently supported by Ransone, claims that the governor in a two-party state has an advantage over one in less competitive states. Electorally, the governor may be seen as the party spearhead. Other party candidates, including legislators, may depend on the voters' approval of the governor for their own election. The governor may also claim support from a common symbolic bond with fellow party loyalists. Finally, he does have a ready made organization. Although the two-party governor does not often have undisputed control over the party apparatus, he may use some of the rewards and punishments available to that organization. If local party organizations are strong, they can materially affect a legislator's nomination and campaign success. Acting through the state party organization, the governor may use his official appointment power to advance the career of a legislator or the legislator's friends. The one-party governor must campaign on the politics of personality with no necessary connection to other candidates or offices. Appeals to party loyalty have little meaning in an essentially "no-party" setting. Neither does the one-party governor have a ready made organization. He must build his own. It is unlikely that such an organization can shape the political advancement of others. He may have a marked affect on a legislator's public career through the patronage of his office. But this will be administered entirely separately from any external organizational base.

The distinction between more or less competitive systems is

not so sharp as the preceding discussion indicates. Obviously organization does mean a great deal in some two party states. These are largely concentrated in the Northeast and Great Lakes areas. Party organization would be quite centralized, continuous in leadership, and closely linked to the governor's office when the party was in power. Excellent examples of such states would be Indiana, Connecticut, New Jersey, and, perhaps, Michigan.<sup>81</sup> In most such states now, or in the very recent past, party machines were heavily oiled by patronage from government jobs, services, and contracts. This patronage system was usually controlled by the governor or by a party chairman in close contact with the governor.<sup>82</sup> However, even in most two-party states, the politics of factionalism may undercut the governor. The governor usually stands as the leader of only one faction.<sup>83</sup> And often organization control is practically meaningless as a political power base. An organization that can control neither nomination access, nor offer substantial campaign help, is an unreliable power base. This situation seems especially prevalent in the Western two-party states.<sup>84</sup> In such a personalistic politics the governor's organizational power position differs little from that in the one-party South.

In fact it may be instructive to compare governors in the one-party South to those in the two-party West where organization is weak. Organizationally the Southern governor may have greater opportunities to build a sure base for support. Both are handicapped because few men hold office long enough to build a lasting personal organization. However, many Southern governors have a

ready power base through an accessible and acceptable patronage system.

It is a fairly standard practice now for executive leaders to make a careful tabulation of legislative votes on gubernatorial programs and to tell dissenting legislators that, if attitudes and votes are not changed, they will get no jobs for constituents, no more state aids for rural roads for their districts, no more factors that are the lifeblood of state legislatures. The relationship is not subtle; it is direct, brutal, and it is effective. Executive politicians now can - - and do - - back recalcitrant legislators against the wall and read the riot act to them.<sup>85</sup>

Strictly speaking this is not a power derived from party organization, but from official position. And one-party states are not uniform. Governors in Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Virginia, and Louisiana can operate in this fashion. Legislative practice limits the impact in states such as Texas, Florida, and North Carolina. Still, in economically deprived areas the chance for even minor state jobs may seem attractive. And state services (roads, schools, hospitals), state contracts for area firms, or special local legislation, may be crucial for economic survival. It seems highly unlikely that Western governors in weakly organized states have this organizational substitute. This is not so much a distinction between the presence or absence of formal merit systems. Several sparsely populated Western states have no, or only recently adopted, general merit systems. More crucial perhaps is the public attitude toward patronage. Again we are referring to Daniel Elazar's distinction among moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic states.<sup>86</sup> Presumably in individualistic and traditionalistic states public attitudes would not find patronage especially abhorrent. It would run counter to

moralistic attitudes.


To conclude the discussion of organization, let us turn more directly to the connection between party and the governor's legislative support. It is assumed that the governor will appeal to his fellow partisans for support. This mechanism works in a variety of ways.<sup>87</sup> First, the governor's electoral success gives a claim on legislators. The claim may be purely symbolic identification. It may be an ideological or constituency oriented identification. That is, the legislator may vote with the governor because he believes in the program and/or feels that his constituency has interest similar to the governor's. Sarah McCally's research casts doubts on this linkage. She found no strong connection between either prior post session electoral success. The linkage is more concrete than this. She found the greatest relationship between a governor's post session primary strength and his success. She assumes that success depends on the personal power base the governor can build within the party. The base could be built by threatening a legislator's success within the legislature (committee assignment) or outside it (nomination). This is available to few. Long before McCally's study Ransone concluded that the governor's success was highly personal. A governor must build a bloc of support from wherever he can in both parties.

A high incidence of divided control in two party states reinforces this last point. From 1952 to 1962 only sixteen states had completely unified party control. Only two two-party states had unified control<sup>87</sup> more than 50% of the time. The phenomenon

also appears in modified one party states when the minority party wins the governorship but fails to capture a legislative majority. Up until the 1960's Democratic governors found themselves in this dubious position most frequently. However, with increasing Republican strength in the Border and South, more Republicans have been in this position. Graph II-1 shows the strong relationship between competition and divided control. What does divided control do to the governor's power? McCally suggests that as long as the parties are quite competitive majority control does not much affect a governor's party support.<sup>89</sup> It does however affect his program success. A governor with a strong party organizational base can control his party whether they have a majority or not. For the same reason, though, when the opposition has a majority it will have more reason to oppose him. A governor's party support does diminish rapidly when his party is in either a hopeless minority or an overwhelming majority. This condition applies more to modified one-party states. A minority governor is adversely affected both because his legislative minority is too small to be cohesive, and because the majority won't be eager to cooperate. A majority governor can't count on high party support, but he doesn't need it to achieve success.

Are we any further ahead in our speculations on the conditions for gubernatorial power? Not much. Even McCally's study is based on rather incomplete evidence. There seems to be no absolutely consistent relationship among the many variables, party competition, organizational strength, patronage opportunity, divided control, legislative control, legislative party size, and

GRAPH II-1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUBERNATORIAL COMPETITION AND DIVIDED CONTROL IN THE AMERICAN STATES, 1945-1970



r = .83  
center line represents the regression line

personal organizational strength. Perhaps it would be easier to ignore personal organizational strength for the moment. It seems that the greatest potential control lies in the highly competitive states with very tight party organizations, and with governors in poor, patronage oriented, one-party states. The one-party governor can ignore divided control and so has an advantage over two-party governors. On the other hand he will have to work hard in a short time period to build his support. A two party governor with a long history of strong organization, begins with a reliable base. Divided control provides the obstacle in this system. However, divided control does not mean automatic conflict. In states where party lines do not reflect high principle, conflict may be softened by gubernatorial services to opposition members. In weakly organized two-party states divided control will have marginal significance. A majority governor will have an advantage mainly in that he can rely upon party as a loyalty symbol. A majority governor in a non-patronage modified one party state would be in much the same position except that his unwieldy majority would reduce party support. A minority governor would be in the weakest position. Paradoxically a governor in a moderately strongly organized two party state that is based on ideology should be hurt must be divided control. He should have high internal party support. But the opposing party should be adamant in opposition. And this is an opposition that patronage cannot overcome.

#### Personal Resources

Of all the power resources none is so vague, fluctuating, and

unamenable to precise measurement as the personal resource. Yet most scholars assume that it is an important-determinant of gubernatorial success. This concept has taken on new stature since Richard Neustadt's highly influential study of the presidency.<sup>90</sup> What are personal resources? Mainly they encompass the governor's concept of his office plus his will and ability to implement that concept. Duane Lockard feels that the following traits are involved:<sup>91</sup> Does he have a dynamic and magnetic personality that will attract supporters and inspire loyalty? Can he intellectually and emotionally comprehend the complexity of state problems and operations? Can he effectively communicate his vision and persuade people to follow his chosen response? Does he have the will to power and activity that will enable him to meet opponents head on when necessary? Does he have the political experience and sensitivity to compromise when necessary? Does he have the will to persist and the courage to take needed risks? Scholars assume that the public expects this kind of leadership and that this is the role that governors should play. Yet we know that not all do this. But we do not know under what conditions it is more or less likely to be played. It has been suggested that not all governors have a complete option in choosing their role. The socio-economic systems sets boundaries. In a highly homogeneous, less developed state there may be less urgency to take a dominant position. In a developing, heterogeneous, complex environment pressure for action may well focus on the governor. Legal powers and the political system also channel action. Strong opportunities do not necessarily force a man to be a leader, but again the pressure of expectations

may be stronger. A strong-willed man in a weak legal-political system may overcome these limits to a degree. Yet even the most strong-willed man cannot overcome very specific checks. The basic cause for diversity in performance is the individuals themselves. After reviewing gubernatorial performance in Illinois from 1933-1962 Steiner and Gove conclude:

There is no model or accepted way of being governor in Illinois . . .Governors are individuals, they have each achieved an important degree of political success, and they play their roles according to their individual perceptions of what constitutes success.<sup>92</sup>

This leads to a final point about general attitudes and style. There is no assurance that a strong activist style will lead to success, partly because success is defined so variably. An easy going "curator" governor may enjoy harmonious relations with the legislature and have a high proportion of his limited program passed. A vigorous governor may encounter continued opposition and see most of his program rejected.

This study is concerned more specifically with the governor's legislative role. And there a governor's attitude may depend greatly on his past career. Two basic decisions he must make are how deeply, and in what manner, will he must make are how deeply, and in what manner, will he enter into organizing the legislature, and how will he form legislative strategy. Leslie Lipson states that some of the most effective governors have come from the legislative ranks.<sup>93</sup> And there seems to be a widely held assumption that a governor who emerges from the legislature will have an advantage. He should have built up numerous political contacts and be sensitive to legislative customs. Joseph

Schlesinger argues that there is not much evidence to substantiate this belief. It is true that state-wide and legislative service are the two offices most commonly in the governors' career background.<sup>94</sup> Close to 50% of the governors have been legislators at one time. However, close to two-thirds have also been lawyers and followed a law enforcement career. Actually, the use of legislative office as a career is concentrated in a few states. Most states have very diffuse career patterns. The states that use the legislative office frequently are also less developed, more homogeneous, and tend toward less competition. Besides, only a handful of states had the legislative office as an immediately prior step to the governorship. In most states the governors come to office with extensive political experience but little knowledge of the legislative process. Even some experience in the legislature does not guarantee legislative understanding. Basically, governors follow a different career path from legislators, and especially those legislators who stay on as an efficient minority. A legislator will go on to become governor only if his ambitions and constituency are quite different from the rest.<sup>95</sup> Only a legislator with a constituency very similar to the state has a good chance to go on. So, a governor with legislative experience probably did not have a very long legislative tenure. He also probably had other political experience intervening between this service and his proportion to governor. Finally, we must consider the quality of his legislative career. If he did have different expectations and constituency from most, he probably was not a legislative leader and may in fact have clashed

with the leadership. It is entirely possible that he may carry acrimonious rather than harmonious, relationships into the governors office.

Assuming a governor is disposed to leadership, what tactics might he follow? The most direct would be to organize the legislature to maximize his own interests. This tactic is largely confined to the South. Ransone found that, in contrast to governors in other regions, Southern governors place first priority on their legislative role.<sup>96</sup> There the governor attempts to place his adherents as speaker, president protem, and floor leader. He can also pack important committees. Possibly Northeastern governors have some influence this way in their capacities as party leaders. In other two party states the practice seems non-existent. A comment by G. Mennen Williams, former governor of Michigan, is typical. He states that he shaped the legislature by formulating the party platform. It was far wiser to let the legislative party pick its own leaders.<sup>97</sup>

Consultation, a less direct but less precarious technique is practiced by virtually every governor. Particularly in two party states the governor's best channel will be through his party leaders. Commonly the governor will have weekly or even daily meetings with presiding officers, floor leaders, and relevant committee chairmen to get information on his program's progress and to plan strategy. He may also try to reach the rank and file with small group informal luncheons or breakfasts.<sup>98</sup> Leadership is not by command or controlling personnel, but by persuasion and shaping one's own demands to meet the needs of others.

We have now covered the main gubernatorial powers. However, before constructing a final set of propositions on their importance, we should examine the other side of the power relationship. One's power position does not depend only on his own resources, but on those available to his potential antagonists. In the next section we will review the powers available to the legislature.

#### IV. LEGISLATIVE RESOURCES

Discussing the resources available to the governor reveals only one side of the power equation. One must also consider under what conditions the legislature would be disposed to support or oppose the governor. And what resources does the legislature have to promote its position. Primary points to briefly consider will be legislative weaknesses, legal resources, organizational strength, and the bases for decision-making.

##### Legislative Weaknesses

The state legislature is one of the anomalies of the American political system. It has very few public supporters. Its own members sometimes turn out to be its most inflexible critics. The communications media are most likely to report its affairs when the matters at hand are bizarre or when legislators are intransigent, whether with one another or with the governor. The public reputation of the legislature with the public is seldom as good as its actual warrant to public respect. Its contributions to significant public policy are seen more often as legislative response to the initiatives of others than as a legislative accomplishment . . . . The American state legislature is an institution waning in every respect except resiliency.<sup>99</sup>

It seems appropriate to begin a discussion of legislative resources with a reflection on their weaknesses. Virtually every commentator on the state legislature expresses the view presented by Professor William J. Keefe above. If this widespread assumption is true, it

has enormous consequences for this work. Because if it is true, then the governors may be powerful not because they are so potentially strong, but because their opponents are pitifully weak.

Wherein lies the legislatures' decline and fall? First, most scholars assume that the populace, when they think about the state legislature at all, see it more as a collection of buffoons or a collection of crooks than a defender of popular rights and liberties. Scandals of the early twentieth century, with fresh examples down to the present, contribute to this view. The great reapportionment controversy during the 1950's and early 1960's cast further doubts on the legislature's representative role. Finally, during the twentieth century the governor, with his claim to a state-wide constituency, has wrestled away the claim to the representative function. However, there is not much evidence on the actual popular view. Indeed, considering the legislatures' social characteristics, this low status seems curious. Studies consistently show that legislators mirror their constituents' "birth right" characteristics (such as ethnicity and religion). They rise far above their constituents' wealth, education and occupational status.<sup>100</sup> Legislators are not a cross section of their constituency, but what their constituency would like to be. A major study showing actual public attitudes toward the legislature was done in Iowa.<sup>101</sup> There, the public had a moderately high disposition to comply with legislative acts, and moderately high preference for maintaining a strong legislative role. Significantly, greatest support came from a higher status, higher educated, professional and managerial groups. Laborers, housewives were

less likely to support the legislature. The study concluded that the former group had better information about the legislature and participated more in politics. One might speculate that the low support came from those who couldn't see that they were getting any benefits from the system. Actually, the questions used better measured generalized support for law than for the lawgiver. Also, possibly individuals grant deference to high status legislators, but look with dismay on the legislature as a body.

If the governor has taken over the legislature's role as popular representative, many believe that he then also assumes its role as prime policy initiator. A specific reason for this, and a contributing factor in status decline, is the constitutional limitations on the legislature.<sup>102</sup> These limits are both internal and external. One external limit has been the increased powers given to the governor. Another is the regulation of substantive legislative power. Theoretically, the legislature has all residual powers not given to the national government, not denied to the states, and not denied by the particular state constitution. However, the latter are so numerous as to circumscribe the residual powers. The more detailed the constitution, the more limited the powers. Constitutions embody some statutory type legislation. Most have revenue, debt, and appropriations restrictions. Internally, the constitution usually imposes procedural hurdles such as restricted sessions, small salaries, several readings of bills.

Scholars tend to view these internal limitations as the most serious. These make legislative work an arduous, unprofitable, and part-time job. Amateurs produced by this system cope with complex

contemporary problems only with difficulty. High turnover in state legislatures illustrates the problem. Universally, high turnover is regarded as a weakness. And it is assumed the lower turnover would strengthen the legislative performance.<sup>103</sup> For all of the states one-third to one-half of the legislators are new at each sessions. Moreover few legislators last beyond two terms. Therefore, there are very few legislators with the knowledge and experience to cope with either the system's procedures or the state's needs. This turnover rate implies that most legislators do not view the legislature as significant either in the system or in their own personal lives. Few are defeated. A few more may retire because of rotation agreements in multi-county districts.<sup>104</sup> However, most retire because they cannot see that the legislature will enhance their future careers.<sup>105</sup> Many others leave because of economic loss, personal reasons and the job's excessive demands. As a result many incumbent legislators contribute little to the legislative task. In Connecticut, James D. Barder found that less than one-third were "Lawmakers" (men who were both interested and active in the legislature). Others were "spectators," "reluctants," and "advertisers": these either did not want to be in the legislature in the first place, or received rewards unrelated to the legislative task.<sup>106</sup>

Now, not all legislatures conform to this pattern. Presumably those legislatures with higher salaries, longer sessions, better staff support, would also have lower turnover. They would be more professional, effective, and powerful.<sup>107</sup> A study by John Soule in the Michigan House lends some credence to this. He found that

82% were willing to return. Over 70% of those with future political ambitions were willing to stay three or more terms. He speculates that this is the result of high salaries (\$15,000/year) and extensive increases in staff. However, a general comparison does not reveal any direct relationship between pay and turnover rates. Turnover would more likely depend on the rate of pay for the amount of work expected (length of sessions) compared to the state's socio-economic level. Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert present evidence that a state's level of governmental professionalism is related highly to its industrial-urban base.<sup>108</sup> The most professional legislatures, therefore, should be in highly developed states. There should be a higher potential for legislative power.

#### Constitutional-Legal Resources

In general the basis for all legislative power is its status as the central constitutional decision-maker. Supposedly its actions legitimate standards for community conduct. Its actions are seen as legitimate because it serves as a representative microcosm of the whole community. Admittedly this is idealized. And Charles Adrian argues that actually the legislature has reverted to its ancient role as the body that mainly declares the law and legitimizes it.<sup>109</sup> At the most it criticizes or withholds consent. Still, no matter how weak its initiating power, it must be consulted and so has an opportunity to block action. There are three more specific formal resources. These are budgetary control, administrative oversight, and staff assistance.

If the legislature is to control policy decisions, its chief

formal weapon is the power of the purse. It has the final authority to raise revenue and approve appropriations. Within limits it approves the contracting of debt. Finally, it may audit departmental financial records. But whatever the formal powers, all available evidence indicates that actual legislative review is cursory and haphazard.<sup>110</sup> Most legislators are too inexperienced to effectively cope with a state's financial system. The appropriations procedure alone is exceedingly complex with up to 100 special funds to consider in some states. Many of these funds legally put much revenue beyond the legislature's control. It is true that about two-thirds of the state legislatures have some staff to facilitate budget review, and about half have post audit facilities. But these facilities are not very extensive. Only sixteen states have special legislative agencies for budget review. Others either have some services provided by legislative councils or work is done by appropriation committee staffs.<sup>111</sup> Even many of the special agencies have too few staff members, or they are poorly trained. Even if adequate alternatives are presented, the legislators do not seem to use them for program control. In Illinois neither the Legislative Budget Commission, nor the appropriations committees, nor the whole legislature, have any substantial impact on budget policy. The California legislature is more adequately equipped for making independent judgements. There a Legislative Analyst, with a thirty man staff, provides excellent information. However, overall legislative appropriations are virtually unchanged from the governor's recommendations. Not all governors in every state get everything that they want.

Department heads still fear the great negative potential in the legislature. However, the power appears to be largely potential, not actual.

Administrative agencies could be another direct source of legislative power. These agencies encompass the manpower and expertise to supply legislators with extensive information. And most proposals for legislation come directly from the administrative branch. Although the governor supposedly has sole access to these benefits, his actual control is tenuous in many states. There are many devices by which the legislature could substitute its own authority for his. General lawmaking powers enable it to create agency structure and establish or review programs. Also, virtually all personnel guidelines are set by the legislature. Hearings and investigations can serve as a potential threat. Finally, the legislature may participate directly in administrative decisions through some version of the legislative veto.<sup>112</sup> However, as with other legislative powers, most students do not believe that administrative oversight has much actual importance.<sup>113</sup> The administrative apparatus is simply too large and its problems too technically complex for amateur legislators to have much impact. Also, state legislatures lack the central leadership, staff, and continuity to provide direction.

This deficiency could possibly be corrected by increasing legislative professionalization. Three measures of professionalization, tenure, salary, and legislative session length, have already been discussed. Many writers believe that increased staff services will be the most potent boost to professionalism. The

assumption has been that legislatures need expert information supplied by an experienced source independent of the executive.<sup>114</sup> Services would include policy research, bill drafting, and financial review. Committee and individual assistance has been the weakest feature of legislative services.<sup>115</sup> In 1954 Belle Zeller reported that only twelve legislatures provided staff for committees (and that primarily clerical). This had increased to forty states by 1967, but most assistants were secretarial and on a pool basis. Less than twenty states provide personalized clerical or secretarial assistance to each individual legislator. Even today only six states provide individual office space. The oldest staff services are the legislative reference bureaus. Wisconsin established the first bureau and many more followed. These supply research and technical information, and assistance in bill drafting. Performance has been rated high.<sup>116</sup> The potentially most powerful tool developed has been the legislative council.<sup>117</sup> These are "super" interim committees that oversee staff work on program development. Most are composed of legislative members selected from both houses by the presiding officers. In a few states the governor also appoints members. The staff prepares reports as directed by the council or upon request from individual legislators. Approximately forty-three states have some sort of council. Not all have met with equal success. In Illinois, Wisconsin, and Maryland from sixty to eighty percent of the programs suggested have passed. On the other hand councils are primarily controlled by the governor in Virginia, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Delaware. Obviously, in the second case they are no

source of legislative power. In no case have they perceptibly improved executive-legislative relations. Staff services have not yet uniformly promoted legislative independence and strength. Perhaps with greater funding they will become a more potent tool.

How can one assess the relative importance of formal legislative resources? Precise measurement is not easy. Any scheme must necessarily be crude. However, perhaps an index comparable to Schlesinger's executive power index can be constructed. The index will use four indicators of professionalization: 1) legislative compensation 2) length of legislative session 3) total expenditures on legislative services and 4) number of legislative services performed. The relative importance of these factors have been discussed previously. A high ranking on these will not assure that a legislature has power. However, it should then possess the tools necessary to exercise power if it wishes to do so. Legislative compensation is the total effective compensation in 1960. Session length is measured by the maximum number of effective legislative days available to the legislature in 1960. Legislative services are measured by the total expenditures for the year 1960. And number of legislative services is the proportion for each state out of a possible total of eleven (these include fiscal, research, and legal functions).<sup>118</sup> Each measure was divided into five groups with from five points to one point assigned to each group in order of descending strength. The pointes were then totaled for an overall index.

Table II-7 A Combined Index of Legislative Professionalization,  
1960

Strong (14-19 points)	Moderate(11-13)	Weak(9-10)	Very Weak(4-8)
19 Pennsylvania	13 Florida	10 Arkansas	8 Georgia
18 California	13 Maryland	10 Delaware	8 Indiana
17 New Jersey	13 Missouri	10 Kansas	8 Iowa
17 Ohio	13 Oklahoma	10 Kentucky	8 New Hampshire
16 Massachusetts	13 South Carolina	10 Mississippi	8 North Carolina
15 Texas	12 Colorado	10 Nevada	8 Rhode Island
15 Illinois	12 Connecticut	9 Alabama	7 Montana
14 Michigan	12 MINNESOTA	9 Arizona	7 South Dakota
14 Maine	12 Oregon	9 New Mexico	7 Virginia
14 Nebraska	12 Tennessee	9 North Dakota	
14 New York	11 Louisiana	9 Vermont	6 Utah
14 Wisconsin		9 Washington	6 West Virginia
			5 Wyoming
			4 Idaho

Source: Book of the States, 1961-62

Presumably the higher the index number, the greater the potential power the legislature has.

#### Organizational Setting

If the legislature is to have any force independent of governor, party, or other external actors, it must have its own leadership strength. The stronger this leadership, the more cohesive should the legislature be. Five variables affect organizational strength. These are seniority, informal rules, committee system, caucus organization, and official leadership positions.

Seniority can be dismissed rapidly. It seems doubtful that seniority has the impact in any state legislature that it has in Congress.<sup>119</sup> Nowhere does seniority automatically give men access to power. This is caused primarily by the high turnover rate. Junior members can usually control a chamber if they desire to do

so. Seniority has importance primarily because it gives superior experience in procedural and substantive matters. Seniority's relative impotence may actually enhance the power of others such as party organization and formal leaders. It could also enhance outsider's power. In a few states a small group of senior men do dominate. Examples are Arizona, South Carolina, Virginia, Texas, and Florida. If these groups are cohesive, they can lend organizational strength to the legislature. It is a strength that likely would ignore governor and party.

Informally, many other rules besides deference to seniority grow up in a legislative body. None operate without some "rules of the game". John Wahlke, et. al. The Legislative System is the classic work on such norms.<sup>120</sup> They discuss legislative behavior from the perspective of roles. The rules regulate a legislator's role vis-a-vis his fellows. Functions performed by these rules include promoting cohesion, increasing predictability, limiting conflict, and expediting business. The rules caution a legislator to keep his word, respect other's rights, and keep conflict impersonal. It is impossible to know how states vary on this point. One might speculate that the greater the rule acceptance and the more "club-like" the atmosphere, the stronger the organization would be. James Barber suggests a different set of essentially purposive roles - lawmaker, reluctant, advertiser, and spectator.<sup>121</sup> Significantly, he found that lawmakers constituted only one-third of the Connecticut legislators interviewed. The other three types help in a representative sense but provide little continuity and drive for the legislature. A final role

worth mentioning is subject matter specialist. Most states have subject matter specialists.<sup>122</sup> However, it is probable that these are far fewer than in Congress. Less continuity again means that fewer could accumulate the required expertise.

Although there have been few studies on state legislative committees, most scholars agree that they are not independent sources of strength.<sup>123</sup> Primarily committees and committee chairmen are control instruments used by others. Small staffs, short sessions, high turnover, and no seniority rules weaken committee potential as an independent power base. In most states chairmen are in their first or second terms. Also, most chambers have a huge number of committees. More men have chairmanships, but these are mere ciphers. The largest volume of bills are channeled into a few committees stacked with members loyal to the leadership. These have great power potential, but they are so overworked that they can't make the potential a reality. For example in Louisiana five senate committees have 77% of the bills. Four house committees handle 70% of its bills.<sup>124</sup> Rules, appropriations and judiciary appear to be favorite control committees. Reformers insist that an excessive number of committees disperse responsibility and unduly fragment the legislators' time. Currently, Mississippi leads with ninety-six, New Mexico (of two house legislatures) has the fewest with twenty-three.<sup>125</sup> Presumably, the fewer the committees, the stronger should the legislature be. Thomas Dye speculates that committee strength will fluctuate under the following conditions: 1) committees exercise less independent influence in two party states where party discipline

is high; 2) committees exercise less independent influence in the party states when the governor and legislature are of the same party, but exercises more influence under divided government; 3) in the states when governor, party, or faction exercises strong influence, committees are not likely to play an independent role; 4) in contrast, committees are likely to be influential in one-party states where the governor does not exercise strong leadership.<sup>126</sup> In summary, the committee system is not likely to be an independent source of legislative strength.

The caucus as a leadership tool depends quite heavily on two-party competition.<sup>127</sup> In one-party states caucuses are not needed although ephemeral ones may sometimes function. Caucuses are not inevitable even in two-party states. But in two-party states the majority group is likely to hold caucuses, and many minority groups will then follow suit. Even when a caucus exists its role is highly variable. Some are used only to organize the legislature. Few caucuses are used frequently on policy questions. In these a vote will be taken on most issues but, except in Connecticut and New Jersey, these are seldom binding.<sup>128</sup> In some very strong party states the governor may appeal directly for caucus support on key issues. Caucuses are strong and compelling in states such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. It has a moderate significance for organization and policy in Delaware, Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Colorado and Washington have caucuses for limited policy discussions. Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming use it for organization only. In Oregon and Nevada the party caucus

plays little role. In California both houses had factions that crossed party caucus lines. After 1960 there was some caucus organization in the house but not the senate. Curiously, a few weak two party states use the caucus more than some highly competitive ones. For example, in New Mexico and Maryland the majority party at least uses it for some organizational and policy decisions. In Vermont and Arizona there are strong factional control groups. In most Southern states there are not even any factions of any significance. However, in Florida a senior faction rules through overlapping committee assignments.

The state legislatures would probably need strong leadership if they were to compete on an equal footing with the governor. Traditionally most state legislatures have been formally organized for strong leadership. The central figure has been the presiding officer. In the lower house the speaker is generally the single most powerful figure. In fact the election for speaker, whether along party or factional lines, has been called the glue that holds the organization together.<sup>129</sup> The speaker may select committee members and chairmen. Since he is not tightly bound by seniority, he could switch and demote chairmen who were not loyal. Appointments to major committees particularly are based on personal and issue loyalty to the controlling group. He also has power to assign bills to committee. Where there are numerous committees, he has great discretion. Finally, he presides over debates and floor procedure. No single officer has quite this power in most upper houses. In fourteen states the senate selects its own leader and his power may be comparable to a

speaker. A lieutenant governor probably shares his power with a president pro tem or a leadership committee. Few speakers could be termed czars. For one thing not many have the opportunity to accumulate personal power. Jewell found that in only one-third of the legislatures had a man served for as long as six to eight years.<sup>130</sup> In twenty-three legislatures rotation practices limited the leaders to a two year term. Also, potential speakers must pledge committee assignments to get elected so their future options are limited. Where speakers do serve a long time they probably serve as part of a group of senior insiders.

Leadership committees are an additional power center. These include rules, policy, steering, and committees on committees. The latter are commonly used in upper houses to make committee assignments or appoint conference committees. Steering and policy committees are not ordinarily formalized, but may be a leadership tool for formulating a program and planning strategy. Rules committees are all powerful only near the end of a session when they can regulate a bill's access to the floor in the last minute rush.

Finally, floor leaders may assist presiding officers or be powers in their own right. Not all bodies operate with formal floor leaders. Only about thirty use them regularly.<sup>131</sup> In two party states they may serve as party leaders to plan strategy, regulate scheduling, and act as the manager for administration bills. In one party states, floor leaders, if they exist, are probably chosen by the governor. On a less formalized basis factions may use floor leaders.

How can we classify legislatures on strength of leadership? Based on an incomplete rough sampling of thirty-two states we can divide the states into four groups.<sup>132</sup> First would be the extremely tightly organization through caucus and floor leaders. Here the presiding officer and committees are extensions of the party organization. The leadership can enforce its decisions with party sanctions. States in this category are Northeastern, highly competitive, and highly industrialized. Examples are Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and possibly New York.

The second group also has strong internal organization. However, it has factional power based on long standing senior leadership. Again, the presiding officer and committees are extensions of the in group. The states are one party or very weakly competitive. Examples are Florida, Arizona, South Carolina, and perhaps Virginia and Texas.

The next group has somewhat weaker organization. There are moderately strong leadership tools, but they are not as complete, nor as firmly exercised, as in the first group. Usually the speaker focuses organizational power, probably through a strong rules committee. Caucuses are used both for organizing the legislature and for policy debate. Examples are Delaware, Ohio, Wisconsin (since 1955), Iowa, New Mexico, Maryland, and perhaps Oklahoma. In the case of the last four states, the organizational structure describes the majority party.

The last group might be divided in two depending on the style and degree of weakness. Generally, organization is weak and highly

factionalized. Leadership is highly personalistic and lacks continuity. Again, power centers around the presiding officer. Caucuses, if used, are largely for organizational purposes. Senior men are probably influential, but there is little central control or leadership guidance. Three types of states are included. One are the culturally developed, highly competitive western states. Examples would be California, Washington, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon. Second are some weakly competitive states, South Dakota, New Hampshire, Maine, and possibly Vermont. Finally, some are one-party states. These differ from the above chiefly because no formal caucuses are used. Leadership is purely factional. Senior men are more influential, but they do not use the influence in a fashion independent from the governor. Examples are North Carolina, Mississippi, Arkansas, Kentucky, Alabama, and Louisiana.

#### Party Voting

Most observations on party caucus strength are impressionistic. There is a more objective measure. The party's effect on formal legislative decisions should be some indicator of party strength. How often do legislative parties muster opposing majorities? How internally cohesive are these parties? Roll call votes do not measure all decisions. Not all party voting is based on organizational strength. However, the roll call does reflect a legislator's public record.

As measured by roll call voting, party influence varies greatly from state to state. In many two party states party influence is the most significant of any on voting. In most respects one

party states are no party states and factors other than party take precedence.<sup>133</sup> Not all two party states exhibit the same degree of party voting. And there is no necessary correlation between the intensity of two party competition and party cohesion.

Strong party organization, discipline, and residual party loyalty can be an independently effective source of cohesiveness in some states.<sup>134</sup> As Lockard points out in these states sanctions need not be used often. Legislators develop a habit of conformity. Leadership can be especially effective where the external party can control access to office. This is not usually true since most states candidates are largely self starters. When parties do affect legislative elections, the legislator not only owes the party a direct debt. He is also more likely to have extensive political experience and so be more closely emotionally aligned to the party.<sup>135</sup> Even in organized states party discipline is not pervasive. The party needs support only on its crucial program and organizational issues. Parties will not waste their own organizational resources on non-essential matters.<sup>136</sup>

A second factor linked to party influence on voting seems to be party control. This involves both control in the legislature and control of the governor's office. The standard hypothesis seems to be that the majority party will be more cohesive than the minority.<sup>137</sup> Also, the party that controls the governor will be more cohesive than one that does not. The theory is that the majority will have more at stake. The minority will feel less efficacious because it cannot determine things even if it does stick together. The governorship provides the party with

extra leverage and gives them an incentive to make a record. Few studies have found this hypothesized relationship to be consistently true.<sup>138</sup> First, majority control and gubernatorial control do not necessarily go hand in hand. The hypothesis did not state which factor predominates when they are not congruent. Secondly, the hypothesis did not consider how numerous the legislative party was. Thirdly, it did not specify the overall party competitiveness. Finally, it did not specify whether these variables affected interparty conflict, intraparty cohesion, or party program success. These many factors interact with one another in a very complex fashion. High party conflict (votes with majorities opposed) is associated with divided party control. Closer party balance may increase conflict in two party states, but not weakly competitive states. Neither minority nor majority is consistently more cohesive. But a growing minority party definitely increases its cohesion when it elects a governor. This in turn may force greater cohesion in a party marked by factionalism when it was in the ascendancy. In two party states the majority group will be more cohesive when the two parties are very evenly balanced, especially if it also controls the governorship. In two party states with strong party organization, majority status produces high cohesion whether accompanied by the governorship or not. In two party states with weak organization, the minority is consistently more cohesive. The governor gives marginal strength to his caucus in these states. The same pattern holds true in weakly competitive states. Finally, majority status and control of the governorship does correlate with success.

Constituency base is related to legislative party unity more than any other variable. Consistently, voting studies show that this is the differentiating factor between two party states that have high cohesion and those that have low cohesion. In the larger, highly urban-industrial states, where each party has a substantially different and internally homogeneous constituency, the highest party voting will be found.<sup>139</sup> Usually this means that Democratic constituencies are urban, lower SES, highly ethnic, minority, and blue collar. Republicans are suburban and rural, middle to upper class, and well educated. Frank Sorauf speculates that this gives parties an "inarticulate ideology" derived from constituency interests. Since the constituencies are homogeneous, the legislator can easily suit his constituents' needs by following the party line. When neither party appeals to a clearly differentiated constituency, more legislators may have to choose between constituency and party. This is further confirmed by studying mavericks in strong two party states. Consistently, those who come from districts most atypical of their party are most likely to deviate from party lines.<sup>140</sup> The party is not only its constituency. Constituency influence works within the party mold. Party is still a better predictor than constituency in strong two party states. Competition is also a constituency trait. The general hypothesis is that the more closely competitive the election, the more likely will a legislator be a maverick.<sup>141</sup> Those from safer districts will support the party more strongly. Presumably, a less secure man can less afford to contravene constituency wishes. It may be that

competition has a curvilinear effect. It is possible to imagine that a long time incumbent from an extremely safe district could deviate from the party with relative impunity. It is difficult to determine the independent consequences of competition. Since most highly competitive will also be atypical socio-economically for both parties, the relative impact can't be differentiated.

Party cohesion also varies with the issues under consideration. The party has no reason to take a stand on many matters. Other issues typically promote party battles. Taxes, labor, and appropriations elicit a party response. Matters that affect the party as a group are important. These are legislative organization, elections, reapportionment, local and state administration, and civil service. Finally, some issues spark party battles in industrialized states but less frequently in others. These are regulation of business, education, welfare, and health.<sup>142</sup> Finally, and most significantly for this study, issues on which the governor has taken a stand often become party votes.

#### Alternatives to Party

Even in the strongly organized two-party states some issues are decided by factors other than party. As competition decreases and party organization becomes progressively more feeble, these other factors become more and more predominant. At some point party ceases to have importance and some kind of factional arrangements take over. Occasionally these factions have a stability and continuity that somewhat resembles a party system. Florida and, to a degree, Arizona seem to have this pattern.<sup>143</sup> Some may have a bi-factionalism that is much weaker and shifts from session to

session. Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee, North Dakota, Kansas, and Vermont have been mentioned as examples. However, any bi-factional lines for governor seldom carry over into legislative factional division. A final pattern is true multi-factionalism where legislative cleavages change with each issue. The best example of this is Samuel Patterson's study of Oklahoma. He concludes that "when party organization or stable factional alignments are not available to a legislator, the patterns are likely to become compartmentalized."<sup>144</sup> That is, Patterson found stable opposing coalitions on most educational issues. But there were different coalitions for taxation, a different pattern yet for elections laws, and so on for each policy area.

Variables commonly affecting voting patterns are urban-rural divisions, pressure groups, ideology, and sectional cleavages. Belle Zeller's old study indicated that pressure groups were highly influential in twenty-four states.<sup>145</sup> Nineteen were modified and one-party states. Exceptions came from the West. Groups are seldom the basis for stable factions because each concentrates on a narrow range with issues vitally important to itself. Some liberal-conservative dichotomies are found in California, Tennessee, Texas, Florida, and New Mexico. California has a very marked north-south split. Alabama has a north v. central/south division on issues such as transportation and race. Not long ago political scientists would have almost unanimously accepted the following proposition:

There are metropolitan and non-metropolitan interests, distinguishable and incompatible each will forward its own interest; since the metropolitan areas are over-

represented they will prevail; if the condition was redressed, the metropolitan areas would prevail.<sup>146</sup>

Numerous recent empirical studies challenge this view.<sup>147</sup> At least they indicate that such a view is unjustifiably oversimplified. It is certainly true that in most states rural areas had greater legislative representation than a purely population standard would warrant. It is also true that after reapportionment in the 1960's metropolitan areas gained legislative seats and often majorities. However, David Derge, and others, found that neither metropolitan nor non-metropolitan delegates vote together with great cohesiveness. Especially in strongly organized two-party states, roll call studies consistently showed that party was more important. In the one-party states the urban-rural division may be a more compelling force on its own. In any state internal metropolitan divisions may blur the conflict. By the time reapportionment occurred the suburbs, not the central cities, benefitted most. Suburban interests are by no means compatible with those of the central city. Divisions do occur on some issues. Clearly daylight savings time, colored oleomargarine, race, and reapportionment itself became urban-rural issues.<sup>148</sup> Divisions also occur on state aid for schools and highways, on school district organization, public morals, and on city self-government. General problems in taxes, health, education, welfare, and labor are less consistently found to cause urban-rural strife. One should not conclude then that such factionalism has no importance. Roll call votes do not reveal all decisional patterns in the legislature. Subtle rural control over the legislative power structure may have precluded the raising of crucial issues.

And certainly legislators in many states perceive a real or potential cleavage. It is far too soon to tell what impact recent reapportionments have actually had.

#### V. Environment, Politics, The Governor and the Legislature


This chapter has been devoted mainly to a discussion of gubernatorial and legislative powers. Here will be briefly summarized some environmental variables associated with those powers. Not all of the resources mentioned can easily be linked to those variables for all states. The following will deal with only those that can.

#### Environment and executive-legislative relations

Environmental and political factors are associated with formal gubernatorial powers. Highly industrialized and urbanized states have the greatest powers, as do highly competitive states.<sup>149</sup> (See Graph II-2 for the environmental relationship which is not strong;  $p = .38$ ) Joseph Schlesinger speculates that as the state's problems grow more complex, the governor is given greater potential for coordinating an attack on those problems. However, Schlesinger also cautions against assuming that governors in highly developed states will necessarily have preponderant power. In a highly developed state the governor has more competitors within and outside government than would a governor in a less industrial state. One should especially note discrepancies between the apparent potential complexity of a state's problems and the governor's potential powers. States with gubernatorial powers far below their development level include Massachusetts, Delaware, Indiana, and Rhode Island. States with powers above their

GRAPH II-2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION-URBANIZATION, 1960

INDUSTRIALIZATION-URBANIZATION RANK ORDER OF 48 STATES, 1960



FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE POWER; SCHLESINGER POWER INDEX.

p = .38

center line represents perfect correlation


industrialization levels are Utah, Wyoming, and Montana. There is almost no relationship between competition and formal powers. (See Graph II-3,  $r = .17$ ) So usually a governor will not have both the party resource and strong administrative powers at his disposal. The associations mentioned between environment and gubernatorial resources also hold true for the legislature, although sometimes to a lesser extent. Legislative competition can be predicted quite well from the cultural-affluence level (See Graph II-4,  $p = .72$ ) It must be remembered that when a state has even a relatively high level of legislative competition, its absolute competitive level is generally substantially below that for governor. Industrialization is a less satisfactory predictor for legislative professionalism. (See Graph II-5,  $p = .52$ ) Notice that the legislative professionalism level for almost every state is relatively low.

Connections between competition, environment, and legislative organizational strength exist, but are less demonstrable because of the great subjectivity involved in classifying legislative organizations. Even then the relationships are not absolute as the following table shows.

Graph 11-3 Relationship Between Gubernatorial Competition  
And Formal Powers of the Governors, 48 States

FORMAL POWERS INDEX FOR U.S. STATE GOVERNORS, 1960

HIGH




Gubernatorial Competition, 1944-1968 Elections

$r = -.17$

Center line is the regression line

GRAPH II-4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL AFFLUENCE AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN STATES, 1944-1968




RANK ORDER OF 47 STATES ON LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION, 1944-1968

$p = .72$

center line represents perfect correlation

GRAPH II- 5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZATION-URBANIZATION AND LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALIZATION, 1960

RANK ORDER OF 48 STATES ON INDUSTRIALIZATION-URBANIZATION, 1960



LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALIZATION INDEX; 48 STATES RANKED ON SALARY, SESSION TIME, NUMBER AND COST OF SERVICES, 1960

$r = .52$

center line represents perfect correlation

Table II-8 Relationship Between Industrialization, Political Culture, Legislative Competition, and Legislative Organizational Strength

		Industrialization			
		1st Quartile	2nd Quartile	3rd Quartile	4th Quartile
Legislative Competition	1st Q*	S,S,M-S,M-S, "M-W"	"M-W"	"M-W", "W", "W"	"M-W" "M-W" W
	2nd Q*	S,S,M-S,"M-S" M,M	M-S,M,"M"	"M"	(M-S) W
	3rd Q*	M	"W"	(M-S) "M", "M-W" "W", (W)	(M) "W", "W"
	4th Q*		(M-S) (M) (W) (W) (W) (W)	(M-S), (M) (W)	(M) (W) (W)

Sources: Industrialization- Hofferbert, "Socio-Economic Dimensions of the American States" Midwest Journal of Political Science (1968); Elazar, American Federalism, on political culture; legislative competition, see Table I-4.

S=Strong  
M-S=Moderately Strong  
M=Moderate  
M-W=Moderately Weak  
W=Weak  
no sign=Individualistic  
" " =Moralistic  
( ) =Traditionalistic

With few exceptions even the moderately organized legislatures are in states that are highly industrialized, competitive, and have an individualistic culture. California and Washington have less organization than most competitive, industrialized states. Michigan is more strongly organized than most moralistic states. Wyoming and Nevada, both Western, are the only weakly organized, individualistic states. Arizona is an isolate, being a competitive, low industrialized state with a traditionalistic


culture, and still having strong organization. Among less competitive states, there is no clear relationship between industrialization and organization. All of the moralistic states but Kansas in this group are weakly organized. Several of the traditionalistic states have strongly organized factional leadership, but this does not appear to be related to industrialization.

#### Executive and Legislative Resources

One thing that becomes apparent from the foregoing is that generally speaking when the governor has highly developed resources, so does the legislature. That is, a state that possesses the requisite environment for high gubernatorial competition or strong formal powers, will also have the requisite environment for high legislative competition and professionalization. Where there is the base for strong party organization, there will also more likely be a base for strong legislative organization. The major deviations from this are the states to look at. One would likely find the most obvious gubernatorial strength or weakness in those states with the greatest discrepancies in gubernatorial or legislative resources. It should still be kept in mind that a similar ranking on legislative competition or power and gubernatorial competition or power does not imply the same absolute strength. The governor's absolute power position would still likely be greater.

Actually, the relationship between gubernatorial formal power and legislative professionalization is very weak. (See Graph II-6,  $r = .17$ ) There are enough extreme deviations to give the overall scattergram the pattern of almost a square. States

GRAPH II-6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALIZATION, 48 STATES



R = .17

center line represents regression line

where the legislature has a far higher rank than the governor would include Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Maine, Nebraska, Florida, and South Carolina. States where the governor would have far higher rank than the legislature would be Washington, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Montana, and Virginia.

It was argued earlier that divided control hampered the executive-legislative relationship. At least when each is controlled by a different party there is no strong incentive toward cooperation. The best predictor of the incidence of divided control is competition, but gubernatorial, not legislative competition. Malapportionment, another variable assumed to cause divided control, does not show the expected patterned relationship. In fact there is a weak tendency to reverse expectations. The higher the malapportionment, the less divided control. (For conformation see Graph II-1, Graph II-7, and Graph II-8.) This means that in those states where the party is most disposed to support the governor, it is highly likely to be in a minority.

#### VI SUMMARY


In the United States the relationship between the executive and the legislature has most often been a struggle for dominance. The promising framework for evaluating this struggle is the bargaining approach. This assumes that no actor in the decision-making process has complete or dominant control. Each actor's relative power position depends upon the resources available to him, and the resources available to his potential competitors.

Resources available to the state governors can be divided into legal-constitutional, institutional, political, and personal.



GRAPH II- 8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDED CONTROL AND LEGISLATIVE MALAPPORTIONMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES, 1944-1970

DIVIDED CONTROL: PERCENTAGE OF YEARS WHEN SAME PARTY CONTROLLED BOTH GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE, 1940-1970



INDEX OF URBAN-UNDERREPRESENTATION, 47 STATES, 1960

r = -.40

center line represents regression line

No governor in any state is likely to have a maximum position on all of these. Governors in highly industrialized competitive states, with a strong party organization, are likely to rank highly on the first three. However, where party organization is strongest, the incidence of divided control will also be highest. Then the political resource is partially negated. States high on cultural- affluence, and also competitive, will likely have strong formal powers and wider opportunities for popular appeals. In this case party organization is lacking. States with lower industrialization and cultural affluence do often have lesser gubernatorial powers, particularly in the political area. The pattern on formal power is mixed. However, governors in traditionalistic states can often make up for this weakness by wide use of patronage powers. Also, one should not only consider the absolute power level. One must consider the governors' powers in light of the problems and potential competitors in their environment.

The legislature as a potential competitor is generally in a somewhat weaker position. They are less competitive politically and most do not have a high degree of professional and organizational strength. Still, many have a strong negative position. Also, states with more competitive and more professional legislatures also are most apt to have strong gubernatorial powers. That is governors with strong power advantages are likely to be faced by legislatures with strong power advantages. The clearest incidences of gubernatorial power or weakness should occur in those deviant states where there are the greatest discrepancies, positively or negative, in resources.

## Chapter II-Footnotes

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2. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, (Chicago: Science Editions, 1962) p. 33.
3. Polsby, op. cit., pp. 102-4; Egger, op. cit., p. 138; J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process, (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 5-6.
4. Polsby, *Ibid.*, pp. 8-14, 102; Egger, *Ibid.*, pp. 139-41; Galloway, op. cit., pp. 238-9;
5. Egger, *Ibid.*, pp. 141-4; Galloway, *Ibid.*, pp. 236-7; Freeman, op. cit., pp. 13-15; MacNeil, op. cit., pp. 16-21.
6. Egger, *Ibid.*, p. 145; Galloway, *Ibid.*, pp. 241-2; Polsby, op. cit., pp. 113-5.
7. Polsby, *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6; Richard Neustadt, "Politicians and Bureaucrats" in David Truman (ed.) Congress and the American Future (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965) pp. 116-20.
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10. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
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12. Lipson, op. cit., pp. 239-40.
13. Roy Morey, Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, Institute of Government Research, 1965) pp. 1-2; Rich, op. cit., p. 4.
14. Morey, *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
15. Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration", American Political Science Review, L (1956), pp. 1057-1073; For a fuller description and reflections on the reform attitude see Rich, op. cit.; Byron R. Abernethy, Some Persisting Questions Concerning the Constitutional Chief Executive, (Lawrence, Kansas: Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas, 1960), A.E. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); Roy Simmons, "American State Executive Studies" Western Political Quarterly, XVII (1964); Lipson, op. cit.; York Wilbern, "Administrative Organization" in James Fesler (ed.), The Fifty States and Their Local Governments, (New York: Knopf, 1967); and Ferrel Heady, State Constitutions: The Structure of Administration, (New York: National Municipal League, 1961).
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31. Jewell (1962), op. cit., p. 107; The actual impact seems uncertain. See Morey, op. cit., p. 46; Carley, op. cit., pp. 47-63; William J. Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 381-2.
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33. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, (eds.), Politics in the American States, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 227.
34. Morey, op. cit., p. 105; Lockard (1963), op. cit., pp. 392-3; Rich, op. cit., p. 20; Ransone (1956), p. 213; William C. Harvard and Loren Beth, The Politics of Misrepresentation, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1962), p. 199: For material on the item veto see Lockard (1963), pp. 392-3, Prescott, op. cit., p. 105; Prescott concluded that the item veto was a rusty gun behind the door, p. 111.
35. See Lockard (1963), *Ibid.*, pp. 392-3; Jewell (1969), op. cit., p. 67; Lipson, op. cit., p. 210-1.
36. Nationally see Prescott, op. cit., p. 102. For the South see Prescott, "The Executive Veto in the South", Journal of Politics, X (1948), pp. 667. For a survey on state practice see Harvard and Beth, op. cit., p. 199; Fred Gannt, The Chief Executive in Texas, (Dallas: University of Texas Press, 1964), pp. 178-82; George Spicer, "Gubernatorial Leadership in Virginia", Public Administration Review, I (1941), pp. 451-2; Samuel S. Solomon, "The Governor as Legislator", National Municipal Review, (1951); pp. 515-7; Rich, op. cit., p. 198; Duane Lockard, The New Jersey Governor, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 123; Morey, op. cit., pp. 105-6 45; Francis Aumann, The Government and Administration of Ohio, (New York: Crowell, 1956), pp. 96-8; Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison: Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 1968), pp. 329 and 336; and McCally, op. cit., p. 927.
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51. Wilbern, op. cit., pp. 345-53.
52. Jewell (1962), op. cit., pp. 120-1.
53. Schlesinger (1965), op. cit., p. 216.
54. Heady, op. cit., p. 19; Wilbern, op. cit., p. 314; Ransone, (1956), op. cit., pp. 283-6.
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76. Lipson, op. cit., pp. 206-7; Ransone (1956), op. cit., pp. 116, 163; Lockard (1963), op. cit., pp. 373-4.
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89. McCally, op. cit., pp. 935-8; This point and the rest of the paragraph rely heavily on McCally's work.
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93. Lipson, op. cit., p. 217; see also Joseph Schlesinger, How They Became Governor, (East Lansing: Government Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957); Schlesinger (1966), op. cit., p. 15; Council of State Governments, op. cit., pp. 2-5.
94. Schlesinger (1966), *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 84-7, 196-8.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 205.
96. Ransone (1956), op. cit., pp. 139, 149; See also Lipson, op. cit., pp. 216-7 and Karl Rosworth, "Policy Making" in James Fesler (ed.), The Fifty States and Their Local Governments (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 329-32.

97. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
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99. William J. Keefe, "The Functions and Powers of the State Legislatures" in Alexander Heard (ed.), State Legislatures in American Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 37; see also Lockard (1969) *op. cit.*, pp. 257-60; Wilder Crane and Meredith Watts, State Legislative Systems, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 2-5; Jewell (1962), *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9; and Thomas Dye (1965), pp. 169-70; The remainder of this section presents a composite of these views.
100. Dye (1965), *Ibid.*, p. 166.
101. G.R. Boynton, et. al., "The Structure of Popular Support for Legislative Institutions", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), pp. 167-70.
102. Keefe (in Heard), pp. 47-50; Belle Zeller (ed.), American State Legislatures, (New York: Crowell, 1954).
103. Zeller, *Ibid.*, pp. 63-4; Crane and Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Keefe (in Heard), *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 66-7; Dye (1965), *op. cit.*, pp. 120, 161; and Duane Lockard, "The State Legislator", in Alexander Heard (ed.), State Legislatures in American Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 103-5.
104. Malcolm Jewell, Legislative Representation in the Contemporary South (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967).
105. Wahlke, et. al., *op. cit.*, pp. 121-30.
106. James D. Barber, The Lawmakers, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 20.
107. John Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (1969), pp. 422, 453-4; however, Lockard claims that there is no relationship to turn over patterns (in Heard), *op. cit.*, pp. 103-6.
108. Sharkansky and Hofferbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 870-2, 875-7.
109. Charles Adrian, Governing Our Fifty States and Their Local Communities, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 52-3.
110. Anton (1966), *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7, 95-8, 109-111, 158-61, 175-77, 246; on California see Doubleday, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-6, 48-55, 77-9, 91, 115-9, 128-9, 152-3; for further confirmation on other states see Beth and Harvard, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-9 (Florida), Dolan, *op. cit.*, p. 58 (del.), Alexander Lacy (ed.) Political Power in American State Legislatures, (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1968), pp. 50, 115-6; exceptions may be found in Texas, Benton, *op. cit.*, pp. 133, 155-6, and Ohio, Aumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.
111. Crane and Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-76; The Book of States, 1966-7, (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1968), pp. 174-8.

112. Little has been done to investigate this tool on the state level; see W.W. Boyer, Bureaucracy on Trial, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). In contrast a great deal has been done on Congress; see Joseph P. Harris, *op. cit.*, Chapter 8; Joseph Cooper, "The Legislative Veto: Its Promise and Perils", in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour Harris (eds.), Public Policy, 1956, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Peter Schauflyer, "The Legislative Veto Revisited" in Public Policy, 1958, Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour Harris (eds.), (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1958); Malcolm Smith and Cornelius Cotter, "Administrative Accountability", Western Political Quarterly, X (1957).
113. Keefe and Ogul, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-401; Keefe (in Heard), *op. cit.*, pp. 45-6; Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 178, 183-5.
114. Zeller, *Ibid.*, pp. 124-5; Alexander Heard (ed.), State Legislatures in American Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 154-62; Donald G. Herzburg and Jess Unruh, Essays on the State Legislative Process, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
115. General information from American State Legislatures: Their Structure and Processes, (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1967), pp. 19-23, 42-45; for information on committee staff see Zeller, *Ibid.*, p. 156; for individual staff see John Wahlke, "Organization and Procedure", in Alexander Heard (ed.), State Legislatures in American Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 135; on California see Doubleday, *op. cit.*, p. 32; on Mississippi see Lacey (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3, 86, 89.
116. Zeller, *Ibid.*, p. 142; William J. Siffin, The Legislative Council in the American States, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), esp. pp. 24-36; for a critical view see Normal Meller, "Policy Positions of Legislative Service Agencies", Western Political Quarterly, V (1952), pp. 112-9.
117. For the most complete discussion see Siffin, *Ibid.*; also see Zeller, *Ibid.*, pp. 127-37, and Crane and Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 67. States with successful experiences are described in Siffin (Illinois) pp. 138-54, (Wisconsin), p. 188; Frank Burdette (ed.), The Legislative Process in Maryland, (University of Maryland: Bureau of Government Research, p. 75. Less successful experiences are described in Harvard and Bath, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-6 (Fla.); Lockard (1959), *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50 (Mass.); Alan Clem, Prarie State Politics, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1967), p. 100 (South Dakota); Dolan, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-6 (Del.); Spicer, *op. cit.*, pp. 449-50 (Virginia); Siffin, pp. 163-80 (Kentucky), and Lacy, *op. cit.*, p. 55 (La.).
118. Book of the States, 1960-61, (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1962).
119. Jewell (1969), *op. cit.*, pp. 53-5; Keefe and Ogul, *op. cit.*, p. 391.
120. The discussion on legislative roles is based on the following: Wahlke (1962), *op. cit.*, pp. 143-8, 153-162;

120. (continued) Barber, op. cit.,; Wayne Francis, "Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body", American Political Science Review, LVI (1962), pp. 953-60; Samuel Patterson, "Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System", Western Political Quarterly, XIV (1961); and Charles Bell and Charles M. Price, "Pre-Legislative Sources of Representational Roles", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (1969). The work is summarized briefly in Dye (1965), pp. 175-181.
121. Barber op. cit., pp. 214-5.
122. Francis (1963), op. cit., pp. 954-7; Dye (1965), op. cit., p. 181.
123. Representative sources are Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 179-81; Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 52-3, 96; Crane and Watts, op. cit., pp. 61-5. For examples on specific states see Paul Beckett and Celeste Sutherland, "Washington State Lawmakers", Western Political Quarterly, X (1957), p. 189; Lacy (ed.), op. cit., p. 4; Dean Mann, "The Legislative Committee System in Arizona", Western Political Quarterly, XIV (1961), pp. 933-7.
124. Lacy (ed.) op. cit., pp. 47-8; for similar experiences in other states see Ross, op. cit., p. 55 (Iowa); Caldwell, op. cit., p. 67 (New York); Burdette, op. cit., pp. 36, 43 (Maryland); Harvard and Beth, op. cit., pp. 136, 148 (Florida); and Mann, op. cit., p. 931 (Florida).
125. Crane and Watts, op. cit., pp. 62-3.
126. Dye (1965), op. cit., p. 180; for examples see Lockard (1959), p. 282 (Connecticut); Rich, op. cit., pp. 80-1 (New Jersey); 2) Doubleday, op. cit., p. 51 (California); Ross, op. cit., p. 115 (Iowa); 3) Anton, (1966), op. cit., pp. 156-65 (Illinois), Gilbert Y. Steiner and Samuel K. Gove, Legislative Politics in Illinois, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 20, Lacy (ed.), op. cit., pp. 43-4 (Louisiana); 4) Harvard and Beth, op. cit., p. 148 (Florida).
127. The general discussion of caucus use relies heavily on Jewell (1969) op. cit., pp. 48-51.
128. Examples of strong caucus states are found in Jewell (in Heard), op. cit., p. 89; Lockard (1959), op. cit., pp. 151, 157, 163, 218, 281-2, 298; Rich, op. cit., pp. 80-1. On moderate caucus states see Dolan, op. cit., pp. 53-4; Carley, op. cit., p. 311; Curtis Martin and Rudolph Gomez, Colorado Government and Politics, (Boulder: Pruett Press, 1964), pp. 34-40; R. J. Huckshorn, "Decision-making Stimuli in the State Legislative Process", Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (1965), p. 24; Frank H. Jonas (ed.), Western Politics, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1961), pp. 200, 218, 264, 324; Doubleday, op. cit., pp. 148-9; William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California, University of California Publications in Political Science, Vol. XIII, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 2-4, 51-3, 82-3; Dean R. Cresap, Politics in the Golden State, (Los Angeles:

128. (continued) The Hayne Foundation, 1954), pp. 52-4. For weakly competitive states see Lockard (1959), p. 116; Clem, op. cit., p. 107; Holmes, op. cit., pp. 246, 255-6; Burdette, op. cit., pp. 29, 33, 36. In one party states see Harvard and Beth, op. cit., p. 107.
129. The discussion of the speaker relies largely on Jewell (1969) op. cit., pp. 37-8, 42.
130. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
131. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
132. See Bibliography, Part IV and Part VII for sources.
133. Jewell (1969), op. cit., p. 107; Ranney (1965), op. cit., p. 89; Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 155-6, 185-8.
134. Lockard (1963), op. cit., pp. 293-5; Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 113-4; Dye (1965), op. cit., p. 188.
135. The general discussion of campaigning is based on Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 29-31 and Lockard (in Heard), op. cit., pp. 109-110. Examples from specific states may be found in Holmes, op. cit., pp. 219-20, 243; Jewell (1967), p. (4), pp. 44-5, 51-76, 82-9, 123-6; Wahlke (1963), op. cit., pp. 96-9; Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 171-2; Leon Epstein, Politics in Wisconsin, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), p. 93; Sorauf (1963), op. cit., pp. 89, 118-9, 144-6.
136. Lockard (1963), op. cit., p. 304; McCally, op. cit., p. 934.
137. Sorauf (1963), op. cit., pp. 137-9; Wahlke (1963), op. cit., pp. 344-6; Malcolm Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures", American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), p. 785; Charles W. Wiggins, "Party Politics in the Iowa Legislature", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XL (1967), pp. 89-90.
138. The rest of the paragraph is based on the following: Jewell (1955), op. cit., pp. 774, 785; Jewell (1969), op. cit., p. 116; Dye (1965), op. cit., p. 197; McCally, op. cit., pp. 923, 931-8; Wiggins, op. cit., pp. 87-9, 93; Clem, op. cit., pp. 108-9; Hugh LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates", Party and Constituency Influences", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (1969), op. 37, 56.
139. For the major commentaries on constituency influence see Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 109-112; Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 187-8; Ranney (1965) op. cit., p. 89 for general summaries. For more specific studies see Jewell (1955), op. cit., pp. 774, 786; Key (1956), op. cit., pp. 242-62; Sorauf (1963), op. cit., pp. 125, 151; Le Blanc, op. cit., pp. 56-7; Robert W. Becker, et. al., "Correlates of Legislative Voting: Michigan House of Representatives, 1954-61", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (1962), p. 391; John C. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Voting", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII (1963), p. 345.
140. For summaries see Keefe (in Heard), op. cit., pp. 42-3; Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 189-91; Crane and Watts, op. cit., p. 87. For specific studies see Sorauf (1963), op. cit., pp. 141-2; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legis-

140. (continued) tature", Western Political Quarterly, XIV (1961), p. 478; Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors", American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), pp. 62-6; Pertti Pesonen, "Close and Safe State Elections in Massachusetts", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII (1963), p. 62.
141. Jewell (1969), op. cit., p. 123; Keefe (in Heard), op. cit., pp. 42-3; Sorauf (1963), op. cit., pp. 140-1; Flinn (1964), op. cit., p. 67; Pesonen, op. cit., p. 62. Evidence from Michigan contradicts this see Becker, et. al., op. cit., p. 384.
142. For examples see Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 116-7; Jewell (1955), op. cit., pp. 788-9; Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 186-7; Lockard (1959), op. cit., pp. 154, 280. For studies that are not so consistent with this see LeBlanc, op. cit., pp. 40-1, 56; Grumm, op. cit., p. 346; and Wiggins, op. cit., p. 94.
143. On Arizona see Morey, op. cit.; For Florida see Harvard and Beth (1962), op. cit., Loren P. Beth and William C. Harvard, "Committee Stacking and Political Power in Florida", Journal of Politics XXIII (1961), pp. 57-83, and Malcolm B. Parsons, "Tensions and Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System", American Political Science Review, LVI (1962), pp. 605-14. For other examples see Jewell (1962), op. cit., pp. 645.
144. Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Legislature", Public Opinion Quarterly XXVI (Summer 1962), p. 200.
145. Zeller, op. cit., pp. 190-1; for other commentaries see Jewell (1969), op. cit., p. 74, and Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 192-4.
146. David Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations", American Political Science Review LII (1958).
147. Derge, ibid.,; Dye (1965), op. cit.; Flinn (1964), op. cit., Robert S. Friedman, "The Urban Rural Conflict Revisited", Western Political Quarterly XIV (1961); Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment", Social Forces (Winter 1964), pp. 256-61.
148. Dye (1965), op. cit., pp. 162-3; Jewell (1969), op. cit., pp. 119-20; Murray Clark Havens, City V. Farm, (U. of Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama Press, 1957), esp. pp. 17, 23, 30, 49.
149. Schlesinger (1965), op. cit., pp. 230-1; Using a different measuring device Sharkansky and Hofferbert present independent confirmation of this, Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit., pp. 869-72: Using a factor analysis they discovered what they called a professionalism-local reliance factor. This factor reflects a high degree of professionalization for legislature and judiciary, and a high reliance on local government for financing. Administrative professionalism and gubernatorial power are also associated, but not to the same degree. This factor correlated highly with

149. (continued) industrialization but not cultural-affluence. When the governor has great formal powers, so will the legislature. Patronage is also less likely to be a resource and local constituencies will not be as dependent on the state.

## CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODS

### Introduction

This thesis' contribution to comparative state politics will not be by examining every state, but by probing one in some depth. The previous chapters isolated those variables most relevant to understanding executive-legislative relations. This chapter summarizes the major hypotheses about those variables. Then the state will be classified along the several variable dimensions, establishing some expectations about variations in the relative strength of gubernatorial powers. After that, by seeing where Minnesota ranks among all of the rest, one can establish expectations about gubernatorial power in that one state. The balance of the chapter will specify how these expectations can be tested within Minnesota. Also, special attention must be given to the officially non-partisan legislature and its possible affects upon power relations.

### I. HYPOTHESES

The many variables discussed in preceding chapters can be conceptualized as falling into one of three dimensions - - environmental, gubernatorial, or legislative. Sixteen variables are included. The environmental dimension encompasses industrialization, urbanization, education, income, ethnicity, race, and political culture. Direct gubernatorial variables include gubernatorial competition, participation, formal powers, party organization, and divided control. Finally, legislative variables include legislative competition, apportionment, legislative professional-

ization, and legislative leadership. Following are sets of propositions for each dimension.

A. Environment and Politics

- 1. Proposition One - The greater the states cultural-affluence, the greater will be its party competition. (moderate; see Graph I-3)
- 2. Proposition Two - The greater a states cultural-affluence, the greater will be its political-participation. (moderate; see Graph I-4)
  - a) Corollary - The greater the participant quality in a society, the greater will be its political participation.
- 3. Proposition Three - The greater a states industrialization-urbanization, the more proportionately equitable will its apportionment system be. (moderate; see Graph I-5)
  - a) Corollary - The more urbanized a society, the more the demand for and power by urban citizens.
- 4. Proposition Four - Moralistic and Individualistic cultures will have high political competition. (moderate; see Table I-9)
  - a) Corollary - States with a traditionalistic culture will have low competition.
- 5. Individualistic cultures will have moderately high participation.
  - a) Corollary One - Moralistic cultures will have moderate participation.
  - b) Corollary Two - Traditionalistic cultures will have low competition. (moderate; see Table I-10)

B. Political Variables.

- 1. Proposition Six - The higher a states political competition, the higher will be its political participation. (moderately strong; see Graph I-10)

C. Environment, Politics, and Gubernatorial Power.

- 1. Proposition Seven - The greater the complexity of the socio-economic system, the greater the focus upon the governor and popular expectation of action by him.
  - a) Corollary One - The greater the complexity of the state's socio-economic system, the greater should be the governor's formal power potential. (moderately weak; see Graph II-2)

2. Proposition Eight - The greater the state's industrial development, the stronger the party organization. (strong; see Table I-11)
  - a) Corollary One - The greater the party competition, the stronger the party organization. (moderately weak; see Table I-11)
  - b) Corollary Two - The stronger the party organization, the greater the leverage the governor will have (over his party members) in the legislature.
  
3. Proposition Nine - The greater the participant quality of the state, the greater should be the governor's public opinion potential.
  - a) Corollary One - The higher the participant quality, the greater the potential audience the governor has.
  - b) Corollary Two - The higher the participant quality, the greater the numbers who would potentially present demands to the legislature.
  - c) Corollary Three - The higher the malapportionment, the greater the governor's potential power as a popular spokesman.
  
4. Proposition Ten - Individualistic cultures should have the strongest professional party organization. (strong; see Table I-11)
  - a) Corollary One - Moralistic and Traditionalistic cultures should have weaker professional party organizations. (moderate to strong; see Table I-11)
  
5. Proposition Eleven - In Moralistic and Individualistic cultures the public opinion power potential should be moderate to strong. (moderate; see Table I-10)
  - a) Corollary One - In a Traditionalistic culture, public opinion potential should be weak. (strong; see Table I-10)
  
6. Proposition Twelve - The stronger the party organization, public opinion potential, formal power, and personal resources, the greater should be the governor's legislative success.
  - a) Corollary One - The greater a governor's power sense, political experience, and legislative knowledge, the greater should be his personal resources.

#### D. Environment and the Legislature.

1. Proposition Thirteen - The greater the socio-economic complexity of a state, the greater its legislative competition. (moderately strong; see Graph II-4)

2. Proposition Fourteen - Moralistic and Individualistic cultures have the greatest legislative competition. (moderate to strong; see Table II-7)
  - a) Corollary One - Traditionalistic cultures have low legislative competition. (strong; see Table II-7)
3. Proposition Fifteen - The more industrialized-urbanized the state, the more equitable the apportionment system. (moderate; see Graph I-5)
4. Proposition Sixteen - The more industrialized-urbanized a state, the greater the legislative professionalization. (moderate; see Graph II-5)
5. Proposition Seventeen - The more industrialized-urbanized a state, the stronger the legislative-leadership organization. (moderate; see Table II-7)
6. Proposition Eighteen - The greater the legislative competition, the greater the legislative leadership organization. (moderately-weak; see Table II-7)
  - a) Corollary One - In competitive states, legislative organization will be weaker in moralistic cultures than in individualistic. (strong; see Table II-7)
7. Proposition Nineteen - The greater the industrialization-urbanization, legislative competition, and legislative organization, the greater the caucus voting cohesion. (moderate)
8. Proposition Twenty - The greater the legislative professionalism and internal organization, the stronger will be the legislative power potential.

#### E. The Governor and the Legislature

1. Proposition Twenty-one - The greater the governor's power potential, and the less the legislative power potential, the greater will be the governor's program success.
2. Proposition Twenty-two - In competitive states, the stronger the party organization, the greater will be the governor's legislative party support.
3. Proposition Twenty-three - In politically competitive states, the stronger the party organization, the greater the governor's program success.
  - a) Corollary One - In competitive states, the stronger the party organization, the less the governor's success under conditions of divided control.

- b) Corollary Two - The greater the legislative malapportionment, the less the divided control. (moderately-weak; see Graph II-8)
  - c) Corollary Three - The greater the legislative competition, the greater the divided control. (moderate; see Graph II-7)
4. Proposition Twenty-four - In modified one-party states, the greater the governor's legislative majority, the less the legislative support for his program.
- a) Corollary One - The governor's program success is unaffected by the size of his legislative majority.
  - b) Corollary Two - For a minority party governor, the greater his legislative party size, the greater his support and success.

Since these propositions are restatements from earlier chapters, little space will be devoted to explanation. After each proposition there is a note evaluating the strength of the relationship. Evidence for this evaluation is based on correlation studies cited previously and graphs found in chapters one and two.

A state's cultural-affluence level explains both legislative and gubernatorial competition better than the industrialization level. There is a moderately strong positive relationship between legislative and gubernatorial competition, with legislative competition being markedly lower for most states. There is a moderate relationship between environment and participation and there is also a modest relationship between participation and competition. Within the competitive group of states there is not a clear differentiation. But one can find a sharp break between the one-party states and the rest. Political culture shows only a moderate relationship with gubernatorial competition. This is not strong except that traditionalistic states have much lower competition than the rest. The same comment applies to culture and participation. Traditionalistic states are uniformly low.

However, slightly more individualistic states than moralistic states have high participation.

The propositions connecting environment, politics, and gubernatorial power cannot be fully tested on a nation-wide basis. This work on Minnesota will be a start on this task. A few propositions can be checked out, however. For example, the relationship between environment and gubernatorial formal powers is not impressive. When either industrialization or cultural affluence are used separately, the relationship appears to be very weak. Also, party organizational strength is not directly related to competition. Only those competitive states that are also highly urban-industrial, and have individualistic cultures, have developed really strong party organizations.

The hypothesized relationships between environment and legislative characteristics also appear. There is a reasonably strong connection between cultural affluence and legislative competition. A less satisfactory relationship exists for industrialization and legislative professionalism. And the relationship between malapportionment and environment is moderate. Connections between competition, environment and legislative organizational strength exist but are less demonstrable. Actually, rather less is known about professionalization and organization on a genuinely comparative basis than is known about the governors. Information on these factors is very weak, crude, and incomplete.

Testing the final set of hypotheses will be the major task in this paper. Work by Sarah McCally, discussed previously, provides empirical evidence for the propositions on gubernatorial support

and success. The hypotheses proposed go one step beyond McCally in attempting to explain her results. Proposition Twenty-one applies primarily to one party states. There, competition, party control, and legislative party size has no meaning and so can profitably be eliminated from the equation of gubernatorial success. However, this proposition as it stands is too simple for other states. One must differentiate between competitive and weakly competitive states. One must also differentiate among the competitive states. Party organization and legislative party size are not so important to a majority governor in a limited competitive situation. He can well afford to "write off" votes from his large surplus. However, a minority governor in the same situation cannot. Also, he almost inevitably faces a divided control situation that reduces his power some. Governors in highly competitive states with strong party organization have advantages with a ready made instrument for control. However, the very strength of party cohesion makes divided control a serious obstacle. It will be much more difficult to build a bi-partisan coalition. A governor in a weak party organization state does not have the ready made instrument. However, neither is divided control so serious. If party means little, divisions between parties will have relatively little impact on legislative operations. The governor will probably build his own coalition regardless of which party controls. The link between divided control and competition is quite strong. However, divided control does not have the same impact in all situations.

## II. CLASSIFICATION OF GUBERNATORIAL POWER

Based on the above propositions one can construct an ideal situation for maximum gubernatorial influence and success. Conversely, an absolutely minimal situation could also be constructed. Obviously, no state conforms to either ideal type. There are a wide range of possible situations in between the two extremes. Because there are so many possible combinations with mixed results for gubernatorial power, it may be impossible to rank the actual states on degrees of gubernatorial power potential. One may be able to construct several groups in between the two extremes. These may differ not so much in the level of power as in gubernatorial style. That is, while overall resource levels may be the same, quite different resource styles will be available to the governor in each type.

Table III-1 Idealized Gubernatorial Power Configuration

- A. Maximum Power
  - 1. Environment
    - High Industrial and Cultural Development
    - Individualistic Culture
  - 2. Gubernatorial Power
    - High Competition, Strong Party Organization
    - High participation
    - Unified party control
    - Strong Formal Powers
  - 3. Legislative Power
    - High legislative competition
    - Low professionalism
    - Weak organizational leadership
    - High malapportionment
  
- B. Minimal Power
  - 1. Environment
    - Low Industrial and Cultural Development
    - Traditionalistic Culture
  - 2. Gubernatorial Power
    - Low competition, weak party organization
    - Low participation
    - Divided control
    - Low formal power
  - 3. Legislative Power
    - High professionalism
    - Low malapportionment
    - Strong organizational leadership

The classification system developed is necessarily crude. States were ranked on each variable dimension. Rankings were divided into quartiles. For political culture, party organization, and legislative organization, states are assigned their qualitative designation. (See Appendix I) Then by inspection states were grouped according to similarity of rankings. Probably one-fourth of the states cannot be uniquely placed with any single group. Even within the larger clusters there are smaller groupings of states. These groupings are outlined in Table III-2.

Table III-2 American States Classified by Gubernatorial Power

Group I.

A. Environment	
Highest Industrialization	Connecticut,
Moderately high culture	Massachusetts,
Individualistic culture	Pennsylvania,
B. Governor's Power	New Jersey, New York,
Moderately high competition	Rhode Island,
Moderate to strong party organization	Indiana, Delaware,
Moderate to high divided control	Ohio, Illinois
Moderate to high formal power	Maryland
C. Legislative power	
Moderate to high competition	
Moderate to high professionalization	
Moderate to strong party organization	
Moderate to good apportionment	

Group II.

A. Environment	
Moderately low industrialization	Colorado, Idaho,
High cultural affluence	Nevada, Utah
Moralistic culture	Oregon, Wyoming,
B. Governor's Power	Montana
Moderate to high competition	
Moderate to high participation	
Moderately weak party organization	
Moderate to high formal power	
High divided control	
C. Legislative Power	
High legislative competition	
Moderate to low legislative professionalization	
Moderate to weak legislative organization	
Mixed apportionment	

## Group III.

- |                      |   |                |
|----------------------|---|----------------|
| A. Environment       | Moderate to low industrialization         | South Dakota,  |
|                      | Moderate cultural affluence               | North Dakota,  |
|                      | Moralistic culture                        | Vermont, Iowa, |
| B. Governor's Powers | Moderate to low competition               | Kansas, Maine, |
|                      | Weak party organization                   | New Hampshire  |
|                      | Moderate divided control                  |                |
|                      | Moderately low participation              |                |
|                      | Moderate to low formal power              |                |
| C. Legislative Power | Moderately low competition                |                |
|                      | Moderately low professionalization        |                |
|                      | Moderate to weak legislative organization |                |
|                      | Moderate to high malapportionment         |                |

## Group IV.

- |                      |   |                        |
|----------------------|---|------------------------|
| A. Environment       | Moderate to low industrialization         | Kentucky, Tennessee,   |
|                      | Low cultural affluence                    | Alabama, Louisiana,    |
|                      | Traditionalistic culture                  | Georgia, North         |
| B. Governor's Powers | Low competition                           | Carolina, Mississippi, |
|                      | Low participation                         | Arkansas, Florida,     |
|                      | Moderate to weak political organization   | Texas, South Carolina  |
|                      | Low divided control                       |                        |
|                      | Moderate to low formal power              |                        |
| C. Legislative Power | Moderate or weak legislative organization |                        |
|                      | Moderate to low professionalization       |                        |
|                      | Moderate to high malapportionment         |                        |

## Isolates

- Michigan (I)
- California, Washington (II)
- Wisconsin, Minnesota (II and III)
- Nebraska (III)
- Missouri (I and IV)
- Oklahoma (III and IV)
- Arizona, New Mexico (III and IV)
- Virginia, West Virginia (IV)

Source: See chapters one and two of this thesis.

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Governors in Group I states have great potential power politically, formally, in popular appeal, and in personal opportunity. In Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Indiana governors might be handicapped by weak formal powers. The legislatures in those states do have strong potential power. However, this strong position can be turned to the governor's advantage if the men in control would follow him through party loyalty. On the other hand governors in these states can seldom fully wield their power potential for their own party rarely fully controls the legislature. The predominant style for governors would be that of party leader. Secondarily, he might be an administrative leader and popular spokesman. Success would be highly variable depending greatly, but not absolutely, on legislative control.

In Group II the governor has a ready made political organization neither within or without the legislature. Here the style would be more that of administrative head and popular spokesman. The governor's success potential would seem to be fairly great, perhaps depending on how well he can develop his own organization. The legislature would not be in a good position to oppose him if it wishes to do so. Even if the opposing party controls the legislature, this may not mean much to gubernatorial success. Except at a symbolic level the opposing legislators may have neither the organization nor the disposition to oppose him.

In some respects the governors in Group III would have the least power but not necessarily the least success. At best they would have only a moderate power on any dimension. A governor's

power may be based more on his own personal resources here than in any other group. His success may be fairly large for two reasons. First, the demands on the governor in this system would not be unduly great. Certainly they would rarely be of a crisis nature. So the governor's program may not be extensive or controversial. Second, the legislature is not in a great position to oppose the governor. Although perhaps more than in any other group the relative powers of the two forces are evenly balanced.

Finally, Group IV contains three distinct sub-groups. Generally, governors in this group would neither have party organization nor great public appeals potential. In Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana, however, the governor is in a strong position. He possesses relatively great formal powers. The legislatures are weakly lead and organized. In Florida, Texas, and South Carolina, however, the governors have relatively weak powers, and the legislatures are moderately well organized. In Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Arkansas, both are relatively weak. Even though few governors in the entire group have strong powers, they don't face the great potential opposition present in Group I. Also, unlike the governors in Group II, they have patronage powers that can be effective in their underdeveloped states. A personally dynamic governor can probably have greater legislative success than one in any other group.

Unfortunately, Minnesota must be viewed as an isolate state. However, it does seem clear that states in groups I and IV can generally be excluded as models. Minnesota would fall somewhere between Groups II and III. It also possesses similar character-

istics to isolates such as Wisconsin and Michigan. In view of this one can study Minnesota most effectively by considering each dimension separately. For each variable it will be best to examine those twelve or sixteen states that rank closest to Minnesota, no matter which quartile they fall into. Environmentally, Minnesota most closely resembles Connecticut, Oregon, Utah, Idaho, Iowa, New Hampshire, Maine, Kansas, South Dakota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Washington. On the gubernatorial dimension Minnesota was closest to Connecticut, Indiana, Rhode Island, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Oregon, Montana, Iowa, and Oklahoma. On the legislative dimension it is closest to New York, Delaware, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Missouri. Minnesota's isolate position can be clearly seen from the many states that have some relationship to it. Environmentally it was aligned with the West and Midwest. On the gubernatorial dimension it is related to the West and East. Legislatively it has a connection with the isolate states and the South. Considering all three dimensions we should take the following for models: Connecticut, Indiana, Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

### III. THE MINNESOTA POLITICAL SYSTEM

Based on the system-wide classification one would expect Minnesota to demonstrate the following characteristics:

- 1) Moderately high on industrialization and cultural-affluence
- 2) Moralistic political culture
- 3) Politically competitive for the governorship
- 4) High popular participation
- 5) Moderately high

formal gubernatorial powers and 6) Moderately high malapportionment. It is not possible to predict in advance party organizational strength, gubernatorial style, or gubernatorial success. Also, legislative operations present a special problem because of legal non-partisanship. However, based on what is known, one should be able to predict how these factors will perform, and test to see if the expectations are true. Specifically, the following hypotheses will be tested.

1. Proposition One - Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrialization and cultural level, there should be a relatively high popular expectation for gubernatorial leadership.
2. Proposition Two - Since Minnesota has a high cultural level, high participation, and a moralistic culture, the governor should have a high public opinion potential.
3. Proposition Three - Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrial and cultural development, and a moderately high formal power potential, the governor's formal powers should be a moderately high potential resource.
4. Proposition Four - Since Minnesota has high party competition, moderately high industrial development, but a moralistic culture, its party organizational strength is not entirely predictable. At best the party will be a moderate source of gubernatorial strength; the probability would be a moderate to weak party organization.
5. Proposition Five - Since Minnesota has a moderately high cultural affluence and a moralistic political culture, there is a great potential for moderately high legislative competition.
6. Proposition Six - Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrial level, but a moralistic culture, there is potential for moderate to weak legislative organization and moderate voting cohesion.
7. Proposition Seven - Since Minnesota has moderately high professionalism and moderate to weak organization potential, there is potential for moderate legislative power.
8. Proposition Eight - Since Minnesota has only a moderate to weak organizational potential, potential party contribution to governor's support and success would be modest at best.

9. Proposition Nine - Since Minnesota has a moderately high potential for divided control, but only a moderately weak party organization potential, divided control would not greatly affect gubernatorial success.
10. Proposition Ten - Since Minnesota has a moderately-high public opinion and administrative power potential, but a moderately-weak party and legislative organizational potential, gubernatorial resources would be no more than moderate.

The first three propositions would appear to be self-explanatory. Those on party organization and the legislature are not. Party organization will be discussed first. In the area of gubernatorial power Minnesota clearly has marked similarities to both Eastern and Western states. Both have relatively high political competition. Minnesota's industrialization level draws it more toward the rather strong party organization found in the East. However, its moralistic culture should draw it toward the weaker party organization found in the West. Minnesota's historical political experiences have little in common with the East. Our conclusion is that, since not even all the moderately industrialized states have a tight party organization, we can expect Minnesota to have only moderate organizational strength at best. The actual organizational level would have to be found by empirical examination.

The legislature presents a more difficult problem. If the legal non-partisanship reflects an actual practice there is no point in discussing party organization. If legal non-partisanship reflects an actual non-partisanship, the governor would have no party leverage available to him and his power potential would be weakened. He would have the popular, formal, and personal resources to draw on. However, one cannot assume that legal non-partisanship

will reflect the actual conditions. The reference point here is to local non-partisan politics. There has been considerable empirical research on this.<sup>2</sup> There appear to be three predominant patterns. First, political parties may go right on operating under the non-partisan facade.<sup>3</sup> The best example of this is Chicago. Even when national party participation is removed politics does not necessarily cease. Organizations that perform all the functions of parties may grow up on a continuing basis. They may even function under local party labels. However, in most non-partisan cities continuing organized activity does cease and politics becomes a highly personalized, candidate oriented affair. Again, we cannot definitely conclude what shape legislative activity will take without empirical observation. We can start with two alternative hypotheses.

The first hypothesis assumes that the legislature is non-partisan in fact. This does not mean that there would be no legislative organization and discipline. One might find continuing groups performing some, or all, party-like functions. These would be to seek and support candidates, choose legislative officers, present and discuss legislative policy issues, and provide voting cues. Or there might be no or highly fluid organization with decision-making being essentially personalistic. In either case communication with an outside party organization or the governor would be unlikely. If one accepts that a one party system is the same as a non-party system, the most appropriate models would be the one party legislatures. As was previously indicated, Minnesota does have marked similarities to Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Arkansas on legislative

characteristics (excluding competition). Most, except South Carolina, have a weakly organized legislative leadership. There is little organizational discipline on voting, although South Carolina and Tennessee have a mild, and declining, bi-factionalism. These seem to have a genuine "non-partisan" system with little legislative organization. Decision-making is personal and based on fluid factions. Where there is organization, as in South Carolina, it is centered around senior officers and committee leaders.

However, these Southern states provide inexact models for Minnesota with such different cultural-affluence, political culture, and external competition systems. On these variables the more competitive Midwestern and Western states would be closer. It might be well to first consider Nebraska and California. Both had legal provisions that partially negate the "natural" legislative system. Nebraska is the only other non-partisan legislature. It is similar to Minnesota in apportionment and legislative professionalism. By all accounts Nebraska does have a genuinely non-partisan system. There is a lack of both strong organizational leadership and factional voting.<sup>4</sup> California is a more interesting example, partly because we know more about it. William Buchanan produced an excellent study on California using non-partisanship as a model.<sup>5</sup> California legislators were elected on a partisan ballot. However, the cross-filing provision in the primaries, combined with the strong anti-party philosophy from the Progressive period, severely weakened parties as an organizational force. From 1934 to 1960 the legislative situation fluctuated between non-partisanship and a very modest partisanship.<sup>6</sup>

However, California legislators did not operate without any organization. Even during the most non-partisan period it did have factions organized around the struggle for presiding officer. And these factions were fairly stable from 1951-1960. Other Western states such as Idaho, Oregon, and Utah also have partisan elections. However, at best they have only very moderately organized legislative leadership. And they seldom have much more than very moderate partisan voting on roll calls. In most states party majorities would be opposed on less than one-third of the roll call votes. So, if Minnesota practice would follow this model, party would count for little whether there was formal party designation or not.

There is one more set of states that resemble Minnesota aside from competitive factors. These are Kansas, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Michigan. All have party designation. Most are moderately competitive for the legislature. Kansas and South Dakota are close to being one party. However, it would be inaccurate to say that these states were non-party for the whole period under consideration. All except South Dakota have at least moderately well organized legislative leadership. Party considerations do not completely dominate the legislative process. However, party majorities are opposed forty to sixty per cent of the time. The party cohesion index ranges from fifty to sixty. If Minnesota followed this model, clearly non-partisanship would be a facade that masked actual party divisions.

It is possible then to predict several alternative models for Minnesota legislative practice. If it followed true one

party practice, or the Nebraska and earlier California models, there would likely be true non-partisanship. A completely fluid situation would be as likely as factionalism. Probability would indicate that the legislative leadership would not even be well organized or modest at best. In this situation the governor would be completely deprived of party contact. He would have to build his own legislative coalition. And he would have to do this without the strong patronage powers available to Southern governors. His power would be weakened and his success should be lessened also. If it followed the Western model the situation would not be far different. Whether party designation existed or not, party would not be a particularly strong resource except as a basis for symbolic appeals. There is no evidence that the legislative party has very strong campaign ties to the external party under these circumstances. Party members do not vote together with any great consistency. Temporary groupings, not parties, settle most issues. The governor, especially a minority governor, will have an advantage in the absence of organized party opposition. His success will definitely have to be based on popular and administrative, not party or patronage, leadership. There is a third possible pattern. It may be that there are factions with a party base that are at least moderately well organized. These can be counted on to hang together on about half the votes. Probably a majority governor will have far more votes than he needs and won't have to rely on party much for success. A minority governor might face more opposition than under the Western model. Even here, party (or faction) support

would be only a modest power resource.

#### IV TESTING HYPOTHESES

The first procedure will be to examine the possible power resources available to the Minnesota governors. For each governor formal powers, public opinion leadership, political organization, and personal resources must be evaluated. The first two should be relatively constant for all governors during the period. The Schlesinger index shows where Minnesota ranks on formal power potential. One task will be to see if this general, crude index has any specific substantive meaning. Based on material taken from the Minnesota Legislative Manual the legal requirements for tenure, veto power, budget powers, and administrative appointment can be examined in more detail. Also, personal interviews with both governors and legislators should show how influential this power is perceived to be in practice. Finally, one can examine how important these powers were for each governor. That is, how are they actually used? How many years do governors serve? How many bills are vetoed per session? What proportion of key office-holders does a governor actually appoint in each term? The same process will be repeated for political organization and public opinion powers. This evaluation must be largely based on interviews and secondary sources. However, more precise information on primaries and general elections success can be gathered from the Minnesota Legislative Manual. Public opinion support can be examined through public opinion polls taken from the Minneapolis Star and the Minneapolis Tribune. An evaluation of personal resources will come exclusively through interviews and secondary sources. Based on these four resource types we can

roughly rank each governor from greatest to least power potential and outline the predominate style for each.

Secondly legislative resources must also be evaluated. Here again source material will be primarily The Minnesota Legislative Manual and interviews with veteran legislators. The manual supplies basic data on rules, committee assignments, committee structure and leadership positions. Legislative respondents were not chosen randomly (See Appendix II). Because such a long time period was covered, resources were more effectively used by selecting only those who had served eight years or more. A representative sample was not desired. What was desired was a sample of men with the experience to discuss legislative activity over a period of time. An attempt was made to see that the whole time period was represented. Also, the sample had a proportional representation from both caucuses (Conservative and Liberal or DFL) and rural/urban areas. A special effort was made to contact those who had held leadership positions. Finally, a few men were suggested by other respondents as being especially knowledgeable. Unfortunately, not all men selected responded. Some had died or moved out of the state. Some were unavailable because of age or illness. A few refused outright to be interviewed. Crucial omissions include Charles N. Orr (Senate majority leader 1935-1949), Archie Miller (Senate majority leader 1949-1959), John Zwach (Senate majority leader 1959-1966), Charles Halsted (House minority leader 1945-1946), and Roy Dunn (House majority leader 1939-1954).

Since the level of legislative professionalism is already

known, most attention will be devoted to discovering leadership and voting structures. Who are the leaders? How much directive power do they have? What are the major leadership tools? What are the basic voting alliances? Most information will come from the interviews. That is, judgements about power will be essentially attributed power. A second measuring device will be legislative committee assignments. This was used by William Buchanan in California and Malcolm Parsons, William Harvard, and Loren Beth<sup>8</sup> in Florida. Minnesota has a caucus structure divided into Conservatives and Liberals (DFL). A fairly good indicator of this caucus affiliation is the vote for Speaker in the House and President Pro Tem in the Senate. Once the caucus affiliation for each legislator is established one can find which caucus the major committee chairmen come from. Also, one can evaluate the proportionate distribution of caucus members on important and less important committees. (Committee importance is based on attribution by the members). A second factional basis to be evaluated will be metropolitan v. non-metropolitan divisions. Again, the proportionate distribution of chairmanships and committee assignments can be measured. Finally, power within the majority group must also be considered. Is there a small group that controls, or is power completely decentralized? For each man one can specify the proportion of important assignments to total committee assignments. In each case a larger than proportionate assignment to important committees will be taken as evidence of group or individual power.

Roll call voting is a second technique for evaluating

factional divisions. Primarily students of legislative politics have measured the strength of pre-determined blocs-caucus and rural-urban. The frequency and strength of these blocs can be measured by techniques developed by Stuart A. Rice.<sup>9</sup> Only contested roll calls are used. Contested roll calls will be defined as those in which 10% or more of those present and voting differed from the prevailing side. One can then determine what proportion of all contested votes had majorities from each faction opposed. Secondly, the Index of Cohesion will measure how internally alike each faction was on these contested votes. An Index of Cohesion is derived by finding for each group the percentage voting yea and the percentage voting nay. For each group the percentage for the minority position is subtracted from the percentage for the prevailing position. For example, if a group votes 75 for and 25 against a proposition, the index would be found by  $75\% - 25\% = 50$ . This measures internal cohesion. The Index varies from 0 to 100. Roll call votes should not be viewed as a definitive expression of legislative decision-making. One cannot assume that a legislator will act at other stages in the decision process as he acts at the voting stage. Also, it is difficult to infer causality from roll call voting.<sup>10</sup> However, roll call voting does at least reflect the public positions of the legislators. Also, the researcher does not have to rely entirely on the roll calls. The interpretation can be supplemented by studying committee assignments, private interviews, and public press accounts. Further, the Index of Cohesion based on roll calls has the advantage of comparability. Since indices have been computed for many states, one can at least judge how Minnesota caucuses performed compared to party

organizations in other states. If the legislature was non-partisan in fact, one would expect caucus voting and cohesion to be below that in other states. Of course, even if there is caucus cohesion, it cannot be assumed that the caucus functions as a party outside the legislature or in its relation to the governor. That must be tested by other means. Finally, bloc voting can be computed not only on all contested roll call votes, but on roll calls in specified issue areas. If the legislature is non-partisan in fact, one would expect that different divisions would form on each issue, as was the case in Oklahoma.<sup>11</sup> But, it has been clearly shown that parties are more cohesive on some issues than on others. If the caucus blocs also show great regularity on these issues, it would be some indication that the group performs party-like functions.

This examination of legislative structure is largely a preliminary to the primary concerns. The main task is to evaluate the major elements in gubernatorial support and program success. Success will be measured by a familiar "box score" such as can be found in the Congressional Quarterly material on the President. A legislative program has been constructed for each governor. Program items were taken from the governors' addresses and budget messages, newspaper accounts, and personal interviews.<sup>12</sup> Using the Minnesota Journal of the Senate and the Minnesota Journal of the House for 1945-1969, program items were linked to specific bills. A list of these bills was presented to the governor for confirmation. Bills that were not definitely acknowledged as being part of the program were eliminated. Then a simple percentage

figure of items passed to the total items presented will stand as the Index of Gubernatorial Success (note that one bill may contain more than one program item). The efficacy of gubernatorial powers will be tested by comparing the ranking of governors on power factors to their ranking on success scores. Overall one would expect a moderate success level. Southern governors enjoy very great success, 75 to 80 per cent. Some Arizona governors have seen only 15 to 20 percent of their programs pass. A U.S. President generally has a success rate in the 50 percent range. A Lyndon Johnson who could get two-thirds of his program through was very successful indeed. Therefore, to consider a 40 to 50 percent rate as moderate seems reasonable.

To evaluate more specifically what legislative elements contribute to gubernatorial success roll call votes will once again be used. For each governor all program bills that encountered contested roll call votes were assembled. From these were selected a smaller number for analysis. Usually no more than two roll calls were used for any one program item unless the votes on that item clearly involved distinctly different issues. It was felt that to use, for example, ten votes on one bill in a sample of 30 votes would unduly inflate that bill's importance in the overall program. This is especially true since many votes on a single bill may be on redundant procedural motions. This set of bills may be subject to two separate analyses. One evaluates the relation between session political conditions and the governor's success. The other examines

patterns of individual and group support for the governor.

The first analysis follows work done by Sarah P. McCally. She developed an Index of Administration Support and an Index of Administration Success. These were then correlated with variables on electoral competition, party structure and control of the legislature. The Index of Support is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by the party members who voted for the governor by the total number of party members who voted. The session index will be the average for all administrative program votes. <sup>13</sup> The Index of Success is obtained by dividing the percent of those who voted in favor of the governor by the percent of his party votes he needed in order to pass his legislation. <sup>14</sup> Again an average is used for the entire session. Of course the caucus will be substituted for party to compare its performance to that of other states. Then product-moment correlations are run between the indices and the political variables. The variables are: 1) Electoral - mean % of vote for seven elections preceeding sessions won by the governor's party, % of preceeding seven elections won by the governor's party, governor's % of pre-session vote, and governor's % of post session vote; 2) Party structure - Governor's % of total primary vote, pre and post session, governor's % of highest two primary candidates, pre and post session; 3) Control of legislature - % of seats held by governor's caucus, absolute number of seats held by the governor's caucus. <sup>15</sup> Actually only the governor's post session primary support and party % of legislative seats have very strong relation to the indices. And the relationship

between party % of seats and legislative support is negative. Primary success is the most important variable. And this is true whether the governor has a legislative majority or not. Presumably primary success demonstrates the governor's strength within his own organization and this serves as a potent program leverage. McCally also found that majority control makes a difference for success, but not for support. The number of seats held has an inverse impact on support. This set of explanatory variables is evidently incomplete, however, In McCally's work the variables accounted for only 44 percent of the governor's support variance, and 30 percent of his success variance.<sup>16</sup>

In the Minnesota setting one would expect party strength and legislative seats held to be of even less importance. That is, in a genuine non-partisan setting, caucus control should make little difference in partisan terms. Personal factors, such as gubernatorial electoral and primary success should be magnified. If caucus control does make a difference, it should indicate some connection between caucus and governor, perhaps between caucus and party.

As a second test of group impact one can use a simpler index of gubernatorial support. This is computed for each legislator. It would be simply the number of roll calls on which the legislator supported the governor's position divided by the number of those roll calls on which the legislator voted. Gubernatorial support can then be compared to such variables as caucus affiliation, urban/-rural constituency, leadership position, and seniority. The strength of the relationship between these variables could be measured by the

average index of support within each category. If the situation was genuinely non-partisan, conservative caucus support should not be significantly different from liberal caucus support. If there was a connection, one should expect to find the conservative caucus more highly supporting Republican governors and the liberal (DFL) caucus more highly supporting DFL governors. One would also expect metropolitan legislators to give more support to DFL governors and non-metropolitan legislators to give more support to Republican governors. If party was significant, caucus leaders should show high support for the governor. If party was not significant, they might show even less support than the average legislator, since there would be more basis for independence. (This is somewhat ambiguous. A leader might show high personal support for a governor whether there was party influence or not). Finally, men with higher seniority should have greater independence and so show less support. Electoral variables can be compared in a slightly different manner. For each district the governor's percentage of the vote for each election was computed. If the governor's program support is related to his electoral strength, the higher his electoral support, the higher should be his program support from that district's legislator. A second factor would be the individual legislator's electoral success. If the legislator was quite strong in the district, he need not be so concerned with the governor's electoral popularity. One might hypothesize that the greater the legislator's election vote, the lower would be his program support for the governor.

## V. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The last task will be an evaluation of changes in gubernatorial power over time. If the variables previously discussed have any predictive value, they should predict changes within the state as well as across state lines.

Since 1940 Minnesota has risen steadily on the industrial-<sup>17</sup>ization-urbanization dimension from 30th rank to 21st. It has fluctuated greatly on the cultural-affluence dimension. In 1940 it ranked 13th, during the 1950's, 27th, and 17th in the 1960's. There are no available indications of changes in political culture. But presumably Elazar's classifications span a long time period. So, Minnesota's political culture will be considered moralistic for the entire period. Based on these environmental changes, one would expect that possible competition and participation should increase, although not in a constant manner. Gubernatorial and legislative formal powers should increase. And party organization should become stronger.

As a matter of fact competition for the governorship did<sup>18</sup> increase fairly steadily. DFL candidates for governor began winning in 1954. After 1954 only once did a losing candidate receive less than 46 percent of the popular vote. Before 1954 no losing candidate had received more than that. Caucus competition for the legislature also increased. In the Senate the minority liberals (DFL) went from 10 to a maximum of 24 seats. They actually controlled the House from 1955-1962. Participation increased slowly but steadily. In 1946 50.8 percent of the eligible voters turned out. In 1966 the figure was 63.1 percent.

However, the governor's formal powers changed very little. The veto power is constitutionally designated and was not altered significantly during the period considered. Basic budgetary and appointment powers were established in the major reorganization of 1939. No real changes occurred again until the 1967-1969 sessions. This came right at the end of the period under study. Its impact on power relationships would be too recent to be measured. The gradual additions to the number of departments would add only the smallest increments to gubernatorial power. The only real change was in gubernatorial tenure beginning in 1962. Beginning with the 1962 elections the governor has had an unrestricted four year term. So although Minnesota had a 14 on the Schlesinger index from 1945 to 1962, this change alone would increase it to 17 from 1963-1969. Legislative professionalization shifted more radically. Using the same criteria as in 1960, the legislature would have had an index of 7 in 1945. In 1969 its index would have been 15. This encompasses changes on all four measures used. Session length increased from 90 to 120 legislative days. Compensation increased from \$2,000 to \$12,000 per biennium. The number of legislative services offered increased from five to nine. And appropriations for legislative help went from under \$100,000 to \$155,000.

One way to examine changes in the governors' resources would be to divide the period into two different eras. The first era will be 1944-1954, the modified one-party era. The second will be 1954-1970, the two-party era. In the first no DFL candidate ever won the governorship. Republican candidates averaged 58

percent of the two party vote. In the Senate the minority caucus never had more than 18 of the 67 seats. In the House they never had more than 46 of 131. Participation averaged 53.5 percent. The governor had a formal power index of 14. The legislature had a professionalization index of 7. If one plugs these figures into the forty-eight state rankings for the entire period, Minnesota's rank drops considerably (See Table III-3). Also, the states that best serve as models change. Environmentally, Minnesota bears a close resemblance to the Midwest, West, and upper New England (Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Wisconsin, Michigan; Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Utah; Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire). On the gubernatorial dimension the comparable states are Western, Midwestern, and Southern (Colorado, Oregon, Utah, Nevada; Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Ohio; Tennessee, Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri). And on the legislative dimension models are Western, Midwestern, and Southern (Utah, Montana, Wyoming, New Mexico, Arizona; South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa, Indiana; North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, West Virginia). Overall, Minnesota bears similarities to South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Utah, Oregon, Colorado, Kentucky, and Vermont. In none of these states did party as an organization loom very large in legislative decision-making. In six states the minority party was generally too small to challenge the majority. In Utah, Oregon, and Colorado organizational strength for either party is modest. This carries over to legislative politics. Only Iowa and Kansas had a moderate legislative organization, primarily within the majority party. The party

Table III-3 Minnesota Rankings on Gubernatorial Power Resources, by Quartile

Years	Indust.- Urban	Cultural Affluence	Political Culture	Governor Comp.	Partici- pation	Formal Power	Divided Control	Malappor- tionment	Legis. Comp.	Legis. Proff.
1945-1970	2	2	M	2	1	2	3	3	2	2
1945-1954	2	2	M	4	2	2	1	3	3	4
1954-1970	2	2	M	2	1	2	4	3	2	2

Source: See Appendix I for a comparison to other states

resource, then, was not apt to be a great source of strength for Minnesota governors. On the other hand, the probability is that the legislature was not strongly organized either. The main gubernatorial style should have been through public appeals and administrative power. It is difficult to predict success level. He should have had an advantage over the legislature, so success should not have been exceedingly low. On the other hand his success is not likely to have been as overwhelming as the Southern governors. Probably success would depend very heavily on personal inclination to build his own organizational base.

The era from 1954 to 1970 was much more competitive. In 1954 a DFL candidate won the governorship for the first time. And the DFL party won four of the six elections. But its candidates averaged only 51% of the two party vote. Although the Liberal (DFL) caucus never controlled the Senate, they had more than one-third of the members for at least half the sessions. Caucuses split control in the House for the eight sessions. One caucus had as much as two-thirds of the seats in only one session. Participation increased to an average of 60.5%. In half the sessions, the governor still had a formal index of 14. In the other half the index increased to 17. On the other hand legislative professionalization increased so rapidly that the differential between governor and legislature was not as great as in the earlier era. On the environmental dimension Minnesota was close to Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Iowa, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. This is not substantially different from the earlier time. On the

gubernatorial dimension change is much more marked. Close states include California, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Indiana, Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. The reader should notice that the Midwestern states have decreased markedly, the Eastern states increased. One finds no clear pattern on the legislative dimension. The close states are Oregon, Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and New York. Overall the best models are Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Wyoming, Michigan, and Delaware. Notice that the similarity to the Midwestern plains states has disappeared. In this era the governor will be operating in a clearly competitive situation. This may add small increments to his power. This does not mean that his party organizational power will be greater. Of the comparable group only Delaware and Michigan have moderately well organized parties. The probability would be against strong party organization even in this era. Strong legislative organization is also found only in Delaware and Michigan. There are some party ties in Colorado, Washington, and Idaho also, but these are not overwhelming. There appears to be stronger potential for gubernatorial leverage in this era than previously, but the difference is not great. And if caucus did stand for party, the governors' success might be lessened, not increased. Because if the assumption held true, three-fourths of the sessions would have been under divided control. So, the style might be expected to shift slightly more partisan, and public opinion oriented,

slightly less to administrative power. Success would probably still be a personal matter. It is by no means clear that governors should be more successful in this era than the first. A changing environmental system probably would increase pressures and problems. But it seems probable that political pressures would not have increased much. And the governor's relative advantage in formal resources would be less.

In summary, the potential for gubernatorial power certainly increased during the period examined. Increased urbanization might bring increased demands for his services. The parties would be more closely competitive and the potential for strong party organization greater. There would be small increments in formal and public opinion potential. However, legislative power potential also increased. Especially in the area of formal powers is this noticeable. Also, the environmental potential for organization, and perhaps party, strength increased. Certainly the relationship between caucuses changed from a situation comparable to a modified one-party system to a fully competitive one (at least in the House). This does not necessarily mean that parties had greater influence. Only the potential would exist. Also, even if party impact did increase, it would not necessarily mean greater leverage for the governor. Because if one makes the assumption that caucus is equated with party, divided control then increased markedly from the beginning to the end of the period. In all perhaps the governors obtained increased power potential. The increase would be marginal.

VI. SUMMARY

This chapter summarizes the relationships between those variables thought important in describing gubernatorial power. Not all are related in the manner expected. Most of the relationships that do exist are only moderate on a forty-eight state basis. Cultural-Affluence and Political Culture can pretty well explain differences in gubernatorial competition, legislative competition, and participation. However, here culture does not operate exactly in the manner expected. The Individualistic cultures are more highly associated with high competition and participation than the moralistic cultures. Industrialization and political culture are highly associated with the strength of party and legislative organization. Highly industrialized, individualistic states consistently have stronger organization. No environmental or political factors seem to be good predictors of either gubernatorial or legislative formal powers. And there may be great disparities between gubernatorial and legislative formal power resources within each state. In the end it is not easy to use these variables to predict gubernatorial program success. For one thing the power resources do not cluster high or low in any one state. For another, when the governor has high power resources, the legislature also tends to have high resources. The clearest extremes in success or failure will be found where power disparities are greatest. Also, there is an extremely complex relationship between competition, party organization, and success. In those states where competition is highest and party organization tightest, the party resource is

usually not available because of divided control. The variables discussed are better indicators of gubernatorial style. In the Eastern states power resources are fairly evenly balanced. Governors rank high on all resource dimensions. It is here that the governor is most likely to be a party leader. In Western states the party resource is weak so the governors would probably follow more of a public opinion and administrative leadership style. Their success may be fairly high because of legislative weaknesses. In the Plains and New England states both pressures and power resources are less for governor and legislature alike. Gubernatorial success probably depends highly on personal resources. In the South a variety of styles are possible. Party leadership is unavailable. Where governors are strong it is because of administrative and patronage powers coupled with legislative weakness. In a few states governors lack even these powers while the legislature is fairly strong.

Unfortunately, Minnesota does not fall clearly within any of the groups described. For the entire period it would fall somewhere between the Western and Plains states, with some similarities to other's isolates. Public and administrative leadership potential would be fairly great. However, party resources are ambiguous. Party organizational strength will likely be modest at best. This is further complicated by the formally non-partisan legislature. A good part of our study will have to be devoted to exploring the way in which the legislature actually operates. If the non-partisanship is real,

the party resource would be eliminated entirely. However, even if there were no formal non-partisanship, and Minnesota followed most of the states close to it, party leverage in the legislature should be only moderate at best. This, coupled with a moderately high legislative professionalism, leads one to predict no more than modest program success for the governors. Their success should depend highly on personal resources.

These expectations can be tested in a number of ways. Basically each governor will be ranked on the power resources studied. They can also be ranked on a "box score" for program success. If the expectations are correct, those that rank highest on power resources should also rank highest on success. The examination of legislative decision-making is a little more complex. This can be tested in two ways. One will be by the distribution of committee seats and power. The other will be by legislative roll calls. A Rice Index of Cohesion will be used on categorical groups. Political variables will be linked on both a session and an individual legislator basis to support and success of gubernatorial program bills. Finally, the predictive ability of the power variables historically will be analyzed. In the period 1944-1954 the party resource should be entirely absent. In the period 1954-1970 there would be at least more potential for such a resource.

## Chapter III - Footnotes

1. Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party", American Political Science Review, LX (1966), 923-942.
2. See Charles Adrian, "A Typology of Non-partisan Elections", Western Political Quarterly XII (1959). 449-458; Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Non-partisan Elections", American Political Science Review XXXXVI (1952); J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis", American Journal of Sociology LXVIII (1958); Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-partisan Ballot", American Political Science Review LII (1959) 1052-63; Charles Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Non-partisan Elections in Big Cities" Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (1962); and Eugene C. Lee, Non partisan Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).
3. See for example Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969) pp. 273-8 and Charles R. Adrian, State and Local Governments second edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 165-66.
4. Belle Zeller (ed.) American State Legislatures (New York: Crowell, 1954) pp. 190-91.
5. William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).
6. Ibid., p. 2.
7. The interview questions and a list of respondents appear in Appendix II. All interviews were done on a personal basis. Interviews lasted 1/2 to 3 hours.
8. Buchanan, op. cit.: Loren P., Beth and William C. Harvard, "Committee Stacking and Political Power in Florida", Journal of Politics XXIII (1961), Malcom B. Parsons, "Tensions and Conflicts in a One-Party Legislative System", American Political Science Review LVI (1962) pp. 605-14.
9. For a good brief description of the technique see Lee F. Anderson, et. al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), Chapter 3.
10. For a justification of the use of roll call analysis see Malcolm Jewell, The State Legislature: Politics and Practice, second edition, (New York: Random House, 1969); for further debate see Wilder Crane, Jr. "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting", Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV (1960) and Fred I. Greestein and Alton F. Jackson, "A Second Look at the Validity of Roll Call Analysis", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII (1963)
11. Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Legislature" Public Opinion Quarterly XXVI (1962)
12. See the Bibliography for a complete list of messages; see Appendix III for the program content.
13. McCally, Op. Cit. pp. 928-9.
14. Ibid., p. 929.

15. Ibid., pp. 931-5.
16. Ibid., p. 940.
17. Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socio-economic Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960", Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), pp. 410-3.
18. Joseph L. Donovan, Minnesota Secretary of State, compiler, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-70 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1969) p. 407; Data on which the ensuing historical discussion is based is not provided directly in this chapter. For the raw data see Chapter IV on state environment and politics, Chapter V & VI the governor, and Chapter VII & VIII on the legislature.

CHAPTER FOUR  
MINNESOTA: ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS

The opening chapters have examined Minnesota's standing, environmentally and politically, in the nation as a whole. Now it is time to look more closely at its social, economic, and political system. What is the nature of Minnesota's people, economy, and political beliefs that might affect its politics? How true are the assumptions that have been made about its political competition and party organization? How have these variables changed over time? And are there any major subsystems or regions within Minnesota that have their own distinct social, economic, and political characteristics?

I. THE MINNESOTA POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Minnesota's political environment may best be understood in four parts. Following the pattern previously laid down, this section shall examine in turn its industrial-urban character, its cultural affluence, and its political culture. Then those environmental subdivisions that might have political significance will be considered. Finally, the significance of these factors for Minnesota politics and gubernatorial power can then be assessed.

Industrialization-Urbanization

Following national trends Minnesota increased in urbanization and industrialization from 1940 to the present (See Table IV-1). However, this advance did not keep pace with the rest of the nation. Although Minnesota went from 62% to 86% in non-agricultural employment, it slipped in rank from thirtieth

Table IV-1 Environmental Change in Minnesota, 1940-1960

Year	Indus.		Urban		Ethnicity		Income		Education	
	Minn.	Rank	Minn.	Rank	Minn.	Rank	Minn.	Rank	Minn.	Rank
1940	61.8%	30	49.8%	21	10.6%	12	N.A.	N.A.	8.5yr.	23
1950	77.2%	35	54.5%	25	7.0%	16	\$2683	21	9 yr.	31
1960	85.5%	40	62.3%	27	25.6%	8	\$3054	24	10.8yr.	24

Source: Henderson and Kreuger: National Growth and Economic Change in the Upper Midwest; U. S. Bureau of the Census; Census of the Population, 1940, 1950, 1960.

to fortieth. It changed from a majority rural to a majority urban state in the same period. But it dropped from the twenty-first rank to the twenty-seventh. It did have a modest population growth rate that was sufficient to maintain its overall population ranking. In other words Minnesota moved from a rural-agricultural to an urban-industrial state in the period that is being considered. However, it did not do so as rapidly as the nation as a whole did. And most of its growth rate was due to births over deaths. It actually experienced an out-migration of nearly 100,000 people. As population was moving out of the state, it was shifting around within. For example, its urban areas had a growth rate of 21/2% from 1950 to 1960, slightly below the national average. However, its rural-farm population decreased at a rate of 2.3% per year. As a state, Minnesota was standing still in population. And its rural areas were experiencing a marked decline. Most of the population movement within flowed to the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Minnesota's metropolitan areas contained 41.1% of the population

in 1940, 44.3% in 1950, and a majority 51.3% in 1960. Although this is still below the national average, Minnesota had become not only an urban state but a metropolitan one. In fact the overwhelming proportion of its urban population is metropolitan. There are few even small cities outside the Twin Cities and Duluth. The Twin Cities itself had an average growth rate of 2.3%.<sup>3</sup> And this was concentrated primarily in the suburban counties, Anoka, Dakota, and Washington. So Minnesota became not only urban, or metropolitan, but increasingly suburban. One suspects that this trend accelerated after 1960.

The movement toward industrialization was also marked. Agricultural employment declined almost 4% a year.<sup>4</sup> Although Minnesota employment was expected to expand from 1960 to 1975, more than 57,000 people would probably leave farm employment.<sup>5</sup> (Paranthenetically, mining and railroad employment would also decline.) Agriculture's significance to the state has declined only gradually. For example, Minnesota slipped from the number one agricultural state in 1945 to number five in 1955.<sup>6</sup> The other primary industries declined even more rapidly. Income added from forestry took a downturn after 1961. Tourism barely held even. The tonnage of iron ore produced slipped downward after 1953. After 1961 the production was no longer so much high grade ore as the lower grade taconite. Actually, manufacturing produced as much income as farming by as early as 1953. By 1969 its annual income production was \$2.5 billion dollars. But, of course, even this manufacturing was, and remains, highly related to a primary economy. Even in 1960 23% of manufacturing

employees were in food and fabrics, 20% in forestry related industries.<sup>7</sup> It was not until 1961 that the state became prominent in such "brain" industries as electronics and chemicals. Looking to the future, agriculture manufacturing is expected to decline an average of 1% a year. Fabricating, metals, chemical, and electronics employment will increase from 4 to 6% a year. These increases in manufacturing employment will offset the losses in agriculture. Services and governmental employment will grow even faster.<sup>8</sup>

The state's ethnic population should also have a significant impact on its politics. No matter what measuring stick for ethnicity is used, Minnesota has always ranked very high among the American states. Although it was slightly below the national average in population foreign born in 1940 and 1950, it still ranked twelfth and sixteenth respectively. Under the new census definition of ethnicity (foreign born plus those with one or more parents foreign born) in 1960 it ranked eighth with 26% of its population falling into this group. This is well above the national average. Although Minnesota is famous as the home of the Scandinavians, this is not quite accurate. The first territorial settlers were primarily New England Yankee Protestants who located along the southern river valleys.<sup>9</sup> The next settlers were the German Catholics who populated the same areas. The Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes came in about the 1870's. Their highest concentration was in the North and Northwest. There was some Irish settlement in the cities, especially St. Paul. And later, heavy concentrations of South and Eastern

Europeans populated the Iron Range. Although the Scandinavian peoples are not the only ethnic groups in Minnesota, it is true that they have had an impact on Minnesota politics out of proportion to their numbers. For example, all seven governors in this study had Scandinavian ancestry.

#### Cultural Affluence

Minnesota's cultural affluence level has fluctuated over the last three decades. In 1940 it was relatively high. By 1950 it had dropped considerably. By 1960 it had risen again. Its rank on per capita income has remained fairly steady. Although often below the national average, it still has managed to rank in the upper half of all the states. Within the state, income did increase from 1940 to 1970. And the rate of increase quickened over the period. It is projected to increase still more rapidly in the future.<sup>10</sup> A second, and stable, component in Minnesota's cultural rank is the virtual absence of black population (Minnesota has a somewhat higher non-white population with its Indian peoples). The proportion of black population increased from only .4% to .7%. Its rank decreased from thirty-sixth to thirty-ninth. Within the state's political system, the black population becomes a crucial issue only in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Even there the population is only three to four per cent black. The major component of Cultural fluctuation was in the area of education. In 1940, Minnesota ranked twenty-third, slightly above the national average. In 1950 it had slid to thirty-first rank. After a major educational effort in the 1950's, Minnesota ranked twenty-fourth and slightly above the national

average again by 1960. But even in 1960 only three of Minnesota's counties had over 50% of the population with a high school education.<sup>11</sup> Aside from these specific indicators, it is probably true that Minnesota's cultural-affluence level increased notably from 1940 to 1970. In the late 1960's a national study placed Minnesota second only to California in "quality of life". Educationally, it has a large state university and a growing college system. Both the Mayo Clinic and the University of Minnesota Hospitals are nationally known in medicine. The Twin Cities has become a major entertainment-cultural center in theater, music, and professional sports. Recently, the state has undertaken an ambitious program to renew its emphasis on multiple outdoor recreation facilities.

#### Political Culture

Minnesota's political culture has been classified moralistic. The characteristics of a moralistic culture include: common effort for the promotion of the good life, governmental promotion of the public interest, citizen participation, issue oriented politics, no emphasis on party regularity, high valuation of honesty and merit in government. Minnesota certainly has a relatively high political participation. In the 1940's average turnout was over 60%. The other cultural characteristics are more difficult to demonstrate. However, based on descriptions by John H. Fenton and G. Theodore Mitau,<sup>12</sup> one could conclude that Minnesota generally fits the moralistic mold. Fenton was particularly impressed by the programmatic, public interest orientation.<sup>13</sup> This is especially in contrast to states such as

Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. For example, although Minnesota ranked only twenty-fifth in per capita income, it spends more and taxes more than most states. It ranks in the top ten in expenditures for welfare. Education programs are well funded. It has long been a leader in mental health and conservation programs. As another example, a man like Luther Youngdahl had no difficulty in making politics in general, and his administration in particular, a moral crusade. In political motivation, both the parties and the electorate are highly program oriented.<sup>14</sup> At least since the 1940's there has been no patronage base for either party. The voters have learned, more than in most states at least, to associate parties with particular policy stands and vote accordingly.

Voter independence from party, however, seems to be unclear. At one point Fenton argues that party voters are highly loyal. County voting returns are pretty much at the same level for each party regardless of the candidate. The voters do not respond excessively to personalities.<sup>15</sup> However, he also shows that a great many voters are not party oriented at all. Ticket-splitting and loyalty to dominate personalities are also notable. "In a space of thirty years, the people of the state had watched, applauded, and voted for Floyd Olson, a Farmer-Labor Governor; Harold Stassen, a Republican Governor; and Hubert Humphrey, a DFL U.S. Senator."<sup>16</sup> Mitau insists even more strongly that party labels are not sacred.<sup>17</sup> He argues that voters are inclined to support a man, not a party. One indicator of this non-party attitude is the strong support for non-partisanship and third party movements.

Only twenty-two political offices within the state are on a partisan electoral basis. Minnesotans supported the Populist and Granger movements, the Non-Partisan League, and the Farmer-Labor party from 1916-1939. From 1931-1939 the Farmer-Labor party controlled the statehouse. Moreover, Minnesota utilizes the open primary for political office. And it supports a legal party structure that opens the possibility for more popular control than is true in most states. <sup>18</sup> It is possible that this independence was more notable earlier in the period we are considering. Party lines seemed to have stabilized more since the late 1930's. It is impossible to say whether this is a result more of a voter turn toward partisan loyalty, or the lack of attractive and dynamic personalities in Minnesota politics.

Finally, Minnesota ranks high on merit in government. Since a comprehensive governmental reorganization and civil service law under Harold Stassen in 1939 the opportunity for party patronage has been minimal. <sup>19</sup>

It would appear to be fairly clear then that Minnesota does fit the moralistic category. The only doubts would be on the score of partisan loyalty and party organization. It may be that Minnesota has veered toward the Michigan example in this regard, even though this is atypical of moralistic states. This point will be explained in more detail later on in the chapter.

#### Environmental Regions

Minnesota is not uniform environmentally throughout the length and breadth of the state. Economically and socially there are many gradations. No two of the 87 counties are exactly alike.

For purposes of discussion the state will be divided into eight regions (See Table IV-2). Initially the state can be split into four areas based on types of farming. <sup>20</sup> These are: I - Dairying, Wood Products; II - Dairying, General Farming; III - Corn, Livestock Feeding; IV - Small Grain and Specialty Crops. However, agriculture no longer adequately explains all of the states occupational patterns. Within Group I one can distinguish five counties that contain the Iron Range. The rest are really primarily timber areas with very marginal small dairy farms. Group II contains four distinct areas. First is the five county Twin Cities metropolitan area that supports almost no agricultural activities. The second is a group of ten counties that have a dairy agriculture, but also have a substantial tourist industry. The third group of counties can be designated East Central. These counties - Benton, Chisago, Isanti, Meeker, Pine, Sherburne, Stearns, and Wright - are located on the west and north of the Twin Cities. These are not really resort areas but neither do they have quite the economy characteristic of the South Eastern Counties. The latter ten counties are traditionally dairying areas, but they also have a number of small cities that are rapidly building a new industrial base. Region III has two sub-areas. The first are mostly South-Southwestern corn and hog counties (plus Freeborn, Mower, Fillmore, and Houston). This is a fairly prosperous farming region. The twelve West Central counties are poorer and have a more marginal agricultural. Region IV, although it contains metropolitan Fargo-Moorhead, is what has been called the Red River Valley.

As one can readily see from Table IV-2 all areas but one are

Table IV-2 Economic and Social Regions in Minnesota, 1960

Region	% Pop. Change	% Rural-Farm	% Non-Ag. Occupation	% Families Income Under \$3,00	% Unemployed	Median Family Income	% High School Ed.
I. Iron Range	-.22	13.5	90.3	24.5	10.5	\$4854	37.6
Forest, Dairy	-1.56	22.2	79.6	27.4	9.3	\$4408	35.5
II. TC Metro Area	+2.28	2.5	96.5	9.7	5.9	\$6698	49.5
Central Resort	-1.87	40.2	67.8	41.2	7.1	\$3853	30.3
East Central Dairy	-.64	37.6	71.8	32.7	4.6	\$4269	31.9
South East Dairy	-.27	28.7	75.8	26.1	5.3	\$5085	38.3
III. South Central	-1.21	38.5	66.6	33.3	4.6	\$4273	37.3
West Central	-1.92	43.6	60.8	41.1	5.2	\$3594	35.5
IV. Red River Valley	-2.23	43.6	63.3	33.8	6.9	\$4135	32.5

Source: Henderson and Kreuger: National Growth and Economic Change in the Upper Midwest; pp. 207-220.

declining in population. The Twin Cities is the only exception. The Iron Range, East Central, and South East have had the least decline. If one drew a line from Duluth to Rock County in the South West, most counties south and east of this line would be fairly stable. Those areas north and west, excepting the cities of Moorhead and Virginia, have lost substantial population. As can be seen from the rural-farm population and the non-agricultural occupations, the northwestern half of the state is also the most rural. These agricultural regions are also the poorest economically. And the very poorest are the farming-resort and the West Central. The wealthiest are the metropolitan and South East areas. However, in another sense the greatest economic problems are in the north. Although median incomes are fairly high, unemployment is markedly higher in the Iron Range and Forest regions than in the rest of the state. The next most depressed areas are the Red River and resort regions. These northern and western regions have also had the greatest decline as trade areas, and their potential going into the 1970's is the

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poorest. Manifestly a principal component in this picture was the decline in the mining industry through the 1950's.

(See Table IV-3) Only the East Central Mesabi range (around Virginia) held up well. Under the Ared Redevelopment Act the upper northeast was the principle redevelopment area in 1963.

One environmental characteristic, ethnic distribution, only partially follows these regional lines. Fenton describes thirty-eight counties as being native Protestant. The rest have either a strong Catholic or Scandinavian representation. Fifty-eight

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Table IV-3 Changes in Employment and Reserves by Iron Range Area from 1953 to 1961.

Area	Mining Employment		Iron Ore Reserve Valuations (thousands of dollars)	
	Amount (1961)	% Change from 1953	Amount (1961)	% Change from 1953
West Mesabi	2,073	-56%	14,246	-9%
Central Mesabi	2,593	-58%	42,756	-36%
East Central Mesabi	1,795	-56%	22,787	-44%
East Mesabi	3,831	207%	20,663	17%
Cuyuna	420	-62%	1,765	-24%
Vermillion	782	1%	2,643	-47%

Source: Adapted from Henderson and Krueger: National Growth and Economic Change in the Upper Midwest; p. 86.

percent of the "nativist" countries are in the corn and hog agricultural region. The Western counties seem to be evenly split between nativist and ethnic. Other regions with strongly nativist counties are the Southeast, metropolitan, and resort areas. Regions with the least native Protestant counties would be the Red River Valley, East Central dairy, the Iron Range, and the forest areas. Western Minnesota, the Red River Valley, and the timbered north are strongly Scandinavian. The Iron Range is composed largely of people with South and East European descent. The Northern Scandinavian regions historically were the major sources of radical political dissent in previous generations. This is re-enforced by the fact that the same areas are also the poorer agricultural regions. It might also be notable that the non-nativist north and northeast have the highest unemployment rates.

#### Political Consequences of Environmental Change

What difference does all of this make politically? On one

level some socio-economic characteristics have been definitely linked to support for different political parties. One would expect that a state with strong rural leanings in the 1940's would also be more likely to support the rural party, the Republicans. However, the marked shift toward an urban industrial economy should also indicate a decline in that party's fortunes. One should not push this prediction too far, however, since agriculture still played a significant part up into the 1960's. But certainly there would have been more basis for Democratic support as the state moved into the 1950's and 1960's. The internal distribution of party support within the state should also be predictable. Urban, ethnic, poorer, industrial workers have a greater tendency to support the Democratic party. But these characteristics are not distributed among Minnesota counties in a consistent way. Highly urban areas such as the Iron Range and the Twin Cities also have the highest income and educational levels. Highly rural areas, such as the resort region, West Central Minnesota, and the Red River Valley, also tend to be poorer economically. In the next section an effort will be made to link these regional environmental characteristics to political party strength in more detail.

The environmental conditions may also have direct consequences for gubernatorial strength. For example, an increasingly urban-industrial state should provide the potential for increasing formal gubernatorial powers. Also, environmental complexity, and especially environmental crises, provides the climate for popular demands on, and popular support for, the governor.

That is, they may provide an opportunity for gubernatorial leadership. One may surmise that in the 1940's domestic problems were not as intense in a rural state. However, increasingly the problems normally associated with urbanization and industrialism would press upon the political leaders. What major changes or crises were there?

The first was the change to an essentially metropolitan state. What was the gubernatorial response? The first request for a metropolitan authority came in 1953 under Governor C. Elmer Anderson.<sup>23</sup> Requests on specifically metropolitan themes continued on a rather minor key up until the 1967 session when it became a dominant program concern.

Along with the industrial shift came the change to an industrial economy. Labor relations battles were prominent throughout the Youngdahl administration. Disputes over workmen and unemployment compensation have continued ever since. Problems of welfare, health, education, and mental health were prominent in every administration from Youngdahl to Rolvaag. Governor Youngdahl requested the first Business Research Department. Surprisingly, agricultural programs were prominent in none of the administration requests. What programs existed were sponsored largely by the national government.

A third problem is the reverse side of urbanization-industrialization. This is the severe decline in the rural areas. This received relatively little attention, except as a part of the general welfare-type programs mentioned. Greater attention has been directed to one particular depressed area.

For example, Governor Freeman sponsored educational aids for depressed areas, much of which was directed at the Iron Range. The great taconite amendment debate during the Andersen administration was also a by-product of this. In 1963 both Governor Andersen and Governor Rolvaag stressed a comprehensive North-eastern Minnesota re-development program.

A fourth great program area, not isolated within Minnesota, was the pressures of war. Governor Thye's program was oriented almost exclusively to the consequences of World War II. This included post war planning, veterans' bonuses, and a delayed building program. Governor Youngdahl was concerned with major housing programs to compensate for post-war shortages.

Other pressures for gubernatorial action arose from special environmental changes. In a way "law and order" was a theme for both Governor Levander and Governor Youngdahl. Perhaps pressure on the latter arose out of war dislocations, pressures on the former from an increasingly metropolitan environment. A second example is conservation. Conservation has always been a concern in Minnesota. However, it was not really a central gubernatorial program concern until 1963 when both Rolvaag and Andersen pushed a major "crystal waters" program. Perhaps it was just that by the 1960's population pressures were so great that conservation was once again a crisis issue. In all, there has been no dearth of pressures upon Minnesota governors. Every administration faced problems created by a changing environment.

## II. MINNESOTA PARTY COMPETITION

To know a state's environmental system is not sufficient.

A governor's powers will also be strongly shaped by the kind of political system in which he operates. On one level one needs to know the configuration of political competition. How closely matched are the two parties? Is their competitive status the same for all offices and across all elections? What is the basis for party support? How does this constituency base affect the party's internal unity? Secondly, one also needs to know what kind of organizational base the governor may rely on if he should wish to use the party to promote his program. Indicators of party strength would include its ability to control nominations, how essential it is to electoral success, and how unified its constituency, ideology, and leadership is. Based on its environmental characteristics, Minnesota should have a competitive electoral system, but a moderately weak party organization. The first will be considered in this section. The latter will be examined in the following section.

#### Level of Competition

Minnesota does have the reputation for being one of the most politically competitive states in the nation. John H. Fenton comments that the electoral division between Republicans and the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party was close and narrowing into the 1960's.<sup>24</sup> This division reached its narrowest point in 1962 when Karl Rolvaag (DFL) won the governor's race by 91 votes after a four and one half month recount battle.<sup>25</sup> Although the parties were competitive, the edge in popular support was with the DFL by 1962. But independents held the balance of power. In January 1962 the Minnesota Poll showed DFL - 47%, Republicans - 32%, and Independents - 21%. (See Table IV-4, re-

produced from Stinnett and Backstrom, p.21). This competitiveness was not uniform for all elections or all offices, however. (See Table IV-5). It is fair to say that the DFL was stronger for national office than it was for state-wide offices. Even then, the average vote shows that both Presidential and Senatorial contests were highly competitive. The state-wide constitutional offices do not follow quite the same pattern. Except for auditor and treasurer, they were definitely competitive. The Republicans swept all state offices from 1944 through 1952. The DFL took all offices, except the governorship in 1960, from 1954 through 1962. The Republicans made a comeback, except for secretary of state, in 1966. There is no way to tell whether the last comeback is a temporary deviation, a swing to a new cycle, or the beginning of full competition. Actually, three constitutional offices, treasurer, auditor, and secretary of state, can only loosely be termed partisanly competitive. Stafford King (R) was the only man to be elected auditor. Julius Schmahl (R) and Val Bjornson (R) held the treasurers office for all but one term. Mike Holm (R) and Joseph Donovan (DFL) held the secretary of states office for all but one term. This appears to be a personalistic politics. Still, even in these personalistic offices, the dominant party averaged no more than 55% of the popular vote. In the other three offices the average vote was even more closely divided. Election to these partisanly-oriented offices appears to depend more on partisan affiliation than individual popularity.

Obviously the Republican party was more dominant in its

Table IV-4

The Minnesota Poll  
January 12, 1962

"In politics do you consider yourself a Democratic-Farmer-Laborite, or a Republican, or a member of some other party?"

	<u>DFL</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>
Total State	47	32	21
Men	49	28	23
Women	45	35	20
Ages 21-39	51	28	21
Ages 40-59	49	31	20
Ages 60& over	36	39	25
Grade School	51	28	21
High School	51	28	21
College	30	47	23
Big Cities	50	26	24
Small Cities	48	35	17
Towns	40	34	26
Farms	48	31	21
Protestants	40	39	21
Catholics	63	13	18
Union Members	69	13	18
Kennedy voters	77	3	20
Nixon voters	8	72	20

Source: Stinnett and Backstrom: Recount: p. 21

Table IV-5, Party Competition for Political Office in Minnesota

Year	Presi- dent	Senator	Gover- nor	Lt. Gov- ernor	Atty. General	Secy. State	State Auditor	State Treas.
1944	52.8%	----	37.8%	41.9%	40.2%	30.4%	----	39.5%
1946	----	39.8	39.7	38.7	34.7	30.9	38.3	37.9
1948	61.9	59.8	46.0	48.8	45.6	37.4	----	45.8
1950	----	----	39.0	40.5	42.7	33.4	39.2	45.1
1952	44.4	42.9	42.9	45.7	41.4	42.1	----	44.0
1954	----	56.4	53.0	53.5	52.7	51.6	49.4	52.8
1956	42.0	----	51.0	52.6	50.2	51.9	----	49.9
1958	----	52.9	57.0	58.9	55.7	57.9	48.9	49.7
1960	50.7	57.7	49.0	55.3	58.2	59.3	----	47.1
1962	----	----	50+	50.2	59.6	59.6	45.9	45.4
1964	63.9	60.7	----	----	----	----	----	----
1966	----	54.4	47.3	48.9	46.8	55.0	44.8	43.7
1968	56.6	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Ave.% DFL Vote	53.2	49.3	46.4	48.5	48.0	46.4	44.6	45.3
% DFL Victories	71.4	75.0	36.4	45.5	45.5	54.5	00.0	09.1
No. of office holders 1945-70	6	4	7	5	5	4	2	3

Source: Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

Percentage figures expressed in terms of the proportion of the DFL vote to the total popular two party vote.

period than the DFL was in its. In five elections the Republicans never averaged less than 55% of the vote in the latter period. It reached its peak in 1958 and 1960. The other elections were extremely close. So the earlier period might accurately be called modified one party Republican. And in this setting Republican personalities did appear to be as important as party organization. This was the era of Mike Holm (Secretary of State, 1921-1951), Julius A. Schmahl (Treasurer, 1939-1951), J. A. A. Burnquist (Attorney General, 1939-1955), Stafford King (Auditor, 1931-1969), and C. Elmer Anderson (Lieutenant Governor, 1939-1943, 1945-1951). The DFL was not perceived as a perilous threat during this time. Indicative of this attitude is the fact that a chief electoral preoccupation of Holm and Schmahl was a personal contest as to which of the two would receive the largest popular vote. In the latter period the only DFLer with comparable personal security was Joseph Donovan (Secretary of State, 1955-1970). The DFL period was more an era of highly competitive contests between two parties, not so much contests among personalities.

#### Constituency Base

In assessing the character of a competitive party system, however, one needs to know more than just the degree of electoral support for each party. The electoral base for the division between parties is also of importance. Internal party stability may be governed by how homogeneous the electorate base is. Inter-party divisions in governmental decision-making may also depend on the degree of intra-party homogeneity. The central

question generally has been, do the two parties reflect the socio-economic and ideological divisions, growing out of the New Deal, that characterize the national parties?

Based on state-wide surveys it would appear that the characteristic differences do exist. (See Table IV-4) Catholics, union members, and those with less than a college education disproportionately support the DFL. Fenton comments on the great differences between the parties based on ethnicity, occupation, and income.<sup>26</sup> But the traditional urban-rural differences are not so clear. It is true that the DFL gets its greatest proportional support from big city dwellers. However, support from farmers and small city dwellers is almost as great. On the other side Republicans receive about the same proportionate support from all but the big cities. So in the end the only clear differences are between big cities and towns. The weight of DFL support is in the first, that of the Republicans in the second. But even these differences are not overwhelming. Table IV-6 also shows the relatively small differences in party urban voting support. Again the weight of DFL support has been more in the big city and metropolitan areas than has the Republican. In the statewide picture these areas are more important for the DFL than they are for the Republicans. In the three main cities the difference has been a definite, but not overwhelming, six to eight percentage points. The difference has been more marked in all metropolitan counties. However, by the 1960's this too had become a rather narrow four percentage points. Also, comparisons among all metropolitan counties is

Table IV-6 Party Voting in Minnesota Metro Areas, 1944-1966

Years	Big City Areas			All Metro Areas			Twin City Metro Area		
	DFL	GOP	Total	DFL	GOP	Total	DFL	GOP	Total
1944-48	38.0	29.7	32.9	49.2	37.8	42.5	37.7	31.9	44.3
1950-58	32.4	26.5	29.3	51.3	41.7	45.4	39.0	36.3	37.4
1960-66	28.6	22.8	25.6	53.4	49.1	50.8	44.5	41.8	43.1

Note: Each column represents that groups percentage of the total state-wide vote that came from the big city metropolitan, or twin cities areas.

Big City - the central cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth.

Metro Area - All people living in standard metropolitan statistical areas.

Twin Cities - All people living in counties around St. Paul and Minneapolis defined as metropolitan.

Source: Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

somewhat misleading. This includes all of St. Louis County. So the substantial DFL advantage is accounted for largely by the Iron Range. While the Iron Range is highly urban, it is not really metropolitan. If just the Twin Cities metropolitan area is considered we see that the difference between Democrats and Republicans has faded to a narrow margin indeed. Republicans have traditionally had strength in Hennepin County. Since the 1950's this is accounted for by suburban support for the Republicans. However, for many years the city of Minneapolis was more Republican than DFL. Even now the Democratic advantage is very small. It should also be clear from the table that the big city contribution to the state-wide vote has diminished over time. (from  $1/3$  to  $1/4$ ) And its contribution to the DFL vote has diminished more rapidly than its contribution to the Republican. At the same time the metropolitan contribution has gradually increased to the point where it did supply, barely, a state-wide majority by the 1960's. (This growth is partially misleading as there were more counties in the metropolitan category in each succeeding decade.) And here there is a very small difference between the parties. The DFL gets a majority of votes from metropolitan areas, the Republicans do not quite do so. It is clear that the importance of metropolitan areas to the two parties has become more similar, not less so, over time.

If one considers party support on a county and regional, not a state-wide basis, the lack of a sharp urban-rural difference is re-enforced. The economic and occupational differences

between the two parties are also blurred. This approach measures neither party identifiers, nor the relative voting importance of a county to state-wide victory, but the degree of electoral support for each party in a county. Pearson product moment correlations were run between average percentage of two party vote for the DFL gubernatorial candidate and median family income, percent population in urban areas, percent population ethnic, and percent of population in industrial occupations (not agricultural, forestry, or fisheries). The basic unit was each of Minnesota's 87 counties. Correlations were run for each decade. A positive correlation should show a positive relationship between that variable and Democratic party strength. (See Table IV-7). The degree of urbanization showed no relationship to the party vote. This confirms the

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Table IV-7 Relationship Between Socio-economic Variables and Democratic Party Strength, Minnesota Counties, 1944-1966.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Urbanization</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Industrialization</u>
1940	.069	.579**	.278**
1950	-.013	.830**	.226*
1960	.177	.484**	.273*

\* - significant at the .05 level

\*\* - significant at the .01 level

Source: Census Bureau: U. S. Census of the Population, 1940, 1950, 1960; Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

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earlier discussion on the blurring of urban-rural divisions between the two parties. One would then not expect to find clear urban-rural divisions between the two parties. And if there

really are different political interests between urban and rural dwellers, this might be a basis for intra-party dissension. Wealth shows a significant relationship to degree of party support only for the 1960's. However, it is the reverse of the expected direction. The correlation shows that the higher a county's median family income the higher should be the percentage of DFL vote. This is partially the result of the fact that rural counties have a lower average income than urban counties. Even though the urban-rural differences are not marked between the two parties, a few urban DFL counties, such as Lake, St. Louis, Anoka, Dakota, Ramsey, and Mower, that have high incomes could make the difference. Also, the results are partially misleading because they do not account for income differentials within metropolitan counties. Suburbs, which are Republican, would probably have much higher incomes than central cities, which are more Democratic. Industrialization shows a steady, significant, but surprisingly low relationship to party voting. It would not be a very efficient predictor of party strength. The best indicator would be proportion of the population ethnic. This would appear to confirm Fenton's observations on party bases of support.<sup>27</sup> Although ethnicity covers immigrants from all countries, in many counties Scandinavians are the most significant ethnic group. Another significant ethnic concentration is the Southern and Eastern Europeans on the Iron Range. And the third great concentration of ethnic groups is in Minneapolis-St. Paul. It would appear that the importance of the ethnic-party association declined between the 1950's and the 1960's. But

one must be a bit cautious in this interpretation. In 1940 and 1950 the word ethnic was defined as the proportion of the population in the county not born in the U.S. In 1960 the definition was expanded to include those whose parents were not born in the U.S. If there was an actual decline in importance it would make some intuitive sense. Supposedly, as an individual gets generationally further away from the ethnic tie, it has a lesser effect on his vote. The correlation for 1950 is surprisingly high. There is no explanation as to why this should be so. In summary, the urban factor was not associated with the county party vote. There were associations for income, industrialization, and ethnicity, but except for ethnicity, the correlations were quite low.

Another way to examine urban-party relationships on the county level is not to measure degree of urbaness or DFL support, but to compare those counties that are majority DFL or urban. Table IV-8 shows this relationship. In each decade a slightly higher proportion of the DFL counties are urban than is the case with Republican counties. But in no case is this difference statistically significant. On the basis of the chi square test one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between DFL support and the urban-rural nature of the county. <sup>28</sup>

Even though there is not a clear urban-rural difference between the two parties, there is a definite regional pattern to party competition in Minnesota. Table IV-9 shows the political characteristics of the state's major economic subdivisions.

The table gives the average % of DFL vote for all the

Table IV-8 Relationship Between Urban Counties and Party Control,  
1944-1966.

	<u>1940</u>		Total
	Republican	DFL	
Majority Urban	9 (11.8%)	2 (18.2%)	11 (12.6%)
Majority Rural	67 (88.2%)	9 (81.8%)	76 (87.6%)
Total	<u>76</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>87</u>

$\chi^2 = .338$  not significant; contingency coefficient is  
Cramer's  $V = .004$

	<u>1950</u>		Total
	Republican	DFL	
Majority Urban	6 (13%)	8 (19.5%)	14 (16.1%)
Majority Rural	40 (87%)	33 (80.5%)	73 (83.9%)
Total	<u>46</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>87</u>

$\chi^2 = .670$  not significant; contingency coefficient is  
Cramer's  $V = .032$

	<u>1960</u>		Total
	Republican	DFL	
Majority Urban	9 (16.4%)	7 (21.9%)	16 (18.4%)
Majority Rural	46 (83.6%)	25 (78.1%)	71 (81.6%)
Total	<u>55</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>87</u>

$\chi^2 = .327$  not significant; contingency coefficient is  
Cramer's  $V = .004$

Sources: Bureau of the Census: Census of the Population, 1940,  
1950, 1960.  
Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

Table IV-9 DFL Support in Gubernatorial Elections by Economic Regions in Minnesota, 1944-1966.

Region	<u>1944-1966</u>		<u>1944-1952</u>		<u>1954-1966</u>	
	Ave. %	%DFL	Ave. %	%DFL	Ave. %	%DFL
	<u>DFL</u> <u>Vote</u>	<u>Majorities</u>	<u>DFL</u> <u>Vote</u>	<u>Majorities</u>	<u>DFL</u> <u>Vote</u>	<u>Majorities</u>
Region I						
Iron Range	55.9	74.5	50.4	56.0	60.8	90.0
Forest	54.3	66.7	48.1	46.7	59.0	83.3
Region II						
Twin City Metro	51.1	53.6	46.8	32.0	54.7	73.3
Resort	42.4	15.5	35.9	00.0	48.0	30.9
East Central	44.5	23.9	36.8	02.5	50.7	41.7
South East	37.4	07.3	31.8	02.0	43.0	11.7
Region III						
South Central	31.6	09.1	30.3	01.0	41.3	15.9
West Central	46.7	40.9	38.1	03.3	53.7	72.2
Region IV						
Red River Valley	52.3	60.0	43.0	24.0	59.3	90.0

Source: Computed from statistics in Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

counties in each region or area. Within each group it also gives the percentage of elections for all counties in which the DFL candidate had a majority. Consistently the Iron Range has been the strongest DFL supporter. Next have been the forest regions and the Red River Valley. And fourth is the Twin Cities metropolitan area. The most competitive regions have been in the central part of the state. These are the West Central farm areas and the East Central dairy regions. They turned from a fairly strong Republican orientation from 1944 to 1952 to a marginal DFL support in 1954-1966. Finally, centers of Republican strength have been the Southern and Southeastern farm regions, and the central resort area.

So the DFL does have centers of strength in urban areas such as the Iron Range and the Twin Cities. But it has equally strong support from northern and western rural areas. Likewise these DFL regions range from the wealthiest to the poorest. The most consistent characteristic that they have in common is a rather high proportion of ethnic population. Even then only about half of the counties in the West Central and Twin Cities areas have this characteristic. Significantly too, the DFL rise to power was marked primarily by a dramatic shift in support in the most rural western parts of the state. It is doubtful that the DFL could have commanded a majority without these areas. On the other side there are also demographic "inconsistencies". The resort and South Central counties are definitely rural-agricultural in character. But the South East is much less so and still is a strong Republican supporter. The South East also ranks high

economically and educationally. But the South Central area only has a modest ranking in this regard. The strong resort area support for the Republicans is the most curious as this region ranks at the bottom both in income and education. Perhaps Fenton's explanation that all of these counties have in common a fairly low ethnic population is as good as any. There is, then, a definite regional difference in party support. The north-south character of this difference can be more readily visualized by observing Figures IV-1, IV-2, and IV-3. This also clearly shows the change and growth in DFL support.

What then can one say in conclusion about party support in Minnesota. Perhaps the name Democratic-Farmer-Labor party best illustrates the nature of that party.<sup>29</sup> The party is an amalgam forged together from several diverse elements in 1944. The Democrats were an urban working class party heavily bolstered by Irish Catholics. From the Farmer-Labor party also came support from organized labor in manufacturing, mining, and rail-roading. But it also contributed a generous portion of North-western, rural, low income, Scandinavian grain farmers. And as the party developed it was more and more influenced by urban liberal intellectuals. The Republicans have a strong electoral base in higher income livestock and dairy farmers from the southern part of the state.<sup>30</sup> Also, since World War I it has been heavily nativist. However, it too has support from metropolitan areas, particularly the Hennepin County suburbs, and the industrializing small cities. So, although the two parties do represent somewhat different constituencies, the lines




Figure IV-1 Party Competition in Minnesota, 1944-1952

-  County usually carried by DFL gubernatorial candidate.
-  County usually carried by GOP candidate.
-  Majority party did not carry more than 60% of elections of average more than 55% of the vote.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1953




Figure IV-2 Party Competition in Minnesota, 1954-1966

-  County usually carried by DFL gubernatorial candidate.
-  County usually carried by GOP gubernatorial candidate.
-  Swing counties: Majority party did not carry more than 60% of the elections or average more than 55% of the vote.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1955-1967





Figure IV-3 Party Competition in Minnesota, 1944-1966

-  County usually carried by DPL gubernatorial candidate.
-  County usually carried by GOP gubernatorial candidate.
-  Swing counties: Majority party did not carry more than 60% of elections or average more than 55% of the vote.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1944-1966

are not rigidly drawn. There is no great difference between parties on the farm and urban vote.<sup>31</sup> More significant are regional divisions that are marked by ethnic, economic, and occupational differences. There would, then, appear to be a basis for internal party divisions along urban-rural lines. One cannot say with confidence on the basis of demographic data that the parties will be internally unified. Perhaps one should not insist too strongly on these potential divisions, however. For even if the constituency base is blurred, the parties do appear to have internal philosophical harmony. Fenton made a great point about the programmatic nature of Minnesota parties.<sup>32</sup> And this impression is reinforced by Thomas Flinn.<sup>33</sup> He concludes that for the DFL especially the platform is a confession of faith. And this faith is consistently New Deal-Fair Deal. Furthermore, they insist strongly on a responsible party's obligation to enact this faith once it controls the government.

### III. POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

Although campaign competition influences party organization, it does not entirely describe that organization. Organization entails many facets. On one level is the formal structure prescribed by statute. But formal organization may obscure as much about actual organization performance as it reveals. Since parties are primarily electoral devices, a better indicator of organizational power structure may be who can control the party's nominee for public office. Finally, most parties go beyond the recruitment function and assist their choice in the general election. In this section, each of these facets of party

organization will be examined in turn.

### Legal Structure

As is true with most states, Minnesota has very thoroughly regulated its political parties. This has been so since the 1890's. Legally, a group can be called a party only if its candidate received at least 5% of the state-wide vote in the last election, and received at least some votes in all of the counties.<sup>34</sup> This does not seem stringent, but it does work against third parties in that their support must be spread throughout the state. Also, in order to hold a primary in a county, a party must file a petition with signatures equal to 5% of the county's last general election vote. With these limitations practically speaking there have been only two parties of consequence since 1944.

The organization prescribed for these parties is quite familiar throughout the U.S. The structure focuses around electoral units. It is decentralized. But, contrary to practice in many Eastern states especially, it is also quite open. The basic structural unit is the precinct caucus.<sup>35</sup> Here local officers are selected, campaign work supervised, and delegates for the next higher organizational unit elected. Any voter may participate in a local precinct caucus if he voted for that party's candidates in the last general election and intends to do so in the next. Practically, this limitation has no significance because it is inherently unenforceable. Participation in local caucuses is mainly limited by one's own energy and inclinations.

In ascending order above the precinct caucus are the county

convention, congressional district convention, and the state convention. Delegates to each higher convention are selected primarily by the one below. Each level has its own executive committee and set of officers. The county and congressional district committees are virtually left on their own, and have the major responsibility for elections at their own level. The state convention has the final legal authority over internal party affairs.<sup>36</sup>

During the intervals between conventions authority lies in the state central committee. However, this is a rather unwieldy body of two hundred to three hundred people. Its membership is a disparate collection of major party leaders, the executive officers of the state, district, and county levels, the executive officers of the auxiliary groups, nominees for public office, and, in the DFL, members of the DFL legislative caucus. Perhaps the smaller executive committee, which meets once a month, offers more effective direction. But legally, and actually, Minnesota parties are quite democratic and open.

#### Nominations and Recruitment

The party's most important task is the recruitment and nomination of candidates for public office. Patterns in this recruitment process can be the single most important indicator of party power structure. Of course the parties do not entirely govern this nomination process. Minnesota has long had nomination by primary. Since 1933 party organizational control has been further weakened by the institution of an open primary.<sup>37</sup> Primary participation does not then require public registration

of party membership. Because of this, "raiding" across party lines has occurred. So the recruitment process is legally quite as open as other features of party organization.

It should be quickly pointed out that Minnesota parties have taken more effective steps than most to reassert some control over nominations. Since the DFL started from a rather weak position in 1944, its dominant leaders have insisted that pre-primary endorsement is essential to hold factions in check, and to maximise chances for electoral success.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, county conventions endorse state legislative candidates and congressional district conventions endorse Congressional candidates. The party constitution directs the state convention to endorse state-wide candidates. This endorsement procedure is often long and arduous since it requires a 60%, not a simple, majority. Also, some elements within the DFL do not favor endorsement. The argument has raged down to the present time. The more populist elements feel that power should be kept with the voters and free from machine influence. Generally, the proponents of endorsement have won. And generally the system has worked. G.T. Mitau reports that from 1944-1954 79% of those endorsed won primary victories.<sup>39</sup> Since then the 1966 primaries represent the only massive successful challenge to endorsement. The Republican party has not embraced endorsement so enthusiastically. The Republicans have really used endorsement only since 1958.<sup>40</sup> Probably during their period of dominance party leaders did not feel the need for unity. Also, since Republican nomination was so desirable, ambitious candidates

may not have honored endorsement anyway. By 1958, after two successive defeats, the need for unity may have become more salient. The Republican endorsement system has been highly successful since that time.

Let us first examine the actual DFL primary contests. (See Table IV-10). The table shows the number of contested primaries for each office and the average number of contestants entered. It also indicates the number of "serious" candidates. Such a candidate is one who received at least 20 percent of the primary vote. Finally, it compares the average percent of primary votes gathered by the winning candidate and the top two candidates. The same figures are shown for the two political eras in the period being covered. The patterns on party organization emerging from this table are not easily interpreted. It does seem clear that only four offices, governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, and the U.S. Senate, are highly competitive. The other three are not. Probably the long time incumbents in those three offices explained the depressed competition. And even the U.S. Senate races seldom have more than one serious candidate. This is even clearer when one observes the winning candidates proportion of the vote. Secretary of State, auditor, and the U.S. Senate races are really quite non-competitive. The treasurer's office is virtually so. For these offices there is usually one candidate (probably a sacrificial lamb for auditor) with an infrequent two-way contest. It would appear that for governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general, there was possibly bi-factional competition.

Table IV-10 Democratic-Farmer-Labor Primaries, 1944-1966.

Office	Number of Nominations	Number of Contested Primaries	Number of Contested Primaries with Incumbent	Ave. No. of Candidates	Ave. No. of Candidates 20% or More of Vote	Ave. % of Vote, Two Highest Candidates	Average % of Vote by Nominee
Governor	11	11	4	3.7	1.5	89.0%	69.3%
Lt. Governor	11	7	0	3.2	1.7	82.2	64.7
Atty. General	11	7	1	2.4	1.8	91.4	69.5
Secy. of State	11	5	2	1.7	1.4	95.6	85.3
State Auditor	6	2	0	1.7	1.5	95.3	76.3
Treasurer	11	5	0	2.5	1.6	95.3	76.3
U.S. Senator	8	7	3	2.5	1.4	93.5	80.5
				<u>1944-1952</u>			
Governor	5	5	0	4.6	2.0	77.3	51.1
Lt. Governor	5	5	0	4.2	2.1	71.6	42.1
Atty. General	5	4	0	2.2	2.0	94.4	61.8
Secy. of State	5	2	0	1.8	1.6	91.8	77.3
State Auditor	2	0	0	1.0	1.0	100.0	100.0
Treasurer	5	3	0	1.8	1.8	94.8	68.1
U.S. Senator	3	3	0	2.7	1.7	89.4	62.3
				<u>1954-1966</u>			
Governor	6	6	4	3.0	1.2	98.5	84.3
Lt. Governor	6	3	2	2.5	1.5	92.6	83.6
Atty. General	6	3	1	2.5	1.6	89.2	76.0
Secy. of State	6	3	2	1.7	1.2	98.8	90.0
State Auditor	4	2	0	1.8	1.8	98.0	77.5
Treasurer	6	2	0	1.8	1.5	92.0	83.2
U.S. Senator	5	4	3	2.4	1.2	97.7	90.2

Source: Computed from statistics in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1944-1969

Table IV-11 Democratic-Farmer-Labor Primaries: Comparing Primary Competition With and Without Incumbents Running, 1944-1966.

Office	All Primaries		No Incumbents		Incumbents	
	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates
Governor	3.7	1.5	3.9	1.7	3.5	1.3
Lt. Governor	3.2	1.7	4.1	2.0	1.0	1.0
Atty. General	2.4	1.8	2.9	2.0	1.5	1.3
Secy. of State	1.7	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.0
Auditor	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.5	---	---
Treasurer	2.5	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.0	1.0
U.S. Senate	2.5	1.4	2.8	1.8	2.3	1.0

Source: Computed from statistics in Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

The winning candidate had a substantial, but not overwhelming, proportion of the vote. So there is no evidence that a multi-factional system existed. There may be some tendency toward bi-factionalism.

This tendency becomes more evident when one takes account of incumbency. (See Table IV-11). With incumbents running all but the governors and the attorney generals office had one "serious" candidate for each primary. When no DFL incumbent was running, all but the auditors office averaged very close to two serious candidates. Overall 58 percent of the contests had one serious candidate, 32 percent were bi-factional, and 10 percent had three candidates. When contests with no incumbents are considered, 14 percent have three candidates, with the balance equally split between one and two candidate contests. The endorsement system

evidently makes the organization strong enough to usually determine the primary winner. But many party members apparently feel no compunction in bucking this endorsement. And a substantial number of party supporters vote against the endorsee. Only incumbency can completely discourage primary challenges. When there are no incumbents, party endorsement can sometimes discourage challengers, but more frequently something like bi-factionalism breaks out.

As might be expected, there are some differences between the earlier and later periods. Except for auditor, primary contesting did diminish. But this can be accounted for largely by the increase in DFL incumbencies. There is an even more marked increase in the percentage vote for primary winners. Virtually no office was competitive. Primaries from 1956 through 1962 were marked by almost complete party solidarity. In 1954 half the contests were one candidate, the other were bi-factional. The 1966 primary was an exercise in deliberate party bi-factionalism and this will be discussed in more detail presently. By contrast, the earlier period showed marked tendencies toward bi-factionalism. In 1950 party discipline broke down into a largely tri-factional pattern. Further, it might be argued that even in the cases during 1944 and 1946 where there was only one major primary contestant, this was more the result of the apparent futility in running against the Republican incumbent than an outcome of party discipline. In short, an examination of the primaries would suggest that the DFL, in spite of pre-primary endorsement, tended to a bi- and even multi-factionalism in its formative period. After its

electoral success a stronger party discipline emerged, undoubtedly bolstered by the electoral potency of incumbents.

However, this tells us little about the basis for party factionalism that does exist. It cannot demonstrate that such factions as do exist are continuing. It does not even conclusively prove the existence of factions. The bi- and multi-factional primaries that emerge may be based solely on temporary personal alignments. And there is little other systematic evidence on this point. In 1948 there was a clear bi-factional alignment based on ideological issues of some consequence. <sup>41</sup> A moderate wing under Hubert Humphrey and Orville Freeman fought a bitter battle to keep Henry Wallace supporters out of the convention and the primaries. Their opponents were a more radical left wing group, some left over from the communist oriented wing of the old Farmer-Labor party. The "right wing" carried the precinct, county, and state conventions. However, the left held a rump convention and put up opposing candidates in the primary. The moderate regulars were partially successful with regular candidates losing to Wallacities only for attorney general and treasurer. However, even in 1948 the ideological bi-factionalism was muddied with the regular candidate losing out to an "Irish name" for lieutenant governor.

The source of factions in the other earlier elections is unclear. One could surmise that there would be latent factionalism between elements from the older Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties. Indeed, based on candidate names, there may have been some ethnic conflicts associated with this division. One frequently finds at least one "Irish name" against one "Scandinavian name"

for many positions. It is possible that the Irish candidates were associated with the urban Irish Catholic Democratic party. The Scandinavians would have been more associated with the Farmer-Labor party. And the multiple candidacies, such as in 1950, might arise from the fact that many party activists, such as Orville Freeman and Karl Rolvaag, became politically active after World War II and had little affiliation with either of the older organizations.

By the time of DFL successes, the older bases for factional division should have become muted. Other than in 1954 and 1966, any internal party factionalism did not spill over into the primaries. Only once did a full scale conflict break out. This was in the 1966 primary when the regular party organization challenged its incumbent governor's right to succeed himself, and lost.<sup>42</sup>

This division was apparently not based on ideology. No one argued that Governor Rolvaag was not a good, loyal DFLer. No one questioned his liberal credentials. Nor was the split rural-urban. Nor was there an ethnic split. Opposition arose on two grounds. The first was the matter of appearance and style. The younger, more middle class, "intellectual" group questioned Rolvaag's electoral appeal. He did not present an attractive personal image. He was not adept at using mass media. He had not made a good impression in handling several public controversies during his administration. Most regular party leaders arrayed against the governor on a second grounds. This was the charge that he had been inept in handling party organizat-

ional problems. Mainly, he lacked effective communications with state party executive leaders, county chairmen, and state legislative leaders. So not only younger members, but most established party leaders concurred in the decision that Rolvaag was non-electable and must step aside. Governor Rolvaag mainly relied on personal acquaintances who had stood by him during the gruelling election recount of 1962. Most of these close associates had not had great party stature prior to that time. Secondly, he had great organizational and financial support from labor unions. This support became especially crucial after the Governor had been denied pre-primary convention endorsement. Finally, in the primary he had overwhelming support from party rank and file. This was partly a sympathy vote. But it may also have been based partly on traditional populist antagonism (especially prevalent among old Farmer-Labrites) toward party organizational control. In any event, party leaders took the risk of challenging an incumbent. At the convention Lieutenant Governor Sandy Keith never trailed Rolvaag in the balloting. But it took twenty ballots before he could get the necessary 60% for endorsement. After the convention, the Governor refused to support the endorsement system, challenged the party in the primary, and won a substantial victory. Even though it is difficult to find a lasting basis for the 1966 division, it was not merely a personality dispute. Nor was it limited only to 1966. The split endured for a time after the 1966 election. And it had some basis at least four years earlier. A number of younger party members had questioned then Lieutenant Governor Rolvaag's right to the gubernatorial nomination in 1962. Sandy Keith and Fifth District

Chairman Forrest Harris had spearheaded an effort to support Attorney General Walter Mondale. The arguments were similar to 1966. Mondale was a young, attractive, and popular campaigner. Opponents questioned Rolvaag's ability to win. They questioned whether long party service was a sufficient condition for nomination. The movement was aborted early because Mondale himself thoroughly squelched it. The 1962 primary was probably the most unified in the party's history.

Based on the nomination process, it is difficult to assess the DFL party's organizational strength. A fair guess would be to call the organizational strength moderate. In the early years the party was moderately weak. But in contrast to many parties in moralistic states, it had the ability to develop pre-primary endorsement. Even though the endorsement was often challenged, and sometimes successfully, the party could usually make it stick. The primary contests themselves reveal a fluid bi-factionalism. Beginning in 1954 the party organization, bolstered by its incumbents was moderately strong. The endorsement system was rarely challenged, and never successfully until 1966. The 1966 experience cautions against a definite conclusion on contemporary party strength. In one respect the party's decision to challenge an incumbent is in itself a sign that the party believed in its own strength. Few party organizations in the U.S. have the temerity to challenge an incumbent and risk the probable general election defeat that this challenge threatens. Even fewer do so successfully. On the other hand the DFL party lost both the primary and the election. It is impossible to determine at this time what direction party organization will take in the future.

In contrast to the DFL, the Republican's primary pattern was highly uni-structured. (See Table IV-12). Usually there was only one serious candidate for any given office. Occasionally the leading candidate was challenged by a second person or group. The only exception to this generalization is the lieutenant governor's office which was highly competitive and shows some tendencies to bi-factionalism. There is no other continuing indication of either competition or bi-factionalism. Curiously, there appears to be little substantial difference between contests with incumbents and those without (See Table IV-13). There is a slight indication that non-incumbent contests were more competitive, but the difference is substantial only for the treasurer's office. There was even slightly more competition for governor and U.S. Senator when there was an incumbency. When no incumbent was running there were contests about 40% of the time. These contests almost uniformly followed a bi-factional pattern.

There were no substantial differences between the earlier and latter periods for the Republicans. The only noticeable difference was a greater tendency for more competition in gubernatorial and senate primaries in the earlier time. More significant differences were found by splitting the entire period into three sections (See Table IV-12). The first encompasses the three primaries during the 1940's (The results would probably be the same if 1940 and 1942 were also included). The second includes four primaries from 1950-1956. And the last includes all primaries from 1958-1966.

The first and last periods are very similar. There were

Table IV-12 Republican Party Primaries, 1944-1966

Office	No. of Nominations	No. of Contested Primaries	No. of Contested Primaries with Incumbents	Ave. no. of Candidates	Ave. No. of Candidates 20% or more of vote	Ave. % of vote Two Highest Candidates	Ave. % Vote for Nominee
Governor	11	8	4	3	1.3	98.1	84.4
Lt. Governor	11	10	3	4	1.6	81.1	56.4
Atty. General	11	3	0	1.5	1.2	96.5	90.5
Secy. of State	11	6	3	3	1.4	94.0	80.8
Auditor	6	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Treasurer	11	5	2	2	1.2	94.3	85.6
U.S. Senate	8	7	3	3	1.1	95.9	82.0
			<u>1944-1948</u>				
Governor	3	3	2	4	1.7	94.4	70.4
Lt. Governor	3	3	2	5	1	82.9	65.6
Atty. General	3	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Secy. of State	3	1	1	1.3	1	100.0	96.3
Auditor	1	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Treasurer	3	1	1	2	1	94.1	90.8
U.S. Senate	2	2	2	4	1.5	95.3	68.4
			<u>1950-1956</u>				
Governor	4	3	2	3.8	1.3	97.5	83.3
Lt. Governor	4	4	1	4.8	2	75.4	42.7
Atty. General	4	2	0	2.3	1.5	90.3	74.0
Secy. of State	4	4	2	6.3	1.8	83.4	60.2
Auditor	2	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Treasurer	4	3	0	3	1.5	88.7	69.8
U.S. Senate	2	2	1	4	1	89.5	83.3
			<u>1958-1966</u>				
Governor	4	2	0	1.5	1	100.0	95.9
Lt. Governor	4	3	0	2.8	1.8	85.3	63.1
Atty. General	4	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Secy. of State	4	1	0	1.3	1.3	100.0	89.3
Auditor	3	0	0	1	1	100.0	100.0
Treasurer	4	1	1	1.3	1	100.0	97.5
U.S. Senator	4	3	1	2	1	99.4	90.6

Source: Computed from statistics in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

Table IV-13 Republican Primaries: Comparing Primary Competition With and Without Incumbents Running; 1944-1966

Office	All Primaries		No Incumbents		Incumbents	
	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates	Ave. No. Candidates	Ave. No. Serious Candidates
Governor	3.0	1.3	2.2	1.2	3.7	1.3
Lt. Governor	4.0	1.6	4.8	1.8	2.8	1.3
Atty. General	1.3	1.2	1.8	1.3	1.0	1.0
Secy. of State	3.0	1.4	4.0	1.5	1.5	1.0
Auditor	1.0	1.0	---	---	1.0	1.0
Treasurer	2.0	1.2	3.7	1.7	1.5	1.0
U.S. Senate	3.0	1.1	2.0	1.0	4.0	1.3

Source: Computed from statistics in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

very few primary contests in either. In the earlier time there was some tendency toward bi-factionalism for governor and U.S. Senator. In the latter there was slightly more competition for lieutenant governor and secretary of state. However, the uni-dimensional structure in the two cases probably springs from different sources. In the first, the period of Republican dominance, the unity was largely imposed by a "tyranny" of the incumbents. Only two of eighteen primaries did not involve incumbents. Only twice were incumbents seriously challenged. The first saw Edward J. Thye unseating veteran Senator Henrik Shipstead in 1946. The second was when Stafford King vigorously, but unsuccessfully, challenged Governor Luther K. Youngdahl in 1948. In the latter period, however, the Republicans had incumbents running in only one-third of the primaries. No incumbent was seriously challenged.

But there were only three serious challenges, two for lieutenant governor and one for secretary of state, in the other eighteen races. It seems reasonable to assume that the pre-primary endorsement system, adopted for the first time in 1958, was working rather effectively. Whatever differences existed within the party were largely sublimated after the convention was over. It seems fair to conclude that this is the mark of a very effective and strong organization.

The early 1950's reveal a quite different pattern. Something approaching bi-factionalism emerges from the lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, and treasurer races. The first office is clearly competitive. The rest marginally so. By this time Republican incumbents were fading out of the picture. Julius Schmahl retired before 1950, J.A.A. Burnquist retired before 1954, and Mike Holm died in 1951. C. Elmer Anderson stepped up to the governorship in 1950. As a result almost half of the twenty-four primaries were seriously contested. And two-thirds of the primaries without incumbents fell into this category.

The primaries do not reveal what the basis for this factionalism in the 1950's might have been. It has been suggested that ever since 1938, when Harold Stassen became dominant in the party, there has been a continuing ideological rift between conservatives and liberals. Earlier an Old Guard, centered around state office holders, opposed the personal organizations of Stassen and Luther Youngdahl. Contests between Youngdahl and Stafford King (1948 for governor), C. Elmer Anderson and Ancher Nelsen (1950 for lieutenant governor) and C. Elmer Anderson and Stafford King

(1950 for governor) might be manifestations of this. Later, urban and suburban liberals, especially for Hennepin County, opposed more conservative members from the non-metropolitan areas. If there was such a division, the party had great success in muting it during the last twelve years. David Lebedoff particularly contrasts the gentlemanly Republican convention to the DFL conflicts in 1966.<sup>43</sup> In 1966 there were at least three major contestants for Republican gubernatorial endorsement: Harold Levander (Dakota County), John Pillsbury, Jr. (Hennepin County), and former governor Elmer L. Andersen (Ramsey County). After thirteen ballots no one had received the necessary 60% for endorsement. The principle contestants got together and agreed that after a stated number of additional ballots, they would all accept the highest man as winner whether he had 60% or not. Accordingly Levander was conceded victory on the seventeenth ballot. No major opponent challenged him in the primary.

Based on the primary evidence, Republican party organizational strength varied greatly. Rarely were contests wide open. Very early, incumbents kept competition in check. In the 1950's the party organization seemed at best moderately strong with a tendency toward bi-factionalism. Since 1958 party influence in the primaries has been very strong indeed.

#### Political Campaigning

At the campaign, as well as the nomination level, the Republican party seems to be better organized than the DFL. For one thing Lebedoff comments that the Republicans have more

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campaign funds. Of course, this is true at the national level as well. The Republican party has easier access to more large contributors. However, in Minnesota they have been better able to raise small donations as well. And by the 1960's at least they had a more efficient centralized operation for fund raising and disbursement. By 1952 the DFL also had a party sustaining fund, but it was not as large. 45 Before that time it is doubtful that they had a very strong state-wide campaign organization at all.

Apparently Republicans are also more proficient at other campaign techniques. 46 Although in this regard, the DFL, at the peak of its powers in the late 1950's, also had good organizational people. On the county level candidate organization was rare. Candidates for the less important state-wide offices relied exclusively on party organization.

Perhaps one reason that the DFL party is less effective in campaigning is that it is less essential for DFL candidates than the Republican organization is for theirs. To some degree they can rely on organized labor for funds, workers, and organizational support. Governor Rolvaag could ignore the party in 1966 partly because labor strongly aided him in the primary and, to a degree, in the campaign.

Republicans have not always relied so heavily on party organization either. Especially down to the middle 1950's campaigning was more a personalistic thing. In part this was a candidate-oriented politics based on incumbency. Long term office-holders had the power of name familiarity, and, to a

degree, the resources of their office. For example, with motor vehicle registrars in every county, the secretary of state had the most extensive patronage potential in the state. In part also this was the result of the strong personalities of Harold Stassen and Luther Youngdahl. Stassen made over the party in his own image from 1938 to 1946 largely through the Young  
 48  
 Republican League. In campaigning he sidetracked the regular party organization with his own personal machinery. When Luther Youngdahl came to power in 1946-1950 he relied heavily on his  
 49  
 own personal popularity, and heavy volunteer and church support. County chairmen were set up to organize local support and coordinate the church people. Particularly in 1950 church leaders were heavily committed to organized campaigning. Some even gave public endorsements.

So probably for both parties campaigning from the 1944 to the 1950's was on a personalized candidate basis. For the DFL this resulted from electoral weakness. For the Republicans it was an outgrowth of incumbency. Since the 1950's the parties have become progressively more essential for financial and campaign support. The process has gone further for the Republicans than for the Democrats.

#### Party Organization - A Summation

It is fairly clear that the DFL was the weaker of the two party organizations. In the first half of the period the party was first characterized by a transitional leadership. This grew into a clear ideological bi-factional fight from 1946 to 1948.  
 50  
 The new, more moderate New Deal leadership (Humphrey-Freeman-

McCarthy) won over the radical Marxist elements. From 1948 to 1954 there was a fairly cohesive visible leadership that sought to use the party as a reform vehicle. However, the party was not well equipped to turn this unity into electoral success. For the most part it could not completely control nomination to office. Pre-primary endorsement was a strengthening tool. But numerous primaries were contested and often marked by a bifactional pattern. Party offices were never filled, half the counties had only a handful of regulars, and the party was often inactive in campaigns.<sup>51</sup> By 1954 the party had taken on more vitality and began to win elections. Aided by incumbency, the endorsement system was fairly effective. However, along with electoral success divisions appeared. The division does not appear to be ideological or urban-rural. It seems to be between the newer urban middle class intellectuals on the one hand, and more populistic farm and union elements on the other.<sup>52</sup> As 1966 showed, with this split the party cannot absolutely count on controlling the nomination, nor on supplying effective campaign help.

In the earlier period, too, the Republican party as an organization was neither strong nor unified. Success was based on popular incumbents and personal strength added by Harold Stassen and Luther Youngdahl.<sup>53</sup> But by 1946 there was close to a three way split among liberal Stassen Young Republicans, "Old Guard" office holders, and reform oriented independents brought in by Youngdahl. This clash boiled over in 1950 with a break between Youngdahl and legislative leaders. It came

to a head again in 1952 when Governor C. Elmer Anderson successfully had Roy Dunn removed as national committeeman. By 1960, however, the party was organizationally strong. Through convention endorsement it virtually eliminated serious primary contests. There was still an ideological cleavage in the party between suburban moderates and rural conservatives.<sup>54</sup> However, they were able to submerge these differences in the interests of campaign unity. Not only did the party effectively manage nominations, it could offer substantial financial and worker campaign support.

From what has been said it seems fair to classify Minnesota as having at least a moderate party organizational system. It clearly exceeds the western states in organizational strength. And both parties would seem to be stronger than those in the less competitive midwestern states. It would not seem appropriate to classify it with Michigan, the only moralistic state with a moderately strong party organization. This is so primarily because neither Minnesota party has the homogeneous constituency and ideological base found in Michigan. Obviously both parties were weaker in the earlier 1944-1952 period. Then they seemed more comparable to parties in the traditional modified one party system. Even then the DFL was able to attempt nomination control. And the Republicans were able to maintain unity into the electoral campaign. In the latter period it seems fair to call Minnesota a moderate organizational system bordering on the moderately strong. Even though the DFL was marked by internal factionalism, it was able to maintain great organizational

discipline until 1966. The Republicans seemed to have developed a strong organizational system, except for their own, milder, internal factionalism.

#### IV. SUMMARY

Minnesota appears to have been a politically competitive, moderate party organization state from 1944 to 1970. In the earlier part of the period competition was less and veered toward moderate one party Republicanism. During the same period, the Democratic party organization was moderately weak and the Republican organization not much stronger. During the latter part of the period, competition was intense and both party organizations much more important in the political scene. This change makes sense in light of the state's increasing urban and industrial character. It is somewhat remarkable and unusual in light of the moralistic political culture.

Divisions between the two parties tend to follow familiar national ethnic, social, and economic lines. This probably accounts for the relatively clear policy differences between them. The one exception to this is the relatively weak urban-rural differences between the two. The DFL has a slightly greater dependence upon an urban electorate, but the difference is not great. Ethnic ties are much more important in interpreting differences in party support among counties. This ethnic factor also partially explains the very clear regional difference in party support. The DFL has its power base in the Iron Range, forest, metropolitan, Red River Valley, and western farm areas. The Republicans are stronger in the

agricultural southeast and south central, and in the north central resort regions.

The lack of urban-rural differences between the two parties partially, but weakly, accounts for factionalism within the parties. This is more true for the Republicans than for the DFL. As it is, though, both parties are remarkably well organized when matched with their counterparts in all but the eastern states. One would hypothesize that party could be a moderately important resource for the governor who can work through the party machinery. At least it would be a more important gubernatorial resource than is normally found in a moralistic state.

## Footnotes - Chapter 4

1. James M. Henderson and Anne O. Kreuger, National Growth and Economic Change in the Upper Midwest (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965) p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. Ibid., computed from county statistics on pages 207-220.
4. Ibid., p. 15; the U.S. rate of decline was 5% a year.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Secretary of State's Office, The Minnesota Legislative Manual (St. Paul: The State of Minnesota, published biennially, 1945 through 1969) See commentary in various manuals on this point.
7. Henderson and Kreuger, op. cit., pp. 98-100.
8. Ibid. p. 22.
9. John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston: 1966) Fenton discusses the impact of ethnicity on Minnesota politics pp. 75-78. Most of my discussion is based on personal knowledge.
10. Henderson and Kreuger, op. cit., p. 16
11. Ibid., pp. 207-220.
12. Fenton, op. cit., pp. 75-113; G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1960).
13. Fenton, op. cit., pp. 104-114.
14. Ibid., pp. 87, 100.
15. Ibid., p. 99, 102.
16. Ibid., p. 102.
17. Mitau, op. cit., pp. 4, 42.
18. Ibid., pp. 39, 44-48.
19. Fenton, op. cit., p. 86.
20. See Henderson and Kreuger, op. cit., showing the various agricultural regions in the upper midwest, p. 43.
21. Ibid., pp. 19, 29.
22. Fenton, op. cit., see map on page 82
23. The discussion on Minnesota's governors response to environmental problems is based on requests in the inaugural and special messages. For a complete list see the Bibliography.
24. Fenton, op. cit., p. 107.
25. Ronald F. Stinnett and Charles H. Backstrom, Recount (Washington, D.C.: National Document Publishers, Inc., : 1964) p. 1.
26. Fenton, op. cit., p. 110.
27. Ibid., pp. 75, 94-6, 110.
28. For a discussion of the chi square test and the contingency coefficient, Cramer's V, see Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) pp. 212-221, 228-231.
29. The following is based on Mitau, op, cit., pp. 24, and Fenton, op. cit., p. 75, 93-96.
30. Fenton, op. cit., pp. 81, 93-4, 96.
31. Ibid., p. 110.
32. Ibid., p. 87.

33. Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget (Interuniversity Case Series, No. 60, 1961) p. 3, and The Policy Process: The Minnesota Governor and the Legislature in 1958 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957), pp. 37, 42.
34. Mitau, "The Status of Political Party Organization in Minnesota Law". Minnesota Law Review, 40; 561-79 (April 1956), p. 564.
35. Ibid., pp. 563, 571; Flinn, (1957) op. cit., pp. 26-7.
36. Mitau, (1960), op. cit., pp. 43, 49.
37. Ibid., pp. 35-8; Mitau, (1956) op. cit., pp. 565, 571.
38. Mitau, (1960) op. cit., pp. 27, 47-8; Flinn (1957) op. cit., p. 27.
39. Mitau (1956) op. cit., p. 573.
40. Ibid., p. 574; Mitau (1960) op. cit., p. 48
41. Mitau, "The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party Schism of 1948", Minnesota History 34, 187-94 (Spring 1955) pp. 191-4; Flinn (1957) op. cit., p. 47.
42. Stinnett and Backstrom, op. cit., pp. 25-29, relates the origins of the split in 1962. For the 1966 conflict I have relied heavily on David Lebedoff, The 21st Bailott (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1969) especially pp. 2-3, 7-11, 36-38, 55, 59-67, 109-138, 149-157, 162-4, 175.
43. Lebedoff, op. cit., pp. 141-3.
44. Ibid., pp. 177, 180.
45. Flinn (1957) op. cit., p. 24.
46. Lebedoff, op. cit., p. 180.
47. Flinn, op. cit., pp. 46-7.
48. Ivan Hinderaker, "Harold Stassen and Developments in the Republican Party in Minnesota, 1937-1943" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1949) pp. 359-60, 726-7.
49. Robert Esbjornson, A Christian in Politics: Luther W. Youngdahl (Minneapolis: T.S. Denison Co., 1955) pp. 204-7.
50. Flinn (1957) op. cit., pp. 27-36.
51. Ibid., pp. 18-22.
52. Flinn (1961) op. cit., p. 3; Mitau (1960) op. cit., pp. 25-27; Lebedoff, op. cit., pp. 32, 291.
53. See Mitau, (1960) op. cit., pp. 18-22; Hinderaker, op. cit., pp. 753-771, 785-7, 51-57, 62-78; Esbjornson, op. cit., p. 191, 211-2, 128-130; Roy E. Dunn as told to Jim Borman, unpublished interview, Minnesota Historical Society, 1966, pp. 11-12.
54. Fenton, op. cit., p. 93.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE MINNESOTA GOVERNOR: FORMAL RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES

In a sense all that has been done up to this point has been preliminary. This chapter finally begins to concentrate upon the central problem. What are the major power resources available to the Minnesota governor? In answering this question the various types of potential resources outlined in chapter two will be taken up point by point. In order, these will be legal-constitutional, institutional, political, and personal. The first two are covered primarily in this chapter. The latter two primarily in the next. Generally, the overall potential for each resource will be evaluated. However, changes in resource potential over time must also be traced. And the use of this resource potential over time must also be traced. And the use of these resources must be illustrated by reference to particular governors. Final judgements on effectiveness will be based almost exclusively by attribution. That is, very little "hard" data exists on resource effectiveness. As a result the greatest reliance is placed on the opinions of governors and legislators most intimately caught up in the process. After this general examination each governor will be evaluated as to his relative power and effectiveness. And from this can be established a rank order of probable program success for each man. Actual success will be examined in chapter ten.

#### I. LEGAL-CONSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

Legal-constitutional resources cover a wide range of specific items. In general these resources are based on con-

stitutional provisions. They include miscellaneous factors such as military powers, special sessions, and messages. The veto and tenure powers also derive primarily, but not exclusively, from the constitution. The governor's control over the administrative branch, and his leverage through the budget, rest more on statutory law.

#### Miscellaneous Constitutional Powers

Except for tenure and veto powers, one compact paragraph summarizes the constitutional powers allotted to the Minnesota governor.

Powers and duties of the governor. Sec. 4. The governor shall communicate by message to each session of the legislature such information touching the state and condition of the country as he may deem expedient. He shall be commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces, and may call out such forces to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and rebel invasion. He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each executive department relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power, in conjunction with the board of pardons, of which the governor shall be ex officio a member, and the other members, which shall consist of the attorney general of the State of Minnesota and the chief justice of the supreme court of the State of Minnesota, and whose powers and duties shall be defined and regulated by law, to grant reprieves and pardons after convictions for offenses against the state, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint notaries public, and such other officers as may be appointed by law. He shall have power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgement of deeds or other instruments in writing to be used in the state. He shall have a negative upon all laws passed by the legislature, under such rules and limitations as are in this Constitution prescribed. He may on extraordinary occasions convene both houses of the legislature. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, fill any vacancy

that may occur in the office of secretary of state, auditor, attorney general, and such other state and district offices as may hereafter be created by law, until the end of the term for which the person who vacated the office was elected, or the first Monday in January following the next general election whichever is sooner, and until their successors are chosen and qualified.

The secondary grants of power contained within this paragraph include commander-in-chief, pardoning power, special sessions, and messages. No governor mentioned the pardoning power as an asset in dealing with the legislature. Indeed the governor does not have full control over the pardoning procedure. He shares this with the attorney general and chief justice. The position as commander-in-chief has not yet been critical either. Many governors have used the National Guard to alleviate natural disasters, particularly spring floods. Governor Orville Freeman attracted great public attention when he called out the Guard during the Wilson meat packing company strike in December, 1959.<sup>2</sup> But although such actions may affect the governor's public image, they have little impact on his legislative position.

The ability to call special sessions is a more direct source of legislative leverage. However, this power is more restricted in Minnesota than in many states. Although the governor may call a special session, he cannot limit its character, subject matter, or adjournment date.<sup>3</sup> The primary force of the session is to focus public opinion on certain issues, and on the governor. During the period 1945 to 1970 there were no less than nine special or extra sessions. Such sessions were held in 1951, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1966, and 1967. It could hardly be

said that these frequent sessions generally enhanced gubernatorial power. The 1951 session lasted one day. It resulted from a deadlock between the Conservative House majority and Governor Luther K. Youngdahl (1947-1951).<sup>4</sup> The House had passed an essential appropriation bill on the last day. The legislative leaders took the bill to Youngdahl at 11:45 p.m. of the last day that he had to sign the bill. The furious governor refused to accept a bill that he would not even have time to read. There was no choice but to call a session to extend the appropriation for educational functions in the state.

Multiple factors produced the frequent extra sessions from 1955-1962. First, the state's business was becoming too complex to handle within the constitutional biennial 90 day sessions. (This was partially alleviated by a constitutional amendment that extended regular sessions to 120 days starting in 1963.)<sup>5</sup> Secondly, divisions between a Liberal House and a Conservative Senate slowed decision making. Governor Freeman's ambitious programs magnified these divisions. The 1955 and 1957 sessions were relatively brief. The first passed needed tax bills, the latter handled mandatory appropriation bills. However, the marathon 1959 and 1961 extra sessions practically became entirely new legislative sessions. They too had been called for tax and appropriations purposes. But they also covered everything from egg candling regulation to aid for dependent children to legislative reapportionment.

The 1967 session was again relatively limited, the main subject being the sales tax. However, other major items such as home rule, a metropolitan sewer bill, and a new Department of

Labor and Industry were also debated. Only three special sessions, 1958, 1962, and 1966, could be restricted to one topic. The first concerned bringing the state unemployment compensation laws into line with new federal legislation. The second dealt with the politically divisive Congressional redistricting. The last resolved the again politically explosive state legislative reapportionment question. In each case the governor established a prior informal agreement with the legislative leadership to restrict the sessions scope.

In no case did the special session markedly demonstrate gubernatorial leverage over the legislature. In no case did it markedly increase his public prestige. In most cases the session was mandatory to keep the state government operating. Some sessions probably hurt the governor. The long drawn out 1959 session, with its intense partisan wrangling, hurt Governor Freeman's prestige. Previously, the 1958 session caused him apprehension when its length cut into campaign time.<sup>6</sup> The 1966 session on reapportionment culminated in a bitter and disastrous split between Governor Karl F. Rolvaag (1963-1966) and both the Senate and House DFL caucuses. And in 1967 Governor Harold Levander (1967-1970) saw the Conservatives in both houses override his veto of the sales tax that he had consistently opposed in public. Overall the governor cannot control the special session sufficiently for it to be a major power resource.

The governor's message power is a final minor constitutional resource. This has been expanded into an opportunity to also transmit budgetary and special messages. Every governor begins

every regular session with his inaugural (or state of the state) message. This outlines the major substantive program changes the governor would like to see. It also contains a preview of his revenue program. Most messages are fairly elaborate. They have become progressively more so over the years since 1945. The budget message follows the inaugural by two or three weeks. This describes the various revenue funds. It also outlines appropriation requests for general program areas with some specific requests for new or specially emphasized items. And it concludes with a revenue program designed to balance the appropriation requests. These presentations also have gradually become more detailed and elaborate. Finally, there are the special messages. These, more than any other, serve to focus public attention on one specific problem area. Topics included have been education, government reorganization, tax reform, mental health, civil rights, crime, and consumer protection. Governors Freeman and Levander made especially extensive use of these.

So, the message device is available. What is its legislative impact? No governor mentioned it as a potent device. Governor Elmer L. Andersen (1961-1963) best summed up the prevailing attitude. The messages are simply an opportunity to point out the major programs that he felt necessary. It is primarily a publicity device that enables the governor to highlight certain issues. It also presents a legitimate excuse to enter the legislative arena. One suspects that this is not a negligible consideration in a state where most veteran legislators fiercely guard legislative independence. Although legislators do not

welcome gubernatorial "meddling", they acknowledge his formal rights under the constitution. And a majority of legislators interviewed do regard the inaugural message, coupled with the budget message, as the governor's major expression of his program. However, even many who regarded the message as a program statement, viewed it as incomplete at best.<sup>9</sup> The formal message may be taken only as an outline, as the governor's introductory remarks on a small set of issues. Not all items will be equally valued by the governor. Some merely serve as a bow to the party's platform. Others he inserts to please certain groups, such as education activists. Most legislators regard the real program as those issues the governor actually pushes during the session. Through informal cues he will indicate his true priorities.

But few legislators felt that these gubernatorial priorities serve as determinative decision-making cues. Even those few largely qualified their statements. Only a very few Conservatives, such as Senator Stanley Holmquist (1955-1958) felt that there was even partial voting on the basis of administration support.<sup>8</sup> Most flatly rejected such a notion.<sup>9</sup> Although most DFL legislators also qualified their responses, they were much more likely to see caucus voting for or against administration bills. In no case would DFL caucus members automatically support 100% of the DFL governor's message. However, those parts that came from the party platform would be supported. As Speaker A. I. Johnson (DFL, 1941-1958) put it, the caucus and the governor's philosophical position generally coincided.<sup>10</sup>

The message then is also a very limited tool. It presents

a legitimate opportunity for the governor to offer a legislative program. He may focus public attention on certain issues and make a public record. And the DFL caucus may support the party portion of the DFL governors' platform. But the message is mostly seen as a beginning, no more.

#### The Veto Power

Article IV, Sec. II of the state constitution most clearly spells out the Minnesota governor's veto power. All bills, after passing both houses, must go to the governor before becoming law. If he approves, he signs it and deposits it with the secretary of state. If he does not, he returns it with his objections to the house of origin. The veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house. The governor may also object to one or more items in an appropriations bill. These objections can also be negated by a two-thirds vote on each item. There has been one significant limitation on this veto power. Until 1968, the governor had only three days to consider a bill. If he did not return it within three days, it became law unsigned. When a large volume of bills cross the governor's desk in a short time, his opportunities for careful scrutiny become terribly limited. Then the initiative for vetoing comes not so much from himself, but from other parties that have objections. One further consideration partially alleviates this limitation. If the legislature adjourns before the three days expires, a bill may not become law without the governor's signature (he has, in effect, a pocket veto). The veto power potential for the governor remained virtually unchanged throughout the period. A small

increase in power was effected by constitutional amendment on November 5, 1968.<sup>11</sup> As of that time the legislature has three days after the session ends to present the bills to the governor. The governor then has fourteen days after adjournment to consider bills passed in the last three days. This change was mainly seen as a technical improvement to handle the tremendous volume of bills passed within the last few session days. But it also extends the time for gubernatorial review of bills. And it extends his discretion in using the pocket veto.

According to Joseph Schlesinger's power index (discussed in chapter two) Minnesota would be classified as a "strong" veto state. This places it in the second rank. Ten states place ahead of it as being very strong. But the veto power's significance resides not so much in its potential as in its use. Compared to many other states, Minnesota governors simply do not exercise the veto power very frequently. (See Table V-1). On the average only six bills are vetoed per session. And only two governors, Rolvaag and Youngdahl, exceeded this figure. These two men accounted for almost 60% of the vetoes in twenty-six years. Youngdahl averaged nearly 9 vetoes per session. Rolvaag averaged 10. By way of contrast, in Wisconsin, sometimes regarded as a "sister" state to Minnesota, there were 395 vetoes during a comparable period, 1945-1967.<sup>12</sup> That is five times the number by Minnesota governors, an average of about 33 per session. One cannot easily compare Minnesota to the nation as a whole because figures are not readily available. However, the state probably would rank toward the lower end of the spectrum. Certainly the average of 18 to 22 vetoes a session in states like Texas and

Table V-1  
 Vetoes by Minnesota Governors, 1945-1970

<u>Session</u>	<u>Total bills vetoed</u>	<u>Vetoes overridden</u>	<u>Attempts to override</u>
1945	3	0	1
1947	8	0	1
1949	8	1	1
1951	10	0	2
1953	5	0	0
1955	2	0	0
1957	5	0	0
1959	4	0	0
1961	3	0	0
1963	6	0	0
1965	14	0	0
1967	6	1	2
1969	4	0	0
Total	78	2	7
Average per session	6	.2	.5

Note: The total includes regular, item, and pocket vetoes. Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969; The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

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Michigan exceeds the Minnesota average. And Minnesota lags far behind California, New Jersey, and New York where the average is from 90 to 290 per session.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, once a Minnesota governor vetoes a bill, the action stands as being pretty much absolute. The legislature overrode only two vetoes (2.5%) in twenty-six years. About 5.6% of the vetoes in Wisconsin were overridden. Only seven override attempts were even made. Most occurred during Governor Youngdahl's battles with the Conservative legislative majority. And most involved not matters of high policy, but local liquor bills. In 1967 the veto battles were over a major issue, the sales tax.

Few governors, then, exercise the veto power. For what purpose is it used? Vetoes do occur across a wide spectrum of

Table V-2  
 Vetoes by Minnesota Governors  
 By Subject Area

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Number of Vetoes</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Liquor	16	20.5
Commercial regulation	11	14.1
State administration	10	12.8
Taxation	8	10.3
Conservation, natural resources	6	7.7
Judicial, law enforcement	4	5.1
Labor	4	5.1
Local	4	5.1
Education	3	3.8
Motor Vehicles	3	3.8
Elections	2	2.6
Welfare	2	2.6
Miscellaneous	5	6.5
	<u>78</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969; Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

policy areas. Many affect important social issues. However, a majority are concentrated in five issue areas. And a majority affect very narrow, technical bills. Twenty percent negated local liquor bills. Most of these resulted from Governor Youngdahl's moral crusade from 1947-1951. The commercial regulation category covers highly diverse issues. They range from rice harvesting practices to an attempt to abolish rent controls in 1953. Many deal with banking practices and loan rates. The state administration category also encompasses a multitude of issues. A very narrow issue would be Youngdahl's veto of an attempt to regulate capitol parking. The largest number involve personnel and salary questions. However, some vetoes also involve larger issues of gubernatorial control. For example, Governor Rolvaag over-ruled an extensive reorganization in the

Department of Conservation. Governor Levander took exception to an attempt to place a time limit on his appointment power in 1967. Tax vetoes also were a major issue in the Rolvaag and Levander administrations. Rolvaag twice vetoed reciprocity agreements with Wisconsin. And Levander twice vetoed sales tax bills. Natural resources is the last, and least significant, of the major veto categories. Three vetoes concerned bounty bills. Another negated acquisition of the Hastings spiral bridge as a state monument. Vetoes in the other categories ranged from a line item veto on a technically deficient claim involving one person, to school bus licensing, to state wide reapportionment. To repeat, most vetoes do not concern great public policy involving the general population or major political disputes. Seventy percent come on narrow issues encompassing small populations or technical problems.

Some scholars have argued that the veto is mainly effective as a bargaining threat, a "gun behind the door". This does not appear to be the general practice in Minnesota. Governors Andersen, Youngdahl, Freeman, and Levander all viewed the veto as a limited negative tool. <sup>14</sup> Governor Freeman nicely demonstrates this position. He refused to play "cat and mouse games" with the legislature. That is, he seldom traded his support for legislative measures in return for his own program success. According to executive secretary David Durenberger, Governor Levander would at least sometimes use the veto as a threat to kill unwanted legislation. The prime example was a gun control bill that had been pushed in a form unacceptable to the governor. However,

Levander would not use the threat as a positive bargaining tool, even though the occasion arose over such issues as highway bonding, a metropolitan sewer bill, and the sales tax. He personally viewed such bargaining as being morally unacceptable.

As a general rule most legislators approved of this limited view concerning the veto.<sup>15</sup> Many legislators, especially veteran senators, acknowledged that the veto was a legitimate tool. But few believed that it could be effective for bargaining. For one thing, veto overuse could well alienate legislators. A governor might threaten a legislator with veto of his pet local bills. But the legislators on any given committee could band together in retaliation. They might indicate that the governor's program would not get out of committee. The veto threat may well lead to lesser, no greater, influence. A very few legislators directly rejected the contention that trading was not done.<sup>16</sup> For example, Senator Nicholas Coleman (DFL 1963-) indicated that some legislators experience great local pressures to obtain special favors. The governor's item veto can also negate pet projects on highways, dams, etc., in appropriation bills. But this interpretation appears to be a minority view. Some governors could not make the veto stick as a negative threat even when they wanted to. The most publicized failure in this regard was Governor Levander's battle over the 1967 sales tax. Not only did the legislature ignore the veto threat, it overrode the governor's actual veto twice.<sup>17</sup>

Only one governor saw the veto as an effective and usable tool. Only one governor used the veto very frequently to affect

major policy decisions. This governor was Kari Rolvaag.

Rolvaag did believe that the veto could be a strong weapon if

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used properly. He would veto legislation that he regarded as bad. He would bargain for his own legislation by threatening a veto or holding up bills on his desk. But Governor Rolvaag also indicated that this must be done with some discretion.

He felt that vetoes will not cause resentment if they are presented correctly. The bill author certainly deserves prior notice and a full explanation. (Senator Coleman indicated that Rolvaag did not always follow through in this regard. He related that an Iron Range legislator told Rolvaag that he had two iron mining bills, but he would not press them if the governor objected. The governor told him to go ahead. But after the bills passed a veto message came down without warning. Legislators do not like to take public defeats that might adversely

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affect their election chances. Most DFLers particularly emphasized Rolvaag's effectiveness. Senator Paul Thuet (DFL, 1959-66) as Senate minority leader worked in tandem with Rolvaag.

In neither 1963 nor 1965 did the Conservative caucus have the votes to override a veto on its own. Thuet could guarantee 100% caucus loyalty on veto issues. Under these conditions they could

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bargain on major issues. Representative Martin O. Sabo (DFL, 1961-) maintained that there was a similar discipline in the House DFL caucus. DFLers pledged not to vote to override a

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veto even if they had voted for the bill originally. As a specific example, Governor Rolvaag used caucus cooperation to

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make the junior college system a state function in 1963.

We can reasonably conclude that the veto is of minor importance in Minnesota. Only Governor Rolvaag used it as a major tool, perhaps his number one resource. Undoubtedly the minority position of the DFL caucus forced him into this position. Judged by frequency of use, the veto was of descending importance for governors in the following order: Rolvaag, Youngdahl, Levander, Anderson-Freeman, Andersen-Thye. However, by his own admission, Youngdahl used the veto primarily to kill special interest legislation, not for major policy. Despite his defeat on the sales tax, perhaps Levander was second to Rolvaag in using the veto as a major policy tool. (albeit in his case it had strictly a negative function). At least he is the only other governor to acknowledge its use as a threat.

#### Tenure

The term of office for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be four years, and until their successors are chosen and qualified. Each shall have attained the age of 25 years and shall have been a bona fide resident of the state for one year next preceeding his election. Both shall be citizens of the United States.  
Minnesota Constitution, Article V, Sec. 3.

According to Joseph Schlesinger the magnitude of the governor's tenure potential is determined by the length of the term plus the restraints on re-election. Thus a four year term with no restraints on re-election grants the greatest tenure potential. Beginning in 1963 Minnesota governors have enjoyed this maximum potential. Before that time Minnesota governors had a two year term with no restraint on re-election. Schlesinger believes that this situation provides considerably less formal power potential. First, it is assumed that the longer a man is in

office, the better he will be equipped to handle that office's duties. Most new governors have precious little time to develop a program or a budget when they come into office. <sup>24</sup> Most general elections are held in November. In just a little over two months the new man must prepare a program, oversee a budget, and make numerous appointments. If he has a four year term, however, he has been through the whole process before the second legislative session. He has had more time to become acquainted with the administrative apparatus. He and his aides should be more aware of the legislative process. Secondly, veteran legislators and administrators may not look at him so much as a new man. Even in the first session they must be aware that he will be around at least one more time. Thirdly, a governor with a four year term may not be bothered so much with electoral distractions. He need not be continually running for office with the urgency found under a short term. By these standards Governor Levander and Rolvaag should have had the greater formal power potential. The others would have had less. Actually, Governor Rolvaag never got to enjoy the full benefits of a four year term.

Aside from tenure potential, what has been the actual gubernatorial tenure in Minnesota? Table V-3 compares tenure both in years served and the terms to which a man is elected. The total number of years were divided by all the men who had served in each office. The total number of terms were divided by the number of men elected to that office. Comparisons were made across the whole period of statehood, the current century,

and the specific period under study. Most Minnesota governors received more than one term in office. The average since statehood is 3.5 years, almost two terms. This increased slightly for the present century. Recent governors have had somewhat less success. However, the differences are not great.

So Minnesotans have been willing to give their governors time to acquire experience beyond that one would expect from the formal limitations. Seventeen (of thirty-two) governors were elected for two or more terms. Governors in the twentieth century were given even greater tenure than in the nineteenth. Only John S. Pillsbury (1876-1882) had three terms in the previous century. In the twentieth century three term governors included John A. Johnson (1905-1909), Theodore Christianson (1925-1930), Floyd B. Olson (1931-1936), Harold Stassen (1939-1943), Luther W. Youngdahl (1947-1951), and Orville L. Freeman (1955-1960). On the other hand, proportionately there were as many one term governors in the twentieth as in the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century governors lasted either one or two terms. In the twentieth century the governor either had one term or three. Either the governor was very popular or he was not popular at all. The three term governor's tenure was usually cut short by death or higher political ambition. In the earlier time, the two term limit seemed to be imposed by mutual agreement. The sharp dichotomy between the one and three termers can be seen in the recent period. Youngdahl and Freeman had three terms. All of the rest had only one. Of course for Rolvaag and Levander this is

Table V-3 Tenure for Minnesota Constitutional Elective Officers, 1856-1970.

	1858-1970		20th Century		1945-1970	
	Average Years	Average Tenure <sup>1</sup>	Average Years	Average Tenure <sup>1</sup>	Average Years	Average Tenure <sup>1</sup>
Governor	3.5	1.8	3.9	1.9	3.7	1.6
Lt. Governor	3.0	1.7	3.1	1.8	3.3	2.2
Atty. General	4.5	2.5	4.4	2.6	6.4	3.5
Treasurer	5.1	2.7	6.4	4.1	14.0	6.3
Secy. of State	6.6	3.4 <sup>2</sup>	11.7	6.6 <sup>2</sup>	12.5	7.7 <sup>2</sup>
Auditor	10.2	2.9 <sup>2</sup>	13.6	4.2 <sup>2</sup>	20.0	10.0 <sup>2</sup>

1. Average tenure represents the total number of terms available during the period divided by the number of men elected to the office.
2. A four year term; others had four year terms only since 1963.

Source: Computed from statistics in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-1970, pp. 245-6.

is mitigated by the longer time span encompassed by a term. Governor Edward J. Thye (1943-1946) and Governor C. Elmer Anderson (1951-1954) had longer than two years in office because they finished out previous governors' terms. The last three governors were elected for only one term each. Never before had there been such a string of one term governors. It would seem that although the average stay in office for governors had increased, their electability had diminished in recent years.

Table V-4 shows how long each governor actually held office. If the assumption that the length in office increases gubernatorial power is true, Governor Freeman ranked highest on this resource. Governor Youngdahl rated second, and the others would follow in order, with Elmer L. Andersen last. No recent Minnesota governor was restricted to only two years in office; none had more than six. Only Freeman and Youngdahl possessed legislative experience running over three sessions.

Table V-4 Tenure in Office, Minnesota Governor, 1945-1970

<u>Governor</u>	<u>Date Entered</u>	<u>Date Left</u>	<u>Total time</u>
Orville L. Freeman	January 5, 1955	January 2, 1961	6 yrs
Luther W. Youngdahl	January 8, 1947	September 27, 1951	4 yrs 9 mo
Harold Levander	January 2, 1967	January 2, 1971	4 yrs
Karl F. Rolvaag	March 25, 1963	January 2, 1967	3 yrs 9 mo
Edward J. Thye	April 27, 1943	January 8, 1947	3 yrs 8 mo
C. Elmer Anderson	September 27, 1951	January 5, 1955	3 yrs 3 mo
Elmer L. Andersen	January 2, 1961	March 25, 1963	2 yrs 3 mo

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-1970, p. 245

Their success should contrast sharply with Thye, C. Elmer Anderson, and Elmer L. Andersen. Levander should rank somewhere in between. Rolvaag presents a unique case in this regard. He really did not have even two full legislative sessions.

When Schlesinger discussed the power potential affected by tenure, he was mainly comparing the governor's position vis a vis the administrative branch, especially other elective officials. Article V, Section 1 in the Minnesota Constitution makes it quite clear that Minnesota does not have one top executive office. "The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and attorney general, who shall be chosen by the electors of the state." Although the state constitution refers to a division of powers into three distinct departments, it does not say that the executive power is lodged in the governor. On the matter of tenure, all executive officers, except the auditor, have been formally equal. Up until 1963 all but the auditor received a two year term. As of 1963 the others were advanced to a four year term.

The actual tenure has differed greatly from one office to another, however. And the differences follow the lines described

by Schlesinger for the U.S. as a whole. Only the lieutenant governor has a shorter life expectancy than the governor (see Table V-3). And from 1945 to 1970 the differences between them was not great. In fact the average lieutenant governor had greater re-electability. The offices increased in tenure from attorney general to treasurer to secretary of state to auditor. In recent times these differences become more pronounced. Although the average tenure for governors and lieutenant governors remain fairly stable, those for treasurer, secretary of state, and auditor at least double. From 1945 to 1970 the treasurer and secretary of state had three times the tenure of the governor. The auditor had five times the average gubernatorial tenure. Some account for this by arguing that, consciously or unconsciously, the voters make a distinction between the first three offices as "political" and the second three as "administrative". In the latter offices the voters may be willing to retain long time incumbents who have the experience to carry out primarily custodial duties. Also, these are not crucial policy positions so that the longer tenure presents few real obstacles for the governor. Still, the longer tenure for auditor allowed Stafford King to challenge both Luther Youngdahl and C. Elmer Anderson for the gubernatorial nomination with impunity. Even though he lost, he had his auditor's position to fall back on. And if the governor did want some action from these officials, he could not count on a friendly response. Perhaps more serious is the division between the governor and the attorney general. The attorney general's activities do have great policy consequences,

if the two incumbents were at odds, it could hamper the governor. Practically, though, no instances of such conflict have ever been mentioned.

In summary, how influential is tenure potential? In 1966 the Minnesota Historical Society asked state scholars to rate the governors and rank them. It found a positive correlation between length of service and executive performance ratings.<sup>25</sup> However, no governor made reference to tenure as a significant factor. Only one legislator did so. In Chapter 10 an attempt will be made to correlate tenure with program success.

#### Administrative Resources

According to classical administrative theory the governor is supposed to be the state's chief executive officer. As such he should have the full administrative apparatus at his command. He should be able to appoint and remove his subordinates. He should be able to issue directives and have them obeyed. In the purely legislative context this administrative apparatus can be a resource. Primarily it can furnish the governor with program ideas, supporting testimony, and group support. Also, the governor might utilize appointive positions for bargaining with the legislators. These resources will be considered in three parts: administrative structure, appointment and removal, and the use of these for program leverage.

#### Administrative Structure

As has already been pointed out, constitutionally Minnesota does not have a single executive. The governor exists as only one among six constitutionally elective officers. Each possesses tenure and functions independent of the other. These fellow executives could not be designated as the governor's agents or

subordinates. They may well belong to a different political party. They may be philosophically estranged from the governor. Even the lieutenant governor, theoretically second in command, may be at odds with the governor. For example, relations between Governor Elmer Andersen and Lt. Governor Karl Rolvaag must have been somewhat strained. Rolvaag successfully defeated Andersen for the governorship in 1963. Fellow partisans fall out also. For example friction existed between C. Elmer Anderson as lieutenant governor and both Governor Harold Stassen and Governor Youngdahl.<sup>26</sup> Lieutenant Governor Sandy Keith challenged Rolvaag for the gubernatorial nomination in 1966. Republican elective officers generally have been more conservative than their fellow governors. This was most evident under Youngdahl. And men from either party could protect their own jurisdiction from fellow partisans in the governor's chair. Most notable in this regard were Mike Holm (Rep., 1921-1952) as Secretary of State, Joseph Donovan (DFL, 1955-1970), as Secretary of State, and Stafford King (Rep., 1931-1969) as Auditor. Even though this potential for conflict exists, only the two DFL governors<sup>27</sup> viewed the elective officials as real obstacles. And for Freeman this was not even very serious. He felt that the governor generally established good working relationships even with Republicans. And although seldom in recent Minnesota history did one party control all offices, only Elmer Andersen faced a politically hostile majority (see Table V-5).

Limitations on the governor's administrative powers are not restricted to the elective officers. Minnesota, as is the case

Table V-5 Party Affiliation of Minnesota Elective Administrative Officers, 1945-1970.

Year	Governor	Lt. Governor	Atty. General	Secy. of State	Treasurer	Auditor	R.R. and Warehouse Commissioner	No. Same Party as Governor
1945	R	R	R	R	R	R	3R	6
1947	R	R	R	R	R	R	3R	6
1949	R	R	R	R	R	R	2R-IDFL	6
1951	R	R	R	R	R	R	2R-IDFL	6
1953	R	R	R	R	R	R	2DFL-1R	5
1955	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	2DFL-1R	5
1957	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	R	2DFL-1R	4
1959	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	R	3DFL	4
1961	R	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	R	3DFL	2
1963	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	R	3DFL	4
1965	DFL	DFL	DFL	DFL	R	R	3DFL	4
1967	R	R	R	DFL	R	R	2DFL-1R	4
1969	R	R	R	DFL	R	R	2DFL-1R	4

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-1970, pp. 245-7

in most states, has never observed the canons of good government organization. The efficiency and economy movement had limited impact. The constitution does make the governor responsible for the faithful execution of the laws. He may require in writing the opinions of the principal executive department heads. But his statutory power is much less clear. That is, the hierarchical principle does not dominate the Minnesota government. The governor possesses only a weak and uncertain command over administrative agencies. So, administrative loyalties may be given to the legislature as easily as to the governor. The primary formal obstacles include the large number of agencies, long and

Table V-6 Administrative Structure in Minnesota Government, 1945-1969.

	Total No.	Single- headed	Multi- headed	Appointed by Governor	
				Longer Tenure	Not by Governor
				Same	
<u>1945</u>					
Constitutional*	4	4	0	0	4
Administrative					
Departments	27	14	13	20	2
Policy and					
Advisory	12	0	12	3	7
Examination Bds.	18	0	18	17	1
Retirement Bds.	4	0	4	0	4
Semi-State					
Agencies	4	0	4	0	4
Total	<u>69</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>22</u>
<u>1969</u>					
Constitutional*	4	4	0	0	4
Administrative					
Departments	35	20	15	10	3
Policy and					
Advisory	39	0	39	10	16
Examination Bds.	20	0	20	19	1
Retirement Bds.	5	0	5	0	5
Semi-State					
Agencies	5	0	5	1	4
Total	<u>108</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>33</u>

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945 and 1969; Classification of administrative agencies based on the manual.

\* other than the lieutenant governor and governor.

overlapping terms for agency heads, multiheaded rather than single-headed agencies, and functional dispersion among many agencies (see Tables V-6 and V-7).

The compilers of the Minnesota Legislative Manual divide the executive branch into six types of administrative agencies:

- 1) constitutional officers
- 2) administrative agencies
- 3) policy and advisory agencies
- 4) examining and licensing boards
- 5) retirement agencies, and
- 6) semi-state societies.

Constitutional officers are those that are elective. None of these are directly

responsible to the governor. Through 1969 the secretary of state had four basic duties. He recorded state documents; he kept certain commercial records; he was the chief state elections officer; and he registered motor vehicles, issued dealers licenses, and issued chauffeur's licenses. The state auditor acts as the state's chief accounting officer and conducts the pre-audit. He also maintains encumbrance controls over appropriated money. The state treasurer is principally the custodial of all state funds. He also records state indebtedness and collects some tax revenues. Finally, the attorney general is the most important policy maker of these four constitutional officers. He acts as the state's chief legal officer. As such he issues advisory opinions, assists in bill drafting, reviews bills for possible veto messages, and appears for the state in court cases. In addition he enforces anti-trust and consumer protection laws, and sets standards for police training.

The administrative agencies are those departments, boards, and commissions whose principle functions are directly administrative (executive) rather than primarily advisory. The most important agencies would include administration, agriculture, civil service, commerce, conservation, education, health, highways, labor and industry, public welfare, railroad and warehouse commission, and taxation. The policy and advisory agencies cover a wide range. These are primarily study groups that advise the governor or administrative departments on specific problems. Examples would be the Governor's Citizen Council on Aging, and the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports

Commission. The examining and licensing boards pursue the narrow function of certifying professionals in specified fields. They act as supervisory devices to maintain professional standards. They operate largely under the control of the professional societies. These boards range from the State Board of Medical Examiners to the Minnesota Board of Examiners in Watch-Making. The retirement agencies oversee retirement funds for state employee groups. These include highway patrolmen, state employees, game wardens, police officers in the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, teachers, and other public employees. Officers elected by the members covered control these boards. Additionally some state financial officers serve in an ex officio capacity. Finally, there are the semi-state societies. These are the Agricultural Society, Arts Council, Historical Society, Horticultural Society, and the Sibley House. A private membership controls the officers and functions. However, these groups receive support from state funds.

As one can see from Table V-6 the total number of agencies has grown considerable. In 1945 Governor Thye had to deal with 69 separate entities. When the legislature convened in 1969 there were approximately 108 such entities. The numbers of actual administrative agencies, most significant for our purposes, grew rather slowly. Only eight were added over the whole period. Phenomenal growth occurred in the advisory groups. And this group accounts almost entirely for the total growth in agencies. It seems likely then that in terms of structural size all governors faced virtually the same administrative

situation. The policy boards, although numerically abundant, were not likely to make a significant difference in administrative powers. If anything, the increased numbers might slightly increase the governor's power as added informational and publicity sources. Although the large number of directly administrative departments might hamper the governor, their numbers did not increase sufficiently to add to this discomfort. Of the administrative departments added, most came before 1955. And most were not of great functional significance. The major new functions came under the Water Pollution Control Commission and the Fair Employment Practices Commission, with the Governor's Commission on Human Rights, set up in 1955. Other changes mainly represented a reshuffling of functions into new structures, or departmental name changes.

This lack of basic change can be seen by comparing the functional spread among departments in 1945 and 1969. If anything, the principle of functional departmentalization (each function located within one agency) was formally weakened during this time. All areas except welfare had some increase in agencies. But only natural resources, administration, finances, and personnel had large increases. One should note again that these changes were not so much in basic agency structure as in advisory boards and commissions. That is, diffusion came not so much in action authority as in policy planning and research. So all governors operated in similar circumstances. But according to administrative theory all had to deal with functions diffused among many power centers that

could resist initiatives. Commerce, natural resources, and finances are exceptionally diffuse. One would expect that governors have great difficulty coordinating these areas.

The potential gubernatorial limits inherent in this administrative size and diffusion are reinforced by specified and overlapping terms for departmental heads. Extending the gubernatorial term to four years somewhat lessened this obstacle. Back in 1945, 22 agency heads were not even subject to gubernatorial appointment (See Table V-6). This constituted almost one-third of the total number. Only seven (10%) had the same term as the governor or served at his pleasure. In remaining agencies either a single department head served a longer term (4 or 6 years), or the agency was headed by a board whose members served for staggered terms. Usually the term for these members ranged from four to seven years. On a seven man board with seven year staggered terms a governor could normally hope to appoint only two members during his own term. It is true that most major departmental heads were subject to gubernatorial appointment. However, 74% still served longer or staggered terms. The only heads who served coterminously with the governor were in the Department of Administration, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Commission, Minnesota Research Commission, and the Department of Military Affairs. By 1969 about the same proportion of agency heads were still completely independent from the governor. But the proportion serving the same or shorter terms had increased greatly. This was especially true in the major

Table V-7 Functional Spread Among Minnesota Agencies, 1945-1969

Function <sup>1</sup>	1945			1969		
	Admin. Dept.	Board or Commission <sup>2</sup>	Total Number	Total Number	Admin. Dept.	Board of Commission <sup>2</sup>
Administration	1	0	1	6	1	5
Personnel	1	4	5	9	1	8
Finance	7	2	9	10	7	3
Agriculture	1	5	6	7	1	6
Commerce	6	8	14	17	6	11
Education	2	1	3	6	3	3
Elections	1	1	2	3	1	2
Health	1	9	10	12	1	10
Human Rights	0	0	0	2	1	1
Labor	3	0	3	6	4	2
Law Enforcement	4	3	7	8	4	4
Local	0	2	2	5	0	5
Military	1	0	1	4	3	1
Natural Resources	1	3	4	11	3	8
Transportation	4	0	4	7	4	3
Welfare	4	0	4	4	3	1

1. Admittedly the functional areas chosen are somewhat arbitrary; the number could be expanded or contracted according to taste.
2. When the table refers to boards and commissions it refers to all agencies not included under constitutional officers or administrative departments.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945 and 1969

administrative departments. The great change came not through statutory enactments but through lengthening the governor's term. Little real action was taken specifically to shorten department head terms to coincide with the governor's until the 1969 session.

Finally, the Minnesota legislature has not been overly concerned with providing the governor a direct chain of command through a series of single headed agencies. In 1945 26% of all units had a single director at the head. In 1969 the proportion was 22%. Again there is a major difference between administrative departments and the other units. In both years a majority of these departments did have single heads. But the proportion has not changed significantly over time. Major departments with multiple direction include the Department of Commerce, Department of Civil Service, the State Board of Health, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, and the educational units - State Board of Education, State College Board, and the State Junior College Board. In these agencies the governor must wait for a collegial decision, or try to deal with many men.

Minnesota governors have possessed few formal coordinating tools to pull this diffuse structure together. There is no real cabinet.<sup>30</sup> An executive council helps to some degree. However, this council consists of the other constitutional elective officers, except the lieutenant governor. None are very amenable to gubernatorial direction. And the council's powers are quite minor. Its major benefit would be an informal opportunity to exchange information. Informally, incumbent governors have also

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periodically assembled department heads for meetings. The Commissioner of Administration arranges the agenda for these meetings. As a third coordinating device departmental heads do submit weekly reports. However, the prime control factor since 1939 has been the Department of Administration.<sup>32</sup> The commissioner oversees budget formation (and allotment), central procurement, physical plant construction, computer services, and management studies. He also issues policy directives to department heads. A good commissioner, backed by an active governor, can insure a fair amount of coordination with these tools.

Few governors have attempted to revise the governmental structure to ensure greater formal coordination.<sup>33</sup> The major reorganization in 1939, sponsored by Harold Stassen, established the subsequent administrative pattern. Governor C. Elmer Anderson did endorse the "Little Hoover" recommendations in 1953 but did not push it. However, Governor Freeman and Governor Levander did push major reorganization drives. Freeman failed almost totally. A comprehensive bill passed in 1955. Unfortunately the governor inadvertently signed a bill that differed from the specific form passed by the legislature. The reorganization's validity was challenged in the courts. On January 20, 1956, the state supreme court found the act invalid because of the defect.<sup>34</sup> Further attempts at reorganization failed in 1957. Levander, on the other hand, partially succeeded. But most of the reforms passed under him will potentially help the governors subsequent to his administration. The general failure to reorganize can be attributed to legislative resistance. Legislators support a

multiheaded executive and independent executive officers precisely because this weakens the governor.<sup>35</sup> The departments themselves, and special groups, also resist change. For example, Stafford King, long time state auditor, enjoyed a large legislative following. Freeman proposed to remove the auditor's pre-audit functions and give them to the Commissioner of Administration. The state auditor would then perform a post audit function and be responsible to the legislature. King vigorously opposed such a change. It failed. Conservation groups successfully kept the Department of Conservation away from direct gubernatorial control. Veteran's groups maintained an independent Department of Veteran's Affairs with a separate Soldier's Home Board.<sup>36</sup> Vested interests, who have contacts with the legislators, do not want changes in their working arrangements. Legislators, working from a separation of powers theory, are reluctant to enhance gubernatorial influence.

A review of the administrative changes that were proposed may reveal what at least two governors viewed as their greatest obstacles within the state structure. For example, both Freeman and Levander sought to reduce the long terms for administrative "subordinates". Whereas Freeman largely failed, Levander largely succeeded by 1969. Extending the governor's term to four years in 1963 eased the latter's task. Only a few heads had a six year term. Currently, exceptions to the coterminous term exist largely within agencies that have multiple heads. Freeman also wanted to eliminate all other elected executives except the lieutenant governor. He failed. Levander sought to have the governor and lieutenant governor elected on the same ticket. He failed also.

In a second area both governors attempted to increase their administrative coordinating power. Freeman would have added the Archives Commission, the pre-audit, and the personnel function to the Commissioner of Administration. The Commissioner would also have been empowered to transfer funds and personnel among departments. None of these recommendations passed. Levander sought a similar transfer power for the commissioner. This time he succeeded. In fact the 1969 reorganization act provided the Minnesota governor with the greatest executive initiated reorganization power in the nation. The Commissioner of Administration may transfer employees, functions, and appropriations from one department to another with gubernatorial approval. Legislative appropriations committees must be informed, but no legislative approval is necessary. <sup>37</sup> During the Levander administration the governor's planning power was also increased. A state planning agency was placed directly under the governor in 1967. In 1969 he received additional power to establish regional planning districts.

The final type of reorganization were suggestions to increase functional departmentalization. Freeman worked especially on changing Commerce, Conservation, Revenue, Agriculture, the Attorney General's office, Labor, Corrections, and the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. Freeman's single permanent success came with the creation of a Department of Corrections. The Youth Conservation Commission, Parole Board, and the corrections functions formerly under welfare, all came under a department headed by a single executive (with a six year term). In addition to these Levander made initiatives for change in pollution,

welfare, education, and public safety. Most changes under Levander were not far reaching. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency added functions in air pollution, solid waste, and land use planning. The governor obtained greater control over the agency's operations. There were two very major triumphs for gubernatorial control. In 1967 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission was changed to the Department of Public Services. Most administrative tasks were moved to an administrative head appointed by the governor for a four year term. The commissioners, who act as an appeal board, will be gradually shifted from elective to appointive status. The second great change came in 1969 with a new Department of Public Safety. Functions previously scattered under the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Civil Defense, State Fire Marshall (Insurance Department), the Motor Vehicle Division (Secretary of State), the Highway Patrol (Highway Department), Driver's education (State Board of Education), Driver's Licensing (Highway Department), registration of private detectives (Secretary of State), and Capitol Security Forces (Administration) all came under a single department. The removal of these functions from the Secretary of State culminated a very long battle.

Few major reorganization attempts have succeeded since 1939 although agencies were gradually added. The most significant change was lengthening the governor's term to four years. Most changes in functional consolidation came during the Levander administration. Legislative dissatisfaction with the prevailing structure, and Representative Robert Renner's great prestige,

accounted for this as much as gubernatorial initiative. Even so, these changes occurred too late to affect even Levander's ability to utilize administrative leverage for his legislative program.

#### Appointment and Removal

The appointment power is generally considered to be the most significant gubernatorial control over the administrative branch. This theory holds that when a man owes his position to the governor, he will be loyal to the governor's program. Of course, this expectation does not always come to fruition. Once a person acquires the position, the governor's hold over him diminishes. Perhaps more significant than would be the power to remove. Faithful service would be rewarded with retention. Rebellious executives would not remain long.

The Minnesota governor possesses wide appointment powers over so-called "policymaking" officials. Under the constitution he appoints notaries public, and all other officers provided by law. However, all such appointments are subject to senatorial confirmation. The governor also fills vacancies in the constitutional elective offices, except lieutenant governor, and other state and district offices. For governors Thye, Youngdahl, and Anderson, these interim appointments served only to the next annual election. Since 1955 the appointment period extends until the end of the officer's term or until the January following the next general election. Further, the governor fills in municipal, districts, and supreme court vacancies. These interim appointments do not require Senate confirmation. Aside from these

policy-making offices, the governor's appointment power has been highly restricted since the 1939 civil service law. In fact the governor is almost totally isolated from this general personnel function.<sup>38</sup> He does appoint the three man Civil Service Board. But the board members serve staggered three year terms. The board appoints the civil service director. Finally, the removal power, too, is virtually non-existent.<sup>39</sup> Generally, only the Adjutant General, the Director of Civil Defense, and the Commissioner of Administration are subject to removal at the governor's pleasure. Other department heads may be removed only for cause.

Except for the attorney general, the governor's actual opportunity to appoint elected constitutional officers in the interim has been quite small. The greatest interim appointment opportunities arise within the judicial system. Although judges officially come to the bench via non-partisan elections, most are initially appointed. In 1969 all but one of the seven state supreme court justices had been initially appointed; 80% of the seventy district judges likewise had been initially appointed.<sup>40</sup>

The largest volume of appointments, and the greatest opportunities for administrative control lie in administrative agency appointments. These appointments are all subject to senatorial confirmation. This has not become a great practical limitation however. Charles Adrian comments that up through 1950 most gubernatorial appointments were approved routinely.<sup>41</sup> The Senate apparently feels that appointment discretion should be left with the governor. Since 1945 few appointments have been disputed.

None were defeated on the floor. A few may have been held up and a few withdrawn. The only real battles occurred under Elmer L. Andersen. In 1961 a highly contested floor vote upheld his appointments for notaries public. Thirty-four conservatives voted for, none against. Only four DFLer's voted for the governor, seventeen against. But the real clash came in 1963. This was a calculated move by Senate Minority Leader Paul Thuet. Under the constitution Andersen retained the governorship until a successor was officially named. The long recount battle delayed Rolvaag's accession to office. Meanwhile many administrative terms had expired. Andersen felt that since he still held the office, it was his prerogative to fill the vacancies. The Senate Conservatives agreed and prepared to support his action routinely. The minority disagreed. They felt that the new governor should make the appointments. When Andersen held firm, Thuet made the appointments a partisan issue. The DFL caucus proceeded to make a public record on the Senate floor. In all there were 92 recorded roll call votes. Most concerned advisory and examining boards. But also included were significant administrative posts such as Commissioner of Banks, Commissioner of Aeronautics, Liquor Control Commissioner, Commissioner of Taxation, the Water Resources Board, and the Board of Health. Every vote usually divided along perfect caucus lines. The DFL lost every one.

Lengthly and overlapping terms have been a much more significant limitation than Senate approval. This limitation was potentially significant for every governor except possibly Levander. One can test the actual limits by examining gubernatorial

success in appointing administrative agency heads. As can be seen from Table V-8 the governor had appointed a majority of agency heads by the start of eight legislative sessions. These include Governors Thye, Youngdahl, Freeman, Rolvaag, and Levander. Only Governors C. Elmer Anderson and Elmer L. Andersen failed in this respect. Appointment success appears to depend directly on length of time in office. Only Governor Thye (who took office in 1943) and Governor Levander appointed a majority in their first session. By the end of the governor's second legislative session second and 93% by the third term. Levander appointed 77% by his second session. Only Rolvaag deviates in this respect. If one were to rank individual governors on their actual appointment powers, it would look as follows:

Youngdahl, Freeman	75%
Levander	69.5%
Thye	56%
Andersen	49%
Anderson	37.5%
Rolvaag	36.5%

Not all departments are equally inaccessible, however. Those departments especially protected from gubernatorial appointment are the Board of Education, Board of Health, Civil Service Board, Commissioner of Taxation, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Securities, Department of Labor and Industry.

Joseph Schlesinger does not consider the governor's over-all appointments as the crucial variable. He selected sixteen major functions and offices for special scrutiny. For Schlesinger the measure of formal appointment power is the degree to which the governor shares this power with another body. Appointments at his own discretion maximizes his power. A popularly elected

Table V-8 Appointments by Minnesota Governors, 1945-1970

Year	Number of Dept. Heads	No. Appointed by Governor	% Appointed	No. not Appointed	% not Appointed
1945	27	15	56%	12	44%
1947	29	13	45%	16	55%
1949	30	26	87%	4	13%
1951	30	28	93%	2	7%
1953	32	12	37.5%	20	62.5%
1955	32	15	47%	17	53%
1957	36	31	86%	5	14%
1959	35	32	92%	3	8%
1961	35	17	49%	18	51%
1963	36	7	20%	29	80%
1965	36	19	53%	17	47%
1967	34	21	62%	13	38%
1969	35	27	77%	8	23%

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

executive gives him no power. On a value scale from 0-5 points, nine Minnesota functional areas rate a four, three rate a one and four a zero. Schelsinger constructed a formal power index by adding the points for each office. This appointive power index ranked the states from 15 to 79. Minnesota fell into the second strongest group with 51 points. This formal ranking changed not at all from 1945-1970. Formal power is not the same thing as actual power, however. Table V-10 shows the actual opportunity rate. The maximum possible proportion of appointments is nine agencies (56%). For the Board of Education and the Board of Health, the governor may be able to appoint a majority of the group that appoints the administrative director. An asterick indicates the occasions on which this occurred. Only Youngdahl, Freeman, and Levander reached the full appointment potential. Only governors who served more than one legislative session appointed a majority of agency heads. The ranking of sessions remains the same as that for all administrative agency appointments. Again, of those

Table V-9 Appointments by Minnesota Governors, 16 Major Officers, 1945-1970

Office	1945	1947	1949	1951	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	1967	1969
Administration	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Agriculture	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Attorney General	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Auditor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Budget	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Conservation	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Public Examiner	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Education	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N*	N	N	N	N	N
Health	N*	N	N*	N*	N*	N	N*	N*	N	N	N*	N	N*
Highways	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Insurance	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Labor	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Secretary of State	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Taxation	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Treasurer	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Welfare	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number by Governor	7	5	8	9	4	5	8	9	6	4	8	6	9
Percent by Governor	44.0%	31.3%	50.0%	56.0%	25%	31.3%	50%	56%	37.5%	25%	50%	37.5%	56%

Y = The governor appointed the officer

N = The governor did not appoint the officer

The public examiner's office was substituted for comptroller

\* Although the governor did not appoint the executive officer, he did appoint a majority of the board in these years.

Source: Computed from information in The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

functional areas that the governor might appoint, Taxation, Labor and Industry, Highways, and Insurance are most resistant to his control.

#### Expertise and Patronage

Control over the administrative apparatus may have legislative benefits for the governor in at least two important ways. First, administrators have more expertise in, and specific information about, policy programs than any other single source. They know the major problems in their own areas. They often must draft a general decision for policy change into specific bill form. They have to provide supporting evidence to get proposals through legislative committee and floor debate. This support may be especially crucial to the governor since the legislators lack all of these assets. Up until very recently the Minnesota legislature was poorly equipped for in depth research. Legislators could not hope to equal the resources available to department heads in any case. Of course, if the administrators oppose the governor's proposals, these same resources can be used for lukewarm support or outright opposition.

It is uncertain how influential this factor is in Minnesota. Only three governors emphasized it. Governor Youngdahl acknowledged that his administrative experts could be a great help.<sup>44</sup> However, he quickly pointed out that they were useful only in an informational capacity. The governor has to push and fight for program acceptance himself. Governor Rolvaag mainly emphasized the benefits that may be derived from innovative department heads.<sup>45</sup> They can suggest bold new programs. More important,

they could shape his own rough policy ideas into legislatively and administratively acceptable form. Particularly helpful were Wayne Olson in Conservation and John Jamieson in Highways. However, no one relied more heavily on administrative experts than did Elmer L. Andersen.<sup>46</sup> He relied primarily on their judgement to evaluate legislative proposals suggested to him. Also essential for Andersen was the political support they could muster. Clientele groups that had a special interest in certain bills could be found behind each agency. The governor insisted that these were not necessarily selfish or economically motivated groups. Associations such as the Council on Special Education or Friends of the Mentally Retarded could appeal to special publics.

Most legislators emphasize these administrative resources much less than the governors. Representative Robert Renner did feel that the governor's greatest strength would be to surround himself with strong department heads.<sup>47</sup> These men then would primarily develop the programs and provide information for messages. They, not the governor, largely carry the bill through testimony in hearings. However, Renner never mentioned any governor who systematically succeeded in this manner. Senator Robert Dunlap (C-1953-1966) emphasized the potential rather than the actuality of this resource.<sup>48</sup> But he contends that administrative officials are far more influential in initiating policy than either the legislator or the governor.

Theoretically a second great administrative resource that gives the governor legislative leverage could be bargaining with patronage. Respondents gave a mixed reaction to this

device. No legislator or governor saw it as a powerful tool. Some insisted on its complete absence from Minnesota politics. Governor Elmer L. Andersen even took some offense at the suggestion. The appointment power was to be used to secure able personnel. It was not to be "prostituted" as a bargaining device.<sup>49</sup> He used it neither as a reward nor as a punishment. Speaker Lawrence Hall (C-1935-1943) affirmed that no governor in his experience attempted to use appointments for bargaining.<sup>50</sup> Prior to 1939 there had been more opportunity to use bargaining. But because the Farmer-Labor party under Governor Elmer Benson so abused the patronage power, Conservatives gladly supported Harold Stassen's suggestions for a strong civil service in 1939. However, the Republican party put great pressure on Stassen to remove old employees and get Republicans blanketed in under the new civil service. Out of some 9,382 employees, 2752 were fired.<sup>51</sup> Since then patronage opportunities have been highly restricted. The attorney general and the secretary of state control as much significant patronage as the governor. By 1969 the governor appointed some 459 positions.<sup>52</sup> This included administrative agencies - 98, advisory boards - 243, examining boards - 107, and semi-state agencies - 11. Of these only 42 received a full or nearly full time salary. Twenty-seven of these were in administrative agencies, many subject to staggered terms.

No one disputed the strong limits on patronage. However, many felt that, if properly used, appointments could bring some leverage. Senator Raphael Salmore especially insisted that governors can and do trade on appointments as well as on priorities for highway

development and public buildings. Senator Karl Grittner (DFL, 1959-1970) allowed that appointments to certain boards

might be used to build support on items such as welfare and hospitals. <sup>54</sup> Representative Roy Schulz (C-1951-1970) believed

that no governor possessed much trading stock. But board appointments can add small increments to a governor's position. <sup>55</sup>

He felt that with experience Governor Levander became astute at this. The technique appears to be not so much by direct bargaining as by creating good will through strengthening a legislator's public prestige. Schulz also indicated that some governors created irritations by not performing astutely on this matter. For example, legislators appreciate being notified in advance when major appointees come from districts. They do not appreciate surprise appointments. Of course trading in marginal areas may become a two way street. Senator Rudy Hanson (C-1955-1970) related that during the Levander administration some groups wanted a farmer on the Water Pollution Control Board. Legislators introduced a bill that would have made such appointments mandatory to be sure that the governor got the message. Patronage is not of great importance in Minnesota then. But a governor so disposed can create good will through exercising care in the appointment process.

#### Administrative Resources: An Evaluation

Formally, Minnesota governors do not possess very great powers over the administrative structure. The greatest potential exists in the appointment power. The governor appoints most top agency decisionmakers. The major exception would be the

five elective departments. The Minnesota Senate never successfully challenges gubernatorial appointments. And the state ranked among the top fifteen in formal power throughout the period. However, removal power is almost non-existent. And the administrative structure does present significant potential obstacles. Agencies are numerous and the number has grown steadily. Functional diffusion among many separate agencies also increased. Because of long and overlapping terms few first term governors can appoint even a majority of agency heads formally under their control. A governor must serve at least into a second legislative session before he can overcome this obstacle. And since reorganization movements failed up until 1967, this structural situation changed little to increase gubernatorial power potential. Harold Levander probably enjoyed greater formal potential power over administration than any other governor. But the reforms directly affecting the governor's office occurred mostly in 1969 when they would affect only future governors.

Curiously in light of the formal provisions, few governors found the administrative arrangements a marked handicap. But few found them a marked advantage either. Governors seemed to regard the administrative branch as a potential advantage, but a practical minor irritant. Only Elmer L. Andersen strongly emphasized the advantages from administrative support. He sought good personnel and relied heavily on them for program ideas and evaluation. In addition these departments enlisted clientele groups to fight for programs that Andersen accepted.

Even though he appreciated administrative support, it is not clear the Anderson could control department heads who opposed him. Karl Rolvaag recalled that Highway Commissioner Marshall<sup>57</sup> opposed Andersen's wishes successfully. Marshall, a strong willed retired Army general, was an Andersen appointee. But he believed that his decisions took precedence over the governor's in highway matters. Actually Andersen seldom really tried to "control" administrators. His personal philosophy rebelled against this approach. Andersen said that he remained flexible on such matters as agency program clearance. He talked over programs with department heads, informally suggesting that he desired their support during committee hearings. However, he did not hold them to this. Especially if asked by legislators, the heads remained free to express personal or departmental views.

Governors Levander and Rolvaag put perhaps the second greatest emphasis on administrative resources. But while Levander found the structure a minor stumbling block, Governor Rolvaag found it a major obstacle. Governor Levander, as did Andersen, considered the appointment power important as an opportunity to obtain trustworthy and efficient people.<sup>58</sup> He believed that once a governor obtains high quality administrators who are willing to serve, the apparatus should run fairly well. Rolvaag too appreciated the benefits to be derived from alert, innovative agency heads. But Levander did not feel that the administrators had greatly hindered him. He stressed reorganization more from theoretical ideas of good government than because of his own practical problems. He acknowledged that splintered governmental

arrangements may cause difficulties. But this was not because entrenched bureaucrats deliberately opposed him. The governor could not completely run state government now simply because the number of contacts required exceed the governor's time capacity. There were so many supposedly reporting to him that he never really saw the majority of them. Levander also stressed the failure in coordination. He felt that legislative program success would be enhanced with the governor only had one administrator to deal with in a functional area. Then that man would genuinely become the governor's key aide in legislative negotiations. The single headed Department of Public Safety stands as an expression of this conviction. Governor Rolvaag, on the other hand, felt hampered by many potential opponents in the bureaucracy. This appears logical since his actual appointment opportunities for key positions ranked lower than any other governor. He did not imagine that his own appointees would be completely loyal, but they were more likely to be so. He believed that reorganization to shorten department head terms would have allowed him to work with more men of the same philosophical bent. Commissioner of Highways Marshall, replaced in 1965, and Commissioner of Taxation Rolland Hatfield, became particular obstacles. The governor admitted that the bitter public dispute between Hatfield and himself had probably been unwise. It lowered public confidence in Rolvaag. But the point is, whether Hatfield was right or not, Rolvaag never felt that he could trust a man appointed by his political opponent.

Governors Freeman and Youngdahl apparently viewed the

administrative branch as a neutral resource. Neither found positive power values in it. In both cases some administrators did resist the governor. But both were perfectly capable of beating down such opposition. Governor Youngdahl experienced the fewest obstacles. He called department heads together for periodic meetings. In these meetings he laid down the law. If an administrator publicly spoke out against the governors program, he would be called on the carpet. If he persisted, he was out.<sup>59</sup> Youngdahl apparently experienced no difficulty in removing those men that he found objectionable. He also indicated that many administrators appreciated the merits of his program, so few hard-nosed tactics were actually necessary. Only one administrator persisted in open defiance. That was Reuben Brustuen,<sup>60</sup> director of public institutions. Youth conservation was a key Youngdahl program. The three social service heads fought over who was to have the program, so Youngdahl decided to set up a separate commission. The institutional people opposed this. But Youngdahl, not a man to tolerate opposition, ordered those officials to cease. Brustuen persisted in lobbying against the bill and organized opposition in the Senate Judiciary committee. Youngdahl obtained the desired organizational structure; however. He also eventually replaced Brustuen. Governor Freeman, another strong willed man, pursued much the same line. He, more than Youngdahl, felt that specific terms for department heads and his own weak removal powers could cause problems.<sup>61</sup> But administrators usually cooperated with him out of common goals. As insurance, his commissioner of administration,

Arthur Naftalin, enforced prior central program clearance on all department heads. These men were bound to support key gubernatorial positions. To Freeman's knowledge, no administrator testified against him in the legislature. He warned several men that he would not tolerate such opposition. In his view this would have constituted proper grounds for removal, and he would have exercised the prerogative if administrators had gone too far.

Among Minnesota governors, then, Governor Andersen rated administrative resources as important, with Governor Rolvaag and Governor Levander valuing it to a lesser extent. Youngdahl and Freeman regarded it as more of a neutral force. In potential and actual control, Youngdahl, Freeman, and Levander would rate highest, Governor Thye next, then Elmer L. Andersen, and last C. Elmer Anderson or Karl Rolvaag.

#### Budgetary Resources

Perhaps the governors most significant power over administrative agencies is the power of the purse. Most administrators are program or at least agency oriented. No matter how extensive an agency's program authorization, it remains a paper program without sufficient funding. Appointment controls are episodic, but to a degree fiscal controls are continuing. Legislators, too, recognize the budget's importance. Many do not value highly the governor's inaugural message. For them his real priorities are established in the budget document. And most state governors do possess strong formal budgetary powers. The efficiency and economy movement succeeded more thoroughly

with the executive budget concept than any other part of its program. As a measure of this Joseph Schlesinger rated the state governors on a five point scale according to the extent to which budgetary authority originates in the governor's office. In the strongest category the governor shares budget preparation only with persons directly appointed by him. Minnesota, along with 28 other states, ranks in this group. However, no state governor could claim absolute authority over the budget. The legislature bestows final approval on all requests. Then major responsibility shifts back to the governor to execute the budget. To achieve a complete understanding of the Minnesota governor's fiscal powers all three of these - preparation, approval, execution - plus funding will be considered.

Minnesota has had a formally strong executive budget since 1939. The basic 1939 law still governs the whole budget process. Under that act the commissioner of administration supervises the budget compilation. By law he acts as the governor's right hand man. All state departments, except the University of Minnesota, the legislature, the courts, and some examining boards, are subject to his direction. <sup>63</sup> Actually, the governor does not directly appoint the state budget director. That position is under civil service. But apparently this imposes no problems.

The governor proposes the biennial budget, which runs from July 1 to June 30. The budget division performs the spade work for this proposal. It prepares the forms for the biennial budgets and receives preliminary requests from each agency. Apparently this formal central clearance is quite well maintained. Officially

no agency request goes to the legislature until it has been to the Department of Administration. Governors Freeman, Youngdahl, and Levander particularly insisted on this.<sup>64</sup> Freeman, with Arthur Naftalin's help, succeeded especially well at this control. In 1969 Commissioner of Administration Rolland Hatfield went one step further on this clearance by presenting only the governor's recommendation to the legislature. Once the requests come in, the commissioner helps the governor establish priorities. He holds hearings on each request, with the governor sometimes sitting in. The governor largely accepts budget bureau recommendations for the final decisions. Usually this means cutting, or "removing the water", as Governor Youngdahl expressed it.<sup>65</sup> The governor does coordinate all requests to bring them into line. He may raise or lower a few requests in major policy areas. Even an expansionist liberal governor such as Orville Freeman followed the basic cutting pattern.<sup>66</sup> He campaigned for major program increases, especially in education and welfare. However, the law required that he balance the budget. At the same time he faced declining revenues. In response the governor asked departments to hold the line. But seven asked for large increases. So he cut all requests except in welfare, personal safety, and conservation. After the governor decides, the commissioner of administration must convince departments to accept gubernatorial priorities.

Governors Freeman and Levander spent a great deal of time mastering the budget. And Freeman felt that the only limitation on budget preparation was the time factor, and a governor's personal inclinations. However, this time factor becomes partic-

ularly acute for a first term governor. Thomas Flinn, covering the Freeman administration in 1955, gives the best insight on this.<sup>67</sup> Freeman was elected as the first DFL governor in November, 1954. He then had 2 1/2 months to prepare a comprehensive program. No DFLer had government experience. As governor-elect Freeman commanded no personal staff. Fortunately, incumbent governor C. Elmer Anderson did consent to appoint DFLer Arthur Naftalin as Commissioner of Administration before Freeman took office. However, the Commissioner of Taxation, G. Howard Spaeth, a long time Republican incumbent, was not asked to resign. Freeman largely by-passed him and worked with economics professor Walter Heller. Freeman also attempted to reach out for legislative assistance. He held three meetings from November through December with DFL legislative leaders. Freeman received some advice on things that couldn't be done, but little positive help from this quarter. The legislators felt that they could not compromise their independent position before the session started. Naftalin and Heller then drafted the message substantially on their own with no legislative consultation after Freeman took office.

Although the governor virtually dominates budget preparation, legislative authorization is another matter. The legislature accepted no governor's budget completely. Governor Rolvaag said that some of his requests were greatly altered. David Durenberger flatly stated that the legislature does not believe in an executive budget at all.<sup>68</sup>

Under the constitution all appropriations bills must originate in the House. However, the Senate also considers bills. And both

houses have had strong willed men as appropriations committee chairmen. During the period under study Claude Allen (chairman 1939-1954) was the strongest chairman in the House. He ran a tight committee during his tenure and was for years regarded as the leading expert on the Minnesota budget. Refusing to use subcommittees, he could keep on top of the whole process. Contrary to Allen the other house chairmen did use sub-committees. Robert Fitzsimons (1963-) did not attempt to totally dominate the committee. But, he enjoyed influence as one of the most respected men in the House. Leo Mosier (1955-1958) and William Shovell (1959-1962) were chairmen during the period of DFL control. Neither served long enough to take strong command. Since A.J. Rockne the Senate has had no tough chairman comparable to Allen. Rockne served even longer than Allen and was known as the "watch-dog" of the treasury. However, his tenure ended just at the beginning of the period under study. Henry Sullivan (1947-1954) and Donald Sinclair (1967-) were both able men. Sullivan took the tougher stance as chairman. Sinclair did not attempt to exercise such close central control, but was influential as a member of the "active minority". He came in after power had been formally decentralized in the committee. This was instituted under Senator Val Imm (1955-1966). As a more easy going man, he did not attempt to dominate as strongly as his predecessors. Also, he felt that business could be handled more efficiently under the decentralized subcommittee system. This more specialized structure has given the total committee more opportunity for detailed budgetary appraisal.

The crucial legislative stage for the governor's budget is the committee hearing. Actually the committees do not consider just one big budget. By the 1939 statute four budgets are presented. These cover education, welfare, state departments, and semi-state agencies. The committees also work on public building bills for capital improvements. The legislators do not have extensive independent information from which to make their decisions. But they do have some. A budget examiner will serve as chief committee staff member. And the budget documents present three figures for each item. The first is the actual expenditure for the previous biennium. The second shows the departmental requests. And the third is the governor's request. This means that the governor's judgement does not stand alone. The legislators may carefully compare previous appropriations with current requests. They also note large discrepancies between departmental and gubernatorial requests. These they scrutinize most carefully, whether it be a large increase or a large cut. Most legislators jealously guard this basis for independent judgement. Under Governor Levander, Commissioner of Administration Rolland Hatfield attempted to create greater gubernatorial leverage by presenting only the governor's requests. Both appropriations committees, but especially the Senate, reacted negatively. They cross examined department heads more closely than previously to bring out opinions contrary to the governors. And they passed an appropriations bill that required all three appropriation figures in the future.

Appropriations hearings start off with the presentation by

the Commissioner of Administration and his staff specialists. He will defend the governor's recommendations. And he may also make a point of attacking departmental requests that the governor thought too high. Next, the committee hears department heads testify on their own areas. This point is the determinative stage for a truly effective executive budget. Formally these department spokesman must go through the Department of Administration. However, in committee the opportunity exists to reverse previous unfavorable decisions if the department head so desires. It is unclear how frequently they actually do so. Legislative informants appeared divided on the question. All acknowledged that departments challenged the governor. But a number felt that this was not a frequent practice.<sup>71</sup> Still, on a few occasions each session, departments tried to restore cuts. For example, Senator Imm perceived little real pressure on department heads to support the governor.<sup>72</sup> Independent departments such as the Board of Education, Board of Health, and the University of Minnesota, are especially prone to question the governor's decisions. All legislators agreed that appropriations committee members encouraged department heads to challenge gubernatorial decisions.<sup>73</sup> Mainly members seek explanations for discrepancies between departments and the governor. On some occasions department heads set up the opportunity for such questioning. Certainly Senator Dosland and Senator Dunlap affirmed that administrators come to committee members informally to request changes. On the other hand Claude Allen denied this. He discouraged government spending. He had little use for

administrative contacts where the plea would inevitably be for more money. Considering the strong legislative insistence on independence, an assertive department head could well perceive great possible benefits from encouraging legislative questions. If he worked under a strong governor, he would need to be circumspect. But he might well feel that the legislature was more his master than the governor.

Few besides legislators and administrators appear at committee hearings. Very occasionally some interested private groups may testify. Representative Allen sometimes brought in such groups to testify against excessively high requests by both administrators and the governor.<sup>74</sup> The governor participates in the approval process very indirectly. One governor asked to appear at a committee hearing but was turned down. Both Youngdahl and Freeman called in legislators to request restoration of big cuts. These requests largely encompassed programs developed from popular campaign promises. Claude Allen indicated that sometimes these encounters grew quite stormy. Usually, though, legislative members listened politely but very seldom reversed decisions. Governor Rolvaag developed a more active, but still circumspect,<sup>75</sup> role. One major example would be in mental health. He lined up lobby support from organizations such as the Mental Health Association and the Minnesota Association for Retarded Children. They could carry the fight for state hospital improvements into the legislator's own district. He also directly lobbied legislators, mainly between sessions. He took trips around the state with legislative leaders to hospitals, prisons, and colleges.

The governor also worked closely with Senator Faye Child when the latter chaired the Senate Finance subcommittee for public institutions. As long as he kept the approach low key, making his points nicely, quietly, without frontal attacks, there were no adverse reactions. No other governor used quite this same approach so successfully.

What impact do gubernatorial requests have on the legislature?

This question should be divided into two parts. First, how much attention do legislators pay to the governor's position? Second, how much do they change his monetary request? Most felt that the governor's request imposed no determinative obligation on the legislature. A few, such as Senator Jack Davies (DFL, 1959-) and Senator C. C. Mitchell (C - 1947-1966), saw the governor's budget as highly determinative. Others such as Senator Salmora and Senator Imm felt that the legislature largely disregarded the governor. By far the most common evaluation was summed up by Governor Freeman<sup>76</sup>. The legislature uses the governor's budget as a starting point, but does not follow it exactly. Representative Allen was even more restrained. His committee did not necessarily disregard the governor's requests. It could be used as a starting point, but they made independent judgements. The governor was not conclusive. And, perhaps more significant, the department head's request would be more likely to stand than the governors. Legislators felt that the administrators should be closer to the problem and know the needs.<sup>79</sup> Legislators view the governor's budget as informative, little more. However, in spite of this attitude, the final budget document varies little

from the governor's total monetary requests. But simply because the total appropriation comes out nearly the same as the governor's request does not rule out the possibility of major re-arrangements on important items within the total. Youngdahl had to fight hard on mental health and lost on youth conservation commission funding. Legislators will also drastically change areas involving buildings and pet projects. The overall appropriation is not so important for the governor (except that he must balance budget). The legislature can hurt him most severely on those relatively few items that he highlighted as key in his messages.

In the third budgetary stage, execution, the governor again gains great discretion through the budget division. Simply because an agency is authorized to spend a certain amount does not necessarily mean that they will. They must receive affirmation for each transaction that the expenditure they desire is legally approved. Also, they cannot spend at the rate they wish. The budget division operates a fairly rigid quarterly allotment system that regulates this flow. With these tools the governor may exercise great leverage at the end of the biennium. Since at least 1939 the unexpended balance in a department's authorization may not be automatically carried over into the next fiscal period. And the appropriations committees scrutinize surpluses quite closely. Departments bringing in surpluses experience great difficulty in getting appropriation raises the next time. Under these conditions agencies seek to spend surpluses at the end of the fiscal year. Governor Youngdahl rigidly

attempted to prevent this. However, it would also be possible for a governor to receive administrative support by allowing the practice. The only real limitation on the governor's power over expenditure is the functional dispersion discussed previously. The independent treasurer maintains all accounts of receipts and disbursements. And although the budget division determines the legal availability of funds, the primary responsibility for this resides in the elective state auditor. Legally a department cannot expend money without his warrant. He also, rather than the governor's aide, maintains the accounting system. But these limits are rather minor. The governor has firm controls over expenditures.

There is one other area that presents great formal limits for the governor. This is revenue. Since by law the governor must balance the budget, revenue is intimately associated with budgeting. The first limit is that up until 1967 the governor often had no chance to appoint his commissioner of taxation. And beyond the tax department sat a Board of Tax Appeals (now called Tax Court) with three men appointed for overlapping six year terms.

Rigid compartmentalization of revenue through trust funds presents a greater potential limit. <sup>79</sup> Not all funds are so restricted. The general revenue fund receives input from departmental receipts, utilities taxes, gross earnings tax, cigarette and tobacco taxes, insurance premiums, inheritance and gift taxes, deed and property taxes, and, since 1967, a sales tax. The second large budget fund under the governor's control

is the income tax school fund. This is supported by individual and corporate income taxes and is allocated to elementary-secondary education.

But in all the 1969 Budget Address listed nineteen 80  
categories of funds. Four are constitutionally designated. These include education, highways, and railroad bonds. A good example is the large trust fund that supplies highway needs. A 1936 constitutional amendment established the highway users trust fund, broadening an older provision for a trunk highway fund. Motor fuel and motor vehicle taxes go into this fund. The constitution in turn divides this into three sub-funds, trunk highways, county-state aid, and municipal-state aid. Moneys are allocated to each respectively by the following formula: 62% to the first, 29% to the second, and 9% to the third. A subsequent amendment did broaden legislative discretion somewhat. Since 1963 the legislature may act to appropriate 5% of the total revenue among the three funds as they wish. The balance must then be distributed by formula. Highway funding is then virtually beyond gubernatorial control. Not all funds derive from a constitutional origin. But it would serve no purpose to enumerate all statutory provisions in detail. A sampling includes five retirement trust funds, natural resources cigarette tax, state airport construction fund, and property tax relief fund. In 1969 only 37% of the appropriations were subject to legislative (and gubernatorial) 81  
action.

Other fiscal restrictions abound in the constitution. Just two will be mentioned. Article IX, Sec. 6 governs state debt.

A 1962 amendment lowered this restriction. Still, if a state governor wants long term debt legislation, he must round up a sixty per cent legislative majority to pass it. A second major potential limit would be the taconite amendment in 1964. Under this until 1989 no legislative act may increase taxes on taconite beyond the total effective in 1963 or the burden that would be liable under laws applying to general manufacturing corporations. In at least these two ways the governor's revenue options are restricted.

Thomas Flinn make quite a point of these restrictions as they circumscribed decisions during Governor Freeman's first administration. <sup>82</sup> Freeman found the general revenue fund with a \$12 million deficit and an impending \$35 million deficit in the income tax school fund. At the same time the conservation, highway, and permanent school funds retained large surpluses. The governor wished to alleviate the problem by diverting some revenue from the permanent school funds to general revenue. After extensive legislative consultation he found that this would be constitutionally difficult and politically unwise. Surprisingly, Governor Freeman in looking back did not feel that dedicated funding was such a real problem. He acknowledged that his job might have been somewhat easier without the limits. But he felt that he could work around them fairly well. He concluded that he would have had to fund each program to the same extent and in much the same way with or without the formal restrictions. Governor Youngdahl, on the other hand, perceived these constitutionally designated funds as grave road blocks. <sup>83</sup> It is unclear

why the two men expressed such conflicting views. Perhaps to a strong willed man such as Youngdahl any restriction on his discretion appeared as intolerable. But Freeman also acted as a strong governor. (Actually, Youngdahl indirectly admitted that constitutional restrictions were not the only funding limits. On certain funds and taxes there were unbreakable "gentlemen's agreements".) No other governor besides these two mentioned the funding restrictions. Perhaps the less assertive took the legal limits as givens and did not seriously question them for that reason.

Overall the Minnesota governor possesses wide formal powers over budget preparation and execution. Even informally these powers are virtually unchallenged. However, there are real potential limits on funding his program and achieving legislative acceptance. Whether acknowledged or not numerous constitutional provisions restrict his ability to raise funds and distribute them as he pleases. Most legislators accept the governor's appropriation decisions as informational starting point. But they readily encourage dissent from department heads and regard these positions as more useful. This does not mean that final budget totals deviate greatly from the governor's recommendations. However, specific items crucial to his program may be changed greatly.

## II. Institutional Resources

Up to now the resources examined were provided either by the constitution or by statute. This chapter shall now turn to resources built into the governor's personal apparatus. These

have some basis in statute and constitution, but they are primarily a result of practices built up within the governor's office.

Unlike chief executives in very large industrial states, Minnesota governors have had to work with very little staff assistance. In 1945 Governor Edward Thye would count on three non-clerical assistants. By 1969 Governor Levander had seven.<sup>84</sup> The largest increases came during the Freeman administration. Four staff aides assisted Governor C. Elmer Anderson in 1953. But in 1955 Governor Freeman used five and by 1959 he had seven. The staff has remained at that level since. Governor Thye used a secretary, executive secretary, and an executive aide. During Governor Youngdahl's tenure an executive assistant was added. Governor Freeman added two administrative assistants, a second executive aide, and a personal aide. Considering the importance of mass media in recent years it seems incongruous that no Minnesota governor until Elmer L. Andersen in 1961 used a specialized news secretary. This completed the personal assistance complement for the governor. There have been up to eight additional clerical-secretarial people (including a personal secretary). But these provide no policy assistance. In fact the governor still has only three real policy aides. Many<sup>85</sup> outside observers have felt that this is far too little. But the legislature consistently opposes large staff increases.

Since there are so few personal aides, most perform multiple duties. The assignment of duties probably varies from one administration to another, and within each administration. But

when the Little Hoover Commission first proposed a basic staff set up, it did assign rather specific functions to each position. <sup>86</sup> The secretary should handle the governor's appointment schedule. The executive secretary took care of extradition, liaison with the attorney general, and office management. Under Levander, executive secretary David Durenberger essentially took over the duties of both. Instead of a secretary Levander had a special assistant position. Functions such as correspondence, bill and statute review, legislative and party liaison, and speech writing were assigned to the administrative assistant. Since the governor now commonly uses two assistants, these tasks are divided between them. Under Levander one supervised department liaison and the screening of gubernatorial appointments. The news secretary promotes the governor's public image. This completes the policy personnel. The executive aide does not serve in a policy capacity. He acts as door keeper and keeps track of the physical location of bills and documents. Usually, the same man serves many governors. Billy Williams held the post under every governor from John A. Johnson in 1905 until 1954. Charles A. Graham has served since 1955.

It would be inaccurate to say that the governor's policy advisors are entirely limited to his personal staff. Especially for legislative policy the governor draws advice and assistance from numerous sources. Some of these are semi-official. Many governors had part or full time research assistants. These may be partly supplied by the party organization or through arrangements with colleges. Governor Rolvaag found bright young lawyers

from the attorney general's staff to be helpful. For example once he had made the decisions, they drew up the veto messages. Another semi-official source in 1969 was the state planning staff. Legislation passed in 1967 made the governor the state planning officer. The state planning staff then works directly under him. Levander assigned them to work on inter-departmental legislation (regional development, water resources, welfare).

The Department of Administration acted as a third official source. As previously mentioned the commissioner serves as the governor's man. A strong commissioner can help the governor in policy areas other than the budget. The drawback here is that a large, primarily civil service staffed department, is not so responsive to the governor on a personal basis. More personal, informal sources, are also numerous. For example, the party chairman may sit in on strategy meetings and supply research facilities. Finally the governor may draw on personal friends with legislative experience. For example, Arthur Gillen, Harold Levander's law partner, served extensively in both houses. He supplied inside knowledge and technical advice on difficult problems. Also, William O'Brien, former legislator and later appointed auditor, worked on natural resources for Levander.

Most legislators regard staff performance as of the highest importance for gubernatorial legislative success. Only former Speaker Lawrence Hall felt that staff make no difference. But, most legislators also concluded that recent gubernatorial staffs have not fulfilled this potential importance. In fact they rated most staff personnel as either ineffectual or downright detrimental.

Only Freeman's staff received fairly consistent praise from legislators. And even this did not apply to all of his staff members.<sup>89</sup> Surprisingly Conservatives praised them as frequently as DFLers. Governor Freeman himself rated the staff highly. Singled out for particular praise was the secretary Thomas Hughes. Hughes was evidently a personable fellow whose style fit within the bounds of legislative proprieties. On the other hand the administrative assistant, Dorothy Houston Jacobsen, alienated members and caused DFL caucus dissension by her manner.<sup>90</sup> Gerald Heany, a DFL party staff man, also irritated legislators. Governor Youngdahl also rated his staff highly, although he thought it numerically too small. However, no legislator reciprocated these feelings. In fact the staffs under Thye, Youngdahl, C. Elmer Anderson, and Elmer L. Andersen made no real impressions on legislators. They emerge as nonentities. In the case of Thye and Anderson this is probably because neither pushed a legislative program. Youngdahl and Andersen acted as their own legislative contact men.

Most legislators criticized Levander's staff not so much as irritants as simply being inexperienced.<sup>91</sup> Indeed both Governor Levander and his staff acknowledged this. In 1967 he appointed very young men who were "green" not only in legislative politics but about political realities in general. They were not knowledgeable on policy problems. They lacked a sense of timing and a feel as to how the legislature would react. But more crucial was not knowing who to contact (and not knowing who not to contact). For this reason they often lined up inappropriate men as sponsors and stepped on sensitive legislative toes. At best this irritated

veteran legislators. At worst it jeopardized legislation. With one session under the belt in 1969, they at least did not hinder legislation, even if their positive contribution was not great either.

Undoubtedly virtually every legislator who would comment on the problem viewed Governor Rolvaag's staff as destructive to effective relations.<sup>92</sup> The charge against them was partly the same as that against Levander's staff - inexperience. Most aides possessed little statewide political experience and were little known in the DFL party. Most had been the governor's recount friends. Secondly, some created enemies within the party. According to David Lebedoff party leaders felt that Jim Rice, Rolvaag's secretary, interfered in local politics too much. But primarily the criticism seemed to be that the personality and approach by Rice and executive assistant Sally Luther turned the legislators off. Luther should have been influential as she had long legislative experience. Most legislators acknowledged her high intelligence, ability, and dedication to the work. However, she was a poor choice. Her personality irritated legislators. She had fought with other DFL caucus members when they controlled the House from 1955-1962.<sup>93</sup> Jim Rice alienated members also. But more felt that he was simply inexperienced and didn't do much. This inactivity isolated Rolvaag more than he should have been. And Rice also hindered Rolvaag's one effective aide, William Shovell.<sup>94</sup> Several legislators commented on Shovell's ability.<sup>95</sup> He had been an effective DFL House member, chairing the appropriations committee for four years.

As a "legislative type" he enjoyed personal popularity with both caucuses. However, power struggles within the staff hampered him. Shovell left after the 1963 session. Senator Nicholas Coleman summed up legislative feeling when he concluded that poor staff work was the key to Rolvaag's downfall. Governor Rolvaag himself firmly rejected this conclusion.<sup>96</sup> When the question was put directly to him he loyally defended his staff. They did not cause his problems. He insisted that they were effective in legislative liaison. The governor explained away criticism of individual members. Some DFL legislators resented Sally Luther because she had outsmarted them when she was in the House. Although Jim Rice was not an organizer, he got along well with people. So Rolvaag's view of his staff differed diametrically from the legislative view. Even if the governor was correct in his belief that his staff was able, they would have been ineffective because the legislators believed so strongly that they were not.

Governor Rolvaag concluded with an observation that has great import for all legislative-staff relations. He had heard criticism of all governor's staffs by the legislators. In his view the gulf is inevitable. Institutional separation promotes this gulf. An activist governor, who inevitable bruises legislative sensibilities, widens it. The staff must do the dirty work. For example, they must take a veto message on a powerful legislator's pet bill to that legislator. His anger at the governor rubs off on them. This observation does not appear to be purely rationalization on Rolvaag's part. Others expressed

the same feeling. Representative Donald Wozniak (DFL-1951-1966) had seen the same problem in every administration. The mechanism followed a familiar pattern of initially friendly relations that gradually deteriorated.

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Why does this deterioration occur? What have been the major defects in gubernatorial staffs? In order of importance these appear to be inexperience, lack of legislative contacts, an institutional arrogance, and insufficient compensation. Many legislators mentioned inexperience. Most legislative aides are relatively young men who have participated little in the general political arena let alone in legislative politics. Senator Dunlap summed up the feeling by saying that instead of appointing naive young lawyers the governor should get together before the session with the most important legislative leaders and get their views on what kind of staff members would work out best. Secondly, most staff members in recent years have not known or understood the legislative process. This was doubly crippling because few governors did either. And by "knowing the process" most legislators apparently mean "knowing who to contact". In turn only an insider can know this accurately because "who to contact" may shift imperceptibly from one session to another or even within a session. Thirdly, several legislators mentioned undesirable traits that can be summed up in the phrase "institutional arrogance".

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These problems are to a degree inevitable because of institutional separation. Staff members tend to see the legislators as a group with quite different objectives than their own. They may come to see the legislature as an enemy and wish

their boss to take a "hard line" against it to save his own program. Some of Levander's staff drifted into this feeling in 1967. Some supported an editorial, suggested by the Republican party, asking the governor to crack down on the legislature. It was ill-timed and ill-conceived to increase legislative support. Fortunately for the governor the reaction was not as bad as it might have been because he managed to remain dis-associated from it. <sup>99</sup> Also, from the legislators point of view, staff members develop an inflated view of their own importance. They will either put pressure on so hard as to become obnoxious; or they may take the legislature for granted. Finally, in a desire to maximize their own position, and to serve the governor, they tend to take over and shield the governor from outside contacts. If the staff is not astute, this may leave the governor isolated. A final deficiency is mentioned more by the governors than the legislators. This is that the staffs are too small and underpaid. Governors recruit the best people that they can. But people with great political experience, and legislative expertise, are reluctant to take the kind of job that a staff position offers.

Despite these many criticisms, legislators do believe that a good staff could maximize gubernatorial success. Two attributes stand out here. Again the most important is legislative "know-how". The second is something almost universally called "personality". Legislative know-how is important because almost all gubernatorial contacts with the legislature are through the staff. The governor steps in personally only on the most important issues. He simply

does not have time to do more. So the main impressions come through the staff. Again, know-how means knowing who to contact and who not to. It means knowing the legislative history of bills so that one can anticipate where support and opposition will come from, what can and cannot be done. It means possessing the sensitivity to anticipate in advance how the legislature will react to a proposal. It means being able to approach and contact legislators in the right way. This last blends off into the personality factor. No one was very specific on what constitutes this personality factor. (But they evidently meant that a person should fit the legislative type. And there is a legislative type in Minnesota. This will be elaborated on in chapter eight.) At least a staff member has to be able to approach legislators on their own terms in their own style. A few legislators suggested that the best way to get this was to hire a former legislator. Others expressed skepticism. They pointed to experience with Mrs. Luther. Also, it would be hard to lure an experienced legislator into a staff position. Finally, the pervading institutional separation would diminish the legislator's effectiveness once he had left that body. Advocates of legislative experience in staff members point out that not just any former legislator will do. He must have been knowledgeable when he was in the body. He must have cultivated friendships, not animosities, when he served. Of past staff members, only William Shovell fits that description, and he was hampered by other political conditions during the Rolvaag administration.

During the period under discussion no governor's staff fit

the ideal. Only Freeman's was viewed as a positive asset. Rolvaag's was seen as a positive failure. The others appeared to be non-entities or at best weak. It must be concluded that, in general, personal staff has not been an effective tool for Minnesota governors.

#### Summary

The review of constitutional, statutory, and institutional resources, does not appear to have revealed any consistent basis for gubernatorial success. All have more or less severe limitations. These resources will not be summarized here. Rather, that will be postponed until the final power rankings for the Minnesota governors are made. First, though, public, political, and personal resources must also be reviewed. Part of the next chapter will be devoted to that task. The chapter will then conclude with the over-all power ranking.

Footnotes Chapter 5

1. Constitution of the State of Minnesota, Article V, Section 4.
2. G. Theodore Mitau, "The Governor and the Strike", in Richard T. Frost (ed.), Cases in State and Local Government, (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961) pp. 207-15.
3. Klaus J. Hermann, Politics of Administrative Reorganization in Minnesota State Government (Ph. D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1960) p. 27
4. Interview with Lawrence K. Yetka, Minnesota Representative, DFL, 1951-1960, August 6, 1969.
5. Joseph L. Donovan, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-1970 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1970) p. 375.
6. Yetka, op. cit.
7. Interviews with Senator Donald O. Wright (C-1935-1970), March 20, 1967; Representative Roy Schulz (C-1951-1970), August 26, 1969; Representative Lawrence Haeg (C-1941-1954), July 18, 1969; Senator Harold W. Schultz (DFL-1951-1962), July 18, 1969; Senator Rudy Hanson (C-1955-1970), August 23, 1969; Speaker A. I. Johnson (DFL-1941-1958), August 4, 1969; and Representative Martin O. Sabo (DFL-1961-), August 18, 1969.
8. Interview with Stanley W. Holmquist, (C-House: 1947-1954, Senate: 1955-); see also interviews with Senator Dosland (C-1959-) August 4, 1969; and Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit.
9. Interviews with Representative Harold J. Anderson (C-1951-), April 6, 1967; Representative M.K. Hegstrom (C-1957-1970), March 22, 1967; Richard Firzsimons (C-1953-), March 29, 1967; Speaker Lloyd Duxbury (C-1951-1970), March 2, 1967; Senator Walter J. Franz (C-1955-1970), April 5, 1967; Senator Gordon S. Rosenmeier (C-1941-1970), March 21, 1967; and Senator Wright, op. cit.
10. Speaker A. I. Johnson, op. cit.; also interview with Speaker E. J. Chilgren (DFL-1927-1964), August 6, 1969.
11. Donovan, op. cit.
12. Wisconsin Legislative Research Bureau, The Wisconsin Blue Book, 1968, (Madison: Department of Administration, 1968) p. 335.
13. See chapter 2, page 9.
14. Interviews with Governor Elmer L. Andersen, March 2, 1967, Governor Luther K. Youngdahl, June 21, 1967, and Governor Orville Freeman, June 21, 1967.
15. Interview with Representative P. K. Peterson (C-1947-1954), August 21, 1969; Senator C. C. Mitchell (C-1947-1966), July 21, 1967; Senator Nicholas Coleman (DFL-1963-), August 20, 1969; also Schulz, op. cit., Dosland, op. cit., and Schultz, op. cit.
16. Interview with Coleman, op. cit., and Senator Raphael Salmore, (DFL-1951-1966), August 7, 1969.
17. For the story of the controversy see G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, second revised edition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) pp. 43, 115, 126; interview with Salmore, op. cit; interview with Representative Paul Overgaard (C-1963-1968), August 23, 1969; interview with David Durenberger, Executive Secretary to Governor Levander, August, 1969.

18. Interview with Governor Karl F. Rolvaag, August, 1969.
19. Interview with Senator Coleman, op. cit.
20. Interview with Senator Paul Thuet, July 22, 1969
21. Interview with Representative Sabo, op. cit.
22. The following discussion was based on information supplied by Representative Sabo, op. cit., and Senator Karl Grittner, (DFL-House-1953-1958, Senate 1959-1970) March 27, 1967.
23. Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth V. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965), p. 220.
24. See Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget (Interuniversity Case Series, No. 60, 1961).
25. Russel W. Fridley, Evaluation of Governors (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1966) p. 3.
26. Hermann, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
27. Interviews with Freeman, op. cit., and Rolvaag, op. cit.
28. Constitution of the State of Minnesota, op. cit.
29. Hermann, op. cit., p. 235; also see James A. Seitz, Administrative Agencies as Formulators of Legislative Policy in the 1963 Session of the Minnesota Legislature (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1964), p. 74.
30. Hermann, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
31. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
32. Ibid., pp. 45, 63.
33. Ibid., pp. 111-115.
34. Ibid., pp. 157-9.
35. Ibid., pp. 60-1, 69-71, 88-89, and 97-99.
36. For examples of several group efforts see Ibid., pp. 191-201, 234-238, 242-254, and 259-271.
37. George A. Werp, "A Report to the Governor on some Legal Implications of the Authority of the Commissioner of Administration to Transfer Functions and Appropriations From One Department to Another", (mimeographed paper submitted to Governor Harold Levander, Sept. 1, 1969).
38. Marvel Brayley, "The Influence of a Governor Upon the Legislature in Minnesota" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1940) p. 46-49.
39. Ibid., p. 25.
40. Donovan, op. cit., pp. 250-1, 262-70.
41. Charles R. Adrian, The Non-Partisan Legislature In Minnesota (Ph. D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1950), pp. 297-8.
42. See roll call votes in the Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1961 (St. Paul; Minnesota Senate, 1962) and the Journal of the Senate, 1963 (St. Paul: Minnesota Senate, 1964).
43. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 222-225.
44. Interview with Youngdahl, op. cit.
45. Interview with Rolvaag, op. cit.
46. Interview with Andersen, op. cit.
47. Interview with Representative Robert Renner (C-1957-1970), August 5, 1969.
48. Interview with Senator Robert Dunlap (C-1953-1966), July 3, 1969.

49. Governor Harold Levander responded in much the same fashion. Interview with Governor Harold Levander, October 3, 1969.
50. Interview with Speaker Lawrence Hall (C-1935-1948), August 18, 1969.
51. Ivan Hinderaker, Harold Stassen and Developments in the Republican Party in Minnesota, 1937-1943, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1949), pp. 447-53.
52. Donovan, 1969-70, op. cit., pp. 115-245.
53. Interview with Salmore, op. cit.
54. Interview with Grittner, op. cit.
55. Interview with Schultz, op. cit.
56. Interview with Andersen, op. cit.
57. Interview with Rolvaag, op. cit.
58. Interview with Levander, op. cit.
59. Interview with Youngdahl, op. cit.
60. Flom, op. cit., pp. 254, 260-2, 269, 438.
61. Interview with Freeman, op. cit.
62. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 225-7.
63. Joseph L. Donovan, The Legislative Manual of Minnesota, 1955 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1956) p. 219.
64. Interviews with Freeman, op. cit., Youngdahl, op. cit., Dosland, op. cit., and Dunlap, op. cit.
65. Interview with Youngdahl, op. cit; also interview with Representative Claude Allen (C-1937-1958; Senator, 1959-1966), August 21, 1969.
66. See Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 9; See also Flinn, The Policy Process: The Minnesota Governor and the Legislature in 1955 (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Minnesota 1957) pp. 69-70, 73-4, 102, 106-7, 110-2.
67. Flinn, (1961) op. cit., pp. 8-11, 19; Flinn, (1957) op. cit., p. 69.
68. Interview with Durenberger., op. cit.; see also on the Youngdahl administration, Robert Esbjornson, A Christian in Politics: Luther W. Youngdahl (Minneapolis: T. S. Denison Co., 1955), p. 213.
69. Interview with Dosland, op. cit.; Claude Allen and Val Imm (D-1935-1966), interview, July 19, 1969), both former appropriations chairmen felt that Hatfield's action was a severe and unfair limitation on the legislature's independent judgement.
70. Interview with Eugene Knudsen, (DFL: House-1955-1962, Senate-1963-1966), August 4, 1969; Fitzsimons, op. cit.; Allen, op. cit.
71. Interviews with Dosland, op. cit., Mitchell, op. cit., Knudsen, op. cit., and Fitzsimons, op. cit.
72. Interview with Imm, op. cit.; also with Allen, op. cit.
73. Examples came interviews with Fitzsimons, Allen, Knudsen, Dosland, Imm, Dunlap, and Mitchell.
74. Interview with Allen, op. cit.
75. The example comes from the interview with Rolvaag, op. cit.
76. Interview with Freeman, op. cit.; similar feelings were expressed by Youngdahl, Allen, Knudsen, Dosland, and Dunlap.
77. Interview with Allen, op. cit.; Eugene Knudsen concurred.

78. Interviews with Senator Jack Davies (DFL-1959-1970), July 17, 1969; also Mitchell, op. cit.; Freeman, op. cit.; and Youngdahl, op. cit.
79. See Flinn, (1957) op. cit., p. 70.
80. Constitution of the State of Minnesota: Article 4 section 32b (railroad fund); Article 8, section 4 (permanent school and swampland fund); Article 8 section 5 (university fund); Article 9, sections 1A, 1B (iron ore occupation tax); and Article 9, section 5, Article 16, sections 5-10 (highway users fund).
81. Levander Budget Address, op. cit., p. 39.
82. Flinn, (1961) op. cit., pp. 5-6; Flinn, (1957) op. cit., pp. 71-3.
83. Interview with Youngdahl, op. cit.
84. The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969, op. cit.
85. For examples see Mitau, op. cit., op. 44; Hermann, op. cit., pp. 36-41.
86. Hermann, op. cit., op. 36-41.
87. Interview with Rolvaag, op. cit.; see also interview with Durenberger, op. cit.
88. Interview with Durenberger, op. cit.
89. Interviews with Representative Aubrey Dirlam (C-1941-), March 21, 1967; Representative D. D. Wozniak (DFL-1951-1966), July 23, 1969; Dunlap, op. cit. Grittner, op. cit.
90. Interview with Dunlap, op. cit.
91. Interviews with Representative R. W. Johnson (C-1963-), July 18, 1969; Senator Donald Sinclair (C-1947-), March 20, 1967; Senator Rudy Hanson (C-1955-1970), August 23, 1969; Renner, op. cit.; Overgaard, op. cit.; Schulz, op. cit.; Dunlap, op. cit.
92. Some would not say anything, for example Speaker E. J. Chilgren (DFL, 1927-1964), August 6, 1969, and Cina, op. cit.; those that would comment include: Dirlam, Renner, R. W. Johnson, Schulz, Knudsen, Wozniak, Sabo, Dunlap, Grittner, and Coleman.
93. Interviews with Renner, op. cit., R. W. Johnson, op. cit., Knudsen, op. cit., Coleman, op. cit., and Mitchell, op. cit.
94. Interview with Coleman, op. cit.
95. Interviews with Renner, op. cit., Schulz, op. cit., Wozniak, op. cit., and Coleman, op. cit.
96. Interview with Rolvaag, op. cit.
97. Interview with Wozniak, op. cit.
98. Interviewees commenting on this phenomenon include: Overgaard, op. cit., Chilgren, op. cit., Wozniak, op. cit., Wright, op. cit., and Coleman, op. cit.
99. This story came entirely from an interview with Overgaard, op. cit.

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## CHAPTER 6

### THE MINNESOTA GOVERNOR: INFORMAL RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES

The last chapter surveyed those power resources available to the Minnesota governor through constitutional or statutory direction. This chapter will conclude the survey by examining those resources provided to the governor by the political system, and by his own personal abilities. First to be considered will be the legislative leverage that comes to the governor from his position as popular representative of all the people. Secondly, one must look at those powers available to him as a partisan activist and party campaigner. Thirdly, the governor's personal abilities will be assessed. The final section will summarize all resources, formal and informal, available to the Minnesota governor. This should indicate the general power of Minnesota governors. Also some attempt can be made at ranking the seven governors covered in this study. This in turn will enable us to make some estimate of their success program success.

#### I. Popular Support

Charles Adrian, at one point in his discussion of the non-partisan legislature, comments that if the governor lacks the diplomacy and ability to rally public opinion, there is no effective substitute to promote his program.<sup>1</sup> Not all Minnesota decision-makers would agree to this proposition. But public opinion was mentioned more often as a potentially important source than any other. And a goodly number rated it as first or second. Surprisingly legislators emphasize its importance more often than governors. Only Luther Youngdahl and Elmer L. Andersen endorsed

its importance without qualification. However, one-fourth of the legislative success. And two-thirds believed it to be an effective device. Moreover, a majority of both DFLers and Conservatives, both senators and representatives, responded in this fashion. It should be quickly pointed out that House members emphasize public support in greater proportion than do Senators. And DFLers support the proposition in far greater proportion than do Conservatives. In fact the only group in which a majority rejected the proposition was the Senate Conservatives. This response pattern makes sense. Traditionally the Senate has asserted a greater independence from the governor and would resent any pressure from him. Also, historically the DFL has been in a minority position more often. They would need more the extra support generated by the governor's leadership.

Public appeals should not be viewed as a direct, simple, mechanistic process. Senator Harold Schultz (DFL- 1951-1962) agreed that the governor's paramount power is his access to the people through publicity.<sup>2</sup> This power is mainly a dramatic one. According to Schultz, he can focus attention on one issue as no legislator can because the mass media is more responsive to him. But this does not mean that the governor can fabricate support. There must exist a genuine public support, latent or overt, for the particular issue. If this prior support exists, an effective gubernatorial appeal can generate a sufficient letter-writing response to put unbearable pressure on the legislature.<sup>3</sup> Another qualification of the technique's effectiveness is the frequency of use. Most appeals must be limited to a very few issues that are

extremely important for the governor. In the first place few governors enjoy the luxury of unlimited time in which to address the public. Even if they did, it would be unwise. Over-exposure blunts the dramatic effect. Also, constant exposure tends to build up a negative reaction in the legislature.<sup>4</sup> Some legislators felt that such tactics helped push through legislation in the short run. But in the long run it helped destroy the governor's personal credit and future success. Response also depends on how the governor approaches his task. Gently persuasion is more readily accepted than violent chastisement. But even then response depends on the individual legislator's particular position. If a particular proposal appeals to the legislator and his district, he will respond positively. Representative August Mueller (C-1944), longtime highway committee chairman, also felt that such appeals can make the chairman's task easier by increasing public knowledge about an issue. Senator Nicholas Coleman (DFL- 1963 -) was blunter. Most long time legislators won't stick their necks out and endanger re-election chances. However, if the governor runs interference for them on important controversial issues by building public support, they can go along. On the other hand, a legislator who opposes an issue, especially if it may hurt him in his constituency, resents such tactics. And legislators whose personal philosophy precludes such gubernatorial pressure will ignore such appeals, or re-act negatively. However, most legislators felt that even when resented, public appeals do more good than harm. Because most accept this as part of the game.<sup>5</sup>

Given this general legislative acceptance, the next question must be how well have Minnesota governors used the public appeals technique? Public appeals are not equally open to all governors. First, for some the conditions are not right. One must be popular before he can make such appeals appear credible to the legislators. Of course, this is a two way thing; a governor may attempt to increase public support by the active use of the media. Public opinion polls serve as one measure of this basic support. Secondly, even if the governor receives public support, he may not possess the skill and inclination to capitalize on it. He may not feel that such appeals are necessary for his success. He may not feel that such pressure is proper. He may be an ineffective public speaker. The next section will examine popular support. Then attention will be directed to gubernatorial use of appeals.

#### The Public Appeal of Minnesota Governors

In general the earlier governors within this period enjoyed wide popular appeal. And in general more recent governors have not. The turning point seems to have come sometime late in the Freeman administration. Since that time, except for a brief period early in 1967, no Minnesota governor enjoyed majority popular approval. The public response recorded in Table VI-1 is only roughly

Table VI-1 Popular Approval for Minnesota Governors, 1947-1970

Governor	Average % Approval	Range of Approval	Year	Average % Approval by Year
Luther W. Youngdahl	82%*	76-89%	1947	76%
			1949	82%
			1951	89%
C. Elmer Anderson	73%*	64-72%	1951	64%
			1953	66%
			1954	72%
Orville Freeman	60%	49-72%	1955	59%
			1956	66%
			1957	70%
			1958	72%
			1959	51%
Elmer L. Andersen	44%	37-48%	1961	43%
			1962	45%
Karl F. Rolvaag	38%	32-45%	1963	41%
			1964	39%
			1965	34%
			1966	40%
Harold W. Levander	40%	30-56%	1967	48%
			1968	40%
			1969	36%
			1970	35%

\* This percentage approval is the result of adding together the proportion of responses either good or fair used to describe the performance in office; as such it represents some inflation over the succeeding ratings.

Source: Minnesota Polls, 1947-1970; also see A Quarter Century of the Minneapolis Tribune's Minnesota Poll, 1944-1969, p. 16.

comparable from one governor to the next. In the first place the question used for Governor Youngdahl and Governor Anderson was different from the rest. The initial question was "Do you think Luther Youngdahl (or C. Elmer Anderson) is doing a good, fair, or poor job as governor of Minnesota?" Since 1955, however, the question has read, "On the whole do you approve or disapprove of the way Orville Freeman (or other governor) is handling his duties as governor of Minnesota?" Also, relatively few such polls were recorded for earlier administrations. Since Freeman's time the

much larger number of polls perhaps justifies greater confidence in the averages expressed for each governor. Unfortunately, no comparable materials readily available for Governor Thye. Nevertheless, these figures are the best hard data available.

Minnesotans generally seem willing to give the governor a chance when he first come into office. Only Governors Andersen and Rolvaag started out lacking a majority public approval. Rolvaag took office late after a weary recount battle. He began in March 25, 1963 with 34% approval and 48% disapproval. Elmer Andersen started out with an even split, 42% approval-42% disapproval. Governor Levander enjoyed the advantage of starting out with 56% approval (20% disapproval, 24% neutral) He slipped below 50% by July 1967, and by late May 1969 disapproval consistently outweighed approval. Governor Freeman, on the other hand, started with 59% approval and this increased up until 1959. He never lost this majority position until May 1959, and then only temporarily.

So an earlier governor could with some justification argue that he did have wide-spread public support. However, Governors Andersen, Rolvaag, and, to a lesser extent, Levander, could not make this claim with substantial credibility. Also, earlier governors received increasing public support as their administrations progressed. This changed during the Freeman period. His popularity peaked at 72% approval in December 1958. By June 1959 this had dropped to 49% and rose only slightly to 52% in August. Governor Andersen's popularity fluctuated within a small range, but remained about the same. With Governor Rolvaag's administra-

tion we find the first serious indication that familiarity breeds contempt. Again, his popularity fluctuates somewhat, but the average reveals a steady decline from year to year. The higher average in the last year is somewhat misleading. It largely reflects the 43% approval in September 1966. And this in turn largely reflected public sympathy resulting from the governor's fight for renomination. Governor Levander recorded the sharpest decline of any governor. He started with 56% approval in January, 1967. By April 1970, the last recorded "sounding", this was down to 34%.

There is no solid basis for explaining this popularity decline. In part very recent governors did not possess the skill of a Youngdahl or a Freeman. It may be that the public had come to expect dynamic, publicity oriented governors, and then reacted negatively when the expected performance did not materialize. At least recent governors have not possessed the kind of personality that excited great popular interest. In Recount Ronald Stinnet and Charles Backstrom comment especially on the rather neutral reaction of the public to the candidates in 1962.<sup>6</sup> But this cannot be accepted as a complete explanation. Certainly C. Elmer Anderson presented no very dynamic public image. He never very seriously attempted to arouse public support. Yet his support remained high. Some have also argued that legislative performance affects public support as much as the reverse. Stinnet and Backstrom especially emphasize this in the case of Elmer Andersen.<sup>7</sup> A Minnesota Poll published on July 9, 1961 revealed that half of those who disapproved of the governor did so because he lacked

leadership, especially with the legislature. This reason dominated almost to the exclusion of any other. However, it is difficult to trace this influence for other governors. No other poll reveals so clear a crystallization of opinion. An indirect way of measuring this is to compare approval levels before and after the legislative session. Table VI-2 reveals a fairly consistent decline in public

Table VI-2  
Public Approval for Gubernatorial Performance, Before  
and After Legislative Sessions

Year	Date	% Approval Before Session	Date	% Approval after Session	% point change
1955	January	59%	July	57%	-2
1959	December (1958)	72%	June	49%	-23
1961	February	42%	June	37	-5
1963	March	34%	June	40%	+6
1965	February	36%	June	34%	-2
1967	January	56%	June	54%	-2
1969	January	40%	June	32	-3

No comparable data is available before 1955 or for 1957

\* Rolvaag took office in March

Source: The Minnesota Poll

approval during the legislative session (the legislature convenes in January and usually adjourns early in June; dates closest to these times were used). But generally the decrease is not large. The only starting drop was for Governor Freeman in 1959. He fought bitterly with the Conservative senators during this session. And a long drawn out special session during 1959 further damaged his image. Andersen (1961) and Levander (1969) also show significant drops. Apparently Rolvaag's popularity had little to do with his legislative performance. It may be that in some vague way the public expects a cooperative and productive relationship

between the governor and the legislature. It may react negatively to the governor if no such relationship develops. But the overall evidence is not very conclusive on this point.

Legislative response to gubernatorial popularity depends partly at least on what the governor is liked for. This can be measured with some specificity for party response (See Table VI-3). Generally gubernatorial approval

Table VI-3  
Public Support for Minnesota Governors, by Party Affiliation

Governor	DFL	Rep.	Independent	Difference between the governors and the opposite party response
Luther Youngdahl (R)	84%	97%		+13
C. Elmer Anderson (R)	65%	83%	76%	+18
Orville Freeman (DFL)	74%	43%	57%	+31
Elmer Andersen (R)	33%	61%	44%	+28
Karl Rolvaag (DFL)	55%	21%	32%	+34
Harold Levander (R)	24%	60%	33%	+36

Source: The Minnesota Poll

followed party lines. Every governor received greater approval from his own party identifiers than from the opposition. Every governor received more support from independents than from the opposing party. There is quite a difference between pre-1955 and post-1955 periods in one respect. The partisan response sharpens beginning with Freeman. There would have been no popular basis for partisan legislative opposition to Youngdahl and Anderson (and one suspects the same was true for Thye). The Republican dominance at that time would blur the need for partisan response anyway. But as partisan competition increased, partisanly inclined legislators would have had no particular popular reason for

supporting the opposing party governor. If one accepts the actuality of a non-partisan legislature, these considerations would not be great anyway. But it would also mean that no legislator would have had reason to support the governor. After Freeman the gubernatorial support from independents was quite low.

It is very difficult to appraise the personality content of popular response. The public is not very clear why they respond to a governor the way they do. The response probably comes more from vague impressions than from specific issues. Also, the Minnesota Poll has not consistently reported the content behind public response. Such information exists only for Governors Andersen, Rolvaag, and Levander. Most Minnesotans, and especially supporters, perceived Governor

Table VI-4  
Qualities or Characteristics of Andersen and Rolvaag

Qualities	Andersen		Rolvaag	
	Viewed by Andersen Supporters	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters	Viewed by Andersen Supporters	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters
Capable	72%	18%	14%	56%
Sincere	68	16	9	38
Intelligent	59	23	14	36
Experienced	55	22	11	31
Thoughtful	37	8	6	15
Conservative	33	19	4	9
A Leader	31	9	7	29
Decisive	21	4	5	17
Dull	2	13	9	2
Not Sincere	1	23	16	1
Liberal	6	5	22	23
Not Friendly	0	2	5	0
Rash	1	5	23	2
Not Experienced	2	10	2	10
Not Competent	1	23	21	0
Indecisive	8	29	13	2
No Opinion	2	10	29	12
Other	2	2	2	1

Source: The Minnesota Poll, October 30, 1962, as adapted from Stinnet and Backstrom, p. 28.

Andersen as capable, sincere, intelligent, and experienced. But only 31% of his supporters described him as a leader. Only 21% saw him as decisive. An earlier poll taken in July 1961 revealed the same defects. Specifically the charge was that he lacked leadership qualities. He was not forceful with the legislature. Significantly, popular response to both Rolvaag and Levander was quite similar. Rolvaag's image appears to have been less clearly defined in 1962. But by 1966 a majority of his supporters saw him as capable, experienced, and sincere. Response from various polls between 1963 and 1965 elicited just a general favorable response without specific content.

Table VI-5  
Public Description of Karl Rolvaag and Harold Levander

Personal Qualities	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters	Viewed by Levander Supporters	Viewed by Levander Supporters	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters
Experienced	80%	41%	23%	9%
Capable	64	22	72	28
Sincere	58	16	65	27
Intelligent	45	19	65	38
A Leader	34	13	43	14
Thoughtful	29	11	25	9
Liberal	25	30	2	3
Decisive	23	9	26	9
Conservative	9	3	39	26
Not Competent	0	37	0	7
Indecisive	4	34	1	6
Not Sincere	2	29	0	6
Dull	5	23	2	5
Rash	2	17	0	2
Not Friendly	2	5	0	3
Not Experienced	0	2	0	28

Source: The Minnesota Poll, October 2, 1966

Rolvaag's detractors were not much more specific in 1962. By 1966 large proportions described him as not competent, indecisive, and insincere. Specific defects from 1963 to 1965 included his 1962

campaign tactics, a "do-nothing" governor, and lack of leadership. Even only one-third of his supporters would describe Rolvaag as a leader. Almost monotonously Levander supporters repeated the adjectives of capable, sincere, and intelligent. Even significant proportions of his detractors acknowledged these traits. A surprisingly large proportion of his supporters in 1966 also chose to see him as a leader. However, in subsequent surveys from 1968 through 1969 this image dimmed. Favorable comments became more and more general support responses. He continued to be rated as honest, good, a hard worker, and sincere. His detractors, on the other hand, developed more specific criticisms. They concluded that the governor was not politically astute, not a dynamic personality, and a weak leader. Generally, then Minnesotans believed that their recent governors have been intelligent, sincere, capable, and hard-working men. But these same governors came across as indecisive weak leaders. None really possessed the dynamic personality to impress the public.

Finally, does the public associate specific issues with the governors? Conclusions on this point must also necessarily be inexact. By scanning Minnesota Poll surveys done during this period one can glean some information. But it is not consistently complete for all governors. Governor Youngdahl stands out above all others in the impact he made in this regard. On August 19, 1951 the Minnesota Poll posed the following question "Luther W. Youngdahl has been governor since January 1947. What do you think are the two main things his administration will be remembered for?" The responses were:

Mental Health Program	65%
Anti-gambling	64%
Strict law Enforcement	10%
Youth Conservation	6%
Liquor Control	4%
Honesty, Efficiency	2%
His Christianity	1%
Work for the FEPC	1%
Other	11%
No Answer	10%

The governor had effectively impressed upon the public mind at least six substantive issues. But actually only two issues penetrated to a large part of the public. And Youngdahl had been at it for five years. The poll did not ask a comparable question for other governors. Taxes and iron ore industry policy were mentioned, with disapproval, for Governor Andersen (July 9, 1961). A very few people mentioned Governor Rolvaag favorably for his tax policy and mental health action. A few on the other side reacted negatively to his Sunday closing veto and tax policies (June 2, 1963; June 13, 1965). Under Governor Levander the sales tax caught the public attention as no other issue did. The Minnesota Poll conducted a rather exhaustive survey published on June 18, 1967, shortly after the legislature passed the sales tax over the governor's veto. 53% of the respondents would have voted against the sales tax package. 65% supported the governor's position. This did not influence legislative action. Perhaps conservative legislators were aware of how volatile public opinion is. The Minnesota Poll conducted subsequent soundings from 1968 through 1969. The level of support for retaining the sales tax was progressively 54%, 57%, and 59%. The poll also queried the public on other Levander programs including government reorganization (52% opposed) 18 year old voting (58% for), and the governors

1969 tax package (6 1/2% for). The governor did get the last two proposals, and part of the first. However, it would be stretching a point to say that there was great public awareness on these issues. Levander never made public plans for these issues. Based on such information as is available, the public does not seem to "like" a governor for particular programs, but from a general impression.

#### Public Relations Skills and Use

Before each Minnesota governor can finally be ranked on public opinion resources, the approach to public relations that each adopted must be considered. Only two governors, Youngdahl and Freeman, really possessed the skills and inclination to exploit this resource. Youngdahl believed that public appeals were his greatest strength. Under the non-partisan system direct public appeals became the only means by which he could reach the legislators and combat the special interests that he regarded as his opponents.<sup>8</sup> He believed that this method helped him pass some essential legislation. Elmer Andersen, a senator at that time, recalled that Youngdahl could so whip up an atmosphere of public support that the legislature did not dare oppose him.<sup>9</sup> As the legislative session warmed up the governor would appear on radio twice a week to plead for his program. A flood of favorable correspondence poured into his and legislative offices as a result. Also, many private organizations promoted direct personal delegations to the legislature. Youngdahl could not push every bill in this fashion. But the radio programs promoted youth conservation, general law enforcement, the anti-gambling bill,

mental health, fair employment practices, family courts, and arrest powers for the Liquor Control Commissioner. He succeeded in at least bringing must bills to the floor. Such success implied some costs however. In his public appearances the governor tended to command rather than persuade. And senior legislators did not react kindly to the governor's repeated assertions that special interest controlled them. The House majority leader publicly replied that the governor was the most pernicious lobby working on the legislature.<sup>10</sup> Many veteran legislators felt that the governor's devotion to issues such as mental health and anti-gambling were phony. They perceived his tactics as a bid for political support at their expense. Eventually, such a bitter feeling developed that both his total program and his personal health were weakened.

Orville Freeman did not rely quite so heavily on public appeals. But he was an effective and astute speaker. Like Youngdahl, Thomas Flinn felt that the governor had few other means by which to influence the legislature.<sup>11</sup> Freeman pursued this tactic with daily press conferences, weekly radio appearances, and a weekly newspaper column. During the session he made two to three speeches daily for his fiscal program. Between sessions he carried a heavy public speaking load around the state.<sup>12</sup> Freeman himself tended to downgrade the ultimate impact of these tactics. He felt that only one or two issues a session could be strongly enough dramatized to develop appreciable support. He had concluded that the public really doesn't pay much attention to the governor's legislative program. They don't know about issues, understand

them, or really care about them.<sup>13</sup> The governor believed that appeals to special groups paid better dividends. These friendly special groups could then directly manage portions of his program in the legislature.<sup>14</sup> Surprisingly legislators, especially DFL legislators, rated Freeman's public contact efforts much more highly than he did.<sup>15</sup> They recalled many more public issues that he had pushed. These included his tax program, reorganization, opposition to the sales tax, building program, higher education, school aids, welfare, and mental health. As with Youngdahl, Freeman's public appeals became less effective as his administration wore on. The Senate especially began to react negatively as Freeman adopted a progressively attacking, "blasting" style.<sup>16</sup> Freeman's most disastrous exploit was his decision to campaign against conservative legislators in the 1958 election. This highly direct appeal to the public seldom works in U.S. politics. It failed in Minnesota. Freeman even failed to accomplish his immediate purpose. Senator Robert Dunlap (C- 1953-1966) recalled his experience with some amusement. The governor came to Plainview, Dunlap's home town, on a speaking engagement. Dunlap sat on the same platform while Freeman urged his defeat in the upcoming election. The senator believes that the incident insured his re-election. The attempt also hurt Freeman in the long run. Representative Lawrence Yetka (DFL- 1951-1960) attributed Freeman's downfall, in public esteem and program success, to this electioneering. He believed that Conservative Senators deliberately set out to get Freeman. Few programs passed in 1959. Moreover, they forced a lengthy special session that hurt his public image.

Governor Freeman then did not quite enjoy Youngdahl's skill, but up until 1959 at least he used public appeals with fair success.

For the other governors the public appeals resource was negligible. Since neither Governor or Thye nor Governor C. Elmer Anderson were directly interviewed, any observations on them cannot be regarded as conclusive. However, during the many legislative interviews neither man was mentioned in connection with public appeals. The impression was that neither man was skilled in public speaking. Probably neither felt that such tactics were necessary. It may even be that neither viewed such tactics as legitimate.

Governor Eimer L. Andersen's failure to use public appeals appears to be more puzzling. Better than any other governor he articulated the philosophy behind public appeals tactics. He outlined the position as follows. The chief executive can easily make news simply because he is governor. As a conspicuous public figure he enjoys far more opportunity for public exposure than any individual legislator. If a governor believes that a program is sufficiently important, he can utilize public pressure to such a degree that he is difficult to withstand. However, extensive pressure may cause controversy that does not enhance a person's future political chances. A governor who uses public appeals then risks legislative anger, loss of future policies, loss of political status, and loss of physical well being. He must calculate whether a particular policy is worth such risks. Evidently Andersen seldom took the risk. He could have capitalized on public appeals if he had wished to do so.

Most commentators regarded him as being personally skillful in using public relations. His office did use the standard tools. During the session there were daily press conferences with releases produced and distributed in advance. The office maintained a weekly newsletter. The governor appeared intermittently on radio and television. However, Andersen limited these tools to very special legislation such as civil rights and taconite. Other than this he consciously pursued an internal rather than a public appeals strategy. Undoubtedly his own personal philosophy prevented him from pressuring the legislature from the governor's chair.

The public route was probably never open for Governor Rolvaag. Although he works effectively in face to face situation, he does not produce a great impact over the mass media. Secondly, Stinnet and Backstrom comment that he failed to get sympathetic vibrations from the public. Most were opposed to him.<sup>17</sup> No governor assumed office with less public approval. Partly this was beyond his control. For example Senator Salmore felt that the internal party divisions, and Sandy Keith's political ambitions, killed the governor's public image. But Rolvaag himself admitted that unseemly public quarrels, such as that with Tax Commissioner Rolland Hatfield further hurt him. As a result Rolvaag simply used the public route very little. He did promote the mental health program this way, but even then the method was low key.

Governor Harold Levander utilized public appeals no more than his predecessor. But he began with fewer handicaps. He enjoyed majority approval upon assuming office. Physically, he

presents the personal appearance that Duane Lockard finds essential for governors in the age of television.<sup>18</sup> His background included extensive experience in forensics. Yet he could not translate these speaking skills to the public media and the political idiom.<sup>19</sup> One problem was that he had little experience as a political campaigner. And like Rolvaag, his favorable personal characteristics did not "come across" on television.<sup>20</sup> But the governor never really attempted to take the public route anyway. According to David Durenberger, he did not have the personal inclination. Also, there were not many major issues that would have benefitted from that tactic. Governor Levander himself stated that he consciously pursued an internal route. He put out gentle hints through the media. And he confessed that late in the 1969 session, with much of his program in committee and increasing pressure from the press, he considered making a public appeals "blast". But he believed that his original strategy paid more long range benefits. However effective this was with the legislature, he threw away what public support that he started with. He failed to project a leadership image. The resulting lack of approval certainly must have affected his decision not to seek re-election. In October 1969, looking back on his two sessions, Levander confessed that he had failed in the public relations department. He still believed that his approach was successful legislatively, but failure to dramatize this materially damaged his public credit.

#### Summary

Since the data is not complete for all governors, it is

difficult to rank them on the public appeals resource. This ranking should include at least three facets: 1) public approval 2) public relations skills and 3) public appeals use for program promotion. On the first dimension the governors would rate in the following order: Youngdahl, Anderson, (Thye?), Freeman, Andersen, Levander, and Rolvaag. On the second dimension the ordering would be: Youngdahl, Freeman, Andersen, Levander, (Anderson-Thye) and Rolvaag. And finally, based on the legislators' recollections, the ranking on use would be Youngdahl, Freeman, Rolvaag-Andersen, Anderson-Thye, and Levander. Clearly Luther Youngdahl stands out as the most effective in public relations. Orville Freeman follows just a little behind. Then there is a large gap. Elmer Andersen possessed the skills, but refused to use them. Karl Rolvaag lacked the skills but used them on occasion because he had no choice. No legislator or commentator mentioned either Thye or Anderson. Governor Levander's strategy positively hurt his public image.

## II Political Party Resources

Most political scientists would regard the governor's party role as the essence of his political leadership. One easily assumes that the state's chief executive also reigns as his party's chief. The governor's party resources may be thought of as falling into four types. He may use the patronage available to his office to trade for support both within the party organizational reprisals, or offer rewards, for legislators. Thirdly, as party campaign leader the governor appears to head the ticket. And his success may reflect on the legislator's campaign. Finally,

the governor may appeal directly to the loyalty of his fellow party members in the legislature and receive program support on that basis. The legislative group would be expected to cooperate in pushing the program through. Each of these four factors will be discussed in turn.

#### Political Patronage

The patronage power may be dismissed immediately. The reader may recall that when the appointment power was discussed in Chapter Five, it was pointed out that very few positions are available to the governor. Most positions are neither full time nor salaried. The last governor who enjoyed any extensive patronage potential was Harold Stassen.<sup>21</sup> But Stassen successfully established the extensive merit system that remains today. Since that time governors have possessed very marginal bargaining power with mainly honorary and interim judicial appointments at their disposal.

#### Party Organization

Most respondents dismissed organizational support almost as readily. In part this is a logical outcome of the non-partisan legislature.<sup>22</sup> Most legislators did not owe their seats to the party. None ran under a party label. Few received campaign support. This situation certainly existed up until the mid-1950's. It existed for the Conservative caucus up until the 1960's. And it still exists for many Conservatives today. People also dismiss party organization because the organizations often have not tried to exert an influence. In the pre-1954 period they were probably too weak to have a great impact (see Chapter 4). Finally, party

organizations were not always at the governor's disposal. Whatever their internal strength might have been, in examining this factor more closely one should first distinguish between the pre and post 1954 period. Secondly one should distinguish between the DFL and Republican governors.

In the 1940's and the early 1950's the dominant Republicans did not possess a strong party organization. The party organization was very loose and depended heavily on the governor's popularity.<sup>23</sup> The governor then could control what organization there was through personal loyalty. Harold Stassen demonstrated this position better than any other man. But Stassen did not actually function as a good party man. He circumvented the regular "old guard" organization to become governor.<sup>24</sup> And in effect he built a new personal liberal party. Governor Thye belonged to the Stassen wing. Stassen picked him for lieutenant governor in 1942. So Thye had good connections with one party wing, but one could hardly call him the party leader. There is no evidence that he ever used the party connection to put pressure on the legislature.

Youngdahl stepped into a rather awkward party situation.<sup>25</sup> He did not function as a party man either. He appealed directly to the people, over the party's head, and so alienated much of the regular party organization. An especially deep rift grew between him and the pre-Stassen "old guard". But he could not count on the liberals, who looked to Stassen, either. Still, he must have exercised some influence. P.K. Peterson related that he became state party chairman from 1949-1953 mainly on Youngdahl's

recommendation. And the governor actively shaped the party platform.<sup>26</sup> But probably this position stemmed from this immense popularity, not from his grasp on party machinery. A conversation with Youngdahl revealed his isolation from party organization. Yet at the same time it also revealed a certain ambivalence. He insisted on his "non-political" approach. He detested the party ward heelers who blocked direct contact with the people. But he wanted, and missed, party support. As governor he expected 100% party support for his program. And for him the non-partisan legislature became the greatest block to his effectiveness. Youngdahl believed, and still believes, that the non-partisan legislature should be abolished. He resented the fact that the party organization could exercise little influence in his favor under the non-partisan system.

Youngdahl's successor, C. Elmer Anderson, operated in a different situation. Originally he advanced within the Stassen Young Republican orbit. But after he was dumped from the lieutenant governor's spot in 1942, Anderson's ties to Stassen could not have been great. On the other hand his anti-Taft position alienated the old guard wing. Anderson's strength lay mainly in his effectiveness as a campaigner. He won five elections for lieutenant governor. In 1952 he defeated Freeman by a solid 55% majority. He received 70% of the primary vote in 1952 and was unopposed in the 1954 primary. Also, he was able to oust veteran national committeeman Roy Dunn in 1952 and replace him with a pro-Eisenhower man.<sup>27</sup> Still, one would hardly count Anderson as a dynamic powerful party leader. No one mentioned that he used

the party leverage in the legislature.

Orville Freeman's position with the DFL party contrasted markedly with the previous governors. Of all the governors Freeman possessed the greatest influence within the party organization. As one of the DFL founders Freeman was an established party leader.<sup>28</sup> He had been both party secretary and state party chairman. In 1950 Freeman ran for attorney general. And he acted as party standard bearer for governor in 1952 before winning in 1954. Opposition within the party appeared to be minimal. He faced some opposition in the 1952 primary. But it was the least opposition in DFL primaries up to that date. Backed by the party pre-endorsement, he faced only token primary opposition from 1954-1960. These strong party connections did not pay off directly in legislative benefits. Even though DFLers generally believe in responsible party government, the legislators do not welcome official party lobbying.<sup>29</sup> Thomas Flinn did observe some casual meetings between party and caucus leaders. And the party does possess some sanctions to back up its wishes. In extreme cases party leaders might swing some local party support away from a legislator. Sample ballots have been used increasingly in metropolitan areas. Labor endorsements also carry great weight in many districts. But Flinn did not believe that these sanctions were overwhelming.<sup>30</sup> Up through the 1950's local organizations were weak in the state as a whole. DFL legislators needn't campaign under the party label if they didn't want to. And party neglect was also at fault. Some legislators sought greater campaign help. But the party never placed great emphasis on this. Legislative

leaders assert independence, and some resentment, to this day because the party has never backed them fully.<sup>31</sup> But even though party sanctions and rewards were not great, Freeman surely had more at his disposal than any Republican governor.

Potentially Karl Rolvaag also should have been able to rely on the party organization. But he could not. Although Rolvaag had not been as influential as Freeman in the party, he also had served as party chairman. He faithfully ran for Congress in losing DFL causes. And beginning in 1955 he served as lieutenant governor for four consecutive terms. Only in 1954 did anyone seriously challenge him in a primary for lieutenant governor. He averaged 55% of the popular vote for lieutenant governor, consistently surpassing Freeman's margins in the gubernatorial races. Rolvaag's party troubles began when he sought the governorship. An influential party segment had favored Walter Mondale over Rolvaag in 1962.<sup>32</sup> Rolvaag's party relations worsened with the long recount in 1962-1963. The DFL leaders first contributed to the widening rift when they abandoned Rolvaag after the state supreme court declared Andersen the winner.<sup>33</sup> Personal supporters fought on to give Rolvaag the governorship. After 1963 Rolvaag's organizational contacts, previously very strong, steadily eroded.<sup>34</sup> This poor rapport was reflected in the Sugar Hills (July 1965) party executive meeting when no state party leader would speak in his behalf. Curiously, the governor's status with the party rank and file seemed to increase as it decreased among party activists.<sup>35</sup> The state party convention held on June 18-19, 1966 became the real turning point. The convention decision to dump the incumbent

governor shifted popular approval moderately, but significantly, away from Sany Keith and toward Rolvaag. Rolvaag went on to win the primary. Nevertheless, his 68% of the primary vote was the lowest since Youngdahl's margins back in 1946 and 1948. No other winning gubernatorial candidate has done so poorly. So the point is, Rolvaag did not draw

Table VI-6  
DFL Approval of Karl Rolvaag and Sandy Keith

	Rolvaag		Keith	
	June 3-8 1966	July 8-12 1966	June 3-8 1966	July 8-12 1966
Strong Approval	14% 41%	22% 50%	15% 46%	10% 39%
Mild Approval	27%	28%	31%	29%
Neutral	21%	18%	25%	26%
Mild Disapproval	23% 38%	24% 32%	22% 29%	19% 35%
Strong Disapproval	15%	8%	7%	16%

Source: The Minnesota Poll

upon the party as Freeman did. Perhaps organizational support would not have promoted legislative success anyway. Governor Rolvaag claimed that the party should have been an extension of his personal staff, but it was not. Although party people were invited to DFL caucus meetings, they did not attend. Even on legislative items critical to the, such as reapportionment, they failed to lobby. But Freeman at least enjoyed some support along these lines. Rolvaag failed to elicit even the marginal leverage that should have been his as a DFLer.

Since 1955 the Republican party organization has not put on great lobbying efforts for its governors either.<sup>36</sup> For one reason, conservative legislators have always been more resistant to party ties than have DFLers. Governor Levander did benefit more from party ties than Governor Andersen did. David Durenberger

said that George Thiss (state chairman) and Jerry Skovold from the party organization served the governor. Their primary role was to furnish the governor with larger staff services to gather information. But, Durenberger pointed out that no occasion arose where the governor really needed direct party lobbying. Levander also benefitted from the increased party recruitment of legislators that began in 1962. Youngdahl and Bernhard Levander (then state party chairman) had urged such activity before 1950. And party participation grew slowly from that time. But there had been no large scale effective effort until 1962. And then the driving influence came more from Young Republicans than the regular organization. One should not over-emphasize the impact of this campaign help. Not all legislators who receive help respond to the party line. But it did create a large pool of Conservatives who were inclined to help the governor.

Neither Levander or Elmer Andersen could be termed the party leader. Elmer Andersen worked for the party for years, but he never held high party office. By the time he ran for governor the Republican party had been built into a moderately strong organization. Under the strong pre-endorsement system Andersen faced primary competition neither in 1960 nor in 1962. But his campaign successes were not overwhelming. And he did not receive unanimous support among party officials. Essentially a liberal with support in the Twin Cities, he lost rural conservative party leaders during his administration. But this was not serious enough to divide the party openly. And Andersen's standing among the rank and file remained fairly high. The 1961 session marked his low

point with 50% approval in June. (Minnesota Poll) But this climbed to 67% approval in October, and remained there long after he left office. Harold Levander did not have Andersen's campaign experience. He had worked for the party since Harold Stassen's time. He also knew Youngdahl and had ties to the party organization through his brother, Bernhard Levander. But he had to fight much harder than Andersen for the nomination. He received endorsement only after a tough convention contest against John S. Pillsbury, Elmer Andersen, and William Randall. Pillsbury, a favorite in Hennepin County, led through the first ten convention ballots. Levander, backed more by rural southern conservatives, won on the 16th ballot after an agreement lowered the necessary winning percentage to 55%.<sup>37</sup> Levander was less known to the rank and file than Andersen, who had been a pre-convention popular favorite.<sup>38</sup> But he picked up partisan approval after the convention. That popularity remained fairly high until after the 1969 legislative session. Then by October 1969 he dropped to less than 50%.<sup>39</sup> Levander then was not a party leader. And his partisan support did not remain as consistently as high as Andersen's. In spite of this party leaders appeared disposed to go along with the governor for the 1970 election. The organization probably calculated that nothing was worth an internal party battle. They appeared genuinely shocked when the governor removed himself from contention on January 26, 1970.

In conclusion only Orville Freeman could be designated a strong party leader. He maintained support both within the party and among party identifiers. Governor Youngdahl developed a good

personal apparatus, and maintained high popular support, but he could not count on a weak, factionalized party. Governors Andersen and Levander worked within a well organized party, but neither could be called the party leader. Andersen was probably somewhat stronger than Levander as he drew on greater political experience and higher partisan approval. Thye and C. Elmer Anderson possessed some party leverage. Anderson exercised this a little more although neither acted as leader. The Republican party at that time was not a tightly knit group. Karl Rolvaag probably suffered from the worst party relations of any governor. But in any case the party organization, facing a non-partisan legislature, was not an effective liasion-lobbying tool for any governor.

#### Election Success

One piece of political folklore contends that the legislature will respond more readily to a chief executive who carries a large electoral majority than one who produces a small margin. For fellow partisans a popular governor can mean an easier campaign. This feature applies very little to Minnesota. Formal non-partisanship for legislators provides effective insulation. However, a large electoral margin may be an alternative means for measuring public popularity. Legislators might hesitate to cross a governor with wide public support. This applies with special force when a governor carries the legislator's own district. By the same reasoning a legislator need pay less attention to a governor who does poorly in the district.

Objectively speaking few Minnesota governors could claim a

great popular mandate (see Table VI-7). No governor carried more than 62% of the vote. Over half received less than 55%. In order of popularity the governors would be Thye, Youngdahl, Anderson, Freeman, Levander, Andersen, and Rolvaag.

Table VI-7  
Percentage of Two Party Vote for Minnesota Governors, 1911-1966

Governor	Year	Governor % of Two Party Vote
Thye	1911	62%
Youngdahl	1950	61.3%
Youngdahl	1946	59.8%
Freeman	1958	57.3%
Anderson	1952	55.7%
Youngdahl	1948	54.1%
Freeman	1954	53%
Levander	1966	52.8%
Freeman	1956	51.6%
Andersen	1960	50.7%
Rolvaag	1962	50.003%

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-1970, pp. 407-8

Even though Minnesota governors have not generally pulled an overwhelming popular votes, they have carried legislative districts. No governor has failed to

Table VI-8  
Number of Legislators Whose District was Carried by the Governor,  
1945 to 1969

Year	House			Senate		
	Total Legislators	Cons.	DFL	Total Legislators	Cons.	DFL
1945	95 - 36	90 - 17	5 - 19	52 - 15	48 - 9	4 - 6
1947	98 - 33	90 - 15	8 - 18	<sup>2</sup> 52 - 15	46 - 9	4 - 6
1949	92 - 39	71 - 15	21 - 24	48 - 19	45 - 12	3 - 7
1951	106 - 25	82 - 5	24 - 20	55 - 12	45 - 6	10 - 6
1953	86 - 35	76 - 9	20 - 26	49 - 18	41 - 11	8 - 7
1955	73 - 58	19 - 46	54 - 12	39 - 28	24 - 24	15 - 4
1957	69 - 62	11 - 50	58 - 12	36 - 31	22 - 26	14 - 5
1959	91 - 40	24 - 35	67 - 5	50 - 17	27 - 16	23 - 1
1961	74 - 57	49 - 9	25 - 48	40 - 27	35 - 8	5 - 19
1963	68 - 67 <sup>3</sup>	44 - 56	44 - 10	11 - 35	11 - 32	21 - 3
1965	68 - 67	23 - 57	45 - 10	32 - 35	11 - 32	21 - 3
1967	87 - 48	74 - 19	13 - 29	43 - 24	36 - 9	7 - 15
1969	87 - 48	68 - 17	19 - 31	43 - 24	36 - 8	7 - 18

1. In each case the first column represents the number of districts carried by the governor. The second column represents the number of districts lost.
2. Includes two independents.
3. Includes one independent.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1970

carry a majority of districts containing a majority of House members. Rolvaag came the closest to failing. Every governor also carried a majority of those districts with caucus members whose philosophy was closest to their own party. But only Youngdahl had a majority in districts for both caucuses. Nearly the same situation exists for Senate districts. Rolvaag did fail to carry a majority of districts in 1962. But again the relationship between caucus and the governor's party generally holds. There were three exceptions. Youngdahl and C. Elmer Anderson had a majority of the opposing caucus in 1951 and 1953. Freeman managed the same feat in 1959. If legislators really followed the governor's election success, one would expect the governors to be

effective in the following order: Youngdahl, Thye-Anderson, Levander, Freeman, Andersen, and Rolvaag. Again assuming that legislators respond to gubernatorial success in their own district, the following should have support from the opposing caucus in the House: Youngdahl (1949-1951), Freeman (1959), Anderson, and Andersen. In the Senate the following enjoyed considerable success in opposing caucus districts: Youngdahl, Anderson, and Freeman. This is not the place to test such speculations. We will specifically follow up on this in Chapter Ten.

#### Caucus Support

In the course of studying reorganization in Minnesota, Klaus Herrmann concluded that whatever legislative influence the governor had, it certainly did not depend on party loyalty. The formal non-partisanship created a situation similar to a one party state. The situation definitely harmed gubernatorial leadership.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand Thomas Flinn concludes that: "The one method of controlling legislative response to executive programs which was effective was used by the governor of his position as leader of his party".<sup>41</sup> This apparent contradiction only reveals that one must make some careful distinctions when examining the relationship between governor and caucus. Elements to distinguish include Conservative v. DFL, Senate v. House, older v. newer legislators, rural v. urban, and past v. the present. In each case the first mentioned factor tends toward a non-partisan or anti-party.

Conversations with legislators revealed that nearly 60% perceived a strong partisan element in the governor-caucus

relationship. The rest were divided between qualified and negative responses. Most often the latter came from Conservatives. DFL legislators (generally called Liberals up until the 1960's) have always responded more to the party affiliation. The DFL would get behind the governor as a caucus and a party matter. Party loyalty was simply understood on the DFL side.<sup>42</sup> This affinity is not based on external organizational efforts, however. But both governor and caucus shared a common symbolic identity. And they shared a similar philosophical outlook on critical political problems. Up until the last eight years a majority of Conservative legislators have never shared that common feeling with Republican governors. A few always did. And Republican governors have always attempted to make partisan appeals. But they could not push too hard with much success.

The Senate has always resisted partisan appeals more than the House. For one thing more House Conservatives have been active party people. Also, the DFL did control the House for four sessions, and its party inclinations sharpened the division. The prevailing philosophy among veteran Conservative Senators always favored strong institutional independence. But DFL Senators were party oriented almost as much as the House. Senator Salmore attributed this to caucus weakness. As the hopeless minority they sought help from any quarter. The Conservative Senators never needed any help.

Recently, the foregoing patterns changed somewhat. Since 1963, and especially since 1967, an increasing number of younger, party oriented Conservatives entered both the Senate and the House.

Most are from the metropolitan areas. Senator Dosland claimed that he had noticed this trend since 1959. He attributed it to reapportionment and more vigorous campaign activity by the Republican party.<sup>43</sup> So now the governors can make increasingly open party appeals. There are more legislators to appear to. In discussing individual governors then a distinction will be made between the pre and post 1954 era. But more important will be the distinction between Republican and DFL governors. This distinction applies with even more force to the caucus relationship than it did to the organizational connection.

Thye, Youngdahl, and Anderson operated with virtually no caucus support. One should remember that they functioned in a situation that would be designated modified one party were party labels used. Thye and Anderson seldom attempted direct appeal of any kind. Youngdahl, although elected with great independent support, did attempt pressure on a party basis, and so ran into trouble.<sup>44</sup> The legislative leaders regarded Youngdahl's actions as a breach of decorum. Veteran Senators believed him to be domineering. Actually Youngdahl's relations with the caucuses were partially reversed from what would be expected. Especially in 1949 and 1951 the Conservatives were cool or hostile to his program.<sup>45</sup> The governor came across as being far more liberal than the Conservative caucus could swallow. As a result Youngdahl came to rely on a shifting coalition of party oriented Conservatives, some liberally oriented Conservative caucus members, and the DFL caucus. Often the DFL caucus gave him greater support than did the Conservatives. No wonder Youngdahl could say that the non-

partisan legislature was his greatest obstacle to program success. Elmer L. Andersen encountered a similar, but more frustrating situation. By then the DFL caucus controlled the House. The Conservative Senate largely opposed his program on philosophical grounds. He complained "One house was against me and the other I couldn't count on."<sup>46</sup> Andersen mentioned wistfully that at least a DFL governor could work through the DFL caucus for his program. He had to work on an individual basis building ad hoc coalitions for different pieces of legislation. This coalition usually consisted of some friendly Conservatives and the DFL caucus.

Orville Freeman experienced a totally different situation. The DFL caucus, with a House majority, strongly backed his major initiatives. Thomas Flinn summed it up this way. The DFL caucus shared a common allegiance to party responsibility. And Governor Freeman measured up to their image of liberalism and competence.<sup>47</sup> So Freeman appealed for caucus support on all of his major items. And Freeman enjoyed a privilege that no Republican governor could have gotten away with. The caucus leaders acted as an inner circle. They met with the governor regularly. On particular issues they would seek a sense of the caucus, and then exert pressure on a party basis if the division was close. When the issue was especially close the Governor might appear before the whole caucus to plead his case. This caucus connection weakened slightly as the administration wore on and tensions gradually developed. On the other hand Freeman found that the Senate was impossible to work with. Other Minnesota governors were fortunate

in that they did not have to face a determined majority opposition.<sup>48</sup>

Karl Rolvaag enjoyed much the same supportive relationship with the DFL caucus.<sup>49</sup> His poor party relations did not extend to the caucus to the same degree. Rolvaag gratefully acknowledged the assistance received from caucus leaders in both houses. He met with both them and the entire caucus, although less frequently than Freeman had. Paul Thuet and Fred Cina maintained good caucus discipline. More sources for friction arose than under the Freeman administration, however. Conservatives controlled both houses. Rolvaag had felt that he must work with Conservative leaders, especially in the Senate. He seemingly developed very good relations with them. In fact most Conservatives rated Rolvaag a much better governor than either the public or the DFL party gave him credit for. But this closeness promoted increasing friction with the DFL caucus. DFLers, especially minority leader Thuet, working on a bill were frequently embarrassed because Gordon Rosenmeier, or another Conservative Senator, would know the governor's position better than they did. The real break came between the 1965 session and the 1966 special session. Reapportionment caused the blowup.<sup>50</sup> The DFL legislators were determined not to allow a law that would give advantage to the Conservatives. Although in the minority, they counted on the governor's veto. Rolvaag did veto a reapportionment bill during the regular session. So Conservatives demanded a special session to resolve the question. DFL floor leaders, Thuet and Cina, urged the governor not to call such a session without prior agreement on a completely

acceptable bill. A group of Conservatives, headed by Senator Rosenmeier, brought a court suit to force a session. Rolvaag met with DFL legislators, who still urged him to hold out. The governor felt that a court suit against him was not in keeping with the dignity of the office. Legally he felt that he had no choice but to see that reapportionment was accomplished. One day Senator Norman Walz (DFL) was attending an interim committee session. He noticed a workman repainting the men's rest room. The workman informed him that the painting was being done preparatory to the upcoming special session. Angered, Walz called Thuet and demanded why the "rural boys" weren't kept informed. Thuet knew nothing about the session either. He called Rolvaag and exchanged angry words on the matter. Later, they exchanged insults publicly. Thuet announced that he would do nothing on the reapportionment bill during the session. Later he and the governor worked out a truce for the special session. But DFL legislators remained bitter towards Rolvaag.

Governor Levander occupied a position not available to any other Republican governor. The Conservatives held a two-thirds majority in the Senate both sessions, and in the House in 1967. For the first time a large proportion of the newer Conservatives in both houses acknowledged a party connection. This support was stronger in the House, but Majority Leader Holmquist helped in the Senate. Some legislators sat in on the Republican party policy task forces. Also, non-party oriented Conservatives shared many policy ideas with the governor. A committee of thirty representatives, not all party men, publicly supported Levander in

the 1966 campaign. In a sense they ran on the same platform. Unlike Andersen and Youngdahl, Levander never had to work with the DFL caucus. But unlike Freeman and Rolvaag, the party appeal was not made so directly. According to Representative Robert Renner (C-1957-1970) Levander merely indicated what his program was, and intimated that it was in their mutual interest to pass it. He never appeared before the caucus. The leaders never put on the pressure for him. With such a large caucus majority they didn't have to. Still, he could rely on built in support within the caucus framework.

#### Summary

Formal legislative non-partisanship certainly has blunted, but not destroyed, the Minnesota governor's party resources. At the least he can get some leverage based on popular electoral support. This is especially true if the governor is popular within the legislator's district. In this regard Thye, Youngdahl, and Anderson had the greatest advantage. Orville Freeman and Harold Levander occupy a middle position. Andersen and Rolvaag were weakest. Non-partisanship largely restricted the party organization's role. However, most Minnesota governors, except Freeman, have not been top party leaders anyway. Under weak competitive conditions the parties were not even strongly organized up until the 1950's. Whatever, the party organizational state, they simply did not enter into the legislative process. The most important party resource is the caucus connection. DFL governors Freeman and Rolvaag, too a lesser extent, benefitted from the DFL's strong partisan orientation. Youngdahl, Anderson, Thye, and Andersen

had to develop their own support. With increasing party orientation among Conservatives since 1963 Harold Levander had more leverage than other Republican governors. But he still ranked behind Freeman and Rolvaag in this respect.

### III Personal Resources

By personal resources is meant those strengths, and weaknesses, brought to the office by the individual. These depend neither on constitution, nor on statute, nor on party. One should know about a persons occupational career and other life experiences that may have prepared him for the governorship. One should also examine the man's personal philosophy about what the governor should do, and how he should do it. Since his success may depend not on his own expectations, but on what others expect of him, comparisons should be made between the governor's philosophy and that of the legislature and the public. Finally, the governor may introduce personal techniques for handling the legislature. Again, these techniques do not depend on statute or caucus affiliation, but on the governor's own initiative.

#### Career Experiences

In a sense every Minnesota governor must be treated as an individual. None developed in exactly the same way. Yet if one believes that background does influence actions in office, he must search for career patterns to compare with success patterns in office. Recent governors do demonstrate some common traits. All have a Norwegian-Swedish background, thus perpetuating the myth of Minnesota as a Scandinavian state. At least politicians appear to feel that a Scandinavian surname is essential to

campaign success. All but one have been lawyers or businessmen. Strangely, few were major party officers. All had been active in political campaigns before achieving the governorship, but only two held top party office. Most reached middle age before attaining office. Freeman was the youngest at 37, and Levander the oldest at 57. This seems natural as one must probably have considerable

Table VI-9  
 Career Experience, Minnesota Governors, 1945-1970

Governor	Age	Party	Ancestry	Occupation	Party Office	Public Office
Edward J. Thye	47	GOP	Norwegian	Farmer	None (active)	Township Board School Board (10 yrs) Asst. Comm. of Agriculture (4 yrs) Lt. Gov. (2 yrs)
Luther W. Youngdahl	51	GOP	Swedish	Lawyer	None (active)	Asst. city Atty. (3 yrs) municipal judge (6 yrs) dist. jg. (6 yrs) sup. ct. (4 yrs) Lt. Gov. (12 yrs)
C. Elmer Anderson	39	GOP	Swedish	Small business	None (active)	Lt. Gov. (12 yrs)
Orville Freeman	37	DFL	Norwegian-Swedish-English	Lawyer	State secretary State chairman	admin. asst. to mayor of Minneapolis (5 yrs)
Elmer L. Andersen	52	GOP	Swedish-Norwegian	Business executive	None (active)	St. Sen. (10 yrs)
Karl F. Rolvaag	50	DFL	Norwegian	Insurance executive	State chairman	Lt. Gov. (10 yrs)
Harold W. Levander	57	GOP	Swedish	Lawyer	None (active)	Asst. Co. Atty. (2 1/2 yrs)

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

experience before reaching high political office. Most put in at least a moderate amount of time in other public office. The average appears to be about ten years. Levander had the least experience with  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years as assistant Dakota County Attorney. Youngdahl offered the greatest experience with almost twenty years in various law enforcement positions. The quality of the previous experience offers something of a surprise. Joseph Schiesinger has done considerable work on gubernatorial careers. For the period 1914-1958 he found that most Minnesota governors had great prior experience in the state legislature, although the state followed no one career pattern.<sup>51</sup> During the current period only one governor, Elmer L. Andersen, could claim such experience. Compared to all states, Minnesota underplayed legislative and law enforcement experience in its governors. It overemphasized administrative and state-wide elective office.<sup>52</sup> There appears to be no real route to the governorship. The lieutenant governorship stands as the most common prior office. Thye, Anderson, and Rolvaag advanced this way. The second is local administrative positions. Freeman served five years as administrative assistant to Hubert Humphrey when the latter was mayor of Minneapolis. Levander held a county attorney position. Minnesota governors offer a curious lack of variety in their individual public backgrounds. Five held only one office prior to the governorship. Freeman and Rolvaag somewhat compensated for this by their party offices. Three governors were lawyers by profession. But considering the predominance of lawyers in U.S. politics, this proportion is not overwhelming. Overall it appears that recent

governors have not possessed the scope of public, party, and professional background that one might expect. This lack of preparation might not fully acclimate them to the policy-making process within which they had to operate as governor. Especially notable in this regard is the lack of legislative experience. One hesitates to argue that the last is essential, however. Few legislators felt that Elmer L. Andersen had been effective.

#### Personal Philosophy

The best way to evaluate a governor's personal philosophy is to compare that philosophy to what is expected of him. One pertinent audience is the public. Unfortunately no one really has a clear idea as to what these expectations are. Youngdahl bluntly replied that such a question is naive. He didn't feel that the public really forms any clear ideas about the governor's role. Orville Freeman expressed puzzlement over the question. He really didn't know what the public expected. There is one objective indicator, although it cannot be projected through the entire period. In April 1970 the Minnesota Poll specifically asked for the public expectations about the governor (See Table VI-10). This poll is not an ideal measurement. It was not open ended, so this is a forced choice measurement of popular opinion. Also, it does not offer some logical alternatives, such as being an able administrator. However, even within these limitations two things appear to be notable. Few persons refused to offer an opinion. Secondly, the legislative relationship dominates the popular view. It even ranks substantially above his role with the public. The low evaluation of previous experience and party

loyalty accords fairly well with the actual situation

Table VI-10

"For each of the following, tell me whether you think it is very important, fairly important, or not too important that the governor have this qualification."

	Is able to work with the state legislature	Follows the will of the people	Has a college education	Held some previous elective office	Be a loyal member of his political party
Very	87%	72%	64%	14%	40%
Fairly	11	22	22	29	29
Not Too	1	5	13	26	30
No Opinion	1	1	1	1	1
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

for recent governors. But the expectation of great facility with the legislature does not. It is not clear that the electorate has held this position for some time. However, more governors in the past played this role. Certainly Theodore Christianson (1925-1930), Floyd B. Olson (1931-1936), and Harold Stassen (1939-1943) effectively pursued this line. Perhaps they helped mold public expectations. In recent times only Luther Youngdahl and Orville Freeman performed in this fashion. Some observers agreed that the press has also fostered an expectation for a legislatively active governor. For example Governor Rolvaag, Representative Renner, and Representative Yetka felt that this was so.<sup>53</sup> But all three agreed that this was a false expectation. The Minnesota governor simply does not possess the full range of resources to effectively pull off this role. It may be that this discrepancy has contributed to the unpopularity of recent governors. Finally, academic observers on the Minnesota

scene have voiced similar expectations of legislative leadership, and have chastised governors for not living up to them. For example Charles Adrian concluded that the governor will accomplish a less systematic program if he does not fully assert himself. Since partisan ties are absent, there is no substitute for great personal diplomatic skill and effort.<sup>54</sup> In other words this position favors the "hard line" approach to legislative-executive relations that was discussed in Chapter Two.

Most legislators adopt quite a different view. Their expectations lie closer to the "soft line" approach. But not all hold that position. Representative Renner insisted that the governor must lead and give energy to the government. Representative Lawrence Yetka went further. Because of party weakness, non-partisanship, and the prevailing legislative belief in its own supremacy, the governor must be personally strong-willed and active, or he will get nothing at all. He concluded that most governors do not do this. The legislature runs government in Minnesota because the governor is weak legally, politically, and personally. Senator Paul Thuet added that the non-assertive governors have progressively limited their successors. The legislature, especially the Senate, eagerly fills the power vacuum. These men agreed that the legislature would resist an assertive governor. Yetka believed that this applies to both caucuses. The DFL applies to both caucuses. The DFL accepts gubernatorial initiatives more readily, but in the end both view the governor as an institutional enemy. But these men also believed that in the end assertiveness pays off even if it does arouse legislative

wrath.

The position just outlined must be seen as a minority position. First, most legislators defended the efficacy of strict separation. Some senior Senators virtually developed this idea into a religious tent.<sup>55</sup> Senator Walter J. Franz (C- 1955-1970) explained it this way. The three constitutionally distinct branches should operate separately. The governor should be primarily an administrator, not a decision-maker. Most who hold this position insist that a hard driving governor harms his program more than he helps. Senator Val Imm believed that personal persuasion works, dictation does not. Eugene Knudsen agreed. The governor should not antagonize the legislature but work on a personal level. The three key elements to a successful relationship are persuasion, personality, and knowledge of the legislative process. Representative John Hartle (C- 1935-1968) contended that the proper approach was to work closely with the legislators, promoting communication and developing a cooperative attitude. The personality factor is a more elusive concept. Some men can control situations others cannot. Primarily, legislators seek an attitude that does not insist too stubbornly that only one particular way is right. It is not quite fair to say that this legislative view resents all assertive governors. A number of senior Conservative representatives referred to Harold Stassen with great fondness.<sup>56</sup> Certainly Stassen behaved as a dynamic, hard driving, exciting governor. But he knew how to approach legislators privately also. He assiduously cultivated personal contacts and became "one of the boys". Some Conserva-

tives dropped away from him later in his administration when they felt that his political ambitions overrode his legislative considerations. Representative E.J. Chilgren (DFL- 1927-1964) summed up the feelings of all. The biggest problem has been that far too many governors have been inexperienced, both in politics generally and in the legislative process. Almost all legislators, both "hard line" and "soft line", concluded that no recent Minnesota governor really affected the legislative process greatly.<sup>57</sup>

Considering that no governor since 1945 has really impressed the legislators, how do they rank the governors for their philosophy and approach? To assess this each legislator was asked to evaluate the governors with whom they had served.<sup>58</sup> Since relatively few legislators were willing to make an assessment, one must view the results with caution. Also, a positive or negative assessment does not mean the same thing for all legislators. For some a positive assessment meant that the governor was dynamic and strong. For others it meant that he operated cooperatively and was well liked. For all it meant that the governor's philosophy and approach helped to achieve his program. Clearly Orville Freeman was regarded as the strongest and most effective governor by the legislators interviewed. Youngdahl ranked close behind. Clearly also, C. Elmer Anderson and Elmer L. Andersen were regarded as least effective in their personal approach. Thye, Levander, and Rolvaag ended up somewhere in the middle. DFLers were much more prone than Conservatives to react in a strong positive or negative way to each governor. They gave Youngdahl and Freeman high marks and rather discounted the rest.

The Conservatives seemed to rank less activist governors higher. They put Freeman first, but Levander, Thye, Rolvaag, and Andersen all stood higher than Youngdahl.

The most common adjectives applied to Freeman, by friend and foe alike, were strong, able, effective, and dynamic. Freeman spoke of his approach in similar terms. According to him this operating philosophy stemmed mainly from his strong orientation toward programmatic reform.<sup>59</sup> Freeman did not profess to know what actual public expectations were for his performance. But he simply assumed that the electorate operated on a mandate basis. He presented a detailed program in the campaign and assumed that his election meant programmatic approval. His tough legislative tactics became a means to carry out the higher end of economic and social reform. DFLers especially appreciated this approach. Even Conservatives attested to his ability in carrying it out. But the tough approach was not always cordially received. Freeman created enemies. Conservative Senators especially resented his "arm-twisting" tactics. Rather than persuade, he would call people into his office and lay down the law.<sup>60</sup> Even DFLers commented upon his hot temper and overly aggressive attitudes. They believed that he did not entirely understand the legislative process. As an example Representative Yetka mentioned the negotiations over unemployment compensation during the 1958 special session. Freeman called the session to extend unemployment benefits during the recession. But Conservative and DFL legislators agreed that the entire unemployment statute needed revision. When the revisions came into conference committee

they made great progress. Then during one meeting a knock came at the door. Senator Donald Wright answered and with a great flourish announced that Mr. Thomas Hughes, Freeman's popular executive secretary, wished to see Mr. Yetka. Yetka demanded to know what the governor wanted. It turned out that the governor wanted to know what was going on. He wanted the session to end soon so he could move into the election campaign. Yetka went back to the meeting, but negotiations broke up. The governor had broken the sanctity of secret conference meetings that both caucuses honored. The Conservatives declined to continue under the circumstances. Freeman's "hard line" approach elicited general respect then. But his insensitivity to legislative sensibilities hampered his effectiveness.

Luther Youngdahl elicited much the same reaction. He too appeared as a very strong dynamic temperament. If anything he possessed greater personal magnetism and popular appeal than did Freeman. He emphasized the governor's programmatic role. This too, extended beyond Freeman's position. No one referred to Freeman's crusading and moralistic zeal. He did not so absolutely appear as a champion of the people. Yet one could hardly avoid applying these terms to Youngdahl.<sup>61</sup> Youngdahl himself did not believe that the public harbored any particular expectations for the governor. He knew what they should expect. They should expect courage, honesty, far-sightedness, and a non-partisan approach. The governor has an obligation to push strongly for the solution of a few outstanding problems. Again, DFLers appreciated the substance of this approach. Most Conservatives

did not. Philosophically, he was too liberal. But they did not accept his operational methods either. Youngdahl acted even more aggressively than did Freeman. Adjectives frequently applied to him include abrasive, strong-headed, uncooperative, and discourteous. The governor severely criticized committee chairmen who had his bills. He refused to listen to their attempts at explaining why progress was slow. Finally, legislators reacted negatively to Youngdahl's crusading zeal. The governor genuinely believed in the moral rightness of his position. This made any opposition morally intolerable. Opponents must be evil and corrupt. Legislators do not relish being pictured in these terms. As a result many painted him as a publicity seeking phony.

In some respects Governor Karl Rolvaag does not really fall within the "soft line" category. He possessed strong programmatic convictions. He vigorously wielded his formal powers, especially the veto, to achieve liberal ends. But he did not push these programs in a vigorous public manner. Rolvaag believed that he thoroughly knew the legislative process. His party's minority position further tempered his approach. Basically, though, he believed that the soft sell was most effective. As a result Conservatives reacted more favorably to his tactics than did DFLers. The latter were disappointed that he did not fight harder for legislation. Many felt that he gave away too much before bargaining. This weakened their own position. Perhaps they expected too much gain from a minority political position. Senator Dunlap best summed up the Conservative position. The governor was quietly and personally effective.

He knew the process. Most importantly, Rolvaag did not act in an abrasive manner. He would call a conference with his legislative opponents, and then at least listen to attempts to persuade him.

Perhaps Levander too would not accept his classification as being completely a soft approach. Certainly he developed an extensive program, especially in 1967, and implied that he would like to see it pass. But according to the governor he consciously adopted a soft sell tactical approach. He worked hard at program development. The quiet way most effectively put it across. Conservative respondents, especially House members, agreed. This soft sell was enhanced because the governor deliberately sought out legislative desires in advance. Legislators willingly went along on a program that already reflected a consensus. A DFLer, Senator Jack Davies (1959) agreed that Levander was effective. But his evaluation came out as sort of a back-handed compliment. According to him Levander unconsciously assumed the best possible approach for the time. Problems were intense and the legislature was ready to do good things. Given its head it did so.<sup>62</sup> Others were not so charitable. Predictably, DFLers who accepted the hard line approach saw Levander as a weak and ineffectual governor. He was a neophyte who dealt with legislative neophytes. An inability to make decisions made the governor appear to be a vacillator.

Governors Thye and Anderson definitely fit the soft line category. Thye was much more effective in this regard. Charles Adrian pronounced a low assessment of Thye. According to him

Thye did not possess the personality to achieve influence. He really made no attempt to be a policy leader. But these very traits endeared him to the veteran legislators.<sup>63</sup> Legislative respondents accepted this evaluation. Representative Larry Haeg (C- 1941-1954) remembered Thye as a man of limited capacity who needed a great deal of help. Others agreed that the governor was poorly prepared by education or political experience for the office. He was neither strong nor aggressive in his legislative contacts. But in his way Thye could also be characterized as being right for his time. Because legislators also agreed on his many good qualities. The governor's blunt, honest, and open manner did not grate as Youngdahls did. Senator Gerald Mullin (C- 1931-1958) praised Thye's ability to operate in a natural way that prompted people to say yes to his requests. Representative Roy Dunn (C- 1935-1966) found him modest and easy to work with. Representative Haeg developed a close personal friendship with governor and found him fun to work with. In all Senator Val Imm accurately reflected the "old timers" sentiments when he said that Thye was the most personally popular of the governors. Governor C. Elmer Anderson, operating with much the same limitations, received few such compliments. Representative Haeg rendered the most favorable evaluation when he said that in a quiet way Anderson got more done than he is given credit for. Anderson did have the reputation for being a good strong parliamentarian. From 11 years in the presiding officer's chair he developed close ties with the Senate "in group". Almost all agreed that the governor was an honest, friendly guy well liked

by all. He respected the legislators and they enjoyed open, easy access to him. However, almost all also agreed that he lacked ability. He was not "heavy". Anderson was not a good speaker, and was so quiet as to be termed retiring and shy. He never attempted forceful leadership on a program. Senator Dunlap felt that the governor was not much in evidence during the session. One veteran DFLer flatly said that no one paid any attention to the governor. Representative Roy Dunn concluded that Anderson was a "square peg in a round hole". He was a weak leader and a weak man.<sup>64</sup>

No governor expressed his basic personal philosophy more articulately and fully than Elmer L. Andersen.<sup>65</sup> For no other governor can such a direct relationship between belief and action be found. Andersen believed as deeply in the governor's programmatic responsibility as did Freeman and Youngdahl. He further believed that the essence of gubernatorial leadership is to arouse the public to an awareness of the most pressing needs. However, no governor could claim sole responsibility for this role. This emphasis on sharing responsibility undoubtedly stemmed from the governor's long legislative experience. Considering Andersen's programmatic differences with Conservative Senate leaders, it is surprising how thoroughly he internalized their operational philosophy. Even after he became governor, Andersen retained a legislative rather than an executive cast of mind. He still had a deep respect for the legislative process, and the independence of the body. This respect was reinforced by a classical view of U.S. government. Andersen fully accepts the need for a balance

and division of powers. He fully opposes executive dictatorship over the legislative process. Besides the belief in legislative independence, Andersen placed great faith in rational decision-making. Decisions should be by rational discourse and persuasion, not by force and bullying. Finally, he maintained a very strong sensitivity to the needs of those who most strenuously oppose his own policy beliefs. In sum, Andersen refused to use certain means to achieve cherished policy desires. He refused the hard line approach. This stand made him appear a failure to those who favor a strong executive.

The Minnesota House of Representatives, controlled by the Liberals (DFL) during Andersen's term, gave him no comfort or consolation when he found that he had left too much to the discretion of the legislature. Andersen had misjudged the role which the Executive and the Legislature must play in the democratic set up of checks and balances. He tried to operate from the governor's chair much as he had worked from his seat in the state senate. He could not be as democratic as his natural inclinations and background urged him to be. This basic misunderstanding of the role of the governor in relationship to the Legislature was as much a cause of the quick recession of Andersen's aura of authority and of his acclaimed ability for leadership as any other fact.<sup>66</sup>

Stinnet and Backstrom concluded that the legislature will devour any governor who attempted to share decision power with it.

This precisely reflects the DFL legislators view of Governor Andersen. Senator Karl Grittner (DFL- 1959-1970) called him a "dud". He was weak and without influence. But the Conservatives did not defend Andersen either. Since he reflected their view on the proper gubernatorial role so closely, he should have expected their commendation. Most agreed that he was knowledgeable about the legislative process, and an able guy. But his

liberal leanings and personal clashes when a caucus member offended powerful Senators too deeply. They probably regarded him as no more a conservative than Youngdahl. Also, some doubted his ability to put his legislative knowledge into practice. Specifically they charged that one could not count on his word. He was too changeable and independent. In any case "hard liners" use Andersen as their primary example that the "soft line" approach won't work. The independent legislature doesn't like to be pressured, but they do grudgingly give in. When a governor does try to live up to their expectations, they ignore him.

A Minnesota governor faces a serious conflict between academic and popular expectations on one side, and legislative expectations on the other. The first prefer the "hard line" approach, the second the "soft line". Only two governors, Freeman and Youngdahl, fully pursued the assertive approach. The others, whether from personal limitations, personal inclinations, or both, followed the opposite approach. The legislators certainly rated the two assertive governors higher than the rest. Both caucuses downgraded C. Elmer Anderson and Elmer L. Andersen, who were not assertive. However, the Conservatives gave moderate approval to Thye, Rolvaag, and Levander. Also, neither Youngdahl nor Freeman fully carried off the hard line role. Their abrasive personalities offended most legislators to some degree. And Andersen's performance does not conclusively indicate which philosophy achieves greater results. If he had not alienated Conservatives by his liberal substantive ideas, he may have pulled off his

tactical philosophy more successfully. The effectiveness of these alternative philosophies will be left as an open question to be further explored in the chapter on program success.

#### Legislative Contacts

This section on personal resources will be concluded by briefly examining how the governors put their philosophy into practice. The possible methods for direct contacts are numerous. The governor might call members into his office individually or in small groups. Sometimes these are "get acquainted" or general contact meetings. More frequently the governor wishes to line up votes or work out accommodations on particular bills. Not all respondents felt that these contacts resulted in much substantive payoffs. No other technique is used as frequently as these informal personal meetings. However, governors may also regularly meet with special groups, such as the caucus leadership, the entire caucus, or committee personnel. Some governors prefer non-face to face contacts, such as phone calls and written messages. Some governors apparently felt that the quickest way to the legislator's vote was through his stomach. Anderson, Youngdahl, and Freeman utilized formal dinners. Freeman, Andersen, and Levander conducted weekly breakfast meetings. Finally, the governor could step directly into the legislative process. He could form his own legislative bloc (only Youngdahl did). He might also attempt to influence committee and leadership selection. Legislators would resent such action and it would backfire.

As would be expected from his approach to the governorship, Orville Freeman pushed direct legislative contacts more than any

governor. Formally, he met with DFL floor leaders and the House Speaker every Wednesday morning for breakfast meetings.<sup>67</sup> And he held informal conferences with them many other times. Chairmen also came in on important questions. Freeman extended his contacts beyond this leadership circle in several ways. He would meet with all House and Senate DFL committee members on issues such as taxation and education.<sup>68</sup> On one occasion he invited in all DFL caucus members to discuss the tax program. On other occasions he spoke directly to the caucus meetings. Unfortunately for the governor this close contact deteriorated over time, especially by 1959. DFL members felt that the governor drifted away from them. He held fewer meetings and relations began to breakdown. Freeman did not only seek out his own caucus. Since they held a majority, he deliberately attempted to seek out Senate Conservatives. Initially this was on a very informal social basis.<sup>69</sup> And the governor went directly to the Senate leadership. The principle confrontation came in a series of end of session meetings with the Senate leaders on tax problems. These Senate contacts seldom paid any dividends. After the governors electioneering attempts in 1958, senior Senators such as Rosenmeier, Wright, and Welch refused to have anything to do with him.

Governor Freeman used one other direct tactic. He directly influenced the internal DFL House leadership structure. He felt that this act tied in closely with his previous position as party chairman. He knew many DFL legislators and he was directly contacted on chairmanship appointments. As Representative Yetka

remembered it, he, Speaker A.I. Johnson, the party secretary, and the governor met early in 1955. Freeman suggested men whom he believed to be his friends. Johnson acknowledged that the governor tried to influence appointments, and the speaker tried to accommodate him if he could. Johnson felt that the governor had legitimate stake in party program success. The governor did not contact Speaker Chilgren so directly in 1959, but Chilgren was a loyal friend so direct contact probably was not necessary. D.D. Wozniak (DFL- 1951-1966), assistant majority leader, believed that the governor and external party played more of a veto role. They would step in and indicate who they didn't want.<sup>70</sup>

There are some spectacular examples of this gubernatorial influence. Freeman definitely wanted Chilgren as tax chairman in 1955. He also supported Sally Luther for the civil administration chairmanship in 1959.<sup>71</sup> The governor blocked the appointment of Peter Popovich as appropriations chairman in 1955 when others felt that he deserved it for his ability and committee seniority. However, real resentment grew up when the governor (and party) stepped in on the speakership fight in 1959. According to Representative Yetka, Majority Leader Fred Cina planned to become speaker when A.I. Johnson left the legislature in 1958. Wozniak then would step up to be majority leader. They felt that they had the positions sewn up. However, Yetka also wanted the speakership. But in seeking votes he found that he fell two short. With party backing he then lined up support for Chilgren. Freeman also favored Chilgren, and, directly or indirectly, indicated his preference to caucus members. Chilgren won and the

furiously Cina almost walked out of the caucus. He felt that the party had caused his defeat. And in fact party leaders, and the governor, trusted Chilgren's party loyalty more than Cinas or Wozniaks. The caucus prevailed upon Cina to stay on as floor leader. But obviously the relations between Cina's supporters and the governor were somewhat strained in 1959.

As the other activist governor, Luther Youngdahl also took a direct personal role in the legislative process. But Youngdahl lacked the direct caucus contacts to aid his efforts. And his initial attempts to develop such contacts were not too successful. He would call legislative leaders up to his office and lecture them on what they must do. He would call bill authors and committee chairmen in to demand explanations for delay.<sup>72</sup> Occasionally this was successful. For example in 1949 he convinced a group of legislative leaders, headed by Roy Dunn, to sponsor his tax package.<sup>73</sup> When the governor found that lecturing failed, he turned more to social contacts. He, like Freeman, held a series of dinners.<sup>74</sup> These were dropped as relations deteriorated. Youngdahl, although he frequently talked to individual legislators, concluded that these attempts at personal persuasion made little impact. From his point of view the legislators were too closely tied to special interests to respond favorably to gentle persuasion. By late 1949, and certainly in 1951, Youngdahl had informally built up a bloc of DFL and Conservative legislators who would support him.<sup>75</sup> These supporters were headed up by P.K. Peterson, Stanley Holmquist, and W.F. Rogosheske on the House side. Occasionally, other legislators would take up

bills on an individual basis. For example Carl Wegner (C) and A.O. Sletvold (C), judiciary committee chairmen in the House and Senate respectively, worked effectively for the youth conservation act.<sup>76</sup> However, Youngdahl's personal contacts were seldom as successful as Freeman's.

The governors with the soft sell approach used personal contacts far less than the two previous governors. C. Elmer Anderson approached contacts primarily from a social point of view. He kept up some semblance of the legislative dinners that Youngdahl had dropped. He also used to take legislators to such events as ball games and boxing matches. Karl Rolvaag followed Freeman's procedure to some extent, but on a reduced level. He did keep up regular breakfast meetings with the caucus leadership. He also appeared at caucus meetings a few times. However, he restricted himself mainly to personal meetings in his own office. And as already mentioned, he met far more with Senate Conservatives than Freeman did. Governor Andersen also used breakfast meetings, but more with the general Senate membership than exclusively with the leadership. This produced few policy payoffs. Senator Dunlap said that members attended and listened politely. But they went away without much change in position. Andersen used his open office contacts more for general contact than specific bill pressure. The governor could recall only two occasions on which he directly contacted the legislators on a specific bill. He insisted on a congressional apportionment compromise in the 1962 special session. And he sent a personal letter to Senate judiciary committee members to spring loose the

fair housing bill. By contrast Harold Levander pushed general personal contacts less than any governor since C. Elmer Anderson. Especially in 1967 he made few direct personal contacts with the legislative rank and file. He simply did not call legislators in for face to face contacts. Most contacts were limited to written messages. The one exception to this was regular breakfast meetings with the legislative leadership and committee chairmen. Even these breakfast meetings were not policy oriented, as under Freeman and Rolvaag, but primarily informational. This lack of direct contact can be attributed to the governor's personal reserve and disinclination to bargain on issues. The governor made a deliberate attempt in 1969 to meet more with the rank and file. The staff left the period from 10 A.M. to 2 P.M. daily open for legislators to come in freely. These efforts met with some success. Levander stepped in extensively on only two major pieces of legislation, the sales tax (1967) and the metropolitan sewer bill (1969). In each case he called a dozen people who might have been persuaded. Other than this the governor deliberately restricted his efforts to only a few issue areas, such as education and appropriations.

#### Summary

This examination of personal resources would not suggest that the Minnesota governor occupies a very strong position, especially if one adopts the "hard line" approach to executive-legislative relations. In the first place, although Minnesota governors usually come into office with a moderate public background, most have had no extensive party experience. Even more

serious from the legislators' point of view, only one possessed any previous legislative experience. Further, only two, Freeman and Youngdahl, fully adopted an aggressive approach to their legislative role. But this approach, combined with their abrasive personalities, offended the prevailing legislative expectations for the governor's role. Outside observers do not feel that the "soft sell" governors did much better. It appears that the Minnesota governor is "damned if he does and damned if he doesn't!" As an expression of their personal philosophies, few governors entered extensively into the legislative process on a personal basis. Freeman, Rolvaag, and, to a degree, Levander, did maintain regular contacts with the legislative leadership. Freeman perhaps went too far in his direct contacts and alienated his own members. Youngdahl attempted extensive contacts, but felt that they were largely useless. The less assertive governors restricted their contacts more to a social level. It is not surprising that most legislators, and some governors, conclude that the governor really has little continuing influence in the legislative area.

#### IV Ranking the Minnesota Governors

The review of the Minnesota governors in the preceding two chapters may leave the reader more confused than enlightened. Few clear cut patterns of gubernatorial performance emerge. No two men have emphasized quite the same resources. Nor have they utilized these resources in quite the same way. The author had hoped to be able to rank the governors in terms of power resources. Then these rankings could be compared to program

success. Unfortunately, a precise power ranking of the governors does not appear to be possible. In the first place the existing theory on executive-legislative relationships provides no sufficient guidelines on how to weight the various resources. So a ranking on a combination of these must be misleading to a degree. Also, the measures of gubernatorial resources are not uniform. Some consist of "hard", others of "soft", data. An overall ranking must combine these two types. The combined ranking, therefore, will be based on an imprecise measurement constructed in a manner somewhat comparable to Joseph Schlesinger's formal power index. Within each resource dimension the governors will be rated from 5 points (strong) to 1 point (weak) on each power resource within that dimension. These points will be averaged for each dimension. The final ranking will be based on an average of these ratings for each dimension.

There are five dimensions in all: legal-constitutional, institutional, political, public appeals, and personal. For the legal-constitutional dimension both the formal power potential and the actual use of the power are considered. The formal ratings are based on Joseph Schlesinger's evaluations.<sup>78</sup> All governors started with almost the same formal power potential. Up until 1963 Minnesota would have ranked about in the middle of the forty-eight states. The budget powers were the strongest possible, with appointive and veto potential being moderately strong. Only tenure potential rated as moderately weak. But from 1963 on, Minnesota ranked at the top of the tenure potential, and in the top eight on total formal power. This formal

power potential can be somewhat misleading. The actual use varied greatly among the governors. Only Youngdahl and Rolvaag actually used the veto power with any frequency. Even Rolvaag's 14 vetoes appear small compared to the general use nationally. For this reason all Minnesota governors but Rolvaag are ranked weak on this resource. Rolvaag's moderately weak ranking may even be questionable. On actual gubernatorial tenure no state had an average tenure of as much as 8 years.<sup>79</sup> About 38% averaged below four years and 37% over four years. Based on Schlesinger's categories of average tenure 5 years plus would be 5 points, 4.1-4.9(4), 4 years (3), 3-3.9(2), and under 3 years (1). On that basis Freeman ranks highest on tenure, Andersen lowest. On administrative appointments there are two measures of actual position control. One measures the proportion of times the governor actually had to put up with opposing partisans in the other six elective offices. Six offices with fellow partisans would be 5 points, five fellow partisans (4), three of four (3), one or two (2), and none (1). On this Youngdahl and Thye rank highest, Andersen lowest. The other measure is the percentage of 16 key administrative positions that the governor was able to fill. Among all states the theoretical maximum would be 100%. By simply dividing these into 20 percentile blocks one gets 80% + (5), 60-79% (4), 40-59% (3), 20-39% (2), and 0-19% (1). The governors did not differ much on this dimension. No governor could hope to achieve more than moderate power ranking with a maximum appointment rate of 56%. The rating on actual budget powers is not based on hard data. Rather legislator and governor

performance evaluations were used. The criteria included how much attention the governor personally devoted to the budget, how rigidly he enforced central clearance, how often administrators challenged the budget in hearings, and how much the governor's budget was finally changed. In this regard Freeman ranked at the top on all criteria. Youngdahl did not put in quite as much time on the problem, and acknowledged that his success was a bit spotty. Levander, more than on any other area in his administration, devoted a great deal of time to mastering appropriations. Although no governor was entirely weak, because he always had a good budget bureau to back him up, none of the others was very strong.

The staff resource can be disposed of fairly quickly. No legislator regarded any governor's staff as highly able. Freeman's staff received the most favorable comments, and the least unfavorable. The others were largely ignored. Rolvaag's staff appeared to be a decidedly negative factor.

The public appeals dimension can be dealt with with some confidence. There is a definite range of hard figures for public approval. Any governor who could command 50% or more approval was rated as strong (5). Those with at least two-thirds approval were rated moderately strong (4). It was felt that no governor who has less than a majority approval could be rated as moderately strong (3). And any governor who dropped below one-third approval would be considered weak (1). The ratings on skills in public appeals, and on frequency of use, were based on legislative-gubernatorial appraisals. Quite clearly only Luther

Youngdahl and Orville Freeman could be rated high on these resources. The others were fairly weak.

Party-political resources are also evaluated by one hard and two soft measures. On electoral popularity any governor who could draw over 60% of the vote in a fairly competitive system could well claim a mandate. This was rated 5 points. A person with 57-59.9% also possessed a respectable majority (4 points). Even 54-56% could be considered a respectable showing, although hardly overwhelming (3). Those with 52-53% could hardly claim great popular support (2). And a governor who received less than 51% should appear in a weak position indeed (1). Most governors and legislators alike stressed how weak the party organization was as a resource. Therefore organizational support was never rated as more than moderate (3 points). The criteria for differentiating among Minnesota governors include how internally cohesive was the organization, how influential was the governor within the structure, and how effective was its direct contact with the legislature. Freeman could count on some help in organizational matters. And Levander found the party helpful on policy research. Youngdahl and Rolvaag are given secondary ratings primarily on the basis of their personal influence. Governor Andersen is given a 2 ranking primarily on the basis of general organizational strength. There has been sufficient documentation on how much Freeman could rely on the DFL caucus. He does not get a 5 rating because relations slightly deteriorated in 1959. Rolvaag is rated only moderate because of friction resulting from caucus minority status. Levander is rated on

a par with Rolvaag. He did not have the automatic caucus response. But neither did he have to cope with animosities. Thye is rated 2 because at least the caucus heads would cooperate with him on matters in their own interest.

Personal resources are by far the most difficult to rate because there is no hard data. The ratings on career experience were based on the length and variety in previous political-public experience, and whether the governor had any previous contacts with the legislative process. Youngdahl had the longest public experience on the local and state level. He was not given a 5 rating because he lacked variety and legislative contact in his experience. Rolvaag, Anderson, Andersen, and Freeman are rated on a par at a moderate level. The first two had become acquainted with Senate operations. Elmer L. Andersen was the only governor with legislative experience, but his experience hurt as much as it helped. Freeman's ranking here may be somewhat questionable. However, his lack of experience in public office was compensated by his long party and campaign activity. It is most difficult to rank governors on their approach to the legislature, because there is such a difference of opinion as to what constitutes the most effective mode of action. For the time being it will be assumed that the hard line approach benefits the governor the most. Clearly only Freeman and Youngdahl followed this line. They are not given a five rating because they lacked the proper personality to fully channel their drive into the legislative process (as Harold Stassen, for example, did not). Thye, Rolvaag, and Levander are given a 2 rating because their

low key approach was fairly well received by the legislature. Finally, the governors are rated according to the frequency, variety, and effectiveness of these personal legislative contacts. None merited a perfect rating. Freeman did the most, but gradually dropped off by the 1959 session. Youngdahl was the next most active, but his contacts were abrasive as much as pleasing. Rolvaag did not pursue his contacts as vigorously, but he had more cordial relations. C. Elmer Anderson is rated on the bottom because he is not recalled as having any contacts at all.

Table VI-II sums up these ratings. The final rankings are not based on an average of each of the nineteen resources rated. To do so would have been to in effect weight legal-constitutional resources three times as important as any other. At this point one cannot consider any one dimension as more important than any other. For that reason the final ranking results from a composite of the average ratings for each dimension. The final ratings make a rather sharp distinction between Youngdahl and

Table VI-II  
Power Resource Rankings, Minnesota Governors, 1945-1970

	Youngdahl	Freeman	Thye	Levander	Rølvaag	Andersen	Anderson
Veto-Formal	3-MS	3-MS	3-MS	3-MS	3-MS	3-MS	3-MS
-Actual	1-W	1-W	1-W	1-W	2-MW	1-W	1-W
Tenure-Formal	2-MW	2-MW	2-MW	5-S	5-S	2-MW	2-MW
-Actual	4-MS	5-S	2-MW	3-M	2-MW	1-W	2-MW
Appointment-Formal	4-MS	4-MS	4-MS	4-MS	4-MS	4-MS	4-MS
-Elective	5-S	3-M	5-S	3-M	3-M	2-MW	4-MS
-Key	3-M	3-M	3-M	3-M	2-MW	2-MW	2-MW
Budget-Formal	5-S	5-S	5-S	5-S	5-S	5-S	5-S
-Actual	4-MS	5-MS	2-MW	4-MS	3-M	2-MW	2-MW
Staff	2-MW	3-M	2-MW	2-MW	1-W	2-MW	2-MW
Public-Appvl.	5-S	4-MS	4-MS	2-MW	2-MW	2-MW	4-MS
-Skills	5-S	4-MS	1-W	2-MW	2-MW	3-M	1-W
-Use	5-S	4-MS	1-W	1-W	2-MW	2-MW	1-W
Party-Org.	2-MW	3-M	1-W	3-M	2-MW	2-MW	1-W
-Elections	4-MS	3-M	5-S	2-MW	1-W	1-W	3-M
-Caucus	1-W	4-MS	2-MW	3-M	3-M	1-W	1-W
Per. Career	4-MS	3-M	2-MW	1-W	3-M	3-M	3-M
-Philosophy	4-MS	4-MS	2-MW	2-MW	2-MW	1-W	1-W
-Contacts	3-M	4-MS	2-W	2-MW	3-M	2-MW	1-W
Average							
Legal Const.	3.44	3.44	2.78	3.56	3.22	2.67	2.78
Staff	2	3	2	2	1	2	2
Pub. Appeals	5	3.67	2	1.67	2	2.33	2
Political	2.33	3.33	2.67	2.67	2	1.33	1.67
Personal	3.67	3.67	2	1.67	2.67	2	1.67
Total Average							
Rank	3.29	3.42	2.29	2.31	2.18	2.07	2.02

S = Strong

MS = Moderately Strong

M = Moderate

MW = Moderately Weak

W = Weak

Source: See Chapters 5 and 6

Freeman on the one hand, and the rest on the other. It is surprising that Freeman rates slightly ahead of Youngdahl, and this may reflect an error in the rating system. General impressions would confirm the greater strength of Freeman and Youngdahl. But most observers have generally considered Youngdahl to be the stronger of the two. For the rest Levander and Thye are nearly even. Rolvaag stands somewhat below them. Elmer L. Andersen and C. Elmer Anderson rank on the bottom. It should be noted that no governor rates exceptionally high. Even Freeman would be placed somewhere between a moderate and a moderately strong position on power resources. The last five governors would appear in the moderately weak category. Again this result of the rating system accords rather well with the legislator's impressions of Minnesota governors' strength.

Both the rating system and general interview impressions suggest that the non-legal aspects of the governor's power resources are most often used. The only device mentioned with any frequency would be the appointment power. But most legislators rated public appeals as a more formidable resource. After appointment power legislators mention personal resources and party (caucus) appeals in order of use. The budget and veto power occur to them much less frequently. Staff resources are mentioned fairly often, but usually in a negative sense. Legislative rankings of the best potential resources accord fairly well with the use rankings. Most would simply indicate that the governors failed to utilize these resources up to their full potential. Legislators believe that personal resources could be

the most important. This probably reflects the personalistic approach to internal legislative decision-making. The thing that counts the most is the individual's personal traits and how well he fulfills the expected legislative role. The problem is that legislators' role expectations for the governor are sharply dichotomized. But both sides do put the greatest emphasis on the governor's personality. And both agree that the governors have failed to live up to expectations. This emphasis on personal traits also makes sense in a moralistic political system that limits the party resource. This is reinforced by the rather fragmented administrative power system. For the same reasons a strong emphasis on the public appeals potential also makes sense. A great many respondents said that this was the only really effective resource open to a Minnesota governor. A majority of legislators agreed that it was an important potential device. Most agreed that few governors took advantage of it. Somewhat surprisingly party-type resources were mentioned as third in importance, although opinion was greatly divided on this. Most agreed that DFL caucus support was important. Conservative support was not. Fourth in potential importance was staff. This achieves some importance because it affords the main contact between the governor and the legislature. Again, most agreed that few governors used this effectively. Apparently formal-legal devices occur to few legislators even as a potential force. Only Conservative Senators emphasized the importance of things such as appointments, veto, and the budget.

In earlier chapters there was speculation that governors

should follow quite distinct power styles as political conditions changed. Specifically, it was suggested that in the pre-1955 period party resources would be weak. This meant that in a politically moralistic state the style should be more toward public appeals, supplemented by an administrative style, as found in many western states. In the post-1955 period, with greater party competition and stronger political organization, the party leader style should develop more regardless of formal limitations on the party. These expectations are not completely borne out. In the earlier period Governor Youngdahl's tactics do closely approximate the predicted pattern. He strongly stressed personal drive and public support. Party appeals did not exist. However, he did not emphasize the administrative tools. Thye and Anderson did not follow the pattern to any marked extent. Legislators mentioned their personal resources to the exclusive of all others. But neither attempted to be a popular leader. The post-1955 governors did not exactly follow expectations either. Caucus appeals became much more important (except for Elmer L. Andersen). But personal characteristics still highly determined gubernatorial performance. Only Elmer L. Andersen followed an administrative style. The others differed little from their predecessors in ignoring this factor. So the two periods differed little in this. Also, public appeals declined much more radically than one would expect. Even Orville Freeman designated the public appeals resource only third in importance.

The test of this rating system will be how well it can predict actual program success for the Minnesota governors.

Given the rather modest power resources available to the governors one would not expect even the most able governor to have exceptionally high success. It is difficult to predict exactly how high this success rate will be. President Johnson was considered to be highly successful when about two-thirds of his program passed. Success rates of up to 90% have been reported in the Southern states.<sup>80</sup> Wisconsin governors produce success rates from 46-85 percent. On the other hand few Arizona governors see more than 40% of their program passed. Success has been as low as 10%. Any expectation for a given success rate must be fairly arbitrary. As a standard for this study the following will be proposed: Very High- 75-100%; High- 60-74.9%; Moderate- 45 to 59.9%; Low- 30 to 44.9%; Very Low- 0 to 29.9%. Neither the very high nor the very low ranges are impossibilities based on reported experience. Sixty percent success would appear to indicate a fairly high level of success based on presidential experiences. It may appear questionable to allow a 45% rate to stand as moderate. But less than one-third of a program passed would certainly be regarded as very low. Based on the power resource rankings one would expect that Youngdahl and Freeman would have close to 60% program success, Levander, Thye, and perhaps Rolvaag from 35 to 45%, and C. Elmer Anderson and Elmer L. Andersen for 30 to 35%.

The rankings as expressed are not quite complete. Chapters Five and Six have explored one side of the power equation. However, legislative strengths and weaknesses have not been considered at all. The next two chapters will go into this in some detail.

## Footnotes: Chapter 6

1. Charles R. Adrian, The Non-Partisan Legislature in Minnesota (Ph.D. thesis University of Minnesota, 1950), p. 405.
2. Interview with Harold W. Schultz (DFL- 1951-1966), July 18, 1969; this view was supported by interviews with Representative E.J. Chilgren (DFL- 1927-1964) August 6, 1969; Representative Robert Renner (C- 1957-1970), August 5, 1969; Senator William Dosland (C- 1959), August 4, 1969; Senator Nicholas Coleman (DFL- 1963), August 20, 1969.
3. Interview with Representative Fred Cina (DFL- 1947-1968), March 20, 1967; Eugene Knudsen (DFL: Representative- 1955-1962, Senator 1963-1966); Speaker E.J. Chilgren, op. cit.; Representative Renner, op. cit.
4. Interview with Senator Val Imm, (C- 1935-1966), July 19, 1969; Senator Robert Dunlap (C- 1953-1966), July 3, 1969; Senator Gordon Rosenmeier (C- 1941-1970), March 21, 1967; Senator Donald O. Wright (C- 1935-1970), March 20, 1967; also DFLers Senator Raphael Salmore (1951-1966), August 7, 1969; Eugene Knudsen, op. cit.
5. Interviews with Speaker Lawrence Hall (1935-1948), August 13, 1969; Stanley Holmquist (C- House 1947-1954, Senate 1955), April 6, 1967; Senator Donald Sinclair (C- 1947), March 20, 1967; Senator Donald Fraser (DFL- 1955-1962), July 1, 1967; Senator Karl Grittner (DFL- House 1953-1958, Senate 1959-1970), March 27, 1967; Speaker E.J. Chilgren, op. cit.,; Representative Cina, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit.
6. Ronald F. Stinnett and Charles H. Backstrom, Recount, (Washington, D.C.: National Document Publishers Incorporated, 1964), see especially Chapters 2 and 3.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-20.
8. Interview with Governor Luther W. Youngdahl, June 23, 1967; see also Robert Esbjornson, A Christian in Politics: Luther W. Youngdahl (Minneapolis: T.S. Denison Co., 1955) p. 213; Interviews with Representative Lawrence Yetka (DFL- 1951-1960), August 6, 1969; Representative D.D. Wozniak (DFL- 1951-1966), July 23, 1969.
9. Interview with Governor Elmer L. Andersen, March 2, 1967; the point is also emphasized by others: Floyd Flom, The Legislative Process: A Case Study of the Passage of The Minnesota Youth Conservation Act with emphasis on the Role of the Individual (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1957), pp. 352-78, 440; Esbjornson, op. cit., pp. 213-24; interviews with Representative H.J. Anderson (C- 1951), April 6, 1967; Representative P.K. Peterson (C- 1947-1954), August 21, 1969; Representative Renner, op. cit., Speaker Chilgren, op. cit.
10. Esbjornson, op. cit., pp. 217-9.
11. This observation probably applied with special force for the Senate; Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget (Interuniversity Case Series, No. 60, 1961) p. 22;

11. (continued) Interviews with Speaker A.I. Johnson (DFL- 1941-1958), August 4, 1969; Speaker Chilgren, op. cit.; Representative Wozniak, op. cit.; Representative Renner, op. cit.; Senator Salmore, op. cit.
12. Flinn, 1961, op. cit., pp. 11, 23; Interview with Governor Freeman, June 21, 1967.
13. Interview with Freeman, op. cit.; Flinn, 1957, op. cit.; p. 292.
14. Interview with Freeman, op. cit.; Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 292-3, 296-8, 313-4.
15. Interviews with Representative Yetka, op. cit.; Representative Chilgren, op. cit.; Speaker Johnson, op. cit.; Representative Wozniak, op. cit.; Representative Renner, op. cit.
16. In 1955, with the Senate resisting his tax bill, Freeman went on TV the last day of the session to attack them, Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 32; Senator Rudy Hanson (C- 1955-1970), August 23, 1969, remembered a similar occasion after the 1958 special session. The session dealt with unemployment compensation. The Senators felt that they had worked hard and given the governor most of what he wanted. Freeman was not satisfied and "blasted" the Senate after the session. This aroused opposition.
17. Stinnett and Backstrom, op. cit., pp. 23-4; also see David Lebedoff, The 21st Ballot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 52.
18. Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government, second edition, (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 337.
19. Lebedoff, op. cit., p. 143; Senator Dosland, op. cit.
20. G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, second revised edition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), p. 144.
21. Ivan Hinderaker, Harold Stassen and Developments in the Republican Party in Minnesota, 1937-1943 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1949), pp. 378-80, 437-50.
22. Klaus J. Herrmann Politics of Administrative Reorganization in Minnesota, 1949-1959 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1960), p. 28; John A. Bond, Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1956), p. 354.
23. Speaker Lawrence Hall, op. cit.
24. Hinderaker, op. cit., see continuing discussion on Stassen's party role, pp. 38, 51-56, 62-68, 230-1, 243, 358-60, 726-7, 753-71.
25. Esbjornson, op. cit., pp. 199-200, 211-12.
26. Interview with Representative Peterson, op. cit.
27. Roy Dunn interview with Jim Borman, 1966, mimeographed manuscript, Minnesota Historical Society, pp. 11-12.
28. Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 23; Flinn, 1957, op. cit. p. 30.
29. Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 23; Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 42, 355-61.
30. Flinn, op. cit., p. 327.

31. Interview with Representative Martin O. Sabo (DFL- 1961), August 18, 1969; Representative Wozniak, op. cit.; Representative Yetka, op. cit.
32. Stinnett and Backstrom, op. cit., pp. 28-34.
33. Lebedoff, op. cit., p. 40-42.
34. Ibid., pp. 45, 59-63, 2-1.
35. See Minnesota Polls, June 13, 1965; October 1-5, 1965; June 3-8, 1966; July 8-12, 1966.
36. Interview with Andersen, op. cit.; David Durenberger, Governor Levander's executive secretary, August, 1969.
37. Lebedoff, op. cit., p. 141-142.
38. Minnesota Poll, June 12, 1966.
39. Minnesota Poll, August 1966 through October, 1969.
40. Herrmann, op. cit., pp. 26, 125; see also Bond, op. cit., p. 354.
41. Flinn, 1957, op. cit., p. 293.
42. Interviews with Senator Harold Kalina (DFL- 1955), April 3, 1967; Senator Coleman, op. cit., Senator Hanson, op. cit., Representative Sabo, op. cit., Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Representative Wozniak, op. cit., Eugene Knudsen, op. cit.
43. Interview with Dosland, op. cit.
44. Interview with Representative Roy Schulz (C- 1951-1970), August 26, 1969.
45. Adrian, op. cit., p. 303.
46. Interview with Andersen, op. cit.
47. Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 331-2, 535; Interview with Senator N.W. Hanson (DFL- 1955), April 4, 1967; Representative Yetka, op. cit.; Speaker A.I. Johnson, op. cit.; Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Salmore, op. cit.; Senator Knudsen, op. cit.
48. Interview with Freeman, op. cit., ; Representative Yetka, op. cit.; Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 23; Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 268-9.
49. Interview with Governor Karl Rolvaag, August 1969; Senator Grittner, op. cit.; Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit.; Senator Salmore, op. cit.; Representative Sabo, op. cit.
50. Lebedoff, op. cit., pp. 68-9; Interview with Senator Paul Thuet (DFL- 1959-1966), July 22, 1969; Governor Rolvaag, op. cit.; Eugene Knudsen, op. cit.
51. James Schlesinger, Ambitions and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 75.
52. Ibid., pp. 78, 93.
53. Interview with Governor Rolvaag, op. cit.; Representative Yetka, op. cit.; Representative Renner, op. cit.
54. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 405-6; Russell W. Fidley, Evaluating the Governors (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1966) mimeographed pamphlet, p. 4; see also Stinnett and Backstrom, op. cit., pp. 12-20.
55. This especially came through in interviews with Senator Walter J. Franz (C- 1955-1970) April 5, 1967; Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit.; Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit.; Senator Dunlap, op. cit.

56. Interviews with Speaker John A. Hartle (C- 1935-1968), March 21, 1967; Representative Lawrence Haeg (C- 1941-1954), July 18, 1969; Claude Allen (C- Representative, 1937-1958; Senator 1959-1966); and Speaker Lawrence Hall, op. cit.
57. Examples would interviews with Representative Schulz, op. cit.; Speaker Chilgren, op. cit.; Representative Yetka, op. cit.; Representative Sabo, op. cit.; Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit.; Senator Dunlap, op. cit.; Senator Schultz, op. cit.; Senator Salmore, op. cit.; Senator Thuet, op. cit.
58. These conclusions are based on open ended questions put to the legislators interviewed. Many would not comment on specific governors. The greatest number (19) responded on Freeman, the fewest (8) on Thye.
59. Interview with Freeman, op. cit.; Flinn, 1957, op. cit.; p. 30.
60. Interview with Arthur Gillen (Representative- 1943-1950; Senator 1951-1958), July 22, 1969; Senator Franz, op. cit.; Senator Dunlap, op. cit.
61. Flom, op. cit., p. 280; Fridley, op. cit., p. 11.
62. Interview with Senator Jack Davies (Senator 1959), July 17, 1969.
63. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 300-2.
64. Roy Dunn interview, op. cit., p. 12.
65. Interview with Andersen, op. cit.
66. Stinnett and Backstrom, op. cit., p. 12.
67. Flinn, 1961, p. 23.
68. Ibid., pp. 30-5; Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 136, 179.
69. Flinn, 1961, op. cit., p. 27; Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 136, 290.
70. Interview with Representative Wozniak, op. cit.
71. Hermann, op. cit., pp. 173-4.
72. Flom, op. cit., p. 361; Esbjornson, op. cit., p. 143.
73. Adrian, op. cit., p. 303; Esbjornson, op. cit., p. 192.
74. Flom, op. cit., p. 490; Esbjornson, op. cit., p. 143.
75. Esbjornson, op. cit., pp. 143, 213; Flom, op. cit., pp. 434, 491.
76. Flom, op. cit., pp. 330, 448.
77. Interview with Fred Krohn, research assistant to Governor Levander, August, 1969; Interview with Representative Paul Overgaard (C- 1963-1968), August 23, 1969.
78. Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive", in Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965) pp. 219-229; see discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.
79. Ibid., p. 219.
80. See Chapter Two of this thesis, pp. 21-2.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE: GENERAL POWER RESOURCES

It has been argued that one cannot judge gubernatorial influence solely by the positive powers available to him. One must also weight the other side of the equation. What power has the legislature to challenge the governor? And, does it have the disposition, to do so? Just as in the case of the governor, there are several potential resources available to the legislature. The first are constitutional-legal powers. These include constitutional grants to the legislature to legitimate law, to provide finances, and to establish governmental procedure. Legal powers also include control over the administrative branch. A second power is the degree of legislative professionalism. That is, how well equipped is the legislature to carry on full time policy-making? Popular support will be considered as a third type of power. How much can the legislature convincingly claim to be the representative of the people? Could it expect popular support in a showdown with the governor? Finally, internal leadership will be considered as a fourth set of resources. What factors of internal organizational setting, informal rules, committee system, formal leadership, caucus organization, contribute to legislative strength or weakness? The last item to check will be roll call voting. This will largely be used to demonstrate caucus and urban-rural patterns of decision-making. The first three sets of resources will be briefly discussed in this chapter. Chapter eight will examine legislative organization in some detail. Finally, patterns of roll call voting will be covered in chapter nine.

Based on the general condition of state legislature, one would expect that these resources would be relatively weak rather than strong. However, the Minnesota legislature is not necessarily like most others.

Those who have said goodbye to legislative bodies all over the world should visit Minnesota. The legislature is very much alive and involved in the governing process of the state. It is likely to be so for a number of years.<sup>1</sup>

From this perspective one should be alert to those factors that contribute to this unusual strength.

### I. CONSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL

The state constitution bestows the general grant for public policy-making on the state legislature. However, no state legislature receives boundless powers. Minnesota is no exception. The same constitutions can, and do, impose quite specific limits on substantive laws, financial discretion, and internal legislative pressure. The legislature may also be restrained by the conditions under which it must work. If it is not equipped to competently deal with a large volume of business, it may not even fully perform the positive powers granted to it. Substantive and procedural powers will largely be examined in the next section. The section after that will focus on legislative structure.

#### Legislative powers under the Constitution

Theoretically, except for specific restrictions, the state legislature retains all plenary powers of state governments.<sup>2</sup> But the Minnesota Constitution is quite vague on this point. It specifically grants only the power to raise taxes and appropriate funds. Much more prominent are specific limits on policy-making

powers. Almost half of the document deals with important substantive policy. Major articles survey policy on education, banking, corporations, local government, militia, highways, forests, and aeronautics. Many of these do grant some discretionary authority. For example, the legislature may establish a general banking law. Other articles impose specific requirements on the legislature. For example, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a public school system. If in fact the legislature retains plenary powers, these grants should be unnecessary. But within each article establishing grants of power, specific prohibitions will be found. A general banking law may be established only with a two-thirds vote (Article IX, section 13). And Article IV, sections 33-34 prohibits special legislation for a long list of enumerated subjects. A local referendum must be called for special local legislation.

The Minnesota Constitution places even greater restraints on fiscal powers. A previous chapter already discussed the five revenue funds, which impose as great a limit on the legislature as they do on the governor. In addition, the legislature must do some things. Article IX, section 1A states that mining companies shall pay to the state an iron ore occupation tax. On the other hand Article XXI restricts legislative discretion on taconite taxes. A final fiscal limitation concerns the state debt. An amendment passed in 1962 did loosen these limits some, and repealed the previous \$250,000 debt limit. However, certain bonds cannot be issued for more than twenty years. And bond authorization requires a  $3/5$  vote. In general, debt may be incurred only for

specified purposes.

Constitutional limits extend beyond substantive provisions. Article IV, section 4 grants each house full authority to determine its own rules. Then the article proceeds to enumerate a dozen of these rules. No bill may be introduced during the last 30 days of the session, except on written request of the governor. All proceedings must be recorded in a journal. All elections in the legislature shall be *vive voce*. Every bill must be read on three different occasions unless a  $2/3$  majority suspends the rules. Two of these readings must be at length. A majority of the total membership in each body shall be a quorum. And no law may be passed except by an absolute majority of all members elected in each house. Now these requirements may not appear to be onerous. But the point is the legislature is not free to follow any set of rules that it chooses.

#### Legislative Procedure

The legislature has developed a large body of formal procedural rules that supplement the constitutional mandates. These have changed very little over the last twenty-five years. As a body, the rules attempt to strike a balance among the individual legislators rights, the ability for a majority to work its will, and the opportunity for the body to act with dispatch. Formally, they appear to do this well. They do this by covering three major stages. The first is bill introduction, the second the committee stage, and the third floor debate and final passage.

In the House, bills are deposited with the Speaker.<sup>3</sup> The chief clerk reviews each bill to ensure proper form. The President of

the Senate, and the Senate Secretary, perform similar functions in the other body. Since the Constitutional requirement for three full readings of each bill would seriously hamper legislative business, it is complied with in form only. The clerk reads only the title for each bill. At one time any bill could have been blocked at this point. A majority could object to introduction at the first reading. The Senate abolished this rule in the late 1950's. Now every bill at least goes to committee. The presiding officer retains some discretion in bill assignment. But the author may request a committee. And a majority may reverse the presiding officer's decision. Further, to ensure coordination, all bills relating to appropriations must eventually go to the appropriations committee. In the House all bills dealing with changes in state government operations must go to the civil administration committee.

The committees, then, sit astride the legislative process. The fate of most bills is decided there. So the chairmen (and a committee majority) possess great power. Most formal rules on committees govern publicizing of the proceedings. Any member may request a formal roll call vote. All decisions are made by majority vote. A majority constitutes a quorum and the rules generally have provided for some published records. But these were restricted to roll call votes. In 1969 the House moved toward fuller legislative information on committee bills. A majority of the House may order a Revisor's analysis (on the form of the bill) and a fiscal note (on financial consequences). Also, a committee may not keep a bill bottled up entirely on its own. A majority of

the body may always recall a bill. At one time Senate committees had to report a bill within twenty-five days. This rule was abolished in 1963. On the House side an author may recall a bill on his own. Prior to 1955 if a committee retained a bill for fifteen days without taking action, the author could request a return to the floor. If there was no action within seven days after that, the bill automatically come out of committee. After 1955, the time limit was extended to thirty and fourteen days respectively.

On the floor both houses attempt to limit debate. One will find no provision for filibuster or dilatory tactics. The presiding officer recognizes the member who is to speak. No member may speak more than twice on the same bill without majority permission. In addition the Senate imposes a five minute limit on speaking. The House allows no one to speak twice on a bill until all those who wish to do so have spoken once. Most decisions are made by majority rule. And no bill passes without an absolute majority. For this reason no member may be absent without leave. All members present must vote unless given permission to abstain. Because the DFL caucus did use delaying tactics over the 1967 sales tax, the Senate in 1969 provided that when someone has a chance to vote and fails to do so, the body may close the role by majority vote. Even with this emphasis on dispatch and majority rule, there is room for individual influence. Any member may request a call of the body, which brings all members in to vote on a bill. A member may also move the previous question to cut off debate. He may also call for the ayes and nays to make a public

record on an issue. Because of its great size the House usually requires several members, from ten to sixteen, to institute such a motion. As a measure to expedite business a  $2/3$  majority may suspend these rules.

After a bill comes out of committee, it receives a second reading and goes on General Orders. Each day the whole body resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole to consider the General Orders Calendar. Under this procedure normal rules are suspended for freer debate. The committee considers bills in the order that they appear on the calendar, unless a majority orders otherwise. Most debate and amendment takes place at this time. Bills reported favorably from the Committee of the Whole go on the calendar for consideration under the normal rules. Each bill receives a third reading and is voted on for final passage. Upon two day notice a member may ask for a special order to move a bill up for consideration. But such a request needs a two-thirds approval. Again to expedite business both bodies instituted a Consent Calendar (Calendar of Ordinary Matters in the Senate) in 1955. If a majority of a committee believes a bill to be non-controversial, it may send a bill directly to this calendar. Those bills are voted upon prior to the Calendar of the Day. However, if there is objection (three members in the Senate and ten in the House) the bill is put on General Orders.

The rules do not always function as formally prescribed. Some observers, especially DFL legislators, insist that the rules were consciously formulated to be manipulated by senior members. Up to this point only the formal potential of the rules has been

considered. Later actual operations will be discussed. But as they stand, the rules do seem to facilitate legislative dispatch in decision-making, while still allowing for an individual role.

Administrative Powers

There is no need to go into legislative power over the administrative branch in great detail here. The reader is referred to Chapter Five where the many administrative limitations on the governor are documented. Most of these were imposed by the legislature. This section will just briefly summarize the conclusions found there.

The legislature may formally set up administrative structure, establish personnel regulations, grant and withdraw funds, and grant and withdraw program authority. It can examine administrative practices through hearings and investigations. The latter has not been used much. Nor has the legislative veto. However, the legislature works closely with departments on appropriations. It may, and often does, disregard gubernatorial recommendations. Also, administrators find legislative approval of far greater importance than the governors for substantive legislation. The legislature has been extremely reluctant to grant the governor control over administrative structure. Most gubernatorial requests for administrative change have been rejected. Those that passed were greatly molded by legislative desires. Not until 1969 did the legislature bestow executive initiated reorganization. The legislature has allowed the greatest leeway in gubernatorial appointments. The Senate rarely rejects or even questions the governor's initiatives. The only legislative appointment power

comes over the University of Minnesota Board of Regents.<sup>4</sup> The legislature's university committees act as nominating committees for at large members. For those regents selected from congressional districts, the legislative delegation from that district acts as the nominating committee. The legislature may impeach administrative officials, but this is rarely used. But even with this discretion the governor's personnel powers are slight. The legislature placed most government employees under civil service administered by an independent Civil Service Board in 1930.

#### The Limited Legislature?

Although the apparent enumerated constitutional limits on the legislature are substantial, Professor Charles Backstrom argues that these constitutional or statutory limitations are self-imposed.<sup>5</sup> That is, the legislature retains as much power as it wishes to have. His evidence is that the Minnesota legislature remains the sole channel to constitutional revision. Under Article XIV a majority of both houses may propose amendments. Ratification depends upon a majority of all people voting in the general election when the amendment is on the ballot. The legislature could also request a constitutional convention by a two-thirds majority. If a majority of the electorate at the next general election agree, at its subsequent session, the legislature provides for the convention.

These formal provisions do entrench the legislature as a great negative force. No change takes place without its approval. Although several governors have requested constitutional conventions, no legislature has given its approval. On the other hand,

this does not allow the legislature a positive means to remove formal restrictions. It is true that voters have shown a greater willingness to approve legislative initiatives in the last ten years. But this has not always been so. From 1960 to 1968, 73% of the proposed amendments received approval. But from 1948 through 1958 50%<sup>6</sup> lost. This means that over the whole period roughly 56% of the suggested amendments passed. Since 1945 the legislature has proposed about three amendments per session. The electorate has approved about 1.7 of these per session. And this does not count suggestions that were not made for fear of popular political repercussions. So, while it is true that the state constitution imposes no barriers that the legislature cannot attempt to work around, it still imposes some limits on absolute legislative discretion.

## II. LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM

In Chapter Two legislative professionalism was discussed at some length. This term is meant to designate how well equipped the legislature is to carry on as a full time law-making operation. The criteria for this included session length, compensation for legislators, legislative research services, and turnover. Minnesota should rate no more than a moderate position compared with the other states. This appears to be true. About seventeen states rate ahead of Minnesota. During the whole period the state did rank moderately high on compensation and appropriations for legislative services. However, it was moderately low on session length and the quantity of services. Moreover, there was a sharp distinction between earlier and later periods. Earlier the legis-

lature would have ranked moderately low. However, after 1955, and especially after 1963, it has been built up into the moderately high range. Each item, session, compensation, services, and turnover, will be examined in turn.

Legislative Session

Under Article IV, Section 1, the Minnesota legislature meets biennially for 120 legislative days. Prior to 1963 the limit was set at 90 days. However, as business increased the legislature increasingly attempted to circumvent the limit. It resorted to such devices as "covering the clock" (and so officially remaining on the last legislative day) or special sessions. Pressure built up to such a degree that the 120 day amendment finally passed overwhelmingly 706,761 to 393,538.<sup>7</sup>

Some reformers have advocated going to annual, unlimited sessions such as those found in Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and several other states. They argue that the volume of business requires such flexibility. Also, emergencies may arise between sessions. There appears to be great popular support for such a change. The Minnesota Poll reported approval that ranged from 61% in 1952 to 74% in 1970. It should be pointed out that in 1968 a majority

TABLE VII-1

Popular Support for Annual Legislative Sessions					
	1952	1959	1964	1968	1970
For	61%	68%	65%	71%	74%
Against	24	19	21	21	14
Don't Know	15	13	14	8	12
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Minnesota Poll

did oppose unlimited sessions. The question was "Do you think it

would be a good idea or a poor idea to adopt both suggestions, that is, to have the legislature meet every year for longer than a 120 day session?" 28% thought it a good idea, 63% believed it would be a poor idea. The Poll did not report a similar question on other occasions. In spite of popular support, Professor Backstrom reports that many of the most powerful legislators oppose annual sessions. They fear that this would lead to a different kind of a legislature, mostly composed of professional politicians. And such a change would require higher pay. At the same time 69% of all legislators responding to a survey favored annual sessions. Even those who oppose it feel that annual sessions will come soon.<sup>8</sup> But those changes are in the future. Over the past twenty-five years Minnesota had a part time legislature.

#### Compensation

Minnesota legislators have also been paid at a part time scale. Salaries are set by statute. The only constitutional limitation forbids an increase during the period for which a particular legislature was selected. However, political considerations prevent legislators from raising salaries greatly.

From 1945 through 1950 legislators received \$2,000 biennially. From 1951 through about 1956 this increased to \$3,000 biennially. Since 1957 salaries have shot up dramatically. Initially they doubled to \$6,000 biennially (per diem living expenses pushed this to almost \$7,000 for some legislators). Increases came again in 1966 and 1968. Currently, base pay stands at \$400 per month for two years. This adds up to \$9600 biennially. Living expenses put maximum compensation at almost \$12,000. So the Minnesota legisla-

for has acted as strictly a part time member.

### Legislative Services

Many reformers consider legislative services to be the key in improving legislative performance. They argue that the legislature cannot function as a professional organization unless it has at least a minimum of clerical staff to perform housekeeping functions. Beyond this it needs a minimum of research assistance in order to develop the independent sources of information necessary to compete with the governor, administrators, and pressure groups. First the general assistance available to the legislature as a whole will be considered. Then the reader can turn to administrative staff, committee staff, and individual assistance.

First, at a minimum most legislators need professional technical assistance to draft bills in the proper form. The Attorney General's office has always done this to a degree. Since 1947 the office of Revisor of Statutes has also assumed bill drafting duties. These two sources probably provide sufficient assistance. But one should notice that neither depends on the legislature. The first is elected, the second appointed by the Supreme Court. Assistance on financial matters has been scantier. The appropriations committees are allocated some staff. The only other agency set up to supply financial information would be the Public Examiner. He conducts a post audit and reports to the legislature. But the report also goes to the governor and administrative agencies. The governor appoints the Public Examiner.

The Minnesota legislature has formally provided for somewhat greater research assistance. Following the practice in many other

states, it established a Legislative Research Committee in 1947. The eighteen legislative members were drawn equally from both houses. The Director supervised four research analysts. After completing studies, the director was to issue factual reports to legislators, the governor, and the public. There is no evidence that these reports were widely used. Professor Backstrom concluded that the legislature allowed the research committee to fossilize.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps for this reason it restructured research facilities in 1967 and 1969. The Senate established an Office of Senate Counsel in 1967. The counsel retains four assistants. They provide basic legal and technical services to Senate committees and interim committees. By 1969 the legislature completely abolished the Legislative Research Committee. The House replaced it with a House Research Department. This was staffed by a director, assistant director, seven research assistants, and three legislative interns. Also, the majority and minority caucuses each retain one or two research assistants. Finally, the two houses jointly established a Legislative Reference Library to store research materials. This has a trained librarian as director, and an assistant.

Another source of research information has been the interim committee. This reached its peak in the last half of the 1950's. In 1953 the legislature authorized two permanent committees and ten temporary interim committees.<sup>10</sup> A total of thirty committees were authorized in 1957.<sup>11</sup> The number of permanent committees continued to grow with twelve authorized in 1969. However, no temporary committees were authorized in 1961. Only six emerged in

1969. As an alternative, beginning in 1963, the legislature began supplying staff and funds to the regular standing committees for interim work. So in this respect the Minnesota legislature has slowly moved to a semi-continuing basis. However, many question the substantive impact of this interim work. Since many legislators feel that the results represent the views of only a few people, they insist on going over everything again during the regular session.

Perhaps the most extensive assistance is that generally available to whole legislative body during the regular session. Throughout the last twenty-five years there has always been a fairly adequate staff to carry out administrative and housekeeping duties. These services changed very little over time. The Senate employed twenty-one administrative officers and clerical staff (excluding pages, sergeants-at-arms, janitors) in 1953. By 1969 this had expanded to thirty.<sup>12</sup> Most administrative personnel acted essentially as clerks who supervised the flow of bills and records. The number of House officials, twenty-one, remained the same. Both houses have been fortunate in one respect. Personnel holding the major positions have been characterized by long experience. Most would acknowledge that the clerical side of the legislative business runs very smoothly. Minnesota seldom has to resort to gubernatorial veto of technically defective bills, as happens frequently in some other states.

Individual and committee assistance differs markedly from the previous picture. Most committee assistance consists purely of clerical and stenographic help. Presumably the clerks might

perform some research functions. The 1953 Senate rules authorized twenty-seven clerks and twenty-one stenographers, a total of forty-seven.<sup>13</sup> Four committees, Finance (3), Judiciary (2), Rules (2), and Taxes (1) has assistance specifically assigned. Presumably the twenty-two general committee clerks assisted the other thirty-four committees. The seventeen general stenographers helped these committees and the twenty-nine senators who had no chairmanship. The 1969 legislative rules authorized thirty-two clerks and forty-four stenographers, a total of seventy-six.<sup>14</sup> Again four major committees had specially assigned help. The Civil Administration and Local Government committees shared a clerk. Twenty-one research and general clerks were available for the other thirteen committees and forty-nine members without chairmanships. The House differed very little from this. If anything, considering its greater size, the House provides less assistance for its members. Authorized personnel increased very little over the period with greatest increases in stenographic, not policy, assistance. Although by 1969 the Senate averaged more than one clerical-stenographic position per member. The House still had less than an average of one per member.

Office arrangements were equally spartan up until 1969. Only floor leaders and major committee chairmen enjoyed individual office space. Most committee chairmen shared offices. Individual senators may have had one or two rooms to share in common. On the House side, members, other than chairmen, had no desk space except on the floor of the chamber. In 1969 all state functions except the legislature, Supreme Court, and the governor,

lieutenant governor, and attorney general's offices were removed from the capitol building. Hearing rooms and committee space were added as a result.

After surveying this picture one may agree with Professor Backstrom that being a Minnesota legislator is a frustrating and demeaning life for the serious member.<sup>15</sup> Even today most lack adequate physical facilities or staff. Staff is probably even less adequate than has been indicated. Most committees have not been able to hire all of the authorized personnel for the part time work available. Many legislators are not satisfied with this situation. Three-fourths of all members replying to a survey believe that all committees should be staffed. Eighty per cent would like to at least share a legislative assistant with another member.<sup>16</sup> So Minnesota has modest legislative services at best. Compared to most other state legislatures they probably do not rate too low. Compared to Congress they rate poorly indeed. Although the situation has slowly been improving, throughout the period under study the Minnesota legislator worked mostly on his own.

#### Tenure

Formally, the Minnesota constitution specifies a two year term for House members and a four year term for Senators. But one would expect that the relatively poor working conditions, low pay, and part time status, would act as just an effective check on long tenure. Certainly high turnover characterizes most states. (See Chapter Two) In 1963 the national average turnover for both upper and lower houses was 34%. Duane Lockard concluded that

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nineteen states had high turnover (40% + freshmen), ten had moderate turnover (30-39%) and seventeen had low turnover (under 30%).<sup>17</sup>

Based on these figures the Minnesota legislature does not live up to expectations. The House has low turnover, the Senate moderately low. On the average 24% of the House members were freshmen (see Table VII-2). The Senate averages 34% freshmen. The highest House turnover came in 1963 with 41%. On four occasions the Senate had as many as 40% freshmen. Not only does Minnesota rate fairly low on turnover, but its legislature retains a fairly large proportion of long term veterans. As a rough rule of thumb, some would argue that a man does not really become effective in the legislative process until his third or fourth session. By this criteria the House has enjoyed a majority of experienced veterans in all but one session. The Senate has averaged 42% in veteran status. A few House members served as many as twenty terms. Only one session (1945) had its most senior member with as few as thirteen terms. The most senior Senate members have lasted as many as nine terms. Only one Senate session (1955) had the most senior member with as few as six terms. Most members do not last nearly this long. But the average House member had four terms. The average Senate member served 2.6.

TABLE VII-2

Tenure in the Minnesota Legislature					
Year	% Freshmen	% 2nd Term	% 3 + Terms	Average Terms †	Average Yrs. at Beginning of Session
<u>Senate</u>					
1945	29.9%	25.4%	44.7%	2.6	8.4
1947*	28.4	22.4	49.2	2.8	7.2
1949	32.8	22.4	44.8	2.6	8.4
1951*	29.9	22.4	47.7	2.9	7.6
1953	31.3	22.4	46.3	2.7	8.8
1955*	40.3	18.0	41.7	2.6	6.4
1957	40.3	18.	41.7	2.6	8.4
1959*	28.4	32.8	38.8	2.7	6.8
1961	28.4	32.8	38.8	2.7	8.8
1963*	34.4	22.4	43.2	2.8	7.2
1965	40.3	20.9	38.8	2.4	7.6
1967*	37.3	28.4	34.3	2.4	5.6
1969	40.3	28.4	31.3	2.4	7.6
	<u>33.9%</u>	<u>24.4%</u>	<u>21.7%</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>7.6</u>
<u>House</u>					
1945	22.2%	22.2%	55.6%	3.3	4.6
1947	24.4	20.6	55	3.1	4.2
1949	25.3	19.1	55.7	3.4	4.8
1951	26.7	19.1	54.2	3.7	5.4
1953	18.3	19.9	61.8	3.8	5.6
1955	30.5	13.7	55.8	3.9	5.8
1957	19.1	22.9	58	4.8	6.6
1959	20.6	19.9	59.5	4.4	6.8
1961	15.3	20.6	64.1	4.6	7.2
1963	40.7	10.4	48.9	4	6
1965	14.8	33.3	51.9	4.2	6.4
1967	31.1	11.9	57	3.6	5.2
1969	20.7	25.9	53.4	3.7	5.4
	<u>23.8%</u>	<u>20%</u>	<u>56.2%</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>5.6</u>

\*Indicates session in which there was a Senatorial election  
 † - Note Senators have 4 year terms. House members have 2 year terms.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual 1945 through 1969

Some evidence suggests that over time Minnesota legislators have extended their term of service. Charles Adrian attributes this to non-partisanship. The argument is that the non-partisan

label, and the low visibility, created a protected conditions for legislators. Adrian surveyed all elections from 1902 to 1948. In 1903 the House had 77% freshmen. In 1949 25% were freshmen. The same figures for the Senate 67% and 33% respectively. The breaking point appeared to come at 1925 for the House and 1935 for the Senate. Before that time a majority of legislators were usually freshmen. After that time a majority were usually holdovers. The House averaged 50% freshmen and the Senate 55%. This contrasts rather sharply with the 1945 to 1969 period. Within the recent period the Senate demonstrates a slight tendency to reverse the trend. Certainly sessions with the highest turnover appeared from 1955 on. There is no consistent pattern for the House. However, again sessions with the greatest turnover came after 1955. Most of this increase can be attributed to reapportionment. This certainly was the case for the 1963 and 1967 sessions. Both houses showed a marked decline in tenure after 1961. But increased competition also partially accounts for the turnover. The Senate demonstrates this point most clearly. A DFL governor won for the first time in 1954. That date also marks an increase in DFL attention to legislative elections. Whatever the cause, recent heavy turnover brought in many young metropolitan legislators. These men are seen as being better educated and more capable than their predecessors. This may be so. If it is true, it may strengthen the legislature. On the other hand fewer of these men may be dedicated to the legislature as an institution. Since they have greater professional and political opportunities, they may be less inclined to make the legislature a second career. This could

weaken one important source of past legislative independence.

One might ask why do Minnesota legislators serve so long? This cannot be answered directly without questioning the legislators themselves. This was impossible to do on a large scale for all legislative sessions. However, another way to get at the problem would be to determine why incumbents do not come back. This could be caused by voluntary retirement, death, or election defeat. The last can be measured most easily. (See Table VII-3) Relatively few senators go down to defeat in any given election. The greatest numbers occurred in 1954 and 1966. But this factor has remained fairly constant since 1950. Only 19% of those incumbent who run get defeated. This low rate of defeat is to be expected. Incumbents enjoy great advantages in U.S. politics. Incumbency success cannot be entirely attributed to non-partisanship however. In spite of the non-partisan election system 70% of the incumbent losses meant a change in caucus affiliation. This pattern was not so marked before 1958 when many veterans were defeated by men who assumed the same caucus membership. However, since 1958 the Minnesota situation differs only slightly from a partisan system.

The relatively few incumbents losses do account for nearly half of the non-returnees. In 1946 most Senators who failed to return stepped out voluntarily (or at least not because of defeat at the polls). In 1962 probably many incumbents retired voluntarily because reapportionment had radically changed their districts. However, in the other four elections a majority re-

TABLE VII-3  
Incumbency Success in Minnesota Legislative Elections

Year	Number of Incumbents Defeated			Percent Involving Caucus Change	Defeats as % of Incumbents Running	Defeated Incumbent as % of all Non-returnees
	General Election	Primary Election	Total Election			
<u>Senate</u>						
1946	4	1	5	60%	9.4%	26.3%
1950	11	0	11	63	19	55
1954	15	0	15	54	27	55.5
1958	10	0	10	80	17.1	52.6
1962	8	1	9	89	17	39.1
1966	14	0	14	79	25	56
Average	10.3	.3	10.6	71%	19.1%	47%
<u>House</u>						
1946	14	0	14	36%	12.4%	43.8%
1948	19	0	19	53	16.2	57.6
1950	16	0	16	44	14.4	45.7
1952	16	0	16	50	13.1	67
1954	20	0	20	75	18	50
1956	23	0	23	87	17.9	92
1958	10	0	10	90	8.8	37
1960	12	1	13	58	9.8	60
1962	21	0	21	81	20.8	41.2
1964	12	1	13	100	8.7	55
1966	23	5	28	71	19.8	54.8
1968	18	0	18	83	14.4	41.3
Average	16.5	.5	17	68%	14.2%	55.3%

tired involuntarily. An even smaller proportion of House incumbents were defeated. On the average about two-thirds of these contests represented caucus change. The differences between the pre and post 1955 periods is much more distinct here than in the Senate. One does not find the same sharp distinction on sources of retirement. But on the whole a majority of House incumbents retired from election defeat, not from voluntary causes.

#### Summary

At best the Minnesota legal-constitutional setting offers only a moderate basis for legislative power. There are numerous constitutional restrictions on its substantive and financial policymaking. The constitution also circumscribes legislative discretion on its own procedures. Although it may block constitutional change it opposes, it cannot necessarily force desired positive changes. On the other hand legislative leaders probably do not feel unduly hampered by these restrictions. Further, such restrictions limit the governor as much as they do the legislative body. It has been able to develop a set of procedural rules that strike a good balance between individual rights and the ability for the whole body to operate with dispatch if it wishes to do so. Also, since the 1950's the electorate seems to accept legislative initiatives for change fairly readily. If the legislature wishes to change its constitutional status, it would seem to be able to do so. Finally, the legislature has managed to retain at least as strong a grip on the administrative branch as has the governor.

In some respects a lack of legislative professionalism presents greater obstacles. Early in the period these resources

were especially weak. They have improved since 1963 to put Minnesota in a moderately strong position. Still, short sessions, low salary, and very scanty staffing prevent Minnesota from having a full time legislature. Again, in one respect this obstacle is more apparent than real. At least a majority of legislators demonstrate very strong loyalty to the institution by staying on longer than would be the case in most states. A majority retire not voluntarily but from defeat. The "active minority" certainly have much more experience than do most governors. This experience and loyalty gives the legislature some strength from which to work.

### III. POPULAR SUPPORT

Historically, the legislature was considered to be the main defender of the people against the kingly (executive) power. Over the years the chief executive gradually replaced the legislature as popular spokesman. To the extent that a legislature can undercut this dominant position it strengthens its own standing. It has already been demonstrated that many recent Minnesota governors have not received high popular favor. The question here will be has the legislature benefitted from executive unpopularity. First, will be examined whether the legislature can credibly claim to represent the entire people. Secondly, popular support for the legislature will be directly evaluated.

#### Legislative Apportionment

Under Article IV, section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution both houses must be apportioned equally throughout the state on a population basis. Reapportionment must take place after each

decennial census. Senators must be elected from contiguous single member districts. No representative district may be divided in forming a senate district. There can be no more than one senator for every 5,000 persons, no more than one representative for every 2,000 persons.

These constitutional requirements have not always been honored. The Minnesota legislature apportioned itself just before World War I in 1913. No other apportionment passed the body until 1959 (and this went into effect for the 1962 election). Before the major U.S. Supreme Court reapportionment decision in 1962 only four states had delayed reapportionment longer than Minnesota. If one accepted numerical population equality for districts as a standard, the Minnesota Senate ranked 26th in malapportionment, the House 31st. Naturally urban counties suffered the most. By the 1950 census the Hennepin-Ramsey county area contained 35% of the population. It received 22% of the House members and 23% of the Senate.<sup>19</sup> This means that it had 8 less Senate seats and 16 less House seats than it deserved under an equal population standard.

Reapportionment became a recurring legislative struggle from 1945 through 1966. The state supreme court refused to rule on a reapportionment suit in 1945 on the grounds that it was a political question.<sup>20</sup> So proponents turned to the legislature. For many years Representative Alf Bergerud, from an extremely under-apportioned suburban district, authored the principle reapportionment bills. His efforts consistently failed up until 1959 session. John Bond attributes this failure to three forces:

rural fear of the cities, conservative fear of increased DFL strength, and legislator self protection.<sup>21</sup>

Judicial pressure in 1959 finally reversed the long string of defeats. A federal district court accepted a reapportionment suit in 1959, but allowed the legislature to proceed with its own reapportionment. The 1959 act increased the number of House seats from 131 to 135. Five Senate seats shifted to metropolitan areas. About 11 additional House seats moved in this direction.

TABLE VII-4

Metropolitan/Nonmetropolitan Seats in the Minnesota Legislature,  
1945-1969

Year	% Metro	Senate		% Metro	House	
		Number Metro	Number Non-metro		Number Metro	Number Non-metro
1945	27%	18	49	27%	35	96
1951	30%	20	47	28%	37	94
1961	31%	21	46	30%	39	92
1963	40%	26	41	31%	50	85
1967	45%	31	36	45%	61	74

Source: Computed from The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945, 1951, 1961, 1963, 1967

The 1959 apportionment was based on the 1950 census. It was obsolete before it went into effect. This became especially evident under the increasingly stringent court standards for population equality. Under the 1960 census 39.1% of the population could theoretically elect a Senate majority, 35% could elect a House majority.<sup>22</sup> Again under court pressure the legislative reapportionment in a 1966 special session amid heavy partisan wrangling. This reapportionment shifted about five Senate seats and eleven House seats to the metropolitan areas. Reapportionment battles are not at an end in Minnesota. The 1970

census will probably show that the metropolitan areas contain over 50% of the state's population. The legislature will have to go through the process again.

For our purposes the central question is did the high malapportionment negatively affect popular attitudes toward the legislature? The best guess would be not much. Bond commented that during the 1950's polls showed that people were either apathetic or unfamiliar with the issue.<sup>23</sup> By the early 1960's, when the issue received greater publicity, awareness may have been greater. Even then one doubts that those favoring reapportionment felt passionately about it. Minnesota remains less metropolitan than most states. Both Bond and Backstrom concluded that most major state issues are not urban/rural in nature. The division was more psychological than actual.<sup>24</sup>

#### Popular Perceptions of the Legislature

General reactions to the legislature may be a better indicator of popular support. Such evidence as is available is not reassuring. For one thing most people simply do not pay any attention to the legislature. (See Table VII-5) Very recently,

TABLE VII-5  
"Do you pay a great deal, some, or very little attention to the state legislature?"

	1951	1953	1969
Great Deal	9%	9%	14%
Some	32	37	51
Very Little	58	54	35
No Answer	1	-	-

Source: Minnesota Poll

probably in the late 1960's, interest increased. But at best only about 14% of the population follows the legislature closely.

As a result supportive attitudes are highly neutral. This was especially true before 1959. (See Table VII-6) In the early 1950's a majority rated the legislature "fair" in handling the state's problems. Almost one-fourth saw it as "good". Much as with the governor these supportive attitudes eroded over

TABLE VII-6

"In general would you say that the (year) legislature did a good, fair, or poor job of handling the state's important problems?"

	1951	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963		1965	1967
Good	27%	27%	23%	21%	10%	49%	14%	SA	4%	7%
Fair	54	59	46	41	31		50	MA	22	27
Poor	13	11	14	12	48	36	20	N	30	24
NA	6	3	17	26	11	11	16	MD	28	25
								SD	16	17

Unfortunately the questions asked was not the same in every year. In 1961 the good and fair categories were consolidated. In 1965 and 1967 the poll asked do you strongly agree, moderately agree, moderately disagree or strongly disagree that the legislature has done a good job. "N" equals neutral.

Source: The Minnesota Poll

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time. For the first time from 1959 through 1967 a large proportion rated the legislature as poor, or with disapproval. Only 1963 was an exception. Significantly, for much of that session the legislature had no governor to contend with because of the long election recount. Except for 1951 the sessions with high disapproval reflect times of high public disagreement between the legislature and the governor. The years 1959 and 1965 mark severe partisan differences. In 1967 the struggle over the sales tax drew public attention.

Summary

The Minnesota legislature would not seem to rate high marks

on popular resources. Up until 1963 one could not say that the apportionment system accurately reflected state population distribution. Metropolitan areas were especially at a disadvantage. At no time have general public supportive attitudes been extraordinarily high. And since 1959 the legislature has often met with high disapproval. On the other hand one should probably conclude that this dimension is as much neutral as negative. The apportionment system did not create great support, but the public was not much interested in the question. In the last decade if the legislature has not met with great approval, neither has the governor. Neither reap any great advantage.

IV CONCLUSION

The general powers of the Minnesota legislature are not very strong. Constitutional-legal powers are moderate at best. And these have not changed appreciably during the period under consideration. The constitution checks legislative discretion in procedures, policy-making, and finances. But it imposes much the same restrictions on the governor. Lack of institutional resources present a greater potential handicap. Only since 1963 has Minnesota taken steps toward providing a full time legislature. Staffing, compensation, and session time were relatively low during most of the period. One would not expect the legislature to have had as great an access to technical information as would the governor. But it did have one advantage. Minnesota has relatively high tenure among its legislators. This means that a fair number devoted extensive time to legislative business. There were always several dedicated men who had extensive experience.

And on this score the legislature enjoyed clear superiority over Minnesota governors.

The legislature does not fare any better from popular resources than from professional. People do not pay much attention to it. When directly asked, they do not express strongly supportive attitudes. Minnesota governors probably have not utilized their relative potential advantage on this dimension as they might have.

## Chapter 7- Footnotes

1. Charles H. Backstrom, The Minnesota State Legislature, a background paper presented at the Minnesota-Dakotas regional session. The American Assembly on State Legislatures in American Politics, Moorhead, Minnesota, June 7-10, 1967, p. 17.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
3. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1953; pp. 64-81; The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-70, pp. 96-115; These contain the rules of the Minnesota Senate and the Minnesota House for the relevant session. The following discussion is based on these rules.
4. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1957 (St. Paul: The State of Minnesota, 1958) p. 25.
5. Backstrom, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.
6. G.T. Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, second revised edition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) p. 102.
7. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-70, (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1970) p. 375.
8. Backstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
10. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1953 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1954) p. 62.
11. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1955 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1956) p. 64; Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1957, pp. 24, 89.
12. Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1953, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-53; Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-70, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1, 89-92.
13. Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1953, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
14. Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1969-70, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
15. Backstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
16. *Loc. Cit.*
17. Duane Lockard, "The State Legislator", in Alexander Heard (ed.) State Legislatures in American Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965) p. 104.
18. Charles Adrian, The Non-Partisan Legislature in Minnesota (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1950), pp. 236-43.
19. John Bond, Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1956) pp. 233, 254-6).
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 280-3.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 287-8.
22. G.T. Mitau, *op. cit.*, pp. 98.
23. Bond, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-6, 393.
24. Backstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Bond, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-9.

CHAPTER EIGHT  
THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE: ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

Even if a legislature does not possess great formal resources, it may be cohesive and strong because of its tight organizational discipline and strong internal leadership. This discipline and leadership may revolve around the party caucus in strong party states. The caucus may act in concert because of common policy and constituency ties. Or party leaders may exert discipline through control over nominations, patronage, and internal legislative rewards. Legislative strength may also derive from disciplined action under strong, able leadership. This leadership may come from formal leaders, such as the presiding officers. Or caucus floor leaders may keep the system operating in an efficient, unified fashion. Power may also flow from the committee system. If the body gives great discretion to its committees over substantive policies, and if these committees are headed by strong, able, and expert chairmen, the committees could act as a bulwark against the governor. Finally, even when parties and formal leaders are weak, some legislatures retain independence through a set of strong, independent senior leaders. These men, with long experience at the state capitol, can and do regard the governor as a "new boy" whose interests and demands need be of small concern to them. The importance of each of these organizational factors in Minnesota will be considered in turn.

I. THE CAUCUS

Aside from Nebraska, Minnesota is unique in possessing a non-partisan legislature. That is, no party designation appears

on the election ballot. And, officially, there are no party caucuses in the legislature. As extensive research on local non-partisanship has made clear, the legal absence of party designation does not assure the absence of partisan influence in practice. And even if parties are absent, organizations may develop that perform party-like functions. Under legal non-partisanship practice varies greatly. Decision-making may be purely on an individual basis with no continuing organization whatsoever. Alliances would form for each bill or each policy area. Or temporary organizations may grow up for each session only. During the 1940's and 1950's this appeared to be the pattern in California. Each session a new factional structure, crossing party lines, grew up around the contest for speaker or majority leader. Another alternative would be the development of permanent caucus organizations that perform party-like functions. Membership, particularly leadership, in these caucuses would continue from session to session. This organization may have a purely legislative existence, or it might be tied to the external party organization. The functions that such an organization might perform would be: a) recruit and run candidates in elections b) organize the legislature and fill leadership positions and c) provide decision-making cues both in committee and on the floor. It seems clear that the Minnesota legislature has had continuous organizations that perform the functions. The basis for caucus organizations, and how they have performed these functions, will be examined in the remainder of this section.

#### Caucus Development

Charles Adrian, an earlier student of the Minnesota legislature, has argued that the state obtained a non-partisan legislature by accident.

When the thirty-eighth legislature of the state met in January, 1913, not one member of that body had the slightest ideas that before the session ended the state would be the surprised possessor of a law-making body chosen without party designation.

Some veteran legislators vigorously deny Adrian's conclusions.

They argue that non-partisanship has positive benefits and was

a deliberate act.<sup>2</sup> The author is not interested in debating the merits of the case here. The principle interest is in discovering how the system has actually functioned. It is fair to say that up until 1961 the general public perceived more merit than deficit in the non-partisan system. According to the Minnesota Poll only 14% supported party designation in 1945. By 1961 50% supported such a change, and this had grown to 65% in 1969.<sup>3</sup> In a way this changing public attitude on non-partisanship probably well reflects changing practice within the legislature itself.

In the early years Minnesota's non-partisan system reflected a true non-partisanship with organization and decision-making resembling the practice in one-party Southern legislatures. From 1913-1929 the Republican oriented legislators enjoyed such large majorities that they were split by factionalism. The House had a personalistic organization that revolved around speaker candidates who used committee assignments as a bargaining tool. Under this arrangement some Democratic oriented legislators were included in the leadership group.<sup>4</sup> The patterns were not even this clear in the Senate. Adrian concludes that the important

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chairmen controlled the body through the rules committee. This pattern changed somewhat in the 1930's. With the success of Farmer-Labor governors Farmer-Laborites in the House began to meet on the governor's program and formed the nucleus of the Liberal caucus. This caucus, composed of Farmer-Laborites, Democrats, and liberal Republicans, organized the House from 1933 to 1938. They never controlled the Senate. As a response to the Liberals, the Conservatives became more organized with Roy Dunn as floor leader in 1933. The caucuses still were not cohesive, and did not enjoy a stable membership. But there was some semblance of organization.

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Starting in 1939 the Conservative caucus took over and formed the basis for the conservative organization that dominated legislative affairs throughout much of the period under study. This dominance partially resulted from Harold Stassen's victory for governor in 1938. The Conservatives elected Lawrence Hall (a Democrat) as speaker from 1939 to 1948. Roy Dunn as majority leader at least held pre-session caucus conferences where officers were selected and some policy matters decided. Also, the majority Senate caucus became more tightly organized under Charles N. Orr. However, up until 1949 or 1951 (perhaps 1955 in the Senate) the majority lacked a cohesive minority opposition. Although the Liberal caucus elected floor leaders, it only gradually became cohesive as its numbers grew. Since the Conservatives held such overwhelming majorities there was no need to exert tight discipline. But at least there was regular leadership and a fairly stable membership. Adrian demonstrates that the

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Table VIII-1 Caucuses, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970

Year	SENATE			HOUSE		
	Conservative	Liberal (DFL)	Ind.	Conservative	Liberal (DFL)	Ind.
1945	57	10		107	24	
1947	55	10	2	105	26	
1949	57	10		86	45	
1951	51	16		87	44	
1953	52	15		85	46	
1955	48	19		65	66	
1957	48	19		61	70	
1959	43	24		59	72	
1961	43	24		58	73	
1963	43	24		80	54	1
1965	44	23		78	56	1
1967	45	22		93	42	
1969	44	23		85	50	

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969; the Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969; the Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

propensity for members to shift caucuses from one session to the other had slowed down by the 1940's. From 1933 to 1949 an average of twelve members shifted caucuses per session.<sup>8</sup> During the 1930's seventy-six members changed. But during the 1940's this was cut to forty-four.

From 1945 to 1970 the caucuses had become fairly stable, cohesive organizations for conducting legislative business. And they became more so, not less, during the period. Earlier in the period the minority caucus was weak, and the majority correspondingly less stable. Not until 1959 did Senate Liberals possess the more than one-third votes needed to block extra-ordinary action by the Senate majority. The House Liberals achieved sizeable strength by 1949. And their accession to majority control in 1955 really marks the beginning of strong caucus organization in the House. Besides the growing Liberal strength,

declining caucus switching also indicates increased organization. (See Table VIII-2) Caucus switching is measured by the number of legislators with continuous legislative service who moved from one caucus to another between two continuous sessions. This phenomenon occurred relatively frequently in the House during the 1930's and 1940's. However, during the 1950's such switches

Table VIII-2 Caucus Switching, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970.

Year.	SENATE			HOUSE		
	Cons. to Liberal	Liberal to Cons.	Ind. to Cons.	Cons. to Liberal	Liberal to Cons.	Ind. to Cons.
1947	0	1	0	2	4	0
1949	0	0	2	7	1	0
1951	0	1	0	0	4	0
1953	0	1	0	0	1	0
1955	0	0	0	3	0	0
1957	0	0	0	0	1	0
1959	0	0	0	1	0	0
1961	0	0	0	0	0	0
1963	0	0	0	0	0	0
1965	0	0	0	0	0	0
1967	0	0	0	0	0	1
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969; The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969; The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

averaged only two per session. And there were none after 1959.

Switching occurred hardly at all in the Senate. No such instances are recorded after 1953. So, although caucus lines were hazy during the 1940's, they became quite sharp in the 1950's, and have been absolute in the last decade.

#### Organization

Caucus affiliation manifests itself most strongly in organizational matters. One recent student of the Minnesota legislature

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observes that the majority caucus exercises 100% control. The majority selects the presiding officers and committee chairmen, makes other committee assignments, promulgates procedural rules, and hires legislative staff. Every committee chairman belongs to the majority caucus. And that caucus enjoys majority control on all committees. The minority caucus has enjoyed few rights beyond selecting its own caucus leaders. In the Senate it had no right to appoint its own committee members up until 1967. Starting with that session most minority requests have been channeled through the minority leader. During the DFL dominance in the House a formal rule acknowledged minority rights in committee assignments. Although the speaker finally makes all assignments, the minority leader's requests for his own people are usually honored. Also in the last few years the minority has been allocated some research staff.

Caucus membership is based primarily on self-selection. Since 1953 at least both caucuses in each house have held pre-session meetings to which likely caucus members are invited. Supposedly the Senate Conservative caucus members must approve new members by majority vote. But veteran members could not recall turning down anyone who wished to belong.<sup>10</sup> Caucus officers are selected at these meetings. And members are committed to vote for caucus candidates for legislative office, rules, and committee assignments.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, these are the only matters on which members are bound to adhere to caucus positions. This especially holds true for Senate Conservatives.<sup>12</sup> No Conservative Senators could recall binding commitments on anything but organizational matters. And

the Senate organization generally has been more informal than that in the House. This was probably a function of the weaker Liberal (or DFL) organization. They had only a very loose and ineffective organization until Harold Schultz became minority leader in 1955.<sup>13</sup> Prior to 1953 they did not even nominate a candidate for President Pro Tem. Even under Schultz the caucus seldom met except for preliminary organizational matters. The caucus reached the peak of its unity from 1963 to 1966 under Paul Thuet.<sup>14</sup> Thuet used Governor Elmer L. Andersen's "lame duck" appointments as a rallying point for caucus discipline. This discipline continued on policy matters in cooperation with Governor Rolvaag. The Liberals also fought the majority caucus rules suggestions each session, but with no success.

The House Conservatives achieved tighter caucus discipline rather earlier than did the Senate. Before 1955 the caucus met prior to the session to make organizational decisions. These early meetings mainly provided the leadership an opportunity to size up the capabilities of new members.<sup>15</sup> Beyond that the caucus rarely met more than three times a session. Occasionally the leader, Roy Dunn, would call the caucus together to tell them what must be done. But because they had such large majorities, greater discipline was seldom needed.<sup>16</sup> During its years out of power from 1955-1962 the caucus decided that greater discipline would be a prerequisite to regaining its majority position. So meetings were held more frequently.<sup>17</sup> This held true until 1967-1970 when increasing majorities again lessened the need for tight organization. As with their Senate counterparts the House Liberals

remained small and poorly organized prior to 1949. They held meetings under caucus leadership prior to that time but lacked the numbers sufficient for organizational "muscle". A bare caucus majority, coupled with a DFL governor's victory, created a very tight and disciplined organization in 1955. Several DFL House leaders referred to the tremendous spirit of togetherness fostered by the hard won majority and its precarious existence. (The term liberal and DFL have been used interchangeably up to this point. After 1955 many Liberals sought to openly identify their caucus as DFL and that usage shall be used from here on out.) As the caucus margin gradually increased through 1961 the discipline gradually weakened. As a minority party from 1963 on the DFL cohesion weakened further.

#### Decision-making

Although both caucuses presented a united front on organizational matters, it is uncertain how much influence they exerted in policy decisions. Senior Senate Conservatives especially insist that the caucus performs no policy role. Senator Gordon Rosenmeier flatly stated that the caucus met once at the beginning of the session and never afterward. Policy matters were never discussed.<sup>19</sup> Others were not so categorical. But all agreed that under no circumstances did the caucus take a binding vote. Such a vote could not have been enforced. Some Senators indicated that policy was discussed at times. Prior to 1955 this was probably on an informal basis through personal contacts among chairmen. Even at that Senator Ancher Nelsen, whose service goes back to the earlier period (1935-1948), recalled that they did

meet to discuss major substantive proposals. Members, the leadership, and the bill authors could know then where things stood on a particular issue. <sup>20</sup> And even though most senators declare that the caucus as such never discussed policy, they acknowledged that from about 1955 or 1957 a "study group" has met for that purpose. Some senators not close to the prevailing "in group" initiated the weekly meetings, and gradually most members began to attend as a means of keeping informed. <sup>21</sup> Now chairmen, and others who have pending legislation, make reports on the status of legislation. Members exchange opinions. In this manner all members know whether the caucus is united or split. <sup>22</sup> Outside observers believe that caucus impact goes beyond this. Charles Backstrom concluded that a requisite for caucus membership is to support committee recommendations on the floor. <sup>23</sup> This would mean that caucus affiliation greatly influenced roll call voting. And some argue that the Minnesota legislature splits as much along caucus lines as the Congress does along party lines. <sup>24</sup>

The Conservative House caucus has more clearly become a policy body. Prior to 1955 this happened infrequently. But even then, according to Speaker Larry Hall, they would meet on big policy issues. <sup>25</sup> Starting in the late 1950's, the caucus began meeting on a regular basis to discuss policy. And after 1963, when it regained the majority, these meetings were used to give some coherence to decision-making. The caucus meets weekly, and sometimes daily late in the session. The primary purpose is to allow the leadership and committee chairmen to report on

pending legislation. Members are free to speak from the floor and bring up matters on their own. Feelings may be measured by informal discussion or an informal show of hands. On major policy issues the caucus did take a definite stand by vote. These were not exactly binding, but members were expected to usually go along. Deviations were allowed for constituency interest or necessity. In this way chairmen and the leadership could know whether an issue could be brought to the floor without seriously splitting the caucus.<sup>26</sup> The caucus did not enforce these decisions through sanctions. Veteran legislators<sup>27</sup> emphasized that no caucus member had ever told them how to vote. But common philosophy, common constituencies, and some loyalty to the caucus means that few deviate on really big issues. The frequency of caucus policy influence has varied greatly even in recent years. With the large majorities in 1967 and 1969 the leadership used meetings less frequently. Indeed some younger members thought that the caucus was not used nearly enough as<sup>28</sup> a policy shaping tool.

Since the DFL caucus has become better organized, and have had a chance at power, they have always been more inclined to take a disciplined stand on policy matters. At least since 1955 the Senate caucus has met to discuss and debate policy. Over time these became regularized weekly meetings. Under the driving influence of Paul Thuet (1963-1966) meetings were held daily toward the sessions end. Thuet sometimes asked for temporary adjournment of floor debate so that DFLers could caucus on a<sup>29</sup> major issue. These meetings were mostly informational with

positions established by a show of hands. But on major issues, where the party, DFL governor, or caucus had previously taken strong stands, men like Schultz, Thuet, and Grittner acted as policy leaders. On the "gut issues" they deliberately made a formal partisan record to take into the next election.<sup>30</sup> These positions were no more binding on the DFL than on the Conservatives.<sup>31</sup> But "arm twisting" and "moral suasion" were used to try to keep members in line. More often than with the Conservatives, the DFL group could simply assume policy unity.

House DFLers followed this same general pattern. But the House caucus became a strong policy organization somewhat sooner. Starting in 1949 the caucus met regularly, sometimes weekly or daily, as a policy conference. These meetings developed a general program for the caucus.<sup>32</sup> This process was stepped up in 1955 when the caucus attempted to put across the governor's program with their one vote majority. As Speaker A. I. Johnson expressed it, the caucus tried to work out in advance a program that all members could successfully support.<sup>33</sup> As with the House Conservatives, the leadership, committee chairmen, and bill authors would explain pending legislation, then open the floor for discussion. As leader, Fred Cina would see that votes were taken on major policy (especially gubernatorial issues) and the members would be expected to follow the majority position. Some of these votes were regarded by the leadership as binding.<sup>34</sup> No sanctions were directly brought to bear on deviants. However, excessive mavericks could not expect loyal caucus support for their own bills. The leadership took a more active role than in the

Conservative caucus to sway members on close votes. But, as with Senate DFLers, cohesion generally came about because of common beliefs, common constituency, and a common cause.

It seems evident that all caucuses were used to at least discuss policy. And all but the Senate Conservatives definitely used it to shape a policy stance on major issues. Does this stance serve as a cue for floor votes? That question cannot be answered definitely at this point. The frequency and strength of caucus voting will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter Nine.

### Recruitment

A final party-type function is the recruitment and campaign support for legislative candidates. Under the non-partisan system, candidates run in primaries where no caucus or party designation appears on the ballot. The two highest vote getters then run in the general election. Again no party designation appears on the separate ballot.<sup>35</sup> No party labels are used during the campaign. Up until recently this system discouraged, but did not completely eliminate, party influence in general elections. As in partisan systems, other groups, such as unions, farmers, citizens, and business, engage in recruitment. Under the non-partisan system they are simply more active. Also, as might be expected in a non-partisan system, incumbency produces special advantages. It reduces competition for a post. There have been more uncontested elections since partisan identification was eliminated.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand incumbency does not produce an absolute advantage. As was demonstrated earlier in this

chapter, an average of from 14 to 19% of the incumbents are defeated. But incumbents probably can develop a more autonomous existence when no party tie exists.

Under this system the caucus participates as one among many recruiting groups. House Conservatives have always provided some recruitment and campaign help. Earlier the activity was very loose and informal. Beginning in 1954 this gradually became more organized and refined. Before 1954 influential Conservatives, largely on the Rules committee, did some work on an individual basis within their own congressional districts.<sup>37</sup> Majority leader Roy Dunn carried the burden in encouraging candidates. He also raised financial assistance from private groups. After he lost his national Republican committeeman's post in 1952 he let recruiting activities slide. This in turn partially contributed to the Conservative defeat in 1954.<sup>38</sup> The caucus as a whole picked up the slack and gradually expanded its activities. Since 1963 these activities have been centered around campaign committees within each congressional district. Although they perform some recruitment, this is not the major task. More frequently, self-starters will contact caucus members in their area. The caucus then provides some funds and policy information in the general election. Very recently the caucus has hired an agent who goes into the districts with campaign materials on bills and DFL voting records.<sup>39</sup> The Senate Conservative caucus, by contrast, does not provide campaign services as such. The caucus leaders may discuss problems, see if an incumbent is in trouble, and try to improve his constituency

position with assignments in the legislature. But external campaigning has been left to other groups.<sup>40</sup>

The DFL House caucus did very little prior to 1954. However, in that year a few caucus activists organized a Liberal Legislature Volunteer Committee with representatives from each Congressional District. Representative Lawrence Yetka raised funds, primarily from labor unions. The DFL party allowed some proceeds from the Jefferson-Jackson day dinner tickets purchased by labor unions to go toward the legislative campaign.<sup>41</sup> Representative Donald Wozniak organized most of the actual campaign work. This included recruiting candidates, financing campaigns, and providing booklets on campaign issues and campaign techniques. Organizers also held regional conferences at which top public relations and research men came in to brief candidates.<sup>42</sup> In all, forty-six House candidates (and twelve Senate candidates) received aid. On request the committee granted up to \$100 per candidate. Since that time a formal caucus recruitment committee has carried on campaign activities with varying scope and success. Before 1958 the Senate DFL caucus was too small to do very much. The DFL party and labor unions dominated campaigns here. In 1958, the caucus, with party help, did enter the field. These activities became large scale only with the 1966 election.<sup>43</sup> The caucus hired a full time campaign agent and had funds (\$25,000) for the first time. Minority leader Paul Thuet traveled extensively on behalf of DFL candidates.

Caucuses then have done at least modest campaign work since 1954. Generally, their efforts along these lines have been

growing. It is uncertain how far the caucus factor carries over into the final party-type function, providing cues for voters. Certainly in the 1940's and 1950's there was little information to provide such cues. But all Conservatives and most DFLers believe that even this influence has been growing since the political system became competitive in 1954.<sup>44</sup> Since candidates increasingly have run as DFLers or Conservatives, these legislators believe that the voting public possesses ample opportunity to make the connection. Probably this connection became apparent sooner in the Twin Cities than in the rural areas. And certainly a few candidates still run as independents. But considering how low voter information is even in partisan campaigns, the connection probably is still not exact as long as no designation appears on the ballot.

#### Party Activity

The foregoing discussion indicates that the Minnesota legislature does not operate under a purely non-partisan system. Fairly stable caucuses have increasingly performed party type functions. The next logical question would be whether the caucuses are not simply the Republican and DFL parties under another guise? Or do these caucuses maintain a purely legislative existence? This question cannot be answered with any degree of precision. On the one hand, even if one could establish that the legislators had partisan affiliation this would not necessarily mean that such affiliation carried over into their legislative activities. Nor would it necessarily mean that the external party organization, as such, exerted leverage over the legislators. On the other hand, one cannot necessarily attribute a lack of

external party influence to a formally non-partisan situation. Even in states under partisan elections the legislative group often operates independently from the party. This is especially true in Midwestern and Western states with moralistic political cultures as Minnesota has.

Influence from direct party organizational activity can readily be dismissed. Legislators from neither caucus and neither house perceived much lobbying activity.<sup>45</sup> Governors from both parties affirmed this observation. At the most such lobbying activities may have increased slightly in the last two or three sessions.

Legislators do acknowledge philosophical and psychological affinity to the parties however. And this affinity definitely has increased since 1955. The Conservative caucus, especially in the Senate, reflected this party affiliation later and to a lesser degree than has the DFL caucus. In commenting on the 1953 session Professor Ralph Fjelstad noted that about 20% of the Conservatives had held Republican party office.<sup>46</sup> Party affiliation has accelerated so since that time that by 1969 85% of House Conservatives and 75% of Senate Conservatives openly acknowledged some relationship to the Republican party.<sup>47</sup> Certainly many House leaders held high office in the Republican party. Roy Dunn was the long time party national committeeman. Speaker John Hartle and Representative P. K. Peterson both were state party chairmen. Odin Langen, Albert Quie, Ancher Nelsen, and John Zwach all advanced to Congress as Republicans after serving in the Minnesota legislature as Conservatives. There

were several exceptions, particularly in the 1940's and 1950's, to this general relationship. Some old line Democrats, Farmer-Laborites, and genuine independents held major legislative posts within the Conservative Caucus. Lawrence Hall, Speaker from 1939-1948, was a Democrat when he entered the legislature. Prominent Conservative Senators such as Gerald Mullin (1931-1956), Thomas Welch (1939-1962), James Carley (1935-1952), Grover George (1947-1962), and Donald Sinclair (1947-) were avowed Democrats. Senator Gordon Rosenmeier (1941-1970) must be considered a genuine independent. But by the 1960's these exceptions had dwindled considerably.

DFL caucus members have always more openly demonstrated their allegiance to the DFL party. Most caucus members have preferred the DFL label to Liberal, at least since 1954. By 1959 80% of the caucus acknowledged the party affiliation.<sup>48</sup> Many legislative leaders served as county and district party chairmen. The caucus has official representation on the DFL central committee. The only major source of competing loyalties would be the labor unions. The unions, more than the party, were responsible for promoting influential DFL legislators such as Karl Grittner (House- 1953-1958, Senate- 1959-1970), Representative Joseph Karth (1951-1958), Representative William Shovell (1953-1962), Representative Peter Popovich (1953-1962), and Representative Martin Sabo (1961-). Still, by the 1960's DFL caucus equalled DFL party in both houses.

In many respects the affinity between the caucuses and the political parties can be traced through their common constituency base. Conservatives are not always elected from Republican

Districts, nor do DFL caucus members always come from DFL districts. But the majority in each caucus does so. The degree of congruence can be seen from Table VIII-3. This reflects the total percentage of districts in each session where DFL legislators came from DFL districts and Conservatives came from Republican districts. If one accepts that there should be a congruence between party and caucus, then the remaining districts

Table VIII-3 Relationships Between Caucus and Party, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970.

Year	HOUSE		SENATE	
	% Districts Congruent	+ DFL <sub>2</sub> Seats	% Districts Congruent	± DFL Seats
1945	83%	-12	81%	- 5
1947	83%	- 6	80%	- 5
1949	73%	+ 6	78%	- 9
1951	78%	+19	79%	+ 2
1953	78%	+11	73%	- 2
1955	76%	- 8	58%	-20
1957	82%	+ 1	60%	-17
1959	76%	-22	58%	-26
1961	74%	+16	81%	- 3
1963	75%	-14	79%	- 8
1965	76%	-12	79%	- 8
1967	76%	- 4	81%	- 1
1969	75%	+ 4	83%	0
		-1.7		-7.8

1. Congruency designates that a district carried by the Republican gubernatorial candidate was held by a Conservative; a district carried by a DFL gubernatorial candidate was held by a DFLer.
2. This indicates the number of seats over or under the amount the DFL caucus "should" have based on the number of districts carried by DFL gubernatorial candidates.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1970.

are "deviants". In both houses over time the deviant districts have constituted a small, but still significant, proportion of the total, averaging 25%. The House performance remained fairly stable throughout. But if anything congruence has declined slightly. This

goes contrary to what should have happened if increased competition really sharpened voter perception of the relationship between party and caucus, and if voters really made decisions on that basis. The Senate too has remained fairly stable, except for the Freeman administration (1955-1960). Then almost 40% of the districts fell into the "deviant" category. These are largely accounted for by districts that cast their votes for Freeman as governor while still electing Conservative Senators. Table VIII-4 reveals that there has traditionally been a stronger relationship between Republican districts and Conservatives than between DFL districts and DFL legislators. Over time men elected from DFL districts constituted about 70% of the DFL House caucus. But this fluctuated greatly. From 1949 to 1953 almost half of the caucus came from Republican districts. The relationship then grew stronger, peaking under Freeman in 1959. In the last two sessions the relationship declined again. Conversely, men elected from DFL districts usually do caucus DFL, but not always. There were many "mavericks" early in the period. This "deviance" decreased sharply during the 1950's, but then shot up again in the 1960's. Again this is contrary to expectations if one assumes that increasing competition should sharpen the caucus-party relationship. The Conservatives have usually relied on Republican districts for their House membership. And only 1959, when Freeman carried an overwhelming majority of the districts, proves an exception to this. Only rarely have members elected from Republican districts crossed caucus lines.

The Senate does not deviate from this pattern of party-caucus relationship, with one exception. The DFL Caucus has always relied

Table VIII-4 Relationship Between Party and Caucus, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970.

Year	% DFL Legislative Seats From DFL Districts	% Cons. Seats from Republican Districts	% DFL Districts Held by DFL Legislators	% Republican Districts Held by Cons. Legislators
<u>H O U S E</u>				
1945	79%	81%	53%	95%
1947	70	87	58	92
1949	53	83	62	77
1951	45	94	80	77
1953	57	90	74	79
1955	82	69	73	80
1957	83	82	84	81
1959	93	54	71	86
1961	66	84	84	66
1963	81	70	65	85
1965	82	70	67	85
1967	67	80	61	84
1969	62	81	67	79
Average	71%	79%	69%	82%
<u>S E N A T E</u>				
1945	60%	81%	40%	92%
1947	60	84	40	92
1949	70	80	37	91
1951	50	88	57	85
1953	47	81	40	84
1955	80	50	38	83
1957	74	54	39	84
1959	96	37	46	94
1961	79	81	70	88
1963	88	74	66	92
1965	88	74	66	92
1967	73	84	64	86
1969	74	86	74	86
Average	72%	74%	52%	89%

Party control of a district is determined by which gubernatorial candidate carried the district in a given election.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1970.

heavily on DFL districts for its membership. The great popularity of Youngdahl (1950) and C. Elmer Anderson (1952) broke this pattern only temporarily. If anything the relationship has grown stronger over time. The Conservative caucus has taken its membership from Republican districts as much as had its House counterpart. Again

the one historical break came during the Freeman era. DFL senators from Republican districts have been very rare indeed. This was not the case for DFL districts. One great source of Senate Conservative strength has been the fact that a majority of men from DFL districts often crossed caucus lines. Beginning in 1961 there was a sharp break with this pattern. DFL districts generally produced DFL Senators from then on. The greater number of "deviants" probably partially accounts for the greater independence and much looser discipline reported in the Senate Conservative caucus.

In Chapter Four the urban-rural base for the two political parties was examined. The caucuses generally reflect the same bases for support. The DFL relies more heavily on metropolitan areas for caucus membership. The Conservatives rely overwhelmingly on non-metropolitan areas. However, one should remember that the relationship is not an absolute one. Over the last twenty-five years the majority of DFL caucus members have come from non-metropolitan areas. The greatest rural dominance was evident when the caucus controlled the House. On the Senate side metropolitan membership gradually grew until it provided a majority of the caucus during the early 1960's. (See Table VIII-5) Also one should note that over time a majority of metropolitan seats have gone as frequently to the Conservatives as to the DFL in the House. Except for 1959-1966 a majority always went to the Conservatives in the Senate. But the Conservative caucus has almost always enjoyed greater homogeneity than the DFL on the urban-rural dimension. On the average three-fourths of the Conservatives have been rural. Also, they retain a much stronger hold on the rural areas than

the DFL Caucus goes over the metropolitan areas. If there really are sharp policy differences between rural and urban areas, one would predict a greater potential for conflict, and less caucus cohesion, on the DFL side. However, through the late 1960's the caucuses grew more alike in their urban-rural composition. Again operating on the assumption of geographical policy differences,

Table VIII-5 Urban-Rural Composition of Minnesota Legislative Caucuses, 1945-1970.

Year	% DFL from Metro Districts	% Cons. from Rural Districts	% Metro Districts with DFLers	% Rural Districts with Conservatives	H O U S E				
1945	50%	79%	34%	88%					
1947	46	78	34	85					
1949	36	78	46	70					
1951	41	78	49	72					
1953	46	81	57	73					
1955	38	82	68	56					
1957	34	79	65	51					
1959	38	83	73	52					
1961	38	81	72	51					
1963	46	69	50	65					
1965	42	66	46	62					
1967	48	56	33	70					
1969	46	55	38	64					
Average	42%	74%	51%	65%					
					S E N A T E				
1945	30%	74%	17%	86%					
1947	40	75	22	38					
1949	40	75	22	88					
1951	31	71	20	77					
1953	33	71	20	79					
1955	37	73	35	74					
1957	37	73	35	74					
1959	46	79	55	72					
1961	50	79	57	74					
1963	58	72	54	76					
1965	58	72	54	76					
1967	45	56	33	68					
1969	43	55	33	65					
Average	42%	71%	35%	77%					

Source: Adapted from statistics in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

this would create an increased potential for divisions within both

caucuses.

The basis for rural DFLers and urban Conservatives can be found by recalling the regional distribution in the political parties. As with the Republican party, the Conservatives show unexpected strength in Minneapolis.<sup>50</sup> And since 1963 the Conservatives do benefit from the expected strength in suburban areas. The DFL usually controls seats from the Northern Iron Range, which is essentially non-metropolitan. In many respects the northwest, central, and western part of the state have been swing areas. They are overwhelmingly rural. The western and central areas shifted in caucus allegiance from Conservative to DFL paralleling the party shift. The shift did not occur so drastically in the Senate as in the House. The northwest also shifted up until 1963. Then the Conservatives showed greater strength than the Republicans in this area. These three regions account for a large part of the "Evilant" cases favoring Conservatives.

Parties influence the caucuses through more than common constituency. At least since 1954 they have exerted an increasing influence in the electoral process. Prior to 1950 neither party took much interest in legislative campaigns. Even when DFL legislators wanted to work for a legislative majority the DFL state central committee was especially negligent.<sup>51</sup> But in 1950 the DFL began to plan a more aggressive campaign based on dues paying clubs at the county level. Concentration centered on marginal districts.<sup>52</sup> Gradually this activity expanded. By 1954 the party was active in thirty-two close primaries. The regular central party organization supplied funds (up to \$200 per candidate),

campaign speakers, and sample ballots with endorsed legislators listed alongside candidates for partisan office. Precinct, county, and ward organizations recruited candidates and voted on endorse-

ments.<sup>53</sup> One should not overemphasize party influence. Party leaders might attempt to use financial assistance and endorsement to maintain legislative discipline on issues, but the sanctions

are not overwhelming.<sup>54</sup> Party activity is not extended to all districts. Indeed, up to the present time DFL legislators have resented what they consider a lack of effort by the party in

legislative races.<sup>55</sup> In part this is inadvertant. The party organization has not been strong enough throughout the state to bring sufficient resources to bear at the legislative level. The party did not even attempt to push candidates for the Senate until 1958.

The Republican state central committee also ignored legislative elections from 1914 until 1950. The Republicans did send one field man for each house to encourage candidates. After the primary they would offer some financial aid to those who wanted it.

Supported candidates were encouraged to caucus Conservative.

Republican efforts, like the DFL, were highly selective. They focused on districts where a DFLer had no opposition or where a Conservative incumbent was not running. Republican activity

increased markedly with the 1962 election.<sup>56</sup> Since reapportionment created new districts, the party saw a chance to elect more party oriented men. Even then the regular party organization left the major task to the Young Republicans. The party state-wide candidate search committee did include a legislative division for the first time. Central headquarters provided a research staff to

create campaign booklets on issues and techniques. It also suggested financial sources. The party established regional training centers for candidates. County organizations provided block workers and, in Hennepin County at least, endorsements through sample ballots. The party organization still refused to challenge Conservative incumbents. It did not go into districts where the organization was weak. Although not restricted to urban and suburban areas, most activity took place there. Caroline Wolf concludes that the party effort paid off. Although recruiters did not insist on party loyalty, 74% of those recruited had held party office or done party work. And party aid was marginally helpful to candidates.

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So by the 1960's both parties engaged in vigorous recruiting through search committees. Legislative races were highly partisan. In almost every district both candidates are supported by opposing parties.

In fact a number of observers believe that the major remnant of non-partisanship is the voters' failure to perceive the connection between caucus and party. On the other hand many Conservative legislators, and some DFLers, contend that voters, especially in urban areas, are aware of the connection. But even when they do know they choose not to vote for caucus on party label but for the man.

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### Summary

The caucus has served as a source of organizational strength in the Minnesota legislature. At no time since 1945 has either house operated in an entirely formless fashion. Since 1955 the caucus lines have become highly stable. The caucus does serve as a tool for selecting legislative leadership and setting procedural

rules. With the possible exception of the Senate Conservatives the caucus also becomes a basis for policy cues. Even Senate Conservatives have discussed policy as a study group since the late 1950's. And the caucus has increasingly acted to recruit members. Minnesota caucuses then perform, at least to a modest extent, functions attributed to parties. And the relationship between caucus and party also has been sharpened for both the DEL (1955 on) and the Conservatives (1963 on). Parties still do not directly lobby in the legislature, but they do recruit members. And the caucuses draw on the same constituency base as do the counterpart parties.

## II. Legislative Leadership

Another source of legislative strength might be the quality of its leadership. And able, skilled leadership can more readily develop cohesiveness and a sense of purpose among the members. They can act as a source for alternatives to the governor. And long continuity of service within the leadership can even give the legislature some advantage over the shorter term, governorship. There are three principle sets of leaders in the Minnesota legislature. Presiding officers function as formal leaders for the whole body. The floor leaders for each caucus act as partisan spokesmen. Finally, some senior men may perform as an informal leadership group based not on position but on experience and legislative expertise.

### The Presiding Officers

Presiding officers include the lieutenant governor (Senate), President Pro Tem (Senate) and Speaker (House). The first two

may be dismissed fairly quickly. The lieutenant governor is a constitutional officer directly elected by the people. As an outsider he has little influence within the Senate. He once possessed the power to appoint committees, but the Senate removed this power in 1931.<sup>60</sup> His sole powers now are to recognize members on the floor and to rule on procedural motions. A majority

Table VIII-6 Candidates for Minnesota President Pro Tem, 1945-1969

<u>Year</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Consecutive Terms Upon Selection</u>	<u>DFL</u>	<u>Consecutive Terms Upon Selection</u>
1945	J.V. Weber	4	None	0
1947	M. Lightner	5	None	0
1949	Gerald T. Mullin	5	None	0
1951	A. O. Sletvold	5	None	0
1953	Donald C. Wright	5	George Siegel	6
1955	Val Imm	6	B.G. Novak	5
1957	Thomas Welch	5	Homer Carr	6
1959	Harry Wahlstrand	6	C.E. Johnson	7
1961	Norman Larson	6	Elmer Peterson	4
1963	Gordon Rosenmeier	6 1/2	Thomas Vukelich	5
1965	Donald Sinclair	5	Raphael Salmore	4
1967	Ernest J. Anderson	4	Norman W. Hanson	4
1969	Walter J. Franz	4	Harold Salina	4

The Pro Tem has always come from the Conservative side.

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969.

may overrule his decisions even on these. On an informal level Edward Thye, C. Elmer Anderson, and Karl Rolvaag gained a familiarity with senatorial practice that helped them some when they became governors. The President Pro Tem is primarily an honorific position. Each caucus usually nominates a candidate (See Table VIII-6). The post goes to the most senior member of the majority who has not previously received the honor. The caucus decides among those who have equal seniority. No one with less than four

terms has ever become pro tem in the last twenty-five years. But any power that these men had came from their own ability and experience, not the position.

The House speakership is quite a different matter. It possesses more formal power than any other position in the House. Some duties, such as signing legislative acts and scheduling committee meeting times, are administrative in nature. The speaker has great influence over floor debate through recognizing members and ruling on procedural motions. He may be overruled by majority vote. But since the speaker represents the majority caucus, this seems unlikely. Finally, although the speaker cannot control House committees, he can directly mold the conditions of committee operation. He assigns bills to committees. With a large number of committees he has some discretion in this matter. Speakers seldom abuse this power and usually consult with the bill author. But he still has the formal authority to make the final decision. The ability to make committee assignments would be his greatest power. Usually he consults with important majority members, but again the final choice remains his alone.

Each speaker goes about making assignments in his own way. But the general process remains about the same. First, the speaker does not function in isolation. He probably consults some major committee chairmen (especially on appropriations) as to what members they would like on their own committees. But he also consults with a group of senior men to get their advice. Under Speaker Hall (1939-1948) this group consisted of majority leader Roy Dunn and other members of the active leadership group that

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ran the caucus. Speaker John Hartle (1949-1954) attempted to carry on the collegial decision-making. A group consisting of senior men from every congressional district provided advice. But he felt that the process did not work well (perhaps because of growing factionalism within the caucus) and he finally took to making most decisions on his own.<sup>64</sup> The DFL caucus reasserted the collegial concept from 1955-1958, using it even more than the Conservatives. This did not limit the speaker any more than the incumbents wished, since both A.I. Johnson (1955-1958) and E.J. Chilgren (1959-1962) requested such a group.<sup>65</sup> This group of about a dozen men came largely from the leaders that constituted the Rules committee. Speaker Chilgren reduced the group to about six or seven men who represented most of the congressional districts. The pattern changed somewhat under Speaker Lloyd Duxbury (1963-1970). After an intense fight for the speakership in 1963, the caucus turned sole authority over to him, and Duxbury made most decisions on his own.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to group consultation, all speakers directed attention to two other sources of advice. Each began by sending out to every member letters requesting his desired committee assignments. Usually the speaker requested three to six choices. Duxbury asked that all committees be ranked by preference. An attempt was made to give every member at least one of his major requests. Speakers also considered majority-minority relationships. Basically, all speakers claimed to apportion seats in such a way as to achieve proportional representation.

All speakers used similar criteria in making appointments.

But each put a different emphasis on the factor involved. The major factors, both for chairmanships and committee assignments, would include seniority, policy, geographical distribution, legislative experience and ability, background and interest. In general Conservative legislators considered seniority and geographical balance more important. The DFL legislators gave more attention to policy position, especially loyalty to the caucus, party, and gubernatorial position. All agreed that seniority, while a major consideration, contained no automatic preference as it does in Congress. Speaker Duxbury believed that seniority was not paramount, but it was hard to deny a very senior man a position if he asked for it. <sup>67</sup> At the least, if two men competing for the same position are relatively equal in other respects, the most senior man may claim preference. Once a man has a position, he retains it until he requests a change. But one should remember that not all senior men receive major chairmanships. Since the House operates with many committees, all men with some experience will receive a chairmanship and the prestige that goes with it. But those senior men who lack aptitude, desire, or ability for the legislative process can be shunted aside to the lesser committees. <sup>68</sup> Especially when the DFL first came to power in 1955 it put great premium on ability and caucus loyalty in making the key assignments. Since no member had a vested interest in a position, this was easier to do. <sup>69</sup> Even the rule on vested interest from past assignments may be broken. This can be done discreetly by moving a man to a different chairmanship that has opened up on the grounds that

the move is an advancement. Under the iron discipline maintained by the Dunn-Hall group the changes might not be so subtle. Removal as a disciplinary tool extended even to chairmanships. George Champlin (Cons. - Mankato) had held the moderately important motor vehicle committee chairmanship for a couple of sessions. But he began to vote consistently against the "in group" position. And he openly questioned the integrity of Majority Leader Roy Dunn on the floor. In the 1947 session he held no chairmanship at all. <sup>70</sup>

The Minnesota speakership has provided continuity of leadership despite battles over the selection. More than in most states Minnesota speakers retain the position until they retire or their caucus suffers defeat. The House does not practice rotation as do many legislatures. Rather the speaker retains office until he wishes to relinquish it. Table VIII-7 reflects this continuity.

Table VIII-7 Candidates for Minnesota House Speaker, 1945-1970.

Year	Conservative	Term <sup>1</sup>	DFL	Term
1945	Lawrence Hall*	6 <sup>2</sup>	Charles Halstead	5
1947	" " *		Joseph Prifrel	5
1949	John Hartle *	8	F. I. Chilgren	12
1951	" " *		Fred Cina	2
1953	" " *		" "	
1955	" " *		A. I. Johnson *	7
1957	Odin Langen	3	" " *	
1959	Lloyd Duxbury	5	E. J. Chilgren *	17
1961	" " *		" " *	
1963	" " *		" "	
1965	" " *		Joseph Prifrel	14
1967	" " *		Richard O'Dea	8
1969	" " *		Joseph Prifrel	16

\* successful candidate

1. indicates term when nominated

2. Hall was first nominated in 1937 (his 2nd term) and won in 1939, 1941, and 1943.

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

Hall served five consecutive terms, Hartle-3, Johnson-2, Children-2, and Duxbury-4. Every man acted as speaker for at least two terms. The average comes to just over three sessions. Also, most candidates had a fair amount of seniority before they were nominated or elected. Hall was the most junior, being elected in his third term. But the others had at least seven terms. The average comes to just over eight sessions.

The lieutenant governor and President Pro Tem, then, offer the Senate little continuing leadership. If the Senate does have leadership to combat the governor, it must reside elsewhere. The speakership does provide potential leadership in the House. The speaker is not the sole leader. He consults with other experienced men. But he does have the opportunity to assert leadership at every stage of the legislative process. Minnesota speakers have enjoyed long legislative experience and retain the leadership position for several years. Finally, they are selected by the majority caucus and act as spokesman for it.

#### The Floor Leaders

The Senate majority leader possesses more formal power than does the pro tem, but the position itself is not powerful. As chairman of the Rules committee, he does head a group which proposes new procedural rules and channels bills from the substantive committees to the floor. Late in the session the committee may control access to the floor through granting special rules by which a bill may bypass the crowded calendar. However, most Conservatives emphasized that the Rules Committee by itself is not an independent powerful force. <sup>71</sup> Especially since 1961, when all chairmen were included in the membership, it has served as little more than a housekeeping organ. Committee meetings may be used for informal

consultation and information exchange, but this stems from the nature of the membership, not the committees' power. The floor leader then does not even exert great independent influence over bill scheduling. This is done on a collegial basis, with each chairman having a great say in his own area. According to senior members the leader acts as a clerical coordinator. He must keep the calendar orderly and procedures moving on the floor.<sup>72</sup> Members certainly do not view him as a caucus policy spokesman.<sup>73</sup> DFL Senators saw recent majority leaders as mere "front men" who reflected the wishes of dominant senior members.

Considering the relative weakness of the position, most incumbents have retained it for a surprisingly long time. (See Table VIII-8) One man served eight consecutive sessions. And the group as a whole averaged four and one-half sessions in office. Charles N. Orr was first elected to the leadership post in 1935. He retained it until he died early in the 1949 session. Orr did exercise great central leadership. He was a tough, hard-driving man who dedicated practically all his time to the Senate. The dominant members in the Conservative group coalesced around him. His death demonstrated that power derived from his personality, not the office. Perhaps the other members were rebelling against Orr's tight rule when they selected Archie Miller. He had been a member of the leadership group under Orr. He was also a popular fellow. But he was not a forceful leader. Such influence as he possessed derived from gentle persuasion.<sup>74</sup> After Archie Miller died the Conservative caucus selected John Zwach. Zwach had originally been suspect among Conservatives because of his

"maverick" performance in the House. He joined neither caucus during his first Senate session. But gradually the Conservative leadership accepted him. Still, DFL legislators believed that while Zwach was a fairly effective legislator, he was not a leader. They saw him as a front man used by others. <sup>75</sup> Senator Holmquist came to office under different circumstances and has attempted to alter the past pattern. A combination of younger party-oriented Senators and rural members outside of the "in-group" pushed Holmquist through. Although he admitted that his job made him primarily an overseer of procedure, Holmquist also wanted to act as a caucus policy spokesman. In 1967 he selected eleven

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Table VIII-8 Floor Leaders, Minnesota Senate, 1945-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Term</u>	<u>DFL</u>	<u>Term</u>
1945	Charles N. Orr	8 <sup>1</sup>	None	
1947	" "	2	"	
1949	Orr/Archie Miller	5	"	
1951	" "		B. G. Novak(?)	4
1953	" "		" "	
1955	" "		Harold Schultz	2
1957	" "		" "	
1959	John Zwach	4	" "	
1961	" "		" "	
1963	" "		Paul Thuet	2
1965	" "		" "	
1967	Stanley W. Holmquist	4	Karl Grittner	3
1969	" "		" "	

1. Orr was first elected majority leader in 1935, his sixth term
2. Orr was killed in an automobile accident; Miller was selected during the session to take his place.

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969

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areas of caucus concern and lined up votes for these. He also tried to promote the Republican governor's program where it coincided with caucus interests. <sup>76</sup>

The minority caucus has not enjoyed such continuity in its leadership. So weak was the organization prior to 1955 the veteran members could not agree who the leaders were, or even that any existed. Harold Schultz became the first full time active minority leader in 1955. He had voiced the opinion that the caucus should be better organized, so the other members dumped the job on him.<sup>77</sup> When he resigned in 1962, Paul Thuet, the hardest driving minority leader, took over. Thuet was defeated in the 1966 elections. The former assistant minority leader, Karl Grittner, took his place. Minority leaders probably last fewer terms because the job is such a thankless one. Schultz's organizational role was to plead with the majority for better committee assignments and rule changes. Beginning in 1963, when the minority possessed more than one-third of the seats, the leader could bargain on bill scheduling and debate. Under Holmquist's leadership, Grittner and other DFL leaders could finally make committee assignments that were honored. But in marked contrast to the majority leader, the minority leader's primary role has been to act as policy spokesman.<sup>78</sup> On agreed upon matters the leader reviewed all bills to protect caucus interests. On the floor he pushed bills to make a record for the campaign. Some members believed that Schultz was too interested in his own constituency bills, and carried too heavy a load, to perform his role effectively. Paul Thuet, with his fierce partisan instincts, performed the leadership function to the utmost. Grittner lacked the personality to be such a dynamic leader. Also he was handicapped as the DFL caucus membership had again slipped below two-thirds of the Senate.

House floor leaders have played a much more dominant role. As with the Senate leadership, there is great continuity, especially on the Conservative side.

Table VIII-9 Floor Leaders, Minnesota House 1945-1970

Year	CONSERVATIVE		DFL	
	Name	Term	Name	Term
1945	Roy Dunn*	8	Charles Halstead	5
1947	" " *		Joseph Prifrel	5
1949	" " *		E. J. Chilgren	12
1951	" " *		Fred Cina	3
1953	" " *		" "	
1955	John Hartle	10	" " *	
1957	Odin Langen	4	" " *	
1959	Lloyd Duxbury	4	" " *	
1961	" "		" " *	
1963	Aubrey Dirlam*	12	" "	
1965	" " *		" "	
1967	" " *		" "	
1969	" " *		Martin Sabo	5

\* majority leader

1 Dunn had been floor leader since 1933

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

Roy Dunn achieved the longest tenure acting as Conservative floor leader from 1933 to 1954. He is remembered as a firm and decisive (almost dictatorial) leader who wielded great power as chairman of the Rules Committee. As was the case with Charles Orr, Dunn devoted his life to the legislature (as well as being Minnesota's Mr. Republican). He gathered about him a small group of able men who ran the House from 1939 through 1954. His power peaked when he could work closely with Speaker Lawrence Hall. Aubrey Dirlam acted as floor leader for eight years. His power was considerably less than Dunn's partly because power had shifted more decisively to Duxbury as speaker. The higher turnover in Conservative leader-

ship from 1955 to 1962 can no doubt be attributed to their minority status. The DFL experienced much greater turnover early in the period. However, Fred Cina provided the caucus with effective leadership for eighteen consecutive years until his electoral defeat in 1968. Even his Conservative opponents viewed Cina as a good partisan leader who demonstrated both an excellent substantive and procedural knowledge. In all Conservative leaders averaged almost four sessions each. DFL leaders averaged two and one-half sessions.

House floor leaders provide both procedural and policy direction.<sup>80</sup> Especially from 1945 through 1962 the leader wielded this power through the Rules committee. The leader schedules the order in which bills appear on the floor, and suggests permanent rules. The Rules committees' power expands greatly during the closing weeks of the session. Most important legislation does not pass out of the substantive committees until very late in the session. As the calendar becomes very crowded not all bills can be heard. The committee can then advance or block a bill by granting or denying a special order. When a bill needs an order to get to<sup>81</sup> the floor at all, the committee assumes absolute power. At one time the Rules committee consisted of the most senior and influential men representing each congressional district. Since these men could regulate the flow of bills, they quite consciously functioned as a policy agency. During Dunn's time the committee<sup>82</sup> was the majority caucus' policy making body. So the floor leader also functions as a policy maker. He assigns men to guide bills on the floor. On major caucus legislation he often assumes

this task himself. He defends the caucus on the floor and makes the necessary campaign record. Sometimes, especially on the DFL side, his assistants act as "whips" to inform members about issues and get them out to vote. The minority leader performs similar functions but he lacks the leverage to maintain discipline and pass his legislation. Since 1963 or 1967 this central leadership role for the Rules committee has faded. As the membership expanded its meetings became unwieldy. Preponderant Conservative majorities lessened the need for close control.

#### Seniority Leaders

One additional set of leaders hold power not necessarily from formal position, but because they have served long within the legislative body. This experience provides them with certain personal advantages. These advantages may be reinforced by formal positions based on seniority. Additional power comes from a set of informal rules fostered and passed on by the senior men.

Seniority is much more important in the Senate than in the House. Governor Elmer Andersen called seniority an absolute rule in all aspects of Senate life.<sup>83</sup> Senior men received a preponderance of the desirable office space and clerical assistance that was available. The Pro Tem and floor leader were always men who had served at least four terms. More importantly, committee chairmanships were assigned by legislative "class". That is, all men who had served at least a certain number of terms would have a chairmanship. Others did not. Senior men also receive more important committee assignments. This rule preserves a formal equality among all men of equal legislative experience. This

does not mean that all senior senators enjoy actual equality. Many senior men with lesser ability and drive will end up with chairmanships less important than those assigned to their juniors. In fact several senators denied that seniority as such bestowed power. But seniority does at least grant a chairmanship. A chairman can affect other appointments to his committee. He may bargain by holding up other members' bills. Seniority also creates other advantages if a man has the minimum capacity to capitalize on them. Through experience a senior man may expend his knowledge of procedural rules. Also over time he develops expertise in a special policy area.

Finally, over time he also develops a knowledge of, and reverence for, the informal rules. Many informal rules maximize the power of senior men. Deference to seniority is itself one "rule". Another is deference to committee positions on the floor. The argument is that only the committee has sufficient time and expertise to thoroughly understand a bill. Once a bill comes to the floor the whole body should respect that committee's judgement. Senator Karl Gritter alleged that by this means the dominant senior group maintained control. He believed that committees are "stacked" to favor certain policy positions. Then the whole body is supposed to accept the position of such committees. Specialization is closely linked to committee dominance. Each man develops an expertise in one or a few policy areas. He then exerts disproportionate influence in these areas simply because he knows more and others rely on his word. This also fits in with the rule of decentralization, the importance of the individual

legislator as the center of the decision process. A fifth rule, hard work, has little to do with seniority. Most legislative work consists of boring, technical, complex tasks. Those who are willing to apply themselves and become legislative craftsmen exert power. Perhaps the most important rule is Senate independence, not to say dominance. Senior Senators develop immense pride in the Senate as a body. They profess small regard for the House. For example Senator Thuet related that he once argued for a bill in committee on the grounds that the House had passed it unanimously. The chairman, Senator Thomas Welch, replied that the Senate did not care what the other body did. The other body did not exist. The Senate made its own decisions. This independent feeling extends to gubernatorial relationships. Many senior Senators (notably Senator Rosenmeier) regarded the governor as insignificant. The Senate and governor each have their own tasks to perform. Neither should interfere with the other. If a large number of powerful senior Senators hold to this norm, one would not expect the governor to easily pass his legislative program. A final rule, related to independence, is non-partisanship. Many senior members deeply and sincerely believe in the merits of the non-partisan governor. Not all members accepted independence and non-partisanship. But these were prevailing attitudes at least up to 1967.

One should hasten to point out that not all informal power resources depend on seniority. Some characteristics inhere in the person. Emphasized as most important was intellect and ability. A person must be well liked personally. A Senator can build

influence through persuasive speaking ability. And he will be given responsibility if he is willing to put in the effort on legislative work. But no one will ascent to the peak of power unless he has the drive and ambition to seek it. Senator Dosland (C) argued that so few Senators possess all of these characteristics, that no one really has to grab for power. Given the heavy Senate workload, anyone who shows ability and interest will be given all of the responsibility he can handle.

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One unanswered question so far is does a senior group act in concert to wield precominant power in the Senate. A majority of observers argued that such a power group has always existed. Some maintain that in any organization there is a striving for influence. And they conclude that a small group always dominates.

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These men, communicating through overlappng assignments on key committees, informally cooperated to achieve common interests. They usually controlled the Rules committee, Committee on Committees, and most, but not all, important committee chairmanships. This group always came from the Conservative caucus. Now some senior Senators, including many alleged to be in the "inner circle", deny that such a group existed.

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They argue that influence flows from individual personal skills. Any "inner circle" would be an artificial grouping of subject matter specialists. These men wield power in their own areas but do not act in concert.

If there is such a group, the membership is fuzzy and changing. The power relationships change over time as attrition removes previously influential members. And perhaps more than one power group exists simultaneously. Also, powerful individuals may

exist along with, but independently of, the dominant groups. Respondents indicate that perhaps four groups existed during the period under study. Before 1949 a tightly knit group of committee chairmen coalesced around the driving influence of majority leader Charles N. Orr. Members included A.J. Rockne, Henry Sullivan, Oscar Swenson, Karl Neumeier, A.O. Sletvold, Archie Miller, and Gerald Mullin. Rockne retired in 1945. After Orr died suddenly in 1949 the same group remained in control under a more decentralized collegial leadership. Powerful chairmen each controlled their own committees and cooperated with one another when their views coincided. Archie Miller, as floor leader, functioned largely as an "umpire". Starting in 1951 the "Orr group" declined in power as its members gradually faded from the scene. About this time Senator Gordon Rosenmeier began to acquire more individual influence. The Orr group had always mistrusted him and blocked him from powerful positions. <sup>90</sup> Also during this transition time Donald Wright reached the peak of his influence. He formed the core of an "urban group" that eventually included Thomas Welch, Charles Root, and Harold O'Loughlin. Daniel Feidt sometimes worked with this group. From 1955-1962 a "rural group" around Rosenmeier acted as a competing power center. Before 1959 Wright was more influential. After that time Rosenmeier gradually came to the ascendancy. From 1963-1966 the Rosenmeier group dominated action. Since most of the other urban men had left, Wright operated on his own as an independent force. The "Rosenmeier group" included at its core Donald Sinclair and Robert Dunlap. At one time or another Val Imm, Jim Keller, Henry Harnen, Gordon Butler, Jim McKee, and

William Dosland adhered more or less closely to the group. Two successive reapportionments in 1962 and 1966 hastened the attrition process. By 1967 the old leadership group was on the wane. A new urban, party-oriented group was just coming into power. Senator Holmquist acted as spokesman for the new group, and as their bridge to the older members. Influential members included Wayne Popham, Harmon Ogdahl, Keith Hughes, Harold Krieger, and Robert Ashbach. Wright, Dosland, and Harold Popp functioned as independent influentials. One must keep in mind that these "groupings" are overly simplified and very flexible. The "dominants" did not always win. Nor did they always act in concert. But experienced observers viewed them as a collection of the most influential Senators at any given time.

The House relied far less than the Senate on seniority as a basis of power. Yet respondents agreed almost unanimously that an inner circle always dominated the decision process.<sup>91</sup> Besides the lesser emphasis on seniority, the House differed on one other point. The power groups were tied more closely to the formal structure. The dominant group invariably clustered around the Speaker and/or floor leader. Members came from the rules committee and major committee chairmen. What other criteria determined membership? Seniority helped. The House never accepted an absolute seniority rule. Seniority gives a man an edge in experience with procedural rules. Also, senior men tend to control the major committee chairmanships.<sup>92</sup> However, no one needs twenty to thirty years to accumulate either experience or major chairmanships. After three or four terms members probably

have received sufficient experience. More important than seniority would be ability, especially ability in persuasion or specific subject matter areas. Senior men who lack ability, understanding, and expertise never really make it into the inner circle. But neither do all able, specialized men. A member must also rate high on the informal rules. <sup>93</sup> He must have established a record of reliability and loyalty to the group and its policies. He should possess some concept of what is good policy. He should demonstrate good judgment about the political necessities of his group. Above all he must have a "word". Once he has committed himself on a bill, given his promise to one of his legislative colleagues, he must stick by that commitment. An effective inner group cannot tolerate someone who is too independent, too unreliable. In summary, influence becomes a very personal matter. It resides in those who learn how to communicate and bargain with others in the legislative system.

From 1945 to 1970 there were three different power configurations in the Minnesota House. The Conservatives dominated the House from 1939 to 1954. During this time power revolved about Speaker Lawrence Hall and Majority leader Roy Dunn. Dunn's Rules committee, along with a few major chairmen, acted as the policy-making body for the Conservative caucus. Once a decision had been made, all group members were expected to fall in line. In addition to Hall and Dunn the core group consisted of Claude Allen, Larry Haeg, George French, Fred Schwanke, Robert Lee, Howard Ottinger, Gordon Forbes, Fred Memmer, A.F. Oberg, and Irvin Talle. After Speaker Hall retired, Roy Dunn's control weakened somewhat.

Gradually a competing group grew up around the new speaker, John Hartle. This group wished to check Dunn's autocratic powers. Some had been Farmer-Laborites or Democrats who took a more liberal policy line than Dunn. Others were oriented toward the moderate wing of the Republican party, or toward Governor Youngdahl. But for whatever reason they did not always cooperate with Dunn although his group remained dominant. Besides Hartle prominent members included P.K. Peterson, Stanley Holmquist, Vernon Welch, Roy Schulz, H.R. Anderson, Alf Bergerud, Clarence Langley, and Floyd Flom.

When the DFL caucus took over from 1955 to 1962 a new power group emerged. As with the Conservatives its membership centered around the Rules committee. The major leader was Fred Cina along with Speakers A.I. Johnson and E.J. Chilgren. Others included D.D. Wozniak, Lawrence Yetka, Charles Halsted, Leo Mosier, William Shovell, Joseph Prifrel, and Karl Grittner. Except for the battle over the speakership in 1959 this group remained fairly homogeneous. They differed from the Conservative influentials mainly in their allegiance to party and gubernatorial programs.

The 1962 elections brought another change in leadership. Lloyd Duxbury barely won the speakership by one vote over Aubrey Dirlam. The contest was largely a personality matter. However, there were overtones of the old Dunn-Hartle split. Remaining members of the former tended to back Duxbury, the latter backed Dirlam. Duxbury also received support from northern rural members and independent legislators from the metropolitan area. However, freshman constituted a majority of the caucus in the 1963 session. These new men,

especially the party-oriented "Young Turks" from Hennepin county, attempted to exert influence by backing Dirlam. The Duxbury leadership included Al France, Robert Fitzsimons, Robert Renner, Salisbury Adams, Ron Everson, Thor Anderson, Wallace Gustafson, W.K. Hegstrom, and August Mueller. Lyall Schwarzkopf, Gary Flakne, Bill Frenzel, Otto Bang, John Yngve and John Johnson headed the "Young Turks". Duxbury made a major effort to treat both sides fairly and they were working together fairly smoothly by 1967. As a symbol of this he drastically enlarged the Rules committee in 1967 and 1969. It could no longer be said to represent the leadership group. Also, power became much more decentralized than previously. There were just too many able, intelligent, and aggressive young men to be controlled as "in groups" had in the past. Greater specialization meant that the men of power depended on the issue.

#### Summary

In summary then both House and Senate have been directed by strong, aggressive leaders. The leadership adheres more closely to formal posts, speaker and floor leader in the House. Aside from the Dunn group the House leaders had no special antipathy towards governors. They were inclined to be cooperative if possible. However, they still spoke as representatives of the House. And they were able to develop some central direction. Except for the leadership of Charles Orr, power in the Senate has not necessarily concentrated in formal leadership positions. Rather a group of able, senior committee chairmen exerted preponderant influence. They worked in common when it suited their purposes. Strong

leadership existed, but it was not centralized in nature. However, up until 1967 the governor was at a greater disadvantage in the Senate. A majority of these leaders so revered the Senate independence that they were ill disposed to work closely with the governor.

### III. THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

Professor Charles Backstrom argues that committee dominance is the single most important characteristic of the Minnesota legislature.<sup>95</sup> Those bills not reported from committee never pass. Those reported almost always pass. Floor amendments seldom succeed. If committees are this important one should examine the reasons why. If one wants to know where the power lies, he should inquire as to who controls the committees.

#### The Senate

Most Senators concur in Professor Backstrom's judgement. And most would defend the system. The Senate must handle two to three thousand bills each session. Business would come to a standstill if every member had to consider every bill on the floor. The committee system lessens the workload. Since no member sits on all committees, he must rely on the word of committee members to shape his judgement on most bills. As a result any given committee's decisions are seldom overturned more than once a session. As one can see from Table VIII-10 the degree of specialization through committees has varied immensely since 1945. Generally, the trend has been away from extreme specialization toward a relatively few committees, each with a different substantive jurisdiction. The number of members on each committee also varies greatly. The

Table VIII-10 Minnesota Senate Committees, 1945-1970

Year	No.	Size	Average No. Per Committee	Assign- ments Range	Per Member Average	Terms of Committee Chairmen
1945	42	5-28	14	6-10	8	all 2 or more <sup>1</sup>
1947	36	5-24	14	5-09	7.3	all 2 or more <sup>2</sup>
1949	36	5-25	14	6-10	7.1	all 2 or more <sup>2</sup>
1951-53	36	5-25	14	5-10	7.6	all 2 or more <sup>3</sup>
1955-57	32	5-23	16	5-11	7.6	all above 1 <sup>1</sup>
1959-61	20	10-23	18	3-10	5.5	all above 2 <sup>4</sup>
1963-65	23	7-27	19	5-10	6.4	all 3 or more
1967-69	18	8-27	21	5-08	5.7	all 3 or more

1. Two members who "should" have had chairmanships did not.
2. One member who "should" have had chairmanship did not;  
one member who had 1 1/2 terms did.
3. One member who had 1 1/2 terms did.
4. One member with two terms did.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

Committee on committees, which determines the composition of conference committees, has remained small (5-10). The others average from 14 to 20 members. In one respect Senate practice permits less member specialization than in the Congress. Each Senate member must carry from 5 to 10 committee assignments. If a member would attempt to conscientiously meet all of his duties, he would face an intolerable assignment. There has been a slight trend away from this heavy committee load since 1945. Power considerations, as well as efficiency, govern decisions in the number of committees and assignments. The number of committees changes to coincide with the number of majority members who share the same legislative class (consecutive terms in the Senate). Diminishing the number of committees has concentrated chairmanships among the more senior members. Senior members also tend to acquire more committee assignments. This in turn increases senior membership on the more

important committees. Not all committees are of equal importance. Some handle more important (and a greater volume of) bills than others. Of course the importance of a committee depends to a degree on a Senator's constituency and personal interests. Yet most senators can agree on the committees of general importance. <sup>96</sup>

In rough order of importance the top nine would be Finance, Taxes, Civil Administration, Education, Judiciary, Public Highways, Committee on Committees, Rules, and Public Welfare. Five other committees of secondary importance would be Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Game and Fish, and Public Domain. The rest were considered less significant. The two procedural committees (Rules and Committee on Committees) rate fairly low because many senators refused to rank them with the substantive committees. They have important powers but were regarded as being different in nature.

Committees possess two important controls over bills. First, they determine whether a bill reaches the floor or not. Secondly, they determine the order in which bills receive floor consideration. <sup>97</sup>

If a bill does go to the floor the negative report would be to indefinitely postpone. The committee may also suggest passage or, more frequently, passage as amended. Technically no committee may kill a bill. Under the rules all committees but Finance must report a bill within twenty-five days of receiving it. After that a bill may be recalled upon the motion of a single senator and a majority vote. <sup>98</sup>

Actually this rule is seldom used. A respected senior majority member successfully uses this tool. <sup>99</sup> These committee procedures largely frustrate minority caucus impact.

The majority caucus has absolute control over all committees. Then

they practically refuse to accept minority caucus amendments on the floor. The Senate Rules committee does not even exercise restraint on the committees by regulating the bill calendar. Bills go on the calendar in the order that they come out of committee. So indirectly a committee shapes bill consideration by speeding up or delaying a bill.

Within the committee the chairman usually becomes the central figure. <sup>100</sup> This does not mean that all chairmen dominate. That depends on the individual personality and approach. All chairmen possess the formal tools needed to lead if they wish. This pattern of leadership by chairmen was most frequently violated from 1967 to 1970 when the younger, aggressive metropolitan members began to <sup>101</sup> take control away from the older chairmen. The chairman controls floor scheduling and subcommittees. But his greatest formal power is setting the agenda. The chairman schedules meetings. He determines what bills will be heard and whether early or late in the session. He arranges hearings. Within the hearing he establishes who will be heard, how much time a bill receives, when during each hearing the bill will come up. Tough, skilled chairmen may use up time through questioning. Or they may schedule a bill so late in a hearing that it receives little consideration. He may also set the tone for committee action by how he votes. A few will even "sit" on a bill, once the committee approves it, to delay its arrival on the floor. However, DFLer's and Conservatives alike emphasized that few chairmen act arbitrarily. The majority ultimately has its way. An able persistent author can always get some action on his bill. They also emphasized

that the chairmen are seldom overridden. The majority want the chairmen to control procedures. Most committees have crowded calendars and very little time. Not all authors want action on all the bills they introduce. Someone must determine which bills are so important that they must be heard. Someone must weed out the inconsequential. Chairmen also exert power from knowledge, experience, and expertise. Considering how few terms most state legislators usually serve, the continuity among chairmen for most Minnesota Senate committees is amazing. For all chairmen who served during the period 1945-1970 the average was 3.3 consecutive sessions in the same post. <sup>102</sup> As might be expected tenure was even longer, 4 sessions, on the nine most important committees. The average was 3.3 for the next eight committees, and 2.6 for the rest. Sixteen percent of the chairmen served six consecutive sessions or more in the same position. Major examples include A.J. Rockne-Finance (10), Donald Wright-Taxes (10), Norman Larson-Public Highways (10), Charles Orr-Rules (8), Val Imm-Finance (6), A.L. Almen-Education (6), and A.O. Sletvold-Judiciary (6).

If chairmen wield the greatest influence in committees, who selects the chairmen? Officially, the whole body approves all assignments. This actually ratifies decisions made by the majority caucus. And the caucus usually ratifies selections made by its steering committee. This committee has varied somewhat <sup>103</sup> in composition over the years. Generally speaking it included one man from each congressional district and the majority leader. Sometimes the majority leader represented his district. Sometimes he was added to the others. This meant that the committee numbered

nine or ten from 1945-1962, eight or nine from 1963-1966. In 1967 the committee was expanded to two men from each district to provide additional representation for the newer metropolitan senators. The members selected were usually, but not always, the most senior from each district. Sometimes the district delegation elected the member, or at least chose from among men of equal seniority. Sometimes the most senior man might defer to one of lesser seniority. Also at times, especially from 1955-1966, the Congressional district lines were not exactly followed. Accommodations were made to include a very senior man whose district was already represented. So, even members who had served on the committee were not clear on the specific membership. But in essence the committee represents another example of the institutionalization of seniority. Seldom would a man with less than three terms be included. Over the period members averaged approximately five terms in experience.

This does not mean that seniority solely guided the selection of committee members and chairmen. Senator Rosenmeier summed it up best when he said that the committee follows a set of informal rules; within these it can be flexible or arbitrary. <sup>104</sup> The committee sends out letters to all members soliciting their requests. It attempts to give each member at least one or two major assignments. The committee gives some attention to geographical balance, constituency, personal competence, and occupational experience. If there is competition for a particular assignment, the most senior man receives preference. If a senior man especially desires a particular assignment, it is hard to deny

his request. Some other very particular rules apply. The committee attempts to place some experienced men on each committee. Only lawyers are assigned to the Judiciary committee. No freshmen go on the Finance and Taxation committees. Once a person receives an assignment, including a chairmanship, he is seldom removed without his approval. Seniority more directly affects chairmanships. The Senate follows no absolute seniority rule. However, all men of the same Senate class receive chairmanships. In determining preferences for a specific committee chairmanship, seniority both in the Senate and on that committee may be considered. The standard rule seemed to be that the most senior man who wanted a particular chairmanship received it. Table VIII-II gives one a rough idea as to which seniority measure is most important. The first measure shows the percentage of times that the chairmanship went to the man on the committee with the greatest overall seniority. The second gives the percentage of

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Table VIII-II Minnesota Senate Chairmanship Assignments, 1945-1970

	All Committees	Top Nine*	Second Five*	Rest*
Most overall seniority	11%	6%	12%	16%
Most seniority on committee	14%	12%	10%	16%
Most senior man who did not have a "better" assignment	57%	38%	33%	77%

\* Based on interviews with legislators

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

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times it went to the man with the greatest previous service on the committee itself. Because so many senior men serve on several committees, one man may hold ranking position on many committees. The third measure attempts to account for a junior man being picked as chairman. First, one eliminates all of those men on

each committee who had chairmanships on equal or more desirable committees. Then one sees if the most senior man among those remaining was chosen as chairman. This provides a rough indicator of the rule that the most senior man who wants the post gets it. This assumes that those with equal or better posts are satisfied with what they have. It can be readily seen that seldom did the most senior man receive the job. In fact in over 40% of the cases a junior man received preference over a more senior who had a less important position. Some DFL Senators alleged that, because each man served on so many committees, the caucus leaders had great discretion in placing desired men in the more important chairmanships. As long as all members with a minimum seniority were chairmen, the formal rule of equality was served. <sup>105</sup> On the other hand the rules were seldom so far bent as to permit a man with no experience on a committee to become its chairman. This happened in only 21% of the cases (and in only 10% of the cases for the nine top committees). Also when two or more Senators have an equal right to a chairmanship in terms of seniority, <sup>106</sup> they will work out an accommodation among themselves.

Apparently most majority caucus members have found little reason for complaint. Minority caucus members have been less satisfied. Most believe that their requests have been ignored. Minority caucus leaders could not determine their own members assignments. Finally they allege that the caucus did not receive proportional representation on committees, especially the more important ones. The matter was somewhat rectified starting in 1963. By 1967 the minority caucus determined most of its own

assignments.

One might ask if committee assignments grant disproportional power to any particular group other than senior men. That is, do certain groups end up with important committee assignments out of proportion to their numbers in the total Senate. There has been a suggestion that the minority caucus does not receive proportional representation. Table VIII-12 appears to confirm

Table VIII-12 Minority Caucus Representation on Minnesota Senate Committees.

Year	Minority % in Senate	Minority % on Top 9* Committees	Minority % on Second 5* Committees	Minority % on Rest* Committees	Minority % on all Committees
1945	15%	8%	17%	16%	12%
1947	15	8	14	17	14
1949	15	8	14	15	13
1951-53	24	10	15	28	21
1955-57	28	15	25	30	25
1959-61	36	20	31	34	27
1963-65	36	23	34	40	32
1967-69	33	23	36	38	30

\* As determined by interviews with legislators.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

this. In no session did the minority receive the same proportion of seats as their numbers would have warranted. However, overall the discrepancy was slight. They were even over-represented on the less important committees. But the discrepancy was very marked for the nine most important committees. This discrepancy is somewhat overstated since the top nine include Rules and Committee on Committees. By tradition no minority member serves on these committees. Even so, they certainly received less than proportional representation, especially from 1951-1966. Even with the two special committees eliminated, the minority averaged minus six

percentage points on the top seven and minus one and one-half percentage points overall.

Table VIII-13 Urban Representation on Minnesota Senate Committees, 1945-1970

Year	Urban % in the Senate <sup>1</sup>	% On Top 9 Committees <sup>2</sup>	% on Second 5 Committees <sup>2</sup>	% On Rest of Committees	% On All Committees
1945	27%	33%	33%	25%	27%
1947	27	37	26	26	29
1949	27	32	24	26	27
1951-53	28	32	26	29	29
1955-57	28	44	29	28	31
1959-61	28	30	20	45	32
1963-65	39	32	28	41	35
1967-69	45	41	39	44	41

	% of Leadership Positions <sup>3</sup>	% of All Chairmen	% of Conservative Caucus
1945	36%	29%	26%
1947	54	33	25
1949	36	31	25
1951-53	27	28	27
1955-57	41	41	27
1959-61	33	30	21
1963-65	10	13	28
1967-69	22	11	42

1. Urban determined by districts in Metropolitan areas - Twin Cities and Duluth.
2. As determined by interviews with legislators.
3. 1945-1958 this included members on Rules, Committee on Committees, and chairmen of Finance, Taxes, Civil Administration, Judiciary, Public Highways, Education, and Public Welfare. After 1959 only the chairman of rules is included with the rest.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

The urban-rural division is another grouping commonly discussed. The allegation has been that the urban areas receive less than proportional representation as rural leaders seek to maintain control. Table VIII-13 does not confirm this assumption. Overall metropolitan legislators received committee assignments in proportion to their

numbers. Especially before 1963 they were also excessively represented among the leadership positions. Reapportionment brought in more urban legislators from 1963-1970. But since they were virtually all new members, they received neither chairmanships or leadership positions. But overall there seems to be no discrimination against urban legislators.

Similar methods reveal the influence of seniority in the Minnesota Senate (See Table VIII-14). Long tenure sees particularly

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Table VIII-14 Average Tenure of Members on Minnesota Senate Committees, 1945-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Average Tenure on Top Nine Committees</u>	<u>Average Tenure on Second Five Committees</u>	<u>Average Tenure on Rest of the Committees</u>
1945	3.2	2.6	2.4
1947	3.7	2.8	2.5
1949	3.1	2.6	2.4
1951-1953	3.6	2.9	2.6
1955-1957	3.6	2.5	2.4
1959-1961	3.6	2.6	2.8
1963-1965	3.6	2.8	2.5
1967-1969	3.2	2.3	2.1
Total	3.5	2.6	2.4

1. Tenure expressed in number of terms; rank of committees based on interviews with legislators.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.

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important for membership on the most important committees. The average terms on the top nine committees has been between three and four terms. That on lesser committees has been a whole term less. More important has been the representation of senior leadership personnel on the top committees. (See Table VIII-15) Men in leadership positions receive assignments in proportion to their

numbers on the lesser committees. However, they are consistently overrepresented on the top nine committees. If one assumes that these leaders worked in concert, and there is no hard evidence that they did, they could have virtually controlled the most important committees up through 1958. Professor Backstrom insists that these

Table VIII-15 Leadership Representation on Minnesota Senate Committees, 1945-1970

Years	% Leadership Members in the Senate <sup>1</sup>	% Leadership On Top Nine Committees <sup>2</sup>	% Leadership On Top Five Committees <sup>2</sup>	% Leadership on Rest of the Committees
1945	20%	45%	21%	16%
1947	19	50	22	12
1949	20	47	20	15
1951-53	22	49	25	16
1955-57	25	55	21	22
1959-61	18	41	13	22
1963-65	15	34	16	9
1967-69	13	31	12	9

1. Members of formal leadership positions include those on Rules Committee, Committee on Committees, and chairmen of Finance, Taxes, Civil Administration, Judiciary, Education, Public Highways, Public Welfare; after 1959 only the chairman of Rules was included with the rest.
2. As defined by interviews with legislators.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1970.

senior men did work in concert. He points out that each member has from seven to ten committee assignments. This means that their committee assignments overlap a great deal. He concludes that the senior committee chairmen form an interlocking directorate through extensive contacts and powerful positions. This is difficult to document. If one takes just the members in important formal leadership positions, there does seem to be some overlap (See Table

VIII-16). On the average each member of the group shares three to four committee assignments with every other member of the group. This overlapping was especially concentrated after 1959. In every session at least some members shared six or seven assignments, usually on the most important committees. At least half of any

Table VIII-16 Shared Committee Assignments by Members of Formal Leadership Group, Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Members in Group<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Average Number of Shared Assignments Within Group</u>
1945	14	3.4
1947	13	3.1
1949	14	2.7
1951-53	15	2.8
1955-57	17	3.3
1959-61	12	4.3
1963-65	13	4.0
1967-69	12	3.6
Average	<u>14</u>	<u>3.4</u>

1. Formal Leadership Group defined as members on Rules Committee, Committee on Committees, and Chairmen of Finance, Taxes, Civil Administration, Judiciary, Education, Public Highways, and Public Welfare.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual 1945-1969

given members committee assignments were on the top nine committees. This still does not directly demonstrate that these men acted in concert. Not all members in leadership positions had numerous overlapping assignments. Not all formal leaders are actual leaders. Undoubtedly some influential men did not occupy the top formal positions. Undoubtedly these men differed on substantive policy. The findings only suggest that the opportunity for interaction, and common action, existed.

Table VIII-17 Committee System in the Minnesota House, 1945-1970

Year	Number	Size	Average Committee Size	Assignments Range	Per. Member Average No.	Tenure of Committee Chairmen
1945	35	3-29	17	*0-6	4.6	All members with 5 terms or more <sup>1</sup> ; 60% of 4 <sup>2</sup>
1947	30	3-29	20	0-5	4.6	All with 4+ terms; 3,3 termers <sup>3</sup> termers.
1949	38	3-29	17.6	0-6	5.2	All with 4+ terms; 3,3 termers <sup>4</sup>
1951	38	3-29	17.5	0-7	5.1	All with 4+ terms
1953	39	5-29	18	0-7	5.3	All with 4+ terms; 3,3 termers <sup>5</sup>
1955	41	9-29	17.5	0-7	5.7	All with 2+ terms
1957	39	5-29	18	0-7	5.5	All with 3+ terms
1959	39	5-29	18	0-6	5.5	All with 3+ terms
1961	34	5-29	19.5	0-6	5.1	All with 4+ terms; 1,3 termers
1963	36	5-29	20	0-6	5.2	All with 2+ terms <sup>6</sup>
1965	33	5-30	21	0-7	5.1	All with 3+ terms <sup>7</sup>
1967	32	15-34	24	0-8	5.8	All with 4+ terms; 5 under 4 terms
1969	28	16-35	28	0-7	5.7	All with 5+ terms; 40% of 4 termers <sup>8</sup>

\* the speaker never serves on a committee

1 Also 1 man with 3 terms; 4 men with 2 terms.

2 One man with 4 or more terms had no chairmanship.

3 One man with two terms had a chairmanship.

4 Three men with 4 or more terms had no chairmanship; 2 men with 3 terms were chairmen; one man with 2 terms had a chairmanship.

5 Two men with 4 or more terms had none; 2 men with 2 terms did.

6 Two men with under 2 terms had a chairmanship.

7 Two men with under 3 terms had a chairmanship.

8 One man with under 3 terms had a chairmanship.

### The House

As in the Senate, committees dominate procedures in the Minnesota House. In 1961 58% of the bills died in committee. But 75% of those reported to the floor passed. In contrast to the Senate, though, there are more competitors to committee influence.

The speaker has great power over assigning committee meeting times, making committee assignments, and referring bills. The speaker enjoys some discretion in this due to numerous and large committees. (See Table VIII-17) During the 1940's the number was very similar to that found in the Senate. But the number did not diminish as rapidly over time. One major cut came in 1961. Since 1963 the numbers have declined more rapidly. House committees may be less influential partly because they carry larger memberships and are more unwieldy to operate. Especially, since 1965 committee size has shot up to an average of almost thirty members. As in the Senate each member carries a substantial assignment load. Although there are numerous committees, most significant legislation is concentrated in a few. These powerful committees include Appropriations, Taxes, Civil Administration, Education, Rules, Highways, and Judiciary. Rules especially served as a focal point for guiding legislation. Over the years the membership included senior chairmen from other committees. These were chosen with regard for congressional district balance. But above all members were the most influential legislators. In the Rules committee strong chairmen could interact with one another to control the flow of legislation. Appropriations and Civil Administration are the

other two key committees. Under House rules, any bill that includes financing, no matter where it was first referred, eventually must come to Appropriations before it can go to the floor. All bills referring to state administrative structure must eventually clear

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Civil Administration. Many significant bills must pass both.

Most House members believe that the chairman is the central figure on a committee. Many argue that he can be absolute if he chooses to be so. At least the chairman will be influential if he possesses the ability and will to utilize the tools available. These tools are quite similar to those in the Senate. Primarily, he can delay. The chairman determines which bills will be considered, which will receive public hearings, and how those hearings will be conducted. Members tolerate this power because someone must screen the large volume of bills. Also, the chairman defends the committee on the floor. And most do not pursue their powers arbitrarily. As a result rarely does a majority overturn a chairman's position. This does not mean that a chairman can necessarily kill any bill. If an author really wants the bill, he can produce action by persistence. He may go further with an informal "round robin" (petition by committee members) to produce pressure. Under the rules, the author may formally request a bill's return if the committee has not acted on it within thirty days after referral. The committee has fourteen days to respond. If no action is forthcoming, the author may demand an automatic return. A majority on the floor may recall a bill at any time.

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Committee chairmen owe their places to the speaker. Major chairmen may be senior legislators. But this counts for less than

Table VIII-18 Seniority and Committee Chairmanships in the  
Minnesota House, 1945-1970.

	<u>Top 7 Committees</u>	<u>Second 9 Committees</u>	<u>Rest of Committees</u>	<u>All Committees</u>
Most Senior in Body	17%	13%	30%	26%
Most Senior on Committee	23%	17%	40%	32%
Most Senior who had no more desirable assignment	37%	29%	87%	65%

Rank of Committee determined by interviews with legislators.

Each figure represents the percentage of times the "rule" was used in each set of committees.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

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in the Senate. Mainly, major chairman must be knowledgeable, influential, and active enough to hold his own under a heavy workload. From 1945 to 1970 in only 26% of the cases was the man on the committee with the greatest seniority in the body promoted to the chairmanship of that committee. (See Table VIII-18) And seniority counted for even less (17%) on the seven most important committees. The position went to the man with the greatest continuous committee service only slightly more often - 32%. As with the Senate this seeming disregard for seniority arises partially from overlapping committee memberships. Since very senior men may hold the ranking position on several committees, those with lesser experience will still often be appointed chairmen. If one takes this into account, the most senior man, who did not possess a more "desirable" chairmanship (as measured by committee ranking), was appointed 65% of the time. But even this seniority principle applied to only 37% of the cases on the seven key committees. The leadership appears to select those able men, agreeable to their viewpoint, with seniority

a secondary consideration. The House did follow one appointment "rule" somewhat more often than did the Senate. In 44% of the cases when vice chairmen were available to fill a vacant chairmanship, they were appointed. This is still far from a rigid rule. Surprisingly, men served as chairmen while a freshman on the committee fairly frequently - 44% of the time. Rarely did this happen on a major committee. But it was the most frequent pattern on the lesser committees.

One finds less continuity among House than among Senate committee chairmen. Shorter terms and higher turnover create vacancies. Changes in caucus control was also a contributing factor. Because of the last factor no chairman could have served more than eight consecutive terms. Four terms would be a more probable upper limit. Under these conditions the average tenure for House chairmen suffers in comparison to the Senate. And the degree of continuity differs less with the importance of the

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Table VIII-19 Continuity in Tenure of House Committee Chairmen, 1945-1970

	<u>Average Consecutive Terms As Chairman of One Committee</u>
Top 7 Committees	2.6
Second 9	2.2
Rest	<u>1.9</u>
All	2.2

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

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committee. Committees with the greatest continuity include Rules, Appropriations, Highways, Dairy Products, Land and Water Resources, and State Institutions. Very few men surpass four terms as chairmen on a single committee. The more prominent ones include Roy

Dunn (Rules-8), Claude Allen (Appropriations-8), John Kinzer (Labor-6), Fred Schwanke (Taxes-5), Howard Ottinger (Health and Welfare-5), Thomas Bondhus (Towns and Counties-6), Vernon Welch (Aircraft-5), and John Howard (State Institutions-5). 71% of committee chairmen served two terms or less.

How have speakers used committee assignments to distribute power among various groups in the House? First, caucus has made some difference. But there has been less discrimination in the House than in the Senate. (See Table VIII-20) Committee assign-

Table VIII-20 Minority Caucus Committee Assignments, Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

Year	% Minority Caucus in House	% Minority, on Top 7 <sup>1</sup>	% Minority on Second 9	% Minority on Rest	% Minority on All Committees
1945	18%	14%	17%	25%	21%
1947	20	19	21	20	20
1949	34	30	34	38	36
1951	34	30	34	38	33
1953	35	31	33	37	35
1955	49.6	44	45	46	45
1957	47	44	45	43	44
1959	45	44	46	46	45
1961	44	43	45	45	44.5
1963	40	37	39	42	38
1965	41	37	38	40	39
1967	31	29	30	30	30
1969	37	31	34	36	34

<sup>1</sup> As determined by interviews with legislators  
Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969; The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

ments have never deviated as much as 5% under the minority's representation in the House. Certainly there has been under-representation on the major committees. But partly this derives from the all majority membership on the Rules committee. Proportional representation was the rule.

Table VIII-21 Urban Committee Representation in the Minnesota House, 1945-1970

Year	% Urban in House	% Urban on Top 7 Comm.	% Urban on Second 9	% Urban on Rest	% Urban on all Comm.	% Urban of all Chmn.	% Urban of Leadership <sup>2</sup>
1945	27%	29%	23%	30%	28%	37%	33%
1947	27	34	17	31	28	23	36
1949	27	34	22	25	26	32	36
1951	28	36	27	25	28	34	40
1953	28	36	25	29	29	31	40
1955	28	32	23	29	29	46	42
1957	28	36	24	29	30	46	38
1959	28	34	31	26	29	44	47
1961	30	39	33	29	32	32	50
1963	35	41	37	32	35	17	37.5
1965	35	41	41	31	35	18	37.5
1967	46	45	42	42	42	31	40
1969	46	49.7	40	47	45	39	40

1. Ranking determined by interviews with legislators
2. Leadership positions include speaker, Rules committee members, and chairman of Appropriations, Taxes, Civil Administration, Judiciary, Education, and Highways.

Urban legislators are those from Twin Cities Area and Duluth Districts

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

Urban legislators also fared well. Over the whole period one finds almost exact proportional representation. In fact urban legislators were generally over-represented on the most important committees. The degree of over-representation would not be sufficient to indicate urban dominance. Neither would it suggest rural dominance. Urban men enjoyed a slight advantage in chairmanships and a marked one in leadership positions. As might

be expected this was most evident during the DFL era. Urban members have been at a marked disadvantage only since 1963. Successive changes in district lines for 1962 and 1966 brought in a host of new urban men whose freshman status did not qualify them for leadership positions. By 1969 the imbalance was beginning to be righted.

Tenure does appear to be related to choice committee assignments. (See Table VIII-22) However, again one sees the lesser

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Table VIII-22 Average Terms of Membership on House Committees, 1945-1970

Year	Top 7 Committees <sup>1</sup>	Second 9	Rest of the Committees
1945	3.8	3.3	3.2
1947	3.8	3.2	3.3
1949	4.2	3.2	3.2
1951	4.0	3.6	3.2
1953	4.6	4.2	3.7
1955	4.7	3.3	3.7
1957	5.2	3.9	3.9
1959	5.3	3.9	4.0
1961	5.9	4.1	4.0
1963	5.0	3.4	3.5
1965	5.2	3.5	4.0
1967	4.1	3.3	3.3
1969	4.3	3.4	3.3
Total Average	4.6	3.6	3.6

1 Ranking determined by legislative interviews

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

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influence of seniority in the House. Differences among levels of committees is not great. Although the emphasis on tenure apparently increased for 1954-1966, it has appeared to lessen again recently.

A final consideration on power through committees should be whether a small group rules through committee assignments. Again

this seems to be less the case in the House than in the Senate. Certainly leadership people have been over-represented on key committees. But the proportion has not been sufficient to ensure

Table VIII-23 Leadership Representation on Minnesota House Committees, 1945-1969

Year	Leadership as % of All House Members	Leadership as % of Top 6 <sup>2</sup> Committees	Leadership as % of Second 9 Committees <sup>2</sup>	Leadership on Rest of Committees
1945	11%	16%	11%	5%
1947	11	16	9.5	3.6
1949	11	18	10	4
1951	11	18	9	5
1953	11	18	9	6
1955	10	17	8	9
1957	11	19	7	8
1959	13	18	6	10.5
1961	12	15	8.5	11
1963	12	20	8	5
1965	12	18	9	7
1967	18.5	23	14	14
1969	18.5	23	14	14

1 Leadership group includes Rules Committee and chairmen of Appropriations, Taxes, Civil Administration, Judiciary, Education, Highways.

2 Rankings determined by interviews with legislators; Rules excluded for purposes of this computation because by definition included all leadership people.

Source: The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969

control through this means. And no respondent indicated that an "interlocking directorate" has been used. Rather, the group that did exist revolved around the speaker and majority leaders. The group operated primarily through the Rules committee., not through directly controlling the other committees.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Although its formal and popular resources are not great, the

Minnesota legislature does possess one major resource for power. This is its own organizational base. At least since 1955 the caucuses have been a growing source of organizational stability. Both Houses have been favored with marked continuity in leadership. The House leadership centers around the Speaker, floor leader, and Rules committee. In the Senate power is centered in a group of dominant senior men who individually chair important committees. The Senate group particularly has not been cordial to close gubernatorial cooperation. Party ties through the caucus might be one source of cooperation, especially for the DFL. But if the controlling caucus differed from the governor, close party ties might lead to even less cooperation. Information from legislative respondents would indicate that if partisanship had any influence on relations, it would have been important only after 1955.

An analysis of legislative resources does not indicate marked advantages or disadvantages for Minnesota governors. Legislative strengths and weaknesses balance one another out to leave the overall gubernatorial potential about the same as indicated in Chapter 6. One could speculate that earlier governors would have greater advantages than the later ones. Increasing legislative professionalization would have created the potential for a stronger technical base in opposing governors' programs. Also caucus organization became somewhat more systematic and tight over the period. Considering the increasing partisan orientation this might be an advantage for DFL governors, especially after 1955, and especially in the House. Republican governors probably would have reaped little advantage until after 1963. On the other hand growing

partisanship might hurt DFL governors in the Conservative Senate, which would be more likely to resist governors in any case. This means that Thye, Youngdahl, and C. Elmer Anderson had some advantages over their successors. Freeman would have been helped in the House, hurt in the Senate. Rolvaag would have been at a disadvantage in both. And Levander would have marked advantages over Elmer Andersen. Before definitely coming to such conclusions on partisan influence, the caucus policy differences will be examined closely in the next chapter. Then gubernatorial success will finally be analyzed.

## Footnotes - Chapter 8

1. Charles Adrian, The Non-Partisan Legislature in Minnesota, (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1956), p. 6; For a discussion of the whole story see Adrian, pp. 3-24; See also G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, second revised edition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), p. 57.
2. For an argument of the pros and cons see Adrian, op. cit., pp. 383-389; Mitau, op. cit., pp. 72-3, and Daniel S. Feidt, "Minnesota's Non-Party Legislature", a manuscript by a former state senator revised by Sidney and Roger Pauly, Chanhassen, Minnesota, 1964.
3. Mitau, op. cit., pp. 96-7.
4. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 37-110; This tells the story of the early years of the non-partisan legislature.
5. Ibid., pp. 89-99.
6. Ibid., pp. 116-157; This part focuses on developments in the 1930's.
7. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 157-65.
8. Ibid., p. 230.
9. Charles Packstrom, The Minnesota State Legislature, a background paper presented at the Minnesota - Dakotas regional session, The American Assembly on State Legislatures in American Politics, Moorhead, Minnesota, June 7-10, 1967, 61; see also Ralph S. Fjelstad "How About Party Labels?", National Municipal Review, 44: 359-64, (July 1955) pp. 359-60.
10. The point on caucus membership by invitation comes from Adrian, op. cit., pp. 176-7; the contrary view was found in interviews with Senator N. J. Larson, March 20, 1967, Senator Chris Erickson January 1966, and Senator Donald O. Wright, March 20, 1967.
11. See Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 360; and G. T. Mitau, Politics in Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 59.
12. Interviews with Erickson, op. cit., Norman Larson, op. cit., Wright, op. cit., Senator Walter J. Franz, April 5, 1967, Senator Harren, April 6, 1967, Senator Rosenmeier, March 21, 1967, Senator Feidt, July 17, 1969, Senator Dunlap, July 3, 1969, and Senator Rudy Hanson, August 23, 1969.
13. Interview with Senator Harold Schultz (DFL), July 18, 1969, also recalled by Senator C. C. Mitchell, (C) July 21, 1969.
14. Interview with Senator Paul Thuel, (DFL) July 22, 1969, and Senator Karl Grittner (DFL), March 27, 1967.
15. Interview with Representative Larry Haeg, July 18, 1969.
16. Interview with Haeg, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, April 6, 1967, and Representative Roy Schulz, August 26, 1969.
17. Interview with H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Odin Langen, June 23, 1967, and Speaker Lloyd Duxbury, March 22, 1967.
18. Interview with Speaker F. J. Chilgren, August 6, 1969.
19. Interview with Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit.
20. Interview with Congressman Ancher Nelsen, June 21, 1967.

21. Initiators of the meetings were particularly Governor (former Senator) Elmer L. Andersen, and Senator Daniel Feidt; recalled in interviews with Senator Feidt, op. cit., and Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit.
22. Descriptions of the use of more recent study group meetings came in interviews with Senators Robert Dunlap, op. cit., Franz, op. cit., and N. J. Larson, op. cit.
23. Backstrom, op. cit., p. 2.
24. See Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1963 (St. Paul: State Government of Minnesota, 1964), p. 411; also see Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 361 and Mitau (1960), op. cit., p. 66.
25. Interviews with Speaker Lawrence Hall, August 18, 1969, Representative Claude Allen, August 21, 1969, and Representative Haeg, op. cit., Representative Schultz, op. cit.
26. Interview with Majority Leader Aubrey Dirlam, March 21, 1967; supplemented by interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Speaker John Hartle, March 21, 1967, Representative Robert Renner, August 5, 1969, Representative M. K. Hegstrom, March 22, 1967, and Representative Robert Fitzsimons, March 29, 1967.
27. Interviews with Representative Hegstrom, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., and Representative August Mueller, March 22, 1967.
28. An example of this feeling came from interviews with Representative Paul Overgaard, August 23, 1969, and Representative R. W. Johnson, July 18, 1969.
29. Interview with Senator Paul Thuet, op. cit., these observations on caucus unity were confirmed by Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Harold Kalina, April 3, 1967, Senator N. W. Hanson, April 4, 1967, and Congressman Donald Fraser, June 21, 1967.
30. Interview with Senate minority leaders Thuet, op. cit., Grittner, op. cit., and Schultz, op. cit.
31. Interview with Senator Jack Davies, July 17, 1969, Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Kalina, op. cit., and Congressman Fraser, op. cit.
32. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 173-5.
33. Interview with Speaker A. T. Johnson, August 4, 1969; confirmed in interviews with Representative (and Senator) Leo Mosier, April 5, 1967, Representative Joseph Prifrel, April 4, 1967, Representative Martin O. Sabo, August 18, 1969, and Representative Donald Wozniak, July 23, 1969.
34. Interview with Majority Leader Fred Cina, March 20, 1967; also by Representative (and Senator) Eugene Knudsen, August 4, 1967, and Representative Wozniak, op. cit., Wozniak indicated that there were from three to eight binding votes a session. Representative Prifrel, op. cit. and Senator Grittner, op. cit., disagreed that any votes were binding.
35. Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 359; Adrian, op. cit., p. 3; see also Thomas Flinn, The Policy Process: The Minnesota Legislature and the Governor in 1955, (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957), p. 51.

36. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 198-9; see also Caroline Wolf, "Republican Party Activists in Minnesota Non-partisan Legislative Politics", (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1964), p. 37.
37. Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 362; also interview with Representative Haeg, op. cit.
38. Interview with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit.
39. A description of the recruitment process came in interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Representative Dirlam, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Fitzsimons, op. cit., and Congressman Odin Langen, op. cit.
40. Interviews with Senator Stanley Holmquist, April 6, 1967, Senator Donald S. Sinclair, April 6, 1969, Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., and Senator Dunlap, op. cit.
41. See Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 362; Flinn, op. cit., p. 52; the most information came from an interview with Representative Lawrence Yetka, August 6, 1969.
42. Representative Yetka, op. cit., and Representative Wozniak, op. cit.
43. Interview with Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator Griffner, op. cit., and Senator Davies, op. cit.
44. Interviews with Conservatives reflecting this attitude include Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Congressman Langen, op. cit., Representative Fitzsimons, op. cit., Representative Mueller, op. cit., DFLers include Senator Griffner, op. cit., Senator Mosier, op. cit., Senator Knudsen, op. cit., and Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit.
45. This point of view is also indicated in Wolf, op. cit., pp. 134-5.
46. Fjelstad, op. cit., p. 362; To follow how party affiliation increased see Mitau (1960) op. cit., pp. 68-9, and Wolf op. cit., p. 87.
47. Mitau (1970) op. cit., p. 90.
48. Mitau (1960) op. cit., p. 66; see also Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget (Interuniversity Case Series, no. 60, 1961) p. 22.
49. Thomas Flinn attributes this to non-partisanship as reinforced by incumbency: see Flinn (1961), op. cit., p. 22; For a fuller statistical analysis of the problem see Appendix IV.
50. For a more complete statistical analysis of this see Appendix V.
51. Adrian, op. cit., p. 190.
52. Ibid., op. 248-9.
53. Mitau (1960), op. cit., p. 67; Flinn (1957), op. cit., pp. 50-2; Flinn (1961) op. cit., p. 23.
54. Flinn (1957), op. cit., pp. 225-7.

55. Interview with Representative Wozniak, op. cit., Representative Yetka, op. cit., and Senator Thuet, op. cit., See also David Lebedoff, The Twenty-first Ballot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 41.
56. Wolf, op. cit., pp. 10-28, 37-62; also interview with Representative Overgaard, op. cit.
57. The statistical information is based on work done by Caroline Wolf, op. cit., pp. 18, 44-47.
58. Ibid., pp. 52-3; see also Backstrom, op. cit., p. 7.
59. Interviews with Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Mueller, op. cit., Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Congressman Langen, op. cit., Representative Fitzsimons, op. cit., and Representative Overgaard, op. cit., Dissenters from the point of view included Senator Mosier, op. cit., Senator Knudsen, op. cit., and Senator N. W. Hanson. All three are DFLers.
60. Adrian, op. cit., p. 121.
61. The following discussion is based on Mitau (1960) op. cit., p. 60; Flinn (1957) op. cit., p. 53; Wolf op. cit., p. 87; and interviews with Speaker Hall, op. cit., Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Speaker A. I. Johnson, op. cit., Speaker E. J. Chilgren, op. cit., and Speaker Duxbury, op. cit.
62. Interviews with Representative Allen, op. cit., and Representative Fitzsimons, op. cit.
63. Interview with Representative Haeg, op. cit., and Speaker Hall, op. cit.
64. Interview with Speaker Hartle, op. cit.
65. Interviews with Speaker A. I. Johnson, op. cit., Speaker E. J. Chilgren, op. cit., Representative Cina, op. cit., Representative Prifrel, op. cit., and Representative Mosier, op. cit.
66. Interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Representative Dirlam, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., Representative Schulz, op. cit., and Representative R. W. Johnson, op. cit.
67. Interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Speaker Hall, op. cit., Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Speaker E. J. Chilgren, op. cit., Representative Mosier, op. cit., Representative Mueller, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Yetka, op. cit.
68. Speaker Hall, op. cit., Representative Cina, op. cit., Representative Yetka, op. cit.
69. Interviews with Speaker Chilgren, op. cit., Speaker Johnson, op. cit., Representative Wozniak, op. cit., and Representative Yetka, op. cit.
70. Interviews with Speaker Hall, op. cit., and Representative Haeg, op. cit.
71. Interview with Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Harren, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., DFL Senators expressed much the same view. Interviews with Senator Davies, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., and Senator Raphael Salmore, August 7, 1969.

72. Interviews with Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., and Senator Holmquist, op. cit.
73. Interviews with Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., and Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit.
74. Interview with Senator Feidt, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Kalina, op. cit., and Senator Salmore, op. cit.
75. Interviews with Senator Kalina, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Salmore, op. cit.
76. Interview with Senator Holmquist, op. cit.
77. Interview with Senator Schultz, op. cit.
78. Interviews with Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit. Congressman Fraser, op. cit., Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit., and Senator Nicholas Coleman, August 20, 1969.
79. Adrian, op. cit., p. 163; also interviews with Representative Haeg, op. cit., and Speaker Duxbury, op. cit.
80. Interview with Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Representative Dirlam, op. cit., Representative Cina, op. cit., Representative Sabo, op. cit., Congressman Langen, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., and Representative Prifrel, op. cit.
81. Interviews with Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative Yetka, op. cit., and Congressman Langen, op. cit.
82. Interviews with Speaker Hartle, op. cit., Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Representative Haeg, op. cit., and Representative P. K. Peterson, August 21, 1969; Expressing the same observations were DFLers Representative Wozniak, op. cit., and Representative Yetka, op. cit.
83. Interview with Governor Elmer L. Andersen, March and April, 1967; expressing similar, but not quite such absolutist views were Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Congressman Nelsen, op. cit., Senator William Dosland, August 4, 1969, Senator Arthur Gillen, July 22, 1969, Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit., Senator Kalina, op. cit., Senator Davies, op. cit., and Senator Grittner, op. cit.
84. Interview with Senator Feidt, op. cit., Senator Gillen, op. cit., and Senator Dosland, op. cit.
85. Interviews with Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Feidt, op. cit., and Senator Dosland, op. cit.
86. Ronald F. Stinnett, and Charles Backstrom, Recount (Washington, D. C.: National Document Publishers Inc., 1964), p. 12. Interviews with Governor Andersen, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit., and Senator Thuet, op. cit.
87. Interview with Senator Dosland, op. cit.

88. Adrian, op. cit., pp. 161, 178-180; Mitau (1960), op. cit., p. 61; Interviews with Conservatives: Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator C. C. Mitchell, op. cit., Senator Gillen, op. cit., Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit., Speaker Hall, op. cit., Representative Haeg, op. cit., Representative P. K. Peterson, op. cit.; DFLers who concurred include Governor Karl Rolvaag, August, 1969, Senator Salmore, op. cit., Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit., Senator Kalina, op. cit., Senator Davies, op. cit., Senator Knudsen, op. cit., Senator Griffner, op. cit., Senator Schulz, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator Coleman, op. cit., and Representative Yetka, op. cit.
89. Interviews with Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Ossiand, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., and Senator Wright, op. cit.; The only DFLer to directly agree with this viewpoint was Congressman Fraser, op. cit.
90. Interview with Speaker Hall, op. cit., and Senator Schulz, op. cit.
91. Interviews with Speaker Hall, op. cit., Speaker Johnson, op. cit., Representative Schulz, op. cit., Representative Allen, op. cit., Representative Overgaard, op. cit., Representative Mosier, op. cit., and Representative Yetka, op. cit.
92. Interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Speaker Hurtle, op. cit., Representative Dirlam, op. cit., Representative Haeg, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Congressman Langen, op. cit., and Representative Mosier, op. cit.
93. Interviews with Representative Haeg, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., Representative Hegstrom, op. cit., Representative Wozniak, op. cit., and Speaker Chilgren, op. cit.
94. Interviews with Speaker Chilgren, op. cit., Representative R. W. Johnson, op. cit., Representative Overgaard, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., and Representative Sabo, op. cit.
95. Backstrom, op. cit., pp. 3-4; see also Wolfe, p. 82.
96. Each Senator was given a list containing the names of all committees that had existed during his tenure in the legislature. He was asked to check those committees that he considered to be the most important - those that handled the largest volume of important legislation. No limit was set on the number that might be checked. The following lists shows the committees in the numerical order of importance. 27 Senators voted.

Finance - 24	Public Welfare - 11
Taxes - 23	Commerce - 8
Civil Administration - 20	Labor - 8
Education 19	Agriculture - 5
Judiciary - 19	Game and Fish - 3
Public Highways - 15	Public Domain - 3
Committee on Committees - 12	Drainage - 2
Rules - 12	

Some 15 other committees had one mention each.

97. Interview with Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Harren, op. cit., Senator Feidt, op. cit., Senator Davies, op. cit.
98. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative, 1955 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1956), p. 74
99. Interviews with Senator Feidt, op. cit., Senator Davies, op. cit., and Governor Andersen, op. cit.
100. Interviews with Governor Andersen, op. cit., Senator Franz, op. cit., Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Harren, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Mitchell, op. cit., Senator Dosland, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator N. W. Hanson, op. cit., Senator Kalina, op. cit., Congressman Fraser, op. cit., Senator Griffner, op. cit., Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Davies, op. cit., Senator Coleman, op. cit., and Senator Selmore, op. cit.
101. Interview with Senator Davies, op. cit.
102. Based on data tabulated from the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-1969.
103. Interviews with Governor Andersen, op. cit., Senator Franz, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Mitchell, op. cit., Senator Frickson, op. cit., Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit., and Senator Dunlap, op. cit.
104. Interviews with Senator Rosenmeier, op. cit., Governor Andersen, op. cit., Senator Franz, op. cit., Senator Holmquist, op. cit., Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Wright, op. cit., Senator Norman Larson, op. cit., Senator Feidt, op. cit., and Senator Mitchell, op. cit., Senator Rudy Hanson, op. cit., and Senator Dunlap, op. cit.
105. Interviews with Senator Schultz, op. cit., and Senator Thuet, op. cit.
106. For example in 1967 Senator Rudy Hanson and Senator Joe Josephson each could have been chairman of either Agriculture or Education. Although Education is ostensibly the more important committee, Josephson was a farmer and came from a more rural district than Hanson, an attorney. Josephson took the Agriculture chairmanship. Interview with Senator Hanson, op. cit.
107. Compare Mitau (1960), op. cit., p. 61 with Mitau (1970) op. cit., p. 84; also based on interviews with Senator Thuet, op. cit., and Senator Schultz, op. cit., as compared to Senator Griffner, op. cit., Senator Coleman, op. cit., and Senator Davies, op. cit.
108. Backstrom, op. cit., p. 2.
109. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1961, (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1962), p. 48.
110. Interview with Representative Yetka, op. cit.

111. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1967-8, (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1968) see House Rules.
112. Interviews with Speaker Duxbury, op. cit., Representative H. J. Anderson, op. cit., Representative R. W. Johnson, op. cit., Representative Mueller, op. cit., Representative Overgaard, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., Representative Hegstrom, op. cit., Representative Schulz, op. cit., Representative Fitzsimons, op. cit., Representative Yetka, op. cit., Representative Knudsen, op. cit., Representative Prifral, op. cit., Representative Mosier, op. cit., Representative Cina, op. cit.
113. Minnesota Secretary of State, The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1967-8 (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1968) see House Rules.

## CHAPTER NINE

### MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE ROLL CALL VOTES

The previous chapter described the structure of power and decision-making in the Minnesota legislature. This chapter will specifically examine decision-making on the floor. The purpose is to ascertain the factors that influence whether a bill passes or fails. If definite patterns emerge, these may also explain the failure or success of gubernatorial bills. Factors commonly used to explain roll call votes include party, urban-rural divisions, constituency, region, committee positions, and ideology. Since roll call voting is not the major concern in this paper, attention will be limited to the two most frequently discussed variables. Conversations with some legislators suggest that caucus might take the place of party in Minnesota. Others deny that this is so. The first section will examine when, to what degree, and on what issues the caucus has been influential. As basis of comparison the next section will then consider the importance of urban-rural divisions. The last section will evaluate how satisfactorily these two factors, taken together, explain roll call voting in Minnesota.

#### I. CAUCUS

Political Scientists have used roll call votes as a tool for describing legislative decision-making at least since the pioneering studies of Stuart Rice. <sup>1</sup> Malcolm Jewell has performed the most extensive work on the state legislatures. And this has been <sup>2</sup> supplemented by others in recent years. No one would contend that roll call votes reveal all influences on decision-making.

Most such votes are unanimous. Major disputes and crucial decisions may take place in committee or be resolved off the floor. A legislator can vote one way in committee and switch on the floor. Also, roll call votes may show how members voted but not why. The reasons must be inferred from the characteristics of those who vote together. Or votes must be combined with other knowledge about the legislative process. But neither is the roll call entirely without importance. The vote is an essential step in the passage of legislation. It forces the legislator to take a public stand that determines whether the bill will become a law. It does provide some clues on how legislators react to demands by party, constituency, and other forces.<sup>3</sup>

Commonly, only non-unanimous roll calls that reveal divisions among legislators are studied.<sup>4</sup> By convention attention is restricted to those bills with at least ten percent of the members present and voting in disagreement with the majority. Measures of party voting vary. Some use the percentage of votes on which a majority of one party voted against a majority of the other. This indicates frequency of party conflict. The index of cohesion measures party unity. One computes the index by calculating the percentage of those members on the prevailing side within a party. Then the percentage of those opposed is subtracted from this for the final index number. If all party members vote the same way, the index is 100. If the party is equally divided, the index is 0. If three-fourths vote for and one-fourth against a measure the index is 50. This is a more severe measure of unity than the percentage voting together because it overemphasizes dissent within

the party. The average index of cohesion for each party on all opposition votes during a session provides a measure of intensity of party conflict. Some utilize an even more severe measure of party voting. They consider only the percentage of contested votes where party majorities opposed one another, and each party had a high index of cohesion, such as 60 or 80.

Based on experience in other states, legislative party cohesion depends somewhat on party electoral competition. One party states reveal no party influence in legislative voting. Party influence is more likely, though not inevitable, in two party states.<sup>5</sup> In two party states cohesion probably depends on the sharpness of constituency differences and strength of party organization. Certainly party voting is most common in northeastern states and the industrialized midwest.<sup>6</sup> Frequency of party voting varies from 35% to 50% of the roll calls in Congress.<sup>7</sup> It has ranged from 17% (California) to 96% (Rhode Island) in the states.<sup>8</sup> Northeastern states such as Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Hampshire range from 60% to 96%. Midwestern states more closely approximate Congressional performance with a range of from 40% to 60%. These include Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and South Dakota. The western states with strong competition, but weak party organization, fall at the bottom of the scale. California, Idaho, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah would fall in a range of from 17% to 40%. Intensity of party voting does not follow such a neat pattern. But most northeastern states have an average index of cohesion from 55 to 75. But the Michigan Senate in 1959 had cohesion rates of

81 and 75. Some less competitive midwestern states - Iowa and South Dakota - do as well as their more competitive neighbors. And the western states showed a cohesion level only slightly less. That is, when party votes occurred, they were as intense as in the better organized midwestern states. But the frequency was much lower.

Parties do not clash on all votes even in the most intensively organized states. Some issues partake of a greater partisan flavor than others. Common partisan issues would appear to be taxes, appropriations, and labor. Welfare, education, and regulation of business may also fall into this group, but the evidence is less certain.<sup>9</sup> Partisanship also appears when the party is involved as an interest group. Such issues include legislative organization; elections, state administration, and perhaps, local organization.<sup>10</sup> Policy questions that arouse little partisan concern include judicial matters, transportation, health, and natural resources.

#### Minnesota Caucus Voting

If the Minnesota legislature was non-partisan in fact as well as law, caucus membership should have no particular relationship to voting patterns. Certainly caucus should appear to be no more important than party in the weakest two party states. It was argued in an earlier chapter that, based on socio-economic environment and party competition, Minnesota should be similar to western or less industrialized midwestern states even if party designation existed in the legislature. Early in the period it should resemble modified one party states such as Kansas, Iowa,

and South Dakota. Even as competition increased it could adopt the pattern of weak party organization states such as Colorado, Idaho, or Utah. There was a slight chance it could follow the stronger party path of Michigan and Wisconsin.

The previous discussion of legislative organization should alert one to the possibility of at least some caucus influence. It had at least a role in legislative organization. Both Conservative and DFL members accorded it some secondary importance on a few major issues. The Senate was more divided. Most conservatives denied any caucus policy influence beyond organizational matters. DFLers accorded the caucus greater significance.

The roll call analysis results are summarized in Table IX-1. In the earlier years Senate caucus voting remained quite low. Up through 1957 the frequency of party voting was similar to that in competitive, but weak party organization, states. At the same time this did not reflect an absolute "no party" system such as one might find in the South. From 1959 on the frequency of caucus voting equaled that found in two party midwestern states. The overall average places Minnesota somewhere between these two groups, as was expected. The intensity of cohesion also starts out low for both caucuses. But again this increased sharply in 1959 to rival two party midwestern states. And from 1963-1965 the cohesion equaled some strong eastern states, although perhaps Michigan is a more appropriate model. The Senate then appears to confirm the hypothesis relating socio-economic development, increasing party competition, and legislative cohesion. The caucuses, at least in roll call voting, responded much as would

Table IX-1 Caucus Roll Call Voting in the Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970.

Year	% Seats Majority Caucus	Number Caucus Votes	% Caucus Votes	% Both Caucus 60+ index of Cohesion <sup>2</sup>	% Both Caucus 80+ index of Cohesion <sup>2</sup>	DFL	Cohesion
S E N A T E							
1945	85%	29	35%	3%	1%	48	47
1947	82	28	33	2	0	45	44
1949	85	15	28	0	0	34	34
1951	76	26	45	1.5	0	48	35
1953	78	23	26	2	1	45	30
1955	72	20	29	7.5	3	52	55
1957	72	37	31	8	4	56	55
1959	62	61	44	19	10	60	64
1961	62	77	56	26	14	65	69
1963	62	152	67	51	47	84	83
1965	66	96	63	40	31	75	82
1967	67	73	62	25	17	64	63
1969	67	34	43	11	5	57	61
Ave.	72%	52	43%	15%	10%	56	59
H O U S E							
1945	82%	52	61%	12%	2%	70	48
1947	80	34	43	5	1	54	44
1949	66	50	54	15	4	58	61
1951	66	63	59	27	10	66	58
1953	65	72	60	27	8.5	65	60
1955	50.4	78	53	15	11	71	52
1957	54	104	50	18	6.5	63	53
1959	55	135	54	16	8	62	50
1961	56	123	52	21	16	70	60
1963	60	98	51	20	12	63	65
1965	58	71	51	29	28	69	80
1967	69	83	43	22	9	66	62
1969	63	61	41	17	10	56	72
Ave.	62%	80	52%	19%	10%	64	59

1. % caucus votes is based on total number of contested votes.
2. % votes with both caucuses having an index of cohesion of 60 or 80 is based on total number of contested votes.
3. DFL was the majority caucus.

Source: Computed from roll calls in the Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-1969, and the Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969.

legislative parties in similar circumstances. Throughout the period the caucuses voted together in a manner similar to Congressional parties. By the 1960's the caucuses opposed one another as frequently, and as intensively, as legislative parties in Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana.

The Minnesota House does not follow the expected pattern. The frequency of caucus voting does not fluctuate with any discernable pattern. The highest frequency came in 1945 and the lowest in 1969. But throughout the level remained fairly steady. Party voting was consistently above that of the western states, more comparable to that in the midwest. The same observation holds true for the intensity of caucus voting. The DFL caucus especially shows no real pattern. After 1947 the Conservatives show some tendency to be more cohesive when in a majority. But again both caucuses maintain a cohesion comparable to the moderately organized two party states in the Midwest.

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Table IX-2 Caucus Conflict and Cohesion, Minnesota Legislature, by Historical Periods.

	%Caucus Votes	S E N A T E		% Caucus Votes	H O U S E	
		Ave. DFL Cohesion	Ave. Cons. Cohesion		Ave. DFL Cohesion	Ave. Cons. Cohesion
1945-54	33%	44	38	55%	63	54
1955-70	49%	64	66	49%	65	62

Source: Computed from Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-1969, and Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969.

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It had been hypothesized that the Minnesota political process could be divided into two eras. Before 1955 it should resemble modified one party states. After 1955 it should be two party competitive. Senate caucus conflict responds as one would expect.

Caucus conflict increased both in intensity and frequency. The House did not follow the expected pattern. Conflict frequency actually diminished. Conflict intensity increased only slightly.

There is no ready explanation for the differences between the two houses. The Senate follows the expected development pattern. The House does not. Overall the House demonstrates both a greater frequency and a greater intensity of caucus voting. But the magnitude of differences between the two is not as marked as one would expect from talking with the state legislators. Most maintained that the House was significantly more caucus controlled than the Senate. This appears to be true up until 1961. But after that caucus conflicts became more frequent in the Senate. And they became at least as intensive. Perhaps formal non-partisanship did dampen the "normal" conflict that one would expect. Senate conflict developed later than in the House because of the strong informal non-partisan norms prevalent among members in the ruling Conservative caucus. That caucus long retained a much greater advantage than did any majority group in the House. Having been kept down longer in the Senate, the minority DFLers responded more strongly in a partisan way as their opportunities for influence increased. And this might have forced the Conservatives in the 1960's to be more partisan in return.

As was expected the DFL caucuses have been more cohesive than the Conservatives. But again the roll call votes do not reveal as marked differences as the legislators had indicated. After 1957 the Senate Conservatives were usually more cohesive than the DFL. And the total average cohesion is almost identical. Superior

discipline of House DFLers over House Conservatives was evident much longer. That pattern was reversed starting in 1963.

Increased socio-economic development and party competition might account for increasing party conflict in the Senate. What other factors seem to be associated with changes in caucus cohesion? Studies of legislative parties have suggested that gubernatorial control, majority-minority status, and size of the majority, are variables to consider. Frequency of conflict in Minnesota does not appear to be associated with any of these. (See Table IX-3) A party that has the governor should be more

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Table IX-3 Variables Associated with Frequency of Caucus Conflict, Minnesota Legislature.

	Senate	House
DFL Governor in Office	47%	52%
Republican Governor in Office	41%	52%
DFL majority	---	52%
Conservative Majority	43%	51%
"Divided" Control	47%	51%
Not "Divided"	41%	52%

Frequency of conflict is the % of contested roll calls on which the majority of each caucus was opposed.

Divided control for each body would be a DFL Governor with a Conservative majority or a Republican governor with a DFL majority.

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cohesive to promote his program. A party with the legislative majority should be more cohesive to promote its own program. When control is divided, conflict should increase over contrasting programs. The Senate shows a very slight tendency for higher conflict with a DFL governor and divided control. (One and the same) But the difference is not great.

There are some relationships between these factors and intensity of caucus conflict. Control of the governorship is not associated with general caucus cohesion. Conservatives and DFLers react differently to having a governor of similar persuasion. This applies with special force to the Senate. The Conservatives become markedly more cohesive when a DFL governor holds office. The same is true for the DFL caucus. This would seem to suggest, but not prove, that DFLers unite behind their governor, Conservatives against him. Republican governors elicit no such strong reaction from either caucus. Majority as opposed to minority

Table IX-4 Intensity of Caucus Conflict, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970.

	S E N A T E			H O U S E		
	All	Cons.	DFL	All	Cons.	DFL
Have Governor	55	48	65	61	58	66
Not Governor	57	67	51	62	60	63
Majority	55	55	--	63	61	66
Minority	56	--	56	60	54	63
Divided control	66	67	65	68	68	67
Not Divided	49	48	51	60	56	63
Governor + Maj.	48	48	--	60	58	65
Non-governor + Maj.	67	67	--	72	73	70
Governor + Minority	65	--	65	64	60	66
Non-governor + Min.	51	--	51	58	52	62

All figures refer to average cohesion.

DFL governor is considered to be closest to DFL caucus; Republican governor is considered to be closest to Conservative caucus.

status makes no great difference in the Senate. One finds some slight tendency for the House majority caucus (especially Conservatives) to be more cohesive, but this is small. Divided

control (a governor of different persuasion from the majority caucus) causes greater differences. The House does not respond to this factor to the same degree as does the Senate. But the Conservative caucus does show a marked sensitivity to a division.

The inner-relationship between gubernatorial control, majority control, and cohesion is a complex one. Generally, Minnesota legislative caucuses muster the greatest unity in facing an opposing governor when that caucus has a majority. But they show the second most discipline when they have the governorship and are in a minority position. Minority House caucuses show some discipline when the governor is of a similar position, but the intensity is not great. The worst position is to be without either the majority or the governor, a hopeless situation. In summary, Minnesota legislative caucuses show the greatest unity when they can battle the governor from a position of strength. But they will also cooperate when the governor can be used as a necessary resource if they are in a minority.

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Table IX-5 Margin of Caucus Control, Caucus Conflict, and Caucus Cohesion, Minnesota Legislature

	SENATE Margin of Control	HOUSE Margin of Control
Frequency of Conflict	-.719	-.110
Cohesion-Conservative	+.886	+.104
Cohesion-DFL	+.923	+.213
Cohesion-Cons. Maj.	+.886	+.836
Cohesion-Cons. Min.	---	-.400
Cohesion-DFL Maj.	---	+.400
Cohesion DFL Min.	+.923	-.054

Figures are based on Spearman rank order correlation coefficients as found in Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 317-9.

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The same relationship may be examined by rank order correlations among margin of control, frequency of caucus conflict, and caucus cohesion. <sup>11</sup> Again the Senate follows expected patterns. The House does not. The greater the proportion of seats one caucus controlled in the Senate, the lower was the frequency of caucus conflict. The relationship is quite strong. This relationship was even more marked for caucus cohesion. The narrower the margin of control, the greater the cohesion. The House experience contradicts expectations. There was a slight negative correlation between margin of control and conflict frequency. Both caucuses were more cohesive the smaller the margin of control, but the relationship is very weak. Majority versus minority status alters the impact of margin of control on cohesion. The majority caucus cohesion does increase the narrower the margin control becomes. But the reverse is true for the minority caucus. There is a slight tendency for cohesion to increase as its numbers dwindle.

#### Caucus Issues

Caucus is not equally important in legislative voting for all issues. Therefore, the roll call votes were broken down into <sup>12</sup> nineteen issue areas. Senate caucus conflict occurred most frequently on labor, legislative organization, national issues, state administration, taxes, and election. Liquor, law enforcement, appropriations, local issues, and agriculture least frequently became caucus issues. The same six sets of issues also aroused great intensity in caucus conflict. In addition some votes on welfare, health, constitutional amendments, local government, and appropriations promoted modest caucus cohesion. With the

exception of legislative organization both caucuses were equally cohesive on the most sharply contested issues. Since the Conservatives always controlled, their greater discipline on organizational matters might be expected. DFLers showed greater cohesion on liquor, local matters, constitutional amendments, health, and welfare. This might seem reasonable for a group with a strongly urban-liberal cast. Conservatives were more cohesive on appropriations, law enforcement, natural resources, transportation and education. Compared to other state senates, Minnesota caucuses do not appear to be extremely disciplined.<sup>13</sup> Minnesota caucus cohesion would equal party cohesion in the most partisan states on elections, health and welfare, legislative organization, taxes, and state administration. On most other issues such as transportation, law enforcement, education, and natural resources it would drop below the average for even the latter.

House caucuses reveal a fairly high frequency of conflict over legislative organization, labor, elections, national issues, taxes, welfare, and constitutional amendments. In addition, when they become issues, there is some intensity of conflict over appropriations, business, health, education, and state administration. The highest conflict issues would be legislative organization, national, taxes, labor, and elections. The House caucuses would then equal party conflict in the most partisan states on legislative organization, labor, taxes, and health-welfare.<sup>14</sup> They would fall below the least partisan states only on local issues and natural resources.

Caucus conflict within House and Senate is quite similar.

Frequency of conflict is more pervasive in the House and covers more issues. Welfare and constitutional amendments are more frequently contested in the House. Business and educational matters become of modest caucus concern in the House while they

Table IX-6 Caucus Voting on Issue Areas, Minnesota Senate, 1945-1970

Issue	Caucus Votes	Non-Caucus Votes	% Caucus Votes	Index of Cohesion, Caucus Votes	
				DFL	Cons.
Agriculture	18	38	32%	46	40
Appropriations	16	37	30	50	68
Liquor	30	97	24	44	24
Business	59	77	43	48	40
Local	26	57	31	60	47
Natural Resources	23	36	39	33	53
Constitutional Amend.	10	19	34	65	35
Law Enforcement	14	69	17	35	45
Elections	16	14	53	78	72
Health	4	6	40	65	55
Transportation	21	40	34	30	42
Labor	52	9	85	67	65
Legislative Organ.	116	45	72	84	92
National	15	3	83	71	68
Education	24	44	35	42	54
State Admin.	124	49	72	84	36
Taxes	95	49	66	69	70
Welfare	17	19	48	65	43
Miscellaneous	2	25	8	82	34

Source: Computed from Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-1969

do not in the Senate. Local issues occasionally become caucus matters in the Senate but not in the House. Conflict over state administration showed the clearest contrast between Senate and House behavior. Caucus disputes were far more pervasive and intense in the Senate. This deviation can be traced to the Senate power to confirm gubernatorial appointees. The DFL governor could particularly rely on Senate DFL caucus support when divisions over such appointments arose.

The kinds of issues that precipitate caucus disputes have not remained constant. Generally the number of such issues has increased over time. From 1945 to 1956 only two or three issues a session could really be designated caucus issues in the Senate.

Table IX-7 Caucus Voting on Issue Areas, Minnesota House, 1945-1970

Issue	Caucus Votes	Non-Caucus Votes	% Caucus Votes	Index of Cohesion Caucus Votes	
				DFL	Cons.
Agriculture	30	41	42%	36	47
Appropriations	34	42	45	66	59
Liquor	58	86	40	31	34
Business	114	119	49	55	49
Local	50	100	33	52	42
Natural Resources	42	89	32	39	47
Constitutional Amend.	32	22	60	71	43
Law Enforcement	38	71	35	46	51
Elections	30	10	75	64	63
Health	9	15	38	58	48
Transportation	28	70	29	37	47
Labor	86	9	91	75	71
Legislative Org.	149	35	81	80	82
National	40	15	73	87	74
Education	40	75	35	63	49
State Admin.	68	70	49	66	53
Taxes	127	56	69	78	69
Welfare	52	23	69	67	51
Miscellaneous	18	22	45	56	43

Source: Computed from Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969

Usually this included conflict over legislative organization and national problems. In other words caucus became relevant mainly on structural matters and for issues that might appeal to partisans that existed within caucus ranks. Less frequently, labor and taxes could be included within this group. Caucus conflict became most far reaching from 1957 to 1966. The Senate then did not exactly follow the response pattern to changing political conditions

that had been predicted. The DFL governor in 1955 did not immediately create intense conflict. Caucuses became most relevant as policy makers in Governor Freeman's second or third term. Legislative organization, labor, state administration, and taxes were always caucus issues at this point. National, appropriations, elections, and welfare became issues almost as frequently. During administrations headed by DFL governors, Senate caucuses responded to social and party-as-group issues just as a party would have. However, caucus conflict again broke from the predicted pattern in 1967 and 1969. Taxes and legislative organization remained major issues. But labor, welfare, and national concerns drop out to be replaced by local and business issues. This may reflect the growing metropolitan influence within the dominant Conservative caucus (since many local issues were metropolitan).

As has already been indicated House caucus conflict does not show the predicted changes over time at all. The number of different caucus issues in any given session remains almost constant. Conflict did become more widespread in the 1951 and 1959 sessions, when dynamic governors were feuding with legislative leadership. Disputes over legislative organization, labor, and taxes remain an absolute constant throughout. Welfare, business, national, and state administration are also constants, albeit on a more muted level. Appropriations and constitutional amendments became caucus matters during the Youngdahl and Freeman periods. Elections aroused caucus passions on a semi-regular basis from 1959 on.

## II. URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT

Caucus affiliation is not the only factor that may be used to

explain roll call votes. The urban-rural division has been another factor commonly considered in writings on state legislatures. In some states the legislators perceive this as being a more important source of conflict than party. Especially under a non-partisan system, one would expect latent urban-rural differences to come to the fore as a basis for factionalism at least on some issues. This should especially be the case in Minnesota as both caucuses contain significant portions of both urban and rural legislators.

#### Urban-Rural Voting

Urban-rural divisions have not been absent in the Minnesota legislature. But neither have they been very pervasive. Urban legislators are defined as those coming from the Twin Cities and Duluth metropolitan areas. Rural legislators include all of the rest. In the Senate a majority of each group never opposed one another on more than one-half of the contested roll calls. The most frequent conflict occurred in 1965. The least came in 1969. Less than one-third of the contested votes in the Minnesota Senate reflected an urban-rural confrontation. Neither group appeared to be very cohesive on the clashes that did occur, although the rural legislators did reach an average index of 50 both in 1945 and 1965. Over time both groups averaged in the mid-thirties. If the same criteria is applied to urban-rural as to party conflict, one would have to say that urban-rural divisions were on a very low level, both in frequency and intensity.

House voting reveals very much the same pattern. The peak of conflict was reached in 1953 with 47% of the contested roll calls

Table IX-8 Urban-Rural Voting in the Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970

Year	% Senate Rural	No. Urban- Rural Votes	% Urban- Rural Votes <sup>1</sup>	% each group 60+ index of cohesion <sup>2</sup>	Index of Cohesion	
					URBAN	RURAL
S E N A T E						
1945	73 <sup>1</sup>	24	28%	0	46	50
1947	73	24	29	0	32	37
1949	73	19	31	2	35	30
1951	70	17	27	1.5	39	34
1953	70	21	26	0	28	20
1955	70	21	29	1	38	34
1957	70	17	15	0	41	33
1959	70	54	40	0	34	37
1961	69	62	45	0	25	42
1963	60	108	46	0	23	43
1965	60	72	48	2	21	50
1967	55	33	27	1	35	30
1969	55	10	12	0	36	34
Average	67 <sup>1</sup>	37	31%	.6%	33	36
H O U S E						
1945	73 <sup>1</sup>	21	24%	0	39	38
1947	73	32	42	1	33	40
1949	73	34	35	4	34	47
1951	72	46	44	1	32	37
1953	72	55	47	1	32	37
1955	72	43	29	0	39	18
1957	72	55	26	0	44	19
1959	72	76	31	0	51	22
1961	70	63	27	1	42	18
1963	63	68	36	0	32	31
1965	63	31	22	0	30	41
1967	55	45	24	1	35	37
1969	55	17	11	0	37	25
Average	68 <sup>1</sup>	30	31%	.7%	37	32

1 % Urban-rural votes is based on total number of contested votes.  
 2 % votes with both groups having an index of cohesion of 60 is based on total number of contested votes; there were no votes with 80+ cohesion.

Urban legislators are those from districts in Twin Cities and Duluth Metropolitan areas

Source: Computed from roll calls in the Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-1969, and the Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969.

having urban-rural divisions. The bottom came in 1969 with 11%. Again rarely did either caucus approach even mild cohesiveness. The two legislative bodies differ very little. Each has exactly the same average frequency, and almost the same intensity of urban-rural voting. Both are low.

There also appear to be a few differences between the urban and the rural blocs. In the Senate rural legislators were slightly more cohesive than the urban. But differences were very slight except for the 1961-1965 sessions. House groups showed just the reverse patterns. Urban members were somewhat more cohesive. But again differences between each group were relatively slight except for 1955-1961 (when DFLers controlled the House) when the urban group had markedly greater cohesion.

Urban-rural conflict changed somewhat over time, but the shifts were not as great as would be expected. One would expect that urban-rural conflict would have been greater earlier in the period. Caucus relationships were more comparable to a modified one-party situation at the time. Other bases for legislative factions should have been more apparent. As caucuses become stronger they should have muted other sorts of conflict. But urban-rural divisions changed very little in the Senate (except for 1959-1965). The House does show some decline, but not at a very steady rate, as time goes on. There are differences between the pre and post 1955 periods, but again these are not marked. In the Senate frequency of conflict actually rose slightly. Urban cohesiveness declined. Rural cohesiveness increased. The House again reverses the pattern. Frequency of conflict did decrease.

Table IX-9 Urban-Rural Conflict in Minnesota Legislature in Historical Periods

	S E N A T E			H O U S E		
	% Votes Urban-Rural	Average Index of Cohesion		% Votes Urban-Rural	Average Index of Cohesion	
		Urban	Rural		Urban	Rural
1945-54	28%	36	34	38%	37	40
1955-70	33%	32	38	28%	39	28

Source: Computed from Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-69, and Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-69.

Rural cohesiveness dropped sharply. Urban cohesiveness increased slightly.

Degree of control also fails to explain urban-rural conflict. The rural group has always enjoyed a majority in both houses. But this majority dropped from 73% in 1945 to 55% by 1969. One might expect that as the urban group came closer to gaining control, conflict would increase. As long as they had a tiny minority they could not hope to influence votes on the floor. And one would expect that issues opposed by the rural group would never reach the floor anyway. This does not appear to be the case. There would appear to be no relationship at all in the Senate. The small relationship that exists in the House reverses expectations. The closer the urban group came to a majority, the less urban rural conflict existed.

Table IX-10 Margin of Rural Control, Urban-Rural Conflict, and Urban-Rural Cohesion

	Senate Margin of Control	House Margin of Control
Frequency of Conflict	.199	-.423
Cohesion- Urban	.022	-.105
Cohesion- Rural	.078	-.119

Figures are based on Spearman rank order correlation coefficients as found in Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 317-9.

If one compares caucus to urban-rural impact, it becomes apparent that the former is far more significant both in frequency and intensity. The urban-rural factor has only a weak influence. Caucus has a utility as at least a moderate explanatory factor. The differential between the two factors on intensity, or cohesion, is even more marked than that on frequency. This becomes especially apparent on the most intensive votes. Votes that would find both urban and rural groups reaching a cohesion of 60 or 80 are extremely rare. Caucuses do not reach that point of intensity often. But they do so 15 times as frequently as urban-rural groups in the Senate, and 19 times as frequently in the House. Caucus voting has always been more important numerically than urban-rural votes in the House. The same holds true for cohesiveness. Since caucus became an important Senate factor only since 1959, the urban-rural impact rivals it in earlier sessions. There were more urban-rural votes in 1949. The proportion of votes were the same in 1953 and 1955. Urban and rural factions were as cohesive as caucuses in 1945. And they were about as cohesive in 1949 and 1951.

Some votes were both urban-rural and caucus votes. If almost all DFLers were urban and Conservatives were rural, a perfect caucus vote would produce an urban-rural vote. And the converse is true. In such cases an apparent caucus or urban-rural vote may be merely a by-product of a more severe conflict between the other grouping. Most such overlapping votes reveal a higher cohesiveness within the caucus. For this reason the urban-rural influence is probably overstated by Table IX-8. The increased urban-rural voting from 1961-1965 can probably be explained by the more frequent caucus

Table IX-11 Urban-Rural Voting, By Issue Areas, Minnesota Senate, 1945-1970

Issue	Number Urban-Rural Votes	Number Non- Urban-Rural Votes	% Urban- Rural Votes	Index of Cohesion	
				Urban	Rural
Agriculture	30	28	52%	63	32
Appropriations	13	39	25	25	14
Liquor	21	102	18	18	27
Business	28	105	21	28	22
Local	21	65	24	33	32
Nat. Resources	17	43	28	29	43
Const. Amend.	10	19	34	36	39
Law Enforcement	12	70	15	45	15
Elections	12	18	40	15	31
Health	4	6	40	36	26
Transportation	11	51	16	25	25
Labor	47	19	71	27	45
Legis. Organ.	83	76	52	17	66
National	10	8	56	25	17
Education	22	46	32	53	42
State Admin.	77	98	44	16	16
Taxes	46	100	32	21	25
Welfare	18	19	49	94	14
Miscellaneous	3	22	12	10	14

Source: Computed from The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-69.

clashes. Lower urban cohesion at this time can be attributed to the fact that the urban delegation was more evenly distributed between the two caucuses. The rural delegation was associated more closely with the Conservative caucus. Based on similar reasoning, urban House cohesion probably increased from 1955-1961 because most urban delegates caucused with the majority DFL. Rural cohesiveness dropped sharply because that group was split between the two caucuses.

#### Urban-Rural Issues

As was the case with caucus voting, the urban-rural influence is not uniform for all issue areas. Studies in other states indicate that urban-rural lines become most sharply drawn over taxation,

Table IX-12 Urban-Rural Voting, By Issue Areas, Minnesota House, 1945-1970

Issue	Number Urban-Rural Votes	Number Non- Urban-Rural Votes	% Urban- Rural Votes	Index of Cohesion	
				Urban	Rural
Agriculture	25	46	35%	70	29
Appropriations	17	59	22	33	34
Liquor	44	100	31	32	31
Business	59	174	25	35	25
Local	38	112	25	43	28
Nat. Resources	24	107	18	35	45
Const. Amend.	21	33	40	53	50
Law Enforcement	28	81	26	32	26
Elections	14	26	35	37	28
Health	6	18	25	39	25
Transportation	11	87	11	43	31
Labor	54	41	57	33	29
Legis. Organ.	45	139	24	48	24
National	27	28	49	31	26
Education	26	89	23	37	33
State Admin.	36	102	26	30	31
Taxes	72	111	39	29	31
Welfare	20	56	27	36	34
Miscellaneous	11	29	28	43	27

Source: The Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969.

welfare, labor, school aids, housing, urban renewal, mass transit, highway location, and regulatory authority for cities. Additionally some specific issues directly influence the urban and rural blocs as interest groups. These include colored oleo margarine, daylight savings time, and legislative reapportionment. Table IX-11 shows the intensity and frequency of urban-rural clashes. The two groups have majorities opposed a majority of times on four issue areas: agriculture, labor, legislative organization, and national. In addition one finds relatively frequent disputes on elections, health, state administration, and welfare. However, it is extremely difficult to find any issue area in which both blocs are even moderately cohesive. Urban legislators were cohesive on

agricultural issues, but rural men were not. Rural delegates were cohesive on legislative organization, but urban men were not. Some cohesiveness shows up on the few education issues that split the two groups. Taxation, transportation, labor, and local issues did not follow the pattern expected. Welfare and education did so in only a moderate way. And if one compares urban-rural voting to Table IX-6, it becomes clear that caucus had more impact on all but agricultural issues.

Much the same story appears in the House. Urban-rural differences are in the majority only on labor issues. Other issues where the divisions appear with some frequency are national, constitutional amendments, and taxes. But only on constitutional amendments will one find both groups with even a moderate cohesion. Urban legislators appear very cohesive on agricultural issues; but the rural men are not. In fact urban legislators are more cohesive on all but four issues: appropriations, natural resources, state administration, and taxes. But except for agriculture and legislative organization, both groups are similarly cohesive in each area.

The urban-rural influence has not always been so weak on all issues. Urban-rural divisions were frequent on agriculture, constitutional amendments, and education in the pre-1955 Senate. From 1955-1962 the urban-rural factor practically disappeared on broad issue areas. It re-emerged on agriculture and, to a lesser extent, welfare issues after 1963. But in the House it has never been more than a sporadic consideration. There seems to have been slightly more urban-rural activity before 1955 in the House. This was

especially true on constitutional amendments, legislative organization, and taxes.

Urban-rural differences do have some meaning. But they are not reflected in broad issue categories as is the case with caucus. They must be sought for on more specific bills. (Table IX-13)

The hard core urban-rural issues may be discovered by finding all roll calls with majorities opposed. Then eliminate from that those roll calls on which caucuses were also opposed and had a higher cohesion than the urban-rural groups. This leaves 175 Senate urban-rural roll calls, about 13 per session. If one sifts these down to the roll calls where both delegations had at least a modest (40+) cohesion, only 37 votes remain. These central issues consist of taxes (8), regulation of oleo margarine (7), school aids (6), daylight savings time (5), legislative reapportionment (3), and the rest scattered. Those issues that were urban-rural but less intense included in addition liquor, business, local laws, and natural resources. (See Table IX-14)

Urban-rural issues in the House were quite similar. Only 192 roll calls (15 per session) could be classified as urban-rural. About 45 were intensive conflicts. The more intensive issues include reapportionment (14), taxes (8), daylight savings time (4), liquor (3), and a scattering of others. The less divisive issues include the preceding areas plus agriculture, business, local, and natural resources. The only real difference between the Senate and House would be that reapportionment issues stirred more controversy on the House floor. Educational aids were less important in the House.

Table IX-43 Core Urban-Rural Issues, Minnesota Legislature, 1945-1970

Year	No. Bills Urban-Rural Majorities Opposed		Number of Votes with Both Groups 40+ Cohesion		Number of Votes Both Groups 60+ Cohesion	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
1945	18	6	7	2	2	0
1947	19	17	1	3	0	1
1949	17	15	5	3	2	1
1951	9	9	4	3	1	1
1953	14	10	0	3	0	1
1955	15	7	2	2	1	0
1957	9	13	1	2	0	0
1959	16	24	3	8	0	0
1961	6	16	1	4	0	2
1963	20	24	8	1	0	0
1965	13	14	4	4	1	0
1967	14	25	1	4	1	1
1969	5	12	0	1	0	0

Bills with Urban-Rural majority opposed excluding those on which caucus majorities were also opposed and the caucus had a higher cohesion than the urban-rural groups.

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969, The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

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Even though the Minnesota legislature showed conflict on some traditional urban-rural issues, in most cases the two groups split on only a minority of roll calls in each issue area. Only daylight savings time and oleomargarine could be considered consistent urban-rural issues. In addition state educational aids in the Senate and reapportionment in the House became issues fairly frequently. But even the reapportionment issue was more of a caucus matter. Before the 1959 session the urban-rural groupings did appear to be more cohesive than caucuses. But from 1959 on both state legislative and Congressional reapportionment were strictly caucus issues on the floor. One should remember that roll call voting does not reveal the full extent of possible urban-rural

Table IX-14 Frequency of Urban-Rural Votes on Probable Urban-Rural Issues

Issue	S E N A T E		H O U S E	
	Urban-Rural	Not Urban-Rural	Urban-Rural	Not Urban-Rural
Oleomargarine	15	1	9	2
Daylight Savings	10	11	16	2
State Legis. Reappor.	7	26	29	42
Cond. Reapportionment	0	5	9	2
Taxes	21	117	19	186
Welfare	4	22	3	49
Labor	5	54	4	108
Educational State Aids	9	10	0	21
Other Education	9	33	8	70
Highway Location	1	13	4	15
Housing	1	3	0	7
Urban Redevelopment	0	3	0	5
Metro Mass Transit	1	5	0	6
First Class Cities	6	28	9	50

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1969, The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969.

conflict. Divisions may arise over issues in Committee of the Whole or standing committees. Major urban-rural battles may be worked out before the floor stage. Also, many potentially divisive issues might not have even come up because of preponderant rural control until 1963.

### III. FACTORS IN MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE VOTING

The final question to be examined is the overall importance of the two principle explanatory factors. Taken together can caucus and urban-rural decisions account for most of the contested roll call votes? To measure this a roll call is counted as a caucus vote if a majority of one caucus was opposed by a majority of the other caucus. If a majority of the urban delegation was opposed to the majority of the rural delegation on the same vote, and if the cohesion of these delegations was higher than that of the

caucuses, that vote is subtracted from the caucus total. The reverse procedure was used to calculate urban-rural votes.

In the Senate the two factors do account for a majority (55%) of the total votes. But 45% of the caucus vote cannot be explained by either. And some of the urban-rural or caucus votes (especially when cohesion is very low) may well be accidental by-products of other forces. Generally, caucus is far more important than the urban-rural factor both in frequency and intensity. Only agriculture could unquestionably be called an urban-

Table IX-15 Comparative Impact of Factors on Issues, Minnesota Senate, 1945-1970

Issue	Caucus	Urban- Rural	Other	No. of Votes With Both Groups at a 60+ Cohesion		No. of Votes With Both Groups at a 80+ Cohesion	
				Caucus	Urban- Rural	Caucus	Urban- Rural
Agriculture	4	26	19	2	3	0	1
Approp.	16	3	36	8	0	3	0
Liquor	23	17	84	1	0	0	0
Business	54	15	71	3	0	1	0
Local	23	10	64	4	0	1	0
Nat. Res.	14	11	33	1	0	0	0
Const. Amend.	10	7	20	2	0	1	0
Law Enforce.	13	10	61	0	0	0	0
Elections	14	5	9	8	0	3	0
Health	4	1	5	2	0	1	0
Transp.	19	4	36	1	0	0	0
Labor	47	5	9	22	0	12	0
Legis. Organ.	112	10	29	95	0	85	0
National	14	1	5	6	0	3	0
Education	15	17	31	4	3	1	1
St. Admin.	115	10	41	94	0	90	0
Taxes	72	14	40	16	1	23	0
Welfare	13	9	14	4	1	1	1
Miscell.	5	0	20	0	0	0	0
Total	587 (42%)	175 (13%)	627 (45%)	303	8	225	3

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-1960.

rural issue. Education is the only issue area other than agriculture where urban-rural divisions become more important than caucus. Divisions on business, national resources, constitutional amendments, elections, health, and education seem to depend on a mixture of forces. One would probably have to examine the specific questions in each case to determine the basis for legislative voting. All but elections are most often explained by factors not accounted for here.

Caucus and urban-rural influences explained only a minority of issues up through 1962. The caucus and urban-rural variables explained almost equal proportions of legislative issues up through 1955. From 1957-1962 urban-rural influences diminished almost to the vanishing point and caucus importance increased. A majority of all issues were decided on caucus lines from 1963-1970. Caucus was of clear importance on only one issue - labor - before 1955. The urban-rural factor affected only agriculture and educational aids greatly. Other issues probably had a more fluid pattern. Based on state social development, party competition, and legislative competitiveness, this was to be expected. Caucus divisions became preponderant on elections, labor, legislative organization, national issues, state administration, and taxes after 1955.

The House voting bears some resemblance to the Senate except that the caucus factor is slightly more important. Caucus and urban-rural factors together do explain a majority (57%) of the votes. Moreover, caucus has been more important throughout the entire period than in the Senate. The peak was from 1951-1962 when about half of the contested votes were caucus matters.

Table IX-16 Comparative Impact of Factors on Issues, Minnesota House, 1945-1970

Issue	Urban-			No. of Votes With Both Groups at a 60+ Cohesion		No. of Votes With Both Groups at a 80+ Cohesion	
	Caucus	Rural	Other	Caucus	Urban- Rural	Caucus	Urban- Rural
Agriculture	11	21	22	0	0	0	0
Appropriations	30	3	22	13	0	6	0
Liquor	37	24	72	3	0	0	0
Business	103	18	117	22	0	6	0
Local	34	17	81	3	1	0	0
Nat. Resources	24	16	63	5	0	0	0
Const. Amend.	20	7	12	4	2	0	0
Law Enforcement	38	11	64	9	0	1	0
Elections	28	4	11	14	0	7	0
Health	8	2	11	3	0	1	0
Transportation	21	5	59	1	0	0	0
Labor	75	2	7	50	0	18	0
Legis. Organ.	121	14	23	97	1	34	0
National	32	3	10	22	0	12	0
Education	42	7	61	10	0	5	0
State Admin.	57	9	61	19	1	8	0
Taxes	118	19	50	65	5	33	0
Welfare	37	2	18	18	1	4	0
Miscellaneous	12	8	19	3	0	1	0
Total	828 (46%)	192 (11%)	785 (43%)	361	11	186	0

Source: The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-1969

Urban-rural influences have stayed steady and low (about 10% of the votes). Still, well over 40% of the House votes can be accounted for by neither factor that has been used.

Caucus is important on some different issues from those in the Senate. Elections and welfare must be added to legislative organization, labor, national issues, and taxes as caucus issues. The urban-rural influence is preponderant in no issue area and surpasses caucus only in agricultural matters. Mixed influences account for voting on agriculture, appropriations, and state administration as

well as business, constitutional amendments, health and education. Other factors not studied are more important for liquor, local, natural resources, law enforcement, and transportation. Unlike the Senate, this pattern changes very little over time. Perhaps the urban-rural influence was more important on liquor matters earlier. Caucus impact becomes more clearly defined on business, elections, and legislative organization from 1951 on. It reached its peak on constitutional amendments and education from 1951-1961. And appropriation, liquor, and health become caucus issues only during the Freeman era. But overall one finds little change in influences on roll call voting for the House as compared to the Senate.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Caucus must be considered an important influence on roll call voting in the Minnesota Legislature. Urban-rural divisions have much less significance. Caucus controversy has been at a moderate level throughout the period in the House. It only gradually increased in the Senate until it became of primary importance after 1959. The early Senate approximated a low partisan situation with fluid patterns of voting. But more recently Minnesota caucuses react to many issues much as parties do in other states. Typical caucus issues would be legislative organization, labor, national, state administration, taxes, elections, and welfare. Appropriations, education, local government, and business regulation do not become caucus issues as frequently as they do for parties. Rural-urban conflicts are not pervasive in any issue area. Some tax issues, also, daylight savings time, school aids,

and reapportionment created some division, especially before 1959. One should not push caucus influence too far, however. Almost 45% of the contested issues are neither caucus nor urban-rural matters.

What consequences might these findings have for Minnesota governors? First, some issues within the governor's program seem bound to be caught up in caucus conflict. The governor would have to make allowances for caucus sensitivities on these issues. All governors would face this consideration in the House. Before 1957 the governors would not have the problem so much in the Senate. Earlier governors could probably build their own ad hoc coalitions.

Later, "divided control" would certainly make a difference. A DFL governor could expect to work with a fairly cohesive caucus. But he would also face a cohesive conservative caucus that had little reason to work with him. Republican governors would not be working with Conservative caucuses that were disciplined. But the DFL caucus would be fairly cohesive still. Caucus conflict should be of particular concern for Governors Freeman, Elmer L. Andersen, and Karl Rolvaag. In addition Governor Youngdahl's 1951 session saw considerable conflict in the House.

The governor would have to consider urban-rural differences on only a few issues in his program. This may have loomed larger at an earlier time in the Senate since caucus had not yet grown as a major factor. But for the most part governors would have to build particular coalitions on most specific issues. These would fall outside either caucus or urban-rural concerns.

## Footnotes - Chapter 9

1. Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928).
2. See Malcolm E. Jewell, The State Legislature: Politics and Practice, second edition, (New York: Random House, 1969), chapter 6; Charles W. Wiggins, "Party-Politics in the Iowa Legislature", in Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI, (Feb., 1967), pp. 86-97; Hugh LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency Influences", in Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (February 1969), pp. 33-57; much of the work in the field is summarized in Thomas Dye, "State Legislative Politics" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (ed.) Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965).
3. Jewell, op. cit., p. 106.
4. Dye, op. cit., p. 185; LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 34; Wiggins, op. cit., p. 87.
5. Jewell, op. cit., p. 107.
6. Ibid., p. 109.
7. Dye, op. cit., p. 185.
8. The following figures on comparative party voting in the American states were collected from Dye, op. cit., p. 186; Jewell, op. cit., pp. 110-111; LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 36; and Wiggins, op. cit., p. 88.
9. See Dye, op. cit., p. 186-7; LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 43.
10. Ibid.
11. For the computation of Spearman rank order correlation coefficient see Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 317-8.
12. This is a combination of categories used by LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 41, and Wiggins, op. cit., p. 94.
13. LeBlanc, op. cit., p. 43.
14. Loc. Cit.
15. For a summary of the findings see Dye, op. cit., pp. 162-5.

## CHAPTER TEN

### GUBERNATORIAL PROGRAMS

The preceding discussion has been directed to one end. What factors determine how successful a governor will be in securing legislative approval for his program? The first section will consider what a legislative program is; how it is developed; and how we can measure success. Then the actual program success attained by Minnesota governors can be analyzed. The final section shall show how various factors- legal-constitutional, public support, personal characteristics, political support, and legislative strength- contribute to our ability to understand that program success.

#### I. Preparing the Governor's Program

Basic to program success is the groundwork laid in preparation. This includes program formulation, bill drafting, selecting legislative authors, and shepherding the program through the legislative process until final passage.

#### Program Formulation

Legislative programs spring from many sources. And each particular bill may have so many forces impinging upon it that it is impossible to say which is the most important. Although there were variations among the different governors, they would rank sources roughly in the following order: 1) groups 2) administrative departments 3) party 4) personal and staff 5) legislators, and 6) previous messages.<sup>1</sup>

Interest groups come in all shapes and types. Principal

ones include trade unions, the education lobby, business leaders, cooperatives. Governor Freeman rated groups of first importance. Rolvaag and Andersen rated them second. The latter commented that the governor must seek support from, and activate "Lobbyists Incorporated". He meant that lobbyists pool the resources of all strong private interests. Each has a special legislative friend. When working in concert they can be invaluable.<sup>2</sup> Groups also enter into program formulation indirectly. An extensive study by James Seitz in 1963 found that administrative agencies regarded groups as a key source for program ideas and, more importantly, legislative support.<sup>3</sup> Prior lobbyist consultation and support ranked above gubernatorial support for administrative program success.

Seitz also intensively studied the administrative department role in legislation. He strongly implies that the governor's program is almost entirely selected from a list of departmental proposals.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately his work is limited to one session. Since administrative dominance was to a degree peculiar to the Andersen period, Seitz's work probably over-emphasizes administrative importance. However, several legislators did confirm that administrators are a significant force.<sup>5</sup> At least the largest volume of proposals usually originate within departments. The governor will "jump on" and endorse particularly promising recommendations. Governors Andersen and Rolvaag mentioned administrators as their number one source. However, Governor Levander saw departments as of secondary importance. During the Freeman administration they rated no better than

fourth. Also, administrative influence on gubernatorial programs is not a one way street. The governor may shape departmental policy. The extent of this impact is unclear. A majority of department heads felt that the governor's objectives were important, and that he should be consulted. Most would not actively oppose a governor when he has strong feelings. However, a strong minority would by-pass the governor on essential departmental bills.<sup>6</sup>

Third in importance as a source is the party, particularly the party platform, though it ranks far below departmental initiatives. Party has become more significant as a source in recent years. But even so, only Governor Levander relied upon it as a number one source, and this was largely in 1967. By 1969 departmental suggestions were at least as important.<sup>7</sup> Governor Freeman placed it second. For Governor Rolvaag party came behind both departments and groups. Governor Andersen mentioned the party platform mostly as an afterthought. For earlier governors party was even less significant because of the virulent non-partisan legislative attitudes. In any case Governors Youngdahl and Thye represented only one wing of a party not very strongly organized. Governor C. Elmer Anderson may have relied more on party (especially for anti-crime legislation), but he also supported much unfinished business from the Youngdahl era. He too presided over a factionalized organization. Governors up to the present day have always found some embarrassment in pushing a party program because of the formal non-partisanship. The party organizations themselves have approached the legislature very

gingerly. This restriction has weighed less for the DFL than for the Republicans. Governor Freeman could easily say that the governor's program was the party program. Governor Rolvaag expressed it that his personal ideas and the party platform were part of the same thought process. Both after all were essentially professional politicians who had spent their entire careers within the organization. On the legislative side only DFLers even mentioned party as a gubernatorial program source.<sup>8</sup> They, too, tended to see the DFL governors' platform as taken from the party platform. Where the relationship was especially close, caucus support followed fairly unanimously. Governor Harold Levander is the only Republican governor to draw heavily on party as a program base. And again his own personal ideas seem to blend with party in a unified process. As he and his aids expressed it, the whole process was tightly integrated from pre-convention personal task forces to party platform to campaign position papers to message to bill form. Levander worked from a party base with party help. So party was not a significant source for governors before 1955 (and Governor Andersen). Beginning with Freeman the party, although not of primary significance, has grown in importance.

Considering the emphasis in political science literature on the governor as a policy initiator, it is surprising how low Minnesota governors rate their own role. Governor Youngdahl seemingly relied rather heavily on his own personal inclinations. And Thomas Flinn argues that Governor Freeman and his staff most encouraged the flow of ideas to themselves.<sup>9</sup> At least one-third

of the governors total program came directly from his own ideas and staff. However, Governor Freeman's recollections do not exactly bear this out. Governor Levander's administration ranked self-initiative about third. At least he helped set up the task forces that developed party programs. But he himself said that the governor's primary role is to give some items a personal push. Governor Rolvaag too rated his staff and personal efforts about third, just above party influence. Governor Andersen expressed the greatest self-abnegation. He stated flatly that he attempted no uni-lateral personal program. His task was to collate ideas from other sources and shape up a balanced program. His most important role was to highlight a few good programs that have little other support, such as the taconite amendment and fair housing. A general survey of opinions on all governors would confirm this collator role. David Duranberger agreed that a large part of any governor's program started with others. Senator Harold Schultz (DFL) summed up the legislative view when he said that the governor often picks up good bills (i.e., politically popular) that originated with legislators. Several legislators voiced resentment over Governor Levander's tactics in this regard. They alleged that he would "adopt" a bill after it had been passed.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps this resentment was heightened by the low value that most governors place on legislative sources. Rolvaag mentioned legislators not at all. Neither did Freeman. Thomas Flinn indicates that although legislative leaders met with the governor to plan strategy, they accounted for only about 10% of

the program suggestions. And almost half of these were unwelcome suggestions on tax alternatives.<sup>11</sup> Governor Andersen, a former legislator, rated legislative sources about third or fourth, on a par with previous governors' programs. This gap between governor and legislature on program preparation is partly the legislators own doing. Again non-partisanship poses some psychological barriers. This in turn is reinforced by the more common institutional separation. Legislators, particularly state senators, prize their independence so highly that they are reluctant to jeopardize their own objectivity by a prior commitment to the governor. Whatever the cause this breach undoubtedly does not promote program success.

Only Elmer L. Andersen even mentioned past program messages as a source for his own ideas. The inaugural messages suggest that Thye (from Stassen) and C. Elmer Anderson (from Youngdahl) relied heavily on previous administrations. It may be that most governors work on their own current needs. It may be also that this reveals a short time perspective and a large ego on the part of the governors. Surely no one can read through all of the gubernatorial messages chronologically and miss the great family resemblance that they assume. Some items, such as party designation, constitutional conventions, no maximums on old age assistance, and government reorganization, recur over and over because they consistently fail in the legislature. Others recur because few programs succeed in one step but must be adopted incrementally. Examples would be state educational aids and implied consent. Again Senator Schultz well summed up the legis-

lative perspective on this. According to him, the governors' programs do not contain much that is new. The legislature has been kicking the same ideas around for years. The governor picks up what he considers best from past messages and the other sources that have been mentioned. The most he can do is publicize the issue and push it some.

#### Bill Drafting

Gathering program ideas is only the first step in the governor's program. Before a program can really be considered by legislators it must be put in bill form. The tools used for this are somewhat less diverse than in program initiation. Understandably many of the same sources that suggest bills also draft them. Groups, departments, and parties (to a lesser extent) will commit their own resources to present an idea in bill form. However, at this stage the staff, especially if it has had legal experience, becomes more important. Also the attorney general enters as a new element. He has a large staff that may be put at the governor's disposal, especially if their philosophies are compatible. Legislators seldom help. They prefer to rework bills within their own domain.

Orville Freeman utilized perhaps the widest range of sources on bill drafting.<sup>12</sup> However, he relied most heavily on his own staff supplemented by the Department of Administration. Most of Youngdahl's bills came from his own office.<sup>13</sup> He could not count on legislative or party help. And he eyed vested groups with suspicion. As might be expected Governor Andersen sought departmental draftsmen almost exclusively. He

personally reviewed final drafts, but departments retained primary responsibility.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand Karl Rolvaag mentioned the attorney general's office more than any other. He had been on good terms with Attorney General Mondale since 1962. And he named Mondale's successor Robert Martson. In 1969 the staff contributed heavily to bill drafting for Governor Levander. The previous session the inexperienced staff had not been so well organized. They found legislators introducing bills that expressed the governor's ideas. So these bills were taken up by the governor.<sup>15</sup>

#### The Bill Author

For groups, departments, and governors alike nothing is more essential to a bill's success than finding the proper legislative author.<sup>16</sup> On this point there appears to be little difference between DFL and Conservatives, Senate or House. The governor's success then hinges to a large degree on his ability to line up such key authors.

The selection process contains four major considerations: 1) personality 2) subject specialization 3) partisanship and 4) seniority. These factors differ in relative importance depending on the issue, session, and partisan balance. Ideally the chief author should be respected, tough, skillfull. In a word he should be a legislative type who is a part of the active minority.<sup>17</sup> Usually one would also select members of the committee that will hear the bill. They can command attention because they thoroughly understand the subject matter. One should seek authors from both caucuses. This may create an

aura of bi-partisanship that reduces conflict over the issue. But the bill will probably stand no chance unless the chief author comes from the majority caucus.<sup>18</sup> Seniority provides no absolute advantage. But a senior legislator is more likely to be part of the active minority and a committee influential. Usually this ideal authorship can seldom be attained. And the search becomes more difficult because only an insider could truly know which legislators rank high on the relevant criteria.

The actual selection process used by governors has fluctuated greatly depending on time period, party, caucus, and legislative body. The basic distinction up until 1967 was based on party caucus. The DFL governors, Freeman and Rolvaag, could count on working directly through the caucus leadership to line up authors.<sup>19</sup> Since the Senate DFL was in a minority, Governor Freeman sometimes had to get Conservative authors. Working with a minority in both houses, Rolvaag had to go much farther in this regard. Republican governors have not had such automatic contact. Thye, Youngdahl, Anderson, and Andersen had to seek out their own sponsors in both houses.<sup>20</sup> Conservative House leaders sometimes went along with Republican governors when doing so was in the formers self interest. This applies with special force to Governor Thye, for whom the leadership felt some responsibility. The Senate leadership never cooperated closely. Youngdahl and Andersen did develop some fairly regular supporters, mostly from non-leadership ranks.<sup>21</sup> Harold Levander became the first Republican governor who could count on fairly steady leadership help. After February 1967 at least, he relied almost exclusively

on the House leadership. Senator Holmquist established contacts for him among newer members in the Senate.<sup>22</sup> The principle difference from the DFL procedure was that the leadership turned most bills over to newer members rather than carrying the load themselves.

#### Bill Oversight

Once authors are lined up, a good share of the governor's program task is finished. Some legislators felt that effective gubernatorial influence did end at this point.<sup>23</sup> Not surprisingly Governors Freeman, Rolvaag, and Levander could leave follow up mostly to caucus members. All three met at least weekly with the leadership for information exchange on legislative progress. On advice from the leaders, the DFL governors would step in at crisis moments. The Conservatives did not attempt tight caucus discipline for the Levander program. But large majorities made that unnecessary. Those governors who lacked caucus ties needed more personal persuasion. Neither Thye nor Anderson did much of this. Andersen's personal philosophy prevented him from intervening on any but very essential legislation. Undoubtedly the most active in this respect was Luther Youngdahl. The Conservative leadership drifted away from him after 1947. Since Youngdahl had no intention of accepting defeat, he actively met with legislators as individuals and in groups to build necessary contacts. Freeman and Rolvaag engaged in similar personal diplomacy with the majority Conservatives. And as a counterweight to lax leadership discipline Governor Levander developed an elaborate follow-up system not on a per-

sonal basis but through his staff.<sup>24</sup>

## II. Measuring the Governor's Program

There appears to be no reliable measure for executive program success. Any measure so far devised appears to be crude. The most common device is the "box score". One takes all positions assumed by the executive that have been introduced in bill form. Success then becomes the number of program positions accepted, divided by the total number of positions taken. The principal deficiency with this technique is that all positions are weighed equally. Undoubtedly this does not reflect reality. The governor may stake his personal prestige on some issues. Others may be included to please some supporters, but without the governor's personal interest. So an alternative method would be just to measure success based on important or vital issues. The problem here becomes which issues to select. The criteria for importance becomes very subjective. Would these be issues that stirred great conflict, issues that affected many people, or issues that received great medial coverage? Most governors, when asked, could not rank the importance of issues with any certainty. A special kind of key issue would be votes involving vetoes.<sup>25</sup> Sarah McCally resorted to this device for her multi-state study.<sup>25</sup> She used only votes on attempts at veto overrides. She argued that the governor's position is clearly stated, and that his supporters would exercise the maximum energy to sustain his position. Considering the wide range of positions most governors take, this seems to be a rather narrow basis for measurement. It is impossible to use in Minnesota. Minnesota

governors rarely veto bills. An attempted override is even more rare. Each house made two attempts on the sales tax issue in 1967. There were a couple of attempts during the Youngdahl administration. But this is all. Vetoes, seldom used, become absolute in practice.

The box score method will be used here. Initially positions were gleaned from formal public documents. These included inaugural messages, budget messages (for new programs only), and special messages. These were supplemented by reviewing newspaper references to governors' positions for each session. This initial position list then had to be translated into legislative action. The Journal of the House and the Journal of the Senate list all bills introduced in each session. The index includes a brief description of each bill. These bill descriptions had to be matched to the gubernatorial positions. And the question always becomes does the bill exactly embody the position taken by the governor? Sometimes newspaper accounts referred to the bill by number. More frequently the bill author was indicated. The relationship became clearer when one knew that the author was a gubernatorial supporter. Finally each governor was asked to check the preliminary list to verify whether he considered each bill to be within his program or not. (Governors Thye and Anderson were not available for this check.) Thomas Flinn's study provided a final list for the 1955 session.<sup>26</sup> And Governor Levander's staff provided a definitive list for his two sessions. No claim is made that the final list includes the

exact program. But at least it should embody the principal positions for each man.

Several measures for success and support have been used. Primarily a distinction is made between legislative success and caucus success and caucus success. Legislative success and support considers the response of all members to the governor's program. Legislative success is calculated by dividing all programs achieved by all programs introduced. This is not exactly the ratio of bills passed. For each bill may contain more than one program. Programs achieved include passing those bills the governor approved and the failure to pass bills that he opposed. Defeats included the failure to pass a governor's program, or passing an item that he opposed. Legislative support for the governor was measured using only contested bills. That is only roll call votes (on governors bills) were included when 10% or more of those voting were in opposition to the majority. Not all of these roll call votes were used in the final index. Some bills elicit many votes. To include all of these would overweight the importance of one issue in the total program. So no more than two votes were used for any one bill, unless the votes were on clearly distinct issues. The Index of Legislative Support then was the number of votes for the governor's positions divided by all votes cast on governors bills. From this can be calculated overall support, the average caucus support, average support from urban and from rural legislators, average leadership support, and support by each individual legislator.

The Index of Caucus Support and the Index of Caucus Success

were adapted from Sarah McCally.<sup>27</sup> The same set of roll calls was used for this as for legislative support. But now interest focuses on the response of the governor's caucus to his program. The DFL caucus was used for DFL governors, the Conservative caucus for Republicans. The Index of Caucus Support then was the total caucus votes cast for the governor's position divided by all caucus votes cast on contested governor's bills. McCally argues that support does not really show how successful the governor was with his party. Since he is interested in passing bills, the governor need not receive support from all caucus members. He needs only the votes sufficient to win on each bill. So if the governor's caucus had a large majority, he could tolerate many deviants on any given vote. The Index of Caucus success is then obtained by dividing the percent of caucus members who voted for the governor's position by the percent of caucus votes he needed to pass the legislation. Since a bill must have an absolute majority to pass either body, the governor will need 31 votes in the Senate and 66 votes (68 from 1963 on) in the House. If the governor's caucus had less than an absolute majority it was assigned 100 as the requisite percentage of votes. Following McCally an attempt will be made to explain varying caucus support or success by several variables- gubernatorial election vote, primary vote, party election vote, and by the legislative seats held by the governor's caucus.

### III. PROGRAM SUCCESS

Based on the resources available to the Minnesota governor

several predictions have been made about probable program success. Governors should rank in the following order- Freeman, Youngdahl, Levander, Thye, Rolvaag, Andersen, and Anderson. The "box scores" should fall in the following ranges. Youngdahl/Freeman: 60%, Levander/Thye/Rolvaag 35-45%, and Andersen/Anderson: 30-35%. An examination of Table X-1 immediately reveals that these expectations are not confirmed. Governor Thye was most successful with 73% of his program passed. The others ranked from Levander through Youngdahl, Andersen, Freeman, Rolvaag, and Anderson. The top three men showed high success with more than 60% of their bills going through. Elmer Andersen ranked in the middle with moderate success. Only three governors- Youngdahl, Rolvaag, and Anderson- really performed as expected. Thye did considerably better than predicted. Levander and Andersen had somewhat better success than expected. Only Governor Freeman fell far below his predicted level.

The governors also received only moderate support on roll call votes. As would be expected the House provided somewhat greater support than did the Senate. This was probably caused partially because Governor Freeman had majority caucus support in the House but not in the Senate. But the Senate's traditionally greater independence also probably contributed to the difference. Governor Levander developed by far the greatest support. Governor Rolvaag ranked on the bottom. Governatorial support is not exactly the same thing as success. Thye especially had much less support than one would expect based on his program success. Governors Levander, Andersen, and Anderson

TABLE X-1  
Minnesota Governors' Program Success, 1915-1970

Governor	Year	Number of Programs Passed	Number of Contested Votes	Legislative Success	Senate House		Caucus Support		Caucus Success		
					Senate House	Senate House	Senate House	Senate House	Senate House	Senate House	
Edward Thye	1915	16-6	10	12	73%	.541	.550	.564	.609	.940	.987
Luther Youngdahl	1917	28-19	21	19	59.6%	.519	.595	.537	.610	.868	.964
	1919	45-24	10	12	64%	.652	.644	.672	.652	1.071	.852
	1921	47-30	10	19	61%	.484	.432	.416	.316	.726	.422
C. Elmer Anderson	1923	19-34	16	16	35.8%	.510	.554	.492	.449	.754	.611
Orville Freeman	1925	41-39	14	39	51.5%	.512	.608	.718	.900	.748	.900
	1927	28-39	19	38	41.8%	.468	.631	.841	.867	.841	.919
	1929	16-46	17	32	25.8%	.485	.604	.739	.830	.739	.905
Elmer L. Anderson	1931	27-32	18	19	45.8%	.591	.623	.522	.401	.614	.401
Karl Kolvaag	1935	19-30	25	20	38.8%	.353	.410	.778	.778	.778	.778
Harold Levander	1937	60-32	20	24	65.2%	.569	.666	.565	.665	.756	.893
	1939	65-41	12	16	61.3%	.612	.696	.654	.784	.816	.980
Average					52.2%	.516	.572	.632	.656	.797	.790

Source: Computed from The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1915-69, and The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1915-69

received more support than one would predict based on the resources available to them. Youngdahl, Freeman, and Rolvaag received somewhat less support than expected. It seems likely that Freeman and Rolvaag fared poorly because they were DFL governors. Freeman did do well in the DFL dominated House. It might also be significant that the less personally aggressive governors ranked above the point that one would have expected. The more aggressive ones ranked below the predicted level.

Overall success does not account for possible variance in the performance depending on the issue involved. That is, the governor may easily pass large quantities on non-controversial legislation. But he may run into trouble on issues of major interest. Table X-2 shows how the governors fared on the various issues. Matters of health, local affairs, natural resources, agriculture, and liquor appear to be relatively non-controversial. Governors meet little opposition. State administration, education, business, welfare, and law enforcement show moderate success. At least governors win more often than they fail. But labor, transportation, taxes, constitutional amendments, legislative organization, and elections are highly controversial. Governors seldom have much success on these. It is of more than passing interest that all but one of these low success issues are also sources for high caucus division. State administration and welfare, where governors have moderate success, also fall into this category. No issues where governors have great success are also caucus issues.

Each governor had some issues that gave him trouble above

TABLE X-2  
Minnesota Governors' Success by Issue Area

Issue	Thye	Youngdahl	Anderson	Freeman	Andersen	Rølvaag	Levander	Total
Health	0-0	15-4	1-1	1-1	0-0	3-1	7-2	27-9
Local	0-0	0-1	2-1	2-0	1-3	0-0	11-1	16-6
National	0-0	0-1	0-0	1-0	1-0	1-0	0-0	2-1
Natural Resources	0-0	5-4	1-0	5-1	2-0	0-0	7-5	20-10
Agriculture	0-0	1-0	1-0	2-3	1-0	0-0	3-2	8-5
Education	1-0	14-8	3-2	9-13	7-5	3-1	5-1	42-32
State Admin.	5-0	5-2	3-9	21-19	0-3	2-0	20-9	56-42
Liquor	0-0	1-1	3-2	2-1	0-0	0-0	0-0	6-4
Business	0-0	5-3	0-0	11-10	1-1	3-4	31-16	41-34
Welfare	2-1	26-10	1-3	8-12	6-5	3-8	2-1	48-40
Law Enforcement	0-0	17-13	1-2	0-0	0-0	0-0	14-12	32-27
Labor	0-2	12-6	0-1	9-10	0-1	1-4	2-0	24-24
Transportation	0-0	0-0	1-0	8-6	2-6	2-4	10-9	23-25
Taxes	6-3	13-9	3-4	9-27	3-4	1-7	13-8	48-62
Legislative Org.	0-0	1-5	0-2	3-6	1-2	0-1	0-2	5-18
Const. Amendment	0-0	0-1	0-1	0-3	2-2	0-0	0-0	2-7
Elections	1-0	0-3	1-3	0-7	0-0	0-0	0-2	2-15

Source: Governors' programs confirmed by interviews with governors. Success computed from The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-69, and The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-69

all others. One might expect to find a marked difference between DFL and Republican governors on this. And DFL governors do face much greater opposition on tax and welfare problems. No pattern emerged on other issues. Governor Anderson found unusual opposition on several issues, most of which were only moderately or non-controversial for other governors. These included health, local issues, state administration, and law enforcement. It seems likely that gubernatorial neglect, rather than real opposition, led to problems for Anderson. Only Freeman created controversy over educational and agricultural issues. Rapidly expanding enrollments, coupled with economic recession, depleted school district financing during Freeman's time. He was more willing than others to take on all opposition to promote extensive aid for hard pressed school districts. Elmer Andersen lost out disproportionately on local and transportation bills. The former marked a beginning push on metropolitan issues. The latter was dominated by the controversial implied consent law. Rolvaag also ran into trouble on transportation and business issues. Normally one would say that a DFL governor would naturally clash with a Conservative dominated legislature on commercial issues. However, Freeman was the most successful governor in the transportation area. He did face stiff opposition on business. Finally, Governor Levander lost disproportionately on the natural resource question. He formulated his program when ecology was a growing but still unsettled policy area.

An individual governor may be more successful than his

fellows because he chooses to push few issues. This might explain Thye's phenomenal success. Or an individual may achieve disproportionate success through his skill in overcoming opposition where others fail. Or he may maximize success by avoiding controversial issues whenever possible. With two exceptions there is a definite relationship between program success and the proportion of the governor's program concentrated in controversial issue areas. The exceptions are Thye and Anderson. More than for any other governor, Thye's programs were concentrated in normally controversial issue areas. Yet he attained the highest success. Governor Anderson had the highest proportion of bills to fall in the non-controversial areas. Yet he had the least success. But the second and third most successful governors, Youngdahl and Levander, did have the lowest proportion of bills in controversial issue areas. And Andersen, Rolvaag, and Freeman had much larger portions in controversial areas.

Table X-3  
Proportion of Gubernatorial Programs in Controversial or Non-Controversial Issue Areas

Year	Controversial		Moderate		Non-Controversial	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
1945	12	57%	9	43%	0	0
1947	15	33	29	63	2	4
1949	13	27	34	51	15	22
1951	17	24	40	56	15	20
1953	16	31	24	46	12	23
1955	42	54	26	33	10	13
1957	22	33	39	58	6	9
1959	24	40	33	55	3	5
1961	23	40	28	48	7	12
1965	20	32	24	50	4	8
1967	31	33	49	52	14	15
1969	15	15	60	61	24	24

Non-Controversial = 60% + of programs passed See Table X-2  
 Moderate = 50-59.9% of programs passed  
 Controversial = 50% or less of programs passed

The preceding analysis makes only a small contribution toward explaining program success. The predicted success rankings in Chapter Six were based on an overall resources index. This index is obviously inaccurate. The remainder of this chapter tries to explain program success in more detail. It will examine more closely the relationship between actual success, the overall index, and more specific resources.

#### IV. CORRELATES OF PROGRAM SUCCESS

The overall potential resource ranking has proved to be less than adequate in predicting gubernatorial program success. However, it is more accurate than the rankings derived in most of the resource sub-areas. Only the rankings on political resources would be better. There is apparently no relationship between success and either public opinion or personal resources. Legal-constitutional resources show a slightly greater but not enormous, relationship to success. Political support and strength seems most closely related to success. Political factors are an especially good indicator if one takes into account majority or minority control in the legislature. If one assumes that governors with divided control labor under special handicaps, the rankings become almost perfect except for C. Elmer Anderson. Even though the caucus most closely related to him had overwhelming control, his program still languished.

##### Legal-Constitutional Powers

Since the general resource categories do not seem to be very accurate as success predictors, perhaps more specific resources should be examined. This examination shall begin with

Table X-4  
 Rankings of Minnesota Governors on Potential Power Resources

	Thye	Levander	Youngdahl	Andersen	Freeman	Rolvaag	Anderson	Correlation with Legisla. Success*
Legislative Success	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	—
Total Power Index	4	3	2	6	1	5	7	.43
Legal-Constitutional	5.5	1	2.5	7	2.5	4	5.5	.23
Actual Veto	6.5	3.5	2	6.5	5	1	3.5	-.38
Actual Tenure	5	3	2	7	1	5	5	.21
Elective Officers	1.5	5	1.5	7	5	5	3	.40
Key Appointments	4	1	2.5	5	2.5	6	7	.69
Actual Budget	6	2.5	2.5	6	1	4	6	.17
Public Leadership	5	7	1	3	2	5	5	-.07
Public Approval	2.5	6	1	5	4	7	2.5	.27
Skills	6.5	4.5	1	3	2	4.5	6.5	.15
Use	6	6	1	3.5	2	3.5	6	-.01
Personal Resources	5	6.5	1.5	4	1.5	3	6.5	-.07
Career	6	7	1	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	-.22
Concept of Office	4	4	1.5	6.5	1.5	4	6.5	.39
Legislative Contacts	5	5	2.5	5	1	2.5	7	.10
Political Resources	2.5	2.5	4	7	1	5	6	.46
Party Organization	6.5	1.5	4	4	1.5	4	6.5	.20
Election Success	1	5	2	6	4	7	3	.48
Caucus Contacts	4	2.5	6	3	1	2.5	6	.16
% Legislative Seats	1	4	2	5	6	7	3	.58

\* These are rank order correlations between ranks on legislative success and other variables

Source: See Chapter 6

the formal resources. Governor Levander enjoyed the widest range of formal powers, and experienced a high degree of success. Youngdahl, Rolvaag, and Anderson show success commensurate with their legal position. But Thye and Freeman do not.

The formal powers measured include actual use of the veto, actual tenure, proportion of elective officers from the opposing party, percentage of key appointments made, and use of the executive budget. The actual tenure and executive budget appear to be little related to gubernatorial success. The use of the veto has a slight negative relationship to success. Thye used the veto little, Rolvaag the most. The use of the veto is probably an admission that the governor cannot influence the legislature any other way.

The Minnesota governors' control over administrative appointments does seem to be associated with legislative success. A governor does slightly better when fellow elective officials come from the same party. This is probably a by-product of the overall political factor that will be considered presently. A governor shared office with fellow partisans mainly in the early period. Because competition was lower he was also more likely to have a surplus of sympathizers in the legislative caucus. The single factor most closely related to success appears to be the governors' opportunity to appoint key administrative officials. The only governors to break this relationship are Thye and Freeman. Why there should be such a close relationship is not easily explainable. These positions are not really used for patronage. No governor except Andersen really felt that adminis-

trative support helped him substantially with the legislature. High ranking on this factor is partially related to long tenure in office. But tenure itself is not especially related to success. Either the governors were mistaken in their assessment of the significance of administrative control. Or there is some intervening variable that is not readily apparent.

In Chapter Three it was hypothesized that Minnesota governors should have moderately high formal powers. The potential does exist. But except for appointment powers these formal resources do not seem to be much associated with the governors' policy success.

#### Public Opinion Leadership

Since Minnesota was classified as a moralistic political culture with a fairly high participation level, it was hypothesized that the governor should have great potential as an opinion leader. There should also be high popular expectations for gubernatorial leadership. This expectation may exist. But Minnesota governors seldom capitalize on it. The general public opinion index ranks with personal resources as the worst predictor of gubernatorial success. Governor Freeman ranked second in public opinion leadership but fifth in success. Thye ranked first in success but fifth in public skills. Levander ranked last in public support but second in success.

Only Freeman and Youngdahl really attempted to exploit the public resource. Andersen, Rolvaag, and Levander utterly failed to sustain public support. But lack of public appeal seems to have little to do with success. Neither public approval, skills

in public appeals, nor the attempted use of public leadership appears to be associated with legislative success. It was a substantial factor only for Governor Youngdahl.

The impression is that legislators care little for the governor's standing with the public. They believe that they each best represent their own particular constituency. And they appreciate more a governor who takes the "inside route" for legislative contacts. Weakness on this factor may be felt not so much on program passage but on a governor's ability to be re-elected. For personal success a governor must be able to sell the public on his accomplishments. Governor Levander was hurt most by this failure.

#### Personal Approach

It was initially speculated that a governor's personal resources should have much to do with his success. The formal powers were not overwhelming. With a non-partisan legislature he should have few political levers. Therefore, it should take a strong, hard driving personality to put a program across. This reasoning appears to be false.

The governors' previous political experiences are related not at all to program success. For Thye and Levander a lack of long state-wide experience seems to have been an asset. Youngdahl did have good success, even with his great public experience. But his previous offices had little to do with executive or legislative skills. Practically his entire career had been in law enforcement. Those who had great party experience, or time in public administrative posts, fared worst.

A "tough-minded" approach to the office does not guarantee success. Nor does a "Whig" approach guarantee failure. Youngdahl was the most successful hard liner. But this didn't work for Freeman. And Rolvaag took an activist role with little positive result. One might make an argument that just the reverse approach works better. Thye, Levander, and possibly Andersen reaped good advantage from a low key style. On the other hand C. Elmer Anderson fared the least well of all. And one cannot say that the activist role necessarily hindered success. The three most activist governors had numerous obstacles in dealing with the legislature. Their personal drive may have been essential to the degree of success they did achieve. From the Minnesota experience one cannot say that any one style works best.

#### Political Resources: General

The original hypothesis specified that the Minnesota governor should have few political resources. Based on the level of industrialization and the moralistic culture it was assumed that the party organization would be weak to moderate. This was found to be true. Organization was weak early in the period but strengthened as competition increased. Organization then should be a very moderate gubernatorial resource. The influence of party was partially measured by interviews and the governors own evaluation of its importance. The conclusion was that organization made no contribution to success. The rankings in Table X-4 bear this out. Levander was probably helped more than any other by party contacts.

Another way to measure this is by gubernatorial success in primaries. Presumably a very successful governor should have great influence in the party. Table X-5 shows the correlation between primary success and gubernatorial success in the legislature. There seems to be no relationship between the governor's strength in the primary before the legislative session and either legislative support or program success. There is a modest relationship between post-session primary strength and program success. This follows Sarah McCally's interpretation that the legislators respond to the strength that the governor can build within the party after he attains office. However, the Senate somewhat confounds this interpretation. The greater the governor's strength within his own party, the more difficulty he had in passing legislation. Governor's Anderson, Freeman, and Andersen especially did well within their own primaries, yet had relatively low program success. The Minnesota experience does not support McCally's conclusions at all on organizational strength and support from the governor's own caucus. Post session primaries had no relationship to either caucus support or success. Pre-session primary strength had a strong negative relationship to the governor's caucus success in the Senate. Primary success did seem to be related to Senate legislative caucus support for Freeman, Rolvaag, and Levander. Partisan influence was more marked in the caucus when these men were governors. The relationship is absolutely negative for Youngdahl and Andersen, however. Andersen was unopposed in the primary, but his caucus was at odds with him. Youngdahl had close primary

TABLE X-5  
Correlates of Legislative and Caucus Success and Support in Minnesota

	Index of Caucus Support		Index of Caucus Success		Index of Legislative Support		Index of Legislative Success	
	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House
Party %, Election Vote	-.77*	-.82*	.08	-.57#	.53	-.21	.16	.16
Gov. % Election Vote	-.69*	-.80*	-.69*	-.54	.13	-.38	.12	.12
Pre-Session	-.53	-.40	.30	.10	.19	-.04	.41	.41
Post Session	-.11	-.11	.80	.03	.20	.09	.44	.44
+50%	-.26	.13	.87*	.47	.27	.60	.60	.60
-50%	.48	.30	.72	-.06	-.38	-.90#	-.90#	-.90#
Pre-Session Primary								
Gov. % of vote	.14	.06	-.76*	-.17	-.14	-.10	-.07	-.07
Gov. % of Top Two	.12	.01	-.64#	-.22	-.20	-.14	-.06	-.06
Post-Session Primary								
Gov. % Total	.10	.02	-.14	-.14	.31	-.02	-.51	-.55
Gov. % Top Two	.09	.03	-.12	-.25	.41	-.24	-.61#	.22
% Seats Gov. Caucus	-.84*	-.27	.09	.37	.60#	.58#	.61#	.34
+50%	.001	-.58	.72	.07	-.26	-.20	.30	.65
-50%	-.66	-.96*	-.66	-.96*	-.54	.99*	-.86	-.10
No. Seats Gov. Caucus	-.84*	-.26	.35	.34	.60#	.59#	.41	.35

The relationship between variables is expressed by a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient in each case.

\*- indicates that the correlation is significant at the .01 level

#- indicates that the correlation is significant at the .05 level

Source: For indices see Table X-1; For election and legislative statistics see The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-69

ances, but his caucus had such huge margins that his success in getting sufficient votes stayed high. In all, party organization seems poorly related to the governor's legislative performance. Perhaps formal non-partisanship has at least weakened the external party organization as a factor.

Another political resource, election success, depends as much upon a governor's personal popularity as his organizational backing. Perhaps this should affect gubernatorial legislative success more. The hypothesis would suggest that legislators would be reluctant to oppose a man with a great popular mandate. A man who barely squeezed into office could be perceived as possessing less political clout. There is a modest relationship between rankings on electoral strength and program success. (See Table X-4) The really large margins came only in the early period when the modified one party situation prevailed. Youngdahl and Thye apparently benefitted from their popularity. Anderson did not. Harold Levander enjoyed great success in spite of his relatively narrow margin.

But pre-session popularity seems to be little related to general legislative success or support. (Table X-5) The post session vote is more significant, especially for success. If the governor had built substantial enough popular support to carry the subsequent election, he received more support in the legislature. However, if he failed to carry the subsequent election, he received greater success the fewer votes he received. The relationship between majority governors and legislative

success was created almost entirely by Thye and Youngdahl. This was a less competitive period when the Conservatives possessed large legislative majorities. Freeman, Rolvaag, and Anderson dropped close elections after suffering setbacks in the legislature. It is difficult to establish the causal relationship in this case. One might as persuasively argue that the governors attained subsequent election success because they were perceived as accomplishing much within the legislature. The others lost because of legislative failures. Only Levander's experience fails to confirm this.

McCally found that the governor's election success related little to his own legislative party's response to his program. This seems to be confirmed except for caucus success in the Senate. There the higher the post-session vote, the more success the governor had in the legislature. This might show that at least the governor's own caucus calculates his political strength when making program decisions. But it is odd that this should influence the Senate (usually more independent) and not the House.

The electoral strength of the governor's party helps him little in general program success. Here again one finds the muting effects of non-partisanship. But the party strength did influence caucus support, again contrary to the McCally findings. The stronger was the party, the less support the governor received from his own legislative caucus. This makes some intuitive sense. If a party is quite dominant, organizational discipline would be more lax even in an avowedly partisan system. If a party has a narrow margin, or is in a minority, it needs

much greater unity to have any chance at influence. Also, the DFL was most often the minority party, whereas its caucuses were the best disciplined. When the Republicans were dominant, the Conservative caucus gave Republican governors much less support. The negative relationship between party strength and gubernatorial success in his own party makes less sense. A minority governor can never hope to receive enough backing to assure success. The governor from the majority caucus should be able to allow great deviance and still have enough votes to carry his program. The expected relationship was thrown off partly because Youngdahl, Andersen, and Anderson were so weak or unpopular in their own caucus that they still could not muster sufficient support.

#### Political Resources- Legislative

The original hypotheses concerning the Minnesota legislature were only partially confirmed. Based on the cultural and economic climate the legislature should have had moderately high competition. This seems to be true for the House. But competition lagged considerably in the Senate. DFLers came reasonably close to a majority only from 1959-1966. Based on general competition and industrialization moderate to weak legislative organization and power was expected. This does not seem to be true. The legislature probably rates moderately high on both. And this in turn might check the governor's more than initially expected. This becomes especially relevant when one realizes that partisan factors are also more significant than expected. Caucus cohesion is at least moderate, especially for

the DFL. The Senate was low on this early, but became moderately high from 1959-1968. This led to only moderate caucus support for the governor however. The DFL supported its governors. And Levander benefitted some. The least expected finding was that divided control materially affected gubernatorial success, at least for DFL governors.

The election process seems to affect the individual legislators response to the governor very little (See Table X-6). It was hypothesized that the governor should receive the most legislative support from those districts in which he had great popular support. The correlation between these factors should be high and positive. This is not confirmed strongly in Minnesota. The relationship is never more than moderate. It is somewhat more frequent in the House than in the Senate. But even so one finds the expected relationship in only about half of the sessions. Sometimes the relationship is the reverse of that expected. This was especially true for Republican governors Youngdahl (1951), Andersen, Thye, and Anderson. The positive relationship held true, best for DFL governors. The relationship turned out positive because DFL governors did well in the same districts as DFL legislators. And DFL legislators supported the governor during the session. On the other hand in the sessions indicated Anderson, Andersen, and Youngdahl were strongly opposed by their "own" caucus members. Thye ran well in rural districts, but received his greatest program support from urban districts. It was also expected that there should be a negative relationship between a legislators election vote and

his support for the governor. Legislators from safe districts could safely ignore gubernatorial pressure. Men with a tenuous hold might rely more on the governor. The results do not confirm this. There seems to be no relationship between a legislator's victory margin and his response to the governor.

Table X-6  
Relationship between Gubernatorial Support and Governor's Vote or Legislators Vote in Individual Districts, 1945-1970

	Senate		House	
	Governor % of Vote	Legislators % of Vote	Governors % of Vote	Legislators % of Vote
1945	-.39*	.21	.13	.00
1947	.09	-.38*	.18#	.03
1949	.17	-.08	.28*	.00
1951	-.49*	.10	-.46*	.03
1953	-.06	.23	-.23*	-.31*
1955	.04	-.08	.64*	.13
1957	.58*	-.02	.68*	.00
1959	.61*	.13	.64*	.02
1961	-.27#	.14	-.52*	-.19#
1963	.62*	-.10	.51*	-.01
1965	.63*	-.07	.63*	-.04
1967	-.01	-.34*	-.03	.02
1969	.28#	-.01	.25*	-.05

The relationships are measured by Pearson product-moment correlations

\* -indicates that the correlation is significant at the .01 level

# -indicates that the correlation is significant at the .05 level

Source: Computed from information in the Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1945-69, The Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-69, and The Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-69.

As was seen in Chapter Eight caucus has always been a significant organizational device in the Minnesota legislature. It has been a source of voting cues in the House since 1945. And caucus conflict increased markedly in the Senate from 1959 on. It should not be surprising then that caucus is an

important factor in gubernatorial success. (See Table X-7)

In the Senate about 57% of the roll calls on gubernatorial bills were caucus votes. Before 1955 only 46% were, but after 1955 this jumped to 62%. The peak came in 1965 when 90% of Governor Rolvaag's bills caused caucus conflict. During the latter period 71% of DFL governors' bills were caucus issues. House conflict would measure even higher, and again this increases slightly for the later period. DFL governors caused greater caucus conflict than Republicans, but the difference appears less marked than in the Senate. Caucus cohesion is also at least moderate on most gubernatorial bills. Cohesion becomes markedly higher in the Senate after 1955. The difference was not so noticeable in the House. Just as significant as period was which party controlled the governorship. Just considering the post 1955 period, DFL governors fostered more cohesion in both caucuses than did Republicans. Finally, one finds that governors bills were a greater source of conflict than were contested bills generally. Conservatives, who have always expressed more independence, did not become more cohesive. Neither did they become less so. This is not to say that governors necessarily set the agenda for caucus conflict. Governors' bills constituted from 25-30% of all caucus roll calls. They came closest to being the primary source of dispute in 1955 when about 45% of all caucus votes revolved around Freeman's program.

Just because the governor's program often became embroiled in caucus conflict does not mean that caucus was always essential to program success. Caucus unity behind a governor relates

TABLE X-7  
The Caucus Factor in Voting on Gubernatorial Programs, 1945-1970

Year	Caucus Votes As % of Total	Senate				House						
		Caucus Vote As % Governor Bills	Index of Cohesion All Bills DFL Cons	Index of Cohesion Gov. Bills DFL Cons.	Caucus Votes As % of Total	Caucus Vote As % Gov. Bills	Index of Cohesion Total DFL Cons.	Index of Cohesion Gov. DFL Cons.				
1945	35%	56%	48	47	52	55	61%	100%	70	48	87	45
1947	33	71	45	44	53	25	43	46	54	44	54	32
1949	28	27	34	34	26	36	54	20	58	61	96	56
1951	45	50	48	35	68	52	59	82	66	58	52	50
1953	26	30	45	30	47	31	60	55	65	60	69	53
1955	29	56	52	55	67	59	53	71	71	52	84	59
1957	31	70	56	55	72	63	50	70	63	53	78	58
1959	44	68	60	64	77	74	54	61	62	50	79	67
1961	56	59	65	69	68	61	52	81	70	60	78	55
1965	63	90	75	84	72	86	51	80	69	80	64	33
1967	62	67	64	63	69	84	43	54	54	62	75	47
1969	43	33	57	61	56	39	41	41	41	72	38	71

Source: Caucus votes and cohesion, See Table IX-1; Governors bills based on interviews with governors and the Journal of the Minnesota Senate, 1945-69, and the Journal of the Minnesota House, 1945-69

poorly to his ranking on program success (See Table X-4). DFL governors worked closely with the DFL caucus. But the DFL's frequent minority status hindered the governor. If the caucus related to the governor controlled the legislature, it made program success somewhat easier. The relationship would be almost perfect except that C. Elmer Anderson deviates so strongly that he throws the association way off. Because of this the relationship between the governor's caucus strength and general legislative support or success is really quite modest (See Table X-5). But the more seats the governor's caucus possesses, the greater chance he has of succeeding. The effect does somewhat depend on whether the caucus is in a majority or a minority. And it depends some on which body is being considered. For the majority caucus, the greater the number of seats the greater the success. However, in the Senate if the governor's caucus was in a minority, the more seats, the less success. This can be traced to the fact that the Senate DFL had more seats in 1965 than previously, but Conservatives had become more partisan than in Freeman's time. And Rolvaag was not as adept as Freeman in working for his program. General support also increased as the governor's caucus seats increased. However, when a majority caucus's seats increased, gubernatorial support decreased. This makes sense. A governor could afford to lose some surplus votes. And one would expect more deviants in a large caucus. However, a governor's minority caucus in the Senate shows the same tendency. One would think that support would increase with size. As a minority comes closer to the 50% figure they should perceive

that unity would increase their chances for impact on legislation. And more deviant majority legislators may cross over under these circumstances. This was the case in the House. Again the explanation seems to be the lesser ability of Rolvaag to influence legislation than Freeman. Freeman at least had the leverage of a majority in the House, which Rolvaag did not.

The relationship between caucus support and the number of seats held is not the same as the relationship for general legislative support. And Minnesota does not behave in the same manner as the states studied by Sarah McCally. Caucus support does decrease as the caucus size increases. But this is as true for a minority governor's caucus as for majority. The minority caucus seemingly does not make a big push for influence simply because its size increases. The governor was more likely to get sufficient caucus members behind him to pass a program as size increased, especially for a majority caucus. But again contrary to expectations, success in mustering sufficient votes to pass a program decreased as a majority caucus grew larger. It may be that the larger minority simply solidified majority lines against the governor.

One can understand caucus support for governors better by examining variations among sessions. (See Tables X-8 and X-9) Gubernatorial support on key votes in the Senate came largely from the DFL caucus during the last twenty-five years. That caucus always gave DFL governors more support than did the Conservative caucus. And the differences between caucuses were always greatest under DFL regimes. However, DFL caucuses

frequently supported Republican governors more than did the Conservatives. This was especially significant for Luther Youngdahl (1951), C. Elmer Anderson, and Elmer L. Andersen. Youngdahl and Andersen especially alienated the Conservatives. But a caucus usually supports governors of a like philosophy. And this association was especially marked after 1955.

Table X-8  
Factors Associated with Gubernatorial Support on Roll Calls,  
Senate

Year	Index of Legis. Support	Cons.	DFL	Urban	Rural	Leader-ship	Legislative Term One	Two	Three	Four and Up
1945	.541	.564	.504	.744	.501	.695	.546	.476	.603	.423
1947	.519	.537	.476	.521	.521	.518	.547	.598	.533	.415
1949	.652	.672	.576	.714	.638	.686	.658	.658	.667	.625
1951	.484	.446	.759	.652	.477	.357	.554	.572	.414	.505
1953	.510	.492	.568	.538	.507	.480	.551	.491	.415	.519
1955	.512	.381	.743	.600	.480	.395	.584	.488	.517	.393
1957	.468	.307	.841	.608	.418	.393	.474	.468	.442	.503
1959	.485	.335	.739	.619	.430	.291	.568	.463	.443	.424
1961	.591	.522	.697	.646	.564	.446	.667	.604	.498	.537
1965	.353	.111	.778	.519	.255	.084	.440	.383	.284	.188
1967	.569	.565	.581	.548	.570	.461	.622	.586	.501	.513
1969	.642	.654	.574	.620	.644	.660	.653	.612	.677	.667

The Index of Support is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast for the governors position by the total number of votes cast on his bills

Source: The Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-69.

Certainly caucus far better explains differences in gubernatorial support than do urban/rural divisions. Urban-rural differences seem to be slightly more significant from 1945-1949 and in 1967. As was expected, urban legislators did support the governor more than rural men. The only Senate exceptions were during the Levander administration. Rural representatives also backed Levander more in 1969 and Governor

TABLE X-9  
Factors Associated with Gubernatorial Support on Roll Calls, House

Year	Index of Legislative Support	Legislative Term											
		Cons.	DFL	Urban	Rural	Leadership	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six	Seven+
1945	.550	.609	.302	.613	.530	.734	.445	.570	.601	.589	.594	.635	.486
1947	.610	.570	.539	.613	.636	.618	.543	.627	.635	.552	.541	.541	.665
1949	.644	.652	.614	.587	.668	.630	.639	.667	.596	.673	.680	.614	.626
1951	.432	.316	.664	.617	.366	.365	.413	.433	.516	.434	.367	.334	.474
1953	.554	.449	.703	.720	.480	.443	.572	.550	.532	.561	.624	.509	.512
1955	.608	.311	.900	.656	.554	.917	.625	.698	.580	.609	.698	.527	.468
1957	.631	.359	.867	.770	.584	.884	.638	.618	.622	.633	.734	.643	.630
1959	.604	.313	.830	.759	.511	.812	.657	.581	.529	.620	.580	.610	.601
1961	.623	.401	.788	.730	.567	.785	.659	.746	.622	.571	.565	.600	.600
1965	.410	.179	.788	.506	.362	.170	.601	.273	.468	.573	.394	.352	.463
1967	.666	.665	.672	.671	.663	.651	.708	.621	.664	.651	.644	.647	.639
1969	.696	.784	.544	.690	.698	.811	.593	.742	.656	.796	.688	.644	.647

The Index of Support is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast for the governor's position by the total number of votes cast on his bills

Source: The Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-1969

Youngdahl more in 1947 and 1949. The great support for Youngdahl can be partly accounted for by his great emphasis on morality: anti-liquor and anti-gambling. This moralistic factor may partially underlie rural support for Levander. Also, he had good support from the leadership, which was largely rural at the time. But neither in frequency nor intensity could the urban-rural division match caucus as a factor. On the average only 34% (House) to 39% (Senate) of the governor's bills caused urban-rural votes. The figure exceeded 50% only during the Youngdahl administration. Governors' bills contributed only about a quarter of the urban-rural votes. The urban-rural influence declined over time as the parties became more competitive.

One reason why Minnesota governors achieve only modest success is that the legislative leadership usually is less supportive than the rank and file. Senate leadership has been particularly inopportune. Only in 1945, 1947, and 1969 were they above average in support. Governors Rolvaag, Freeman, Andersen, and Youngdahl (1951) could rely little on the most powerful men in the Senate to support their aims. The House leadership was more responsive in at least half of the sessions. Only Governors Anderson and Rolvaag faced severe opposition. The DFL leadership went all out for Freeman (and to a lesser extent for Andersen). Thye and Levander enjoyed good support from Conservative leaders. Leadership support or opposition guarantees neither success nor defeat. Youngdahl got along well without it. Freeman's support in the House was more than offset by Senate opposition. However, a friendly leadership can smooth

the way. An antagonistic one can make it rocky.

Tenure was not as significant a factor as had been supposed. It was felt that more senior members would feel more independence from the governor since their careers did not depend on him. Newer legislators would not have such a stable base of power and could use the assistance that a governor might offer. They would also be less steeped in the value system of independence. And since they came into office more nearly at the same time, they might be more responsive to the same demands that come to play on the governor. The House especially does not reflect this supposed tendency. In most sessions there appears to be no consistent relationship between tenure and support. Three times, 1945, 1957, and 1963, the older members gave higher support. Only twice, 1961 and 1967, did the newer members reveal a marked preference for the position assumed by the governor. Senate "old-timers" show a clearer tendency to oppose gubernatorial positions. Only Thye really received great support from older members. Freeman's administration, except for 1959, showed no marked tendency in any direction. Youngdahl, Andersen, Rolvaag, and Levander (1967) certainly counted most on the new members. This difference from the House might be accounted for by the much stronger "informal rules" accepted by the veteran Senators. These rules emphasized more aloof attitudes.

This leaves the last factor in support to be discussed. The House has been much more receptive to gubernatorial programs than has the Senate. The contrast was most sharply marked from 1955-1960. Differences during this period can be attributed more

Success of Gubernatorial  
 TABLE X-10  
 Bills in House and Senate, 1945-1970

Year	Senate				House				Became Law	
	Died in Committee	Died on Calendar	Defeated on Floor	Passed*	Died in Comm.	Died on Cal.	Defeated on Floor	Passed*		Died in Conference
1945	1				1					16
1947	8	2	1	2	11	2	1	1		23
1949	4	4	3	5	17	2	1	1		41
1951	19	5	2	5	18	2	2	9		47
1953	22	5	2	5	21	1	3	6		20
1955	21		7		12		5	11	4	41
1957	27	3	2	3	17			11	4	28
1959	31	6	1		12	2		19	2	14
1961	24	10		3	16	4		14	1	27
1965	25	1		1	23	1		4		19
1967	27	2		1	20			10		59
1969	36	2		1	23	7	1	15		60
Total	245	40	18	26	191	21	13	104	11	395

\*This indicates the number of bills that passed one body but not the other

Source: The Minnesota Journal of the Senate, 1945-69, and The Minnesota Journal of the House, 1945-69

to partisan considerations than differences in perception of the legislative role. However, the rest cannot be attributed to partisanship. The DFL House supported governor Andersen more than did the Conservative Senate. Only in 1949 and 1951, when the House leadership waged an exceptionally strong feud with Governor Youngdahl, was the Senate more supportive. This House-Senate difference carries over into program success as well as program support; the Senate was more likely to bottle up programs that the House had passed than vice-versa. (See Table X-10) The discrepancy was especially severe from 1955-1962. This is again partially accounted for by partisanship. But again that is not entirely true. Andersen had almost as much difficulty with the Senate as had Freeman. And even Levander had more success in the House. The only exception was very early in the period. Neither House especially opposed Thye. The House did resist Youngdahl's program more in 1947 and 1949.

#### V CONCLUSIONS

There were ten propositions about Minnesota politics to be tested. These propositions, and how well they were confirmed are discussed below.

Proposition One: Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrialization and cultural level, there should be a relatively high popular expectation for gubernatorial leadership. (The result was unclear; see Chapter 6).

Proposition Two: Since Minnesota has a high cultural level, high participation, and a moralistic culture, the governor should have a high public opinion potential. (Not confirmed; see Chapters 6 and 10).

Proposition Three: Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrial and cultural development, and a moderately high formal power potential, the governor's formal power should be a moderately high potential resource. (Not confirmed except for appointment power. See Chapters 5 and 10).

Proposition Four: Since Minnesota has high party competition, moderately high industrial development, but a moralistic culture, its party organizational strength is not entirely predictable. At best the party will be a moderate source of gubernatorial strength; the probability will be a moderate to weak party organization. (Confirmed as weak; See Chapters 4, 6, and 10).

Proposition Five: Since Minnesota has a moderately high cultural affluence and a moralistic political culture, there is a great potential for moderately high legislative competition. (Confirmed for House but not for Senate; See Chapters 8 and 10).

Proposition Six: Since Minnesota has a moderately high industrial level, but a moralistic culture, there is potential for a moderate to weak legislative organization, and moderate voting cohesion. (Unconfirmed for organization; confirmed for voting; See Chapters 8 and 9).

Proposition Seven: Since Minnesota has moderately high professionalism, and moderate to weak organization potential, there is potential for moderate legislative power. (Confirmed; see Chapters 7, 8, and 10).

Proposition Eight: Since Minnesota has only a moderate to weak organizational potential, potential party contribution to the governor's support and success will be modest at best. (Unconfirmed, although more true for Republican governor; See Chapters 8 and 10).

Proposition Nine: Since Minnesota has a moderately high potential for divided control, but only a moderately weak party organization potential, divided control would not greatly affect gubernatorial success. (Unconfirmed: See Chapters 8 and 10).

Proposition Ten: Since Minnesota has a moderately high public opinion and administrative power potential, but a moderately weak party and legislative organizational potential, gubernatorial resources would be no more than moderate. (Confirmed: See Chapter 10).

The preceding work on the Minnesota governors' power and

program success leads to a number of unexpected conclusions. First, by their own admission, the governors were not even highly significant initiators of programs. Most bills supported by governors originally came either from groups or state administrators. Late in the period, and especially for DFL governors, party platforms became a modest source. The governors also played a very selective role in carrying bills through the legislature. Most bill drafting and oversight are left to the staff. The lack of close gubernatorial contact can be especially seen in the selection of authors. Since most governors were inexperienced in the legislative process, by default or design the actual selection was left to others. The governor's primary role seems to be to establish priorities by giving some emphasis to the legislative projects suggested by others.

The question then becomes how valuable is the governors' support? That is, once a governor gets behind a program, does he have the power to promote its success? The propositions tested would have suggested that total gubernatorial resources should be equally balanced by legislative resources in Minnesota. Both would be at a moderate level. These expectations appear to be true. Public opinion resources were lower than expected, but the governor had a greater legislative caucus organization to rely on than expected. Formal administrative resources were fairly high. The Minnesota legislature had less professional development than was expected, but the level increased to a moderately high point over the period. As a compensating factor, legislative organization and leadership was moderately strong.

So, although both branches were weaker in some power resources than anticipated, both had compensating strengths. As a result, Minnesota governors had the moderate program success that had been anticipated. This does not mean that all governors had uniform success. Some did better than expected, others worse. Thye (73%), Levander (62%), and Youngdahl (61%), had moderately high success. Freeman (41%), Rolvaag (39%), and Anderson (36%) were moderately low. Elmer L. Andersen ranked in the middle with 46% of his bills passed.

The Minnesota situation does seem to demonstrate the hypothesized relationships between environment and politics very well. High industrialization, cultural affluence, and a moralistic culture should produce relatively high political competition and participation. As the population becomes more diverse there should be a greater potential for different needs and diverse opinions on public policy. This in turn lays the groundwork for competing political parties. Those individuals with greater income, education, and status are more likely to take part in the political system. So, as these elements increase in a society there is a larger pool of potential participants. A moralistic culture emphasizes policy alternatives in promoting the good of the commonwealth. It also places a premium on individual commitment to a responsible, active role in the system. These relationships were confirmed in some detail for Minnesota in Chapter Four. The division between the pre and post 1955 periods particularly shows how the political performance changed as the environment changed. The cultural affluence

increased only slightly. But Minnesota definitely became more industrialized over time. Since the political culture was always moralistic, gubernatorial participation and competition was never very low. But over time they increased as the environment developed. The DFL party, newly formed in 1944, took five consecutive defeats before finally placing Orville Freeman in the governor's chair in 1954. It won three of the next five elections, but the differences between the two parties was never very great. Legislative competition also increased, but not as rapidly in the Senate as one would have expected. The DFL caucus controlled the House from 1955-1962. But formal non-partisanship, longer Senate terms, and the negligence of the opposition, enabled the Conservatives to retain control throughout the period. Also, too many long term Senate incumbents were too firmly entrenched to be defeated by even such a popular DFL governor as Orville Freeman.

However, the relationships between potential power resources and gubernatorial success are a second deviation from the hypothesized pattern. The general power index, based on all potential powers, has only very modest value in predicting program success. Public opinion and personal resources seem to be especially unimportant. It was felt that a moderately high industrialization and cultural environment should provide the basis for great public support behind gubernatorial initiatives. The reasoning was that as the environmental system developed, the problems in the system should multiply. These problems would create greater demands on government. As the single most

public figure, the governor should be the logical repository of these demands. This should have special force in a state with the cultural base for a participant electorate, and a political culture that encourages that participation. Although the possibility for such public expectations about gubernatorial leadership in Minnesota would appear to exist, it is uncertain what the actual expectations are. Some polls do indicate that large numbers see legislative leadership as the most important gubernatorial duty. And some governors ranked low in popular esteem partly because of poor legislative leadership. However, even the most public oriented governors, Youngdahl, and Freeman, felt that popular expectations were very vague. And few governors attempted to capitalize on this resource. But more important, while skill in public opinion leadership appears to affect strongly the governor's re-election chances, it has little to do with legislative response to his program. Governors who have high popular support and great media skills do not do appreciably better in passing programs than governors who rate very low in the polls.

Nor do strong personal resources consistently improve legislative response. Those who hold to the "hard line" view of executive-legislative relations believe that the governor must be a dominating force. That is, the assumption is that an activist governor should have more program success than a passive, or "Whig", governor. The successful governor would have an extensive legislative program. He would use all the formal and political powers at his disposal to pressure the

legislature into accepting the program. If the legislature balks, he would take his case directly to the people through the media. This "hardline" approach to legislative relations does not appear to necessarily result in great legislative payoffs in Minnesota. The less aggressive, low key governor, who takes the "inside", not the public, route has as good, or greater chance for positive legislative response. The best examples would be Governors Thye and Levander. The more activist DFL governors Freeman and Rolvaag were not very successful. But it would be incorrect to come to the reverse conclusion. The "Whig" governor is not always successful in Minnesota. In fact C. Elmer Anderson had the least success. And Luther Youngdahl, a "hard liner" by any standard, was quite successful.

Formal powers were also not nearly as important as had been expected. The major powers here are tenure, veto, budget, and appointment. All of these powers were formally quite similar for all of the governors. The term was lengthened to four years, in 1963, but only Harold Levander enjoyed the full benefits of this. The actual use of these powers did change from one governor to another. Presumably the longer the governor is in office, the more influence he should have. He will have more experience, and his potential opponents cannot view him so much as a temporary newcomer. Extensive use of the veto power should indicate to legislative opponents that the governor is willing to fight and back up his positions. He could use this to kill unwanted legislation. Or he could bargain by withholding the veto in return for support on his own program. The more a

governor has control over what goes into the budget, the more influence he has over his program. Because program authority is useless without the funds to support it. He can also use this in bargaining with both legislators and administrators. Finally, the appointment power can aid the governor through increasing the number of loyal subordinates to fight for his programs. Or he could use some appointments to bargain with legislators also. But, differences among the governors in tenure in office, use of the veto, and insistence on budgetary dominance, do not seem to account for differences in success. The one exception to this was the appointment power. In fact, the best predictor of program success, among all of the variables considered, was the proportion of key administrative appointments that a governor has been able to make. There is no ready explanation for this. Appointments are not used for patronage. Of all the governors only Elmer L. Andersen stressed administrators as a supporting factor. But since administrative departments are a prime source for bill initiatives, author selection, and legislative testimony, it may be that administrative cooperation was far more significant than most governors were willing to acknowledge.

Political party sources external to the legislature were as weak as expected. Party structure had developed to a greater degree, especially later in the period, than one would have predicted from Minnesota's political culture. Most states with moralistic cultures develop only moderately weak political party organizations. This expectation is reinforced in Minnesota's

case because it does not rank at the top of the industrialization dimension. Minnesota seems to have developed a fairly strong organization with issue oriented activists. That is, it follows more the pattern of Michigan than the Eastern states. However, non-partisanship in the legislature at least had the effect of shutting out active lobbying by these party organizations. Indicative of this is the fact that the governor's success in the party primary had small impact upon his program success. Only the governor's personal election success made even a modest contribution. And even the governor's electoral strength in a particular legislative district matched poorly his legislative support from that district.

The legislative political factor is much more significant than had been originally postulated. Earlier in the period this was not so important. Legislative organization and caucus divisions were weaker, as one would imagine in a weakly competitive legislative system. In partisan states with weak competition the party organizations are not usually significant in legislative decision-making. The dominant caucus represents too wide a diversity of constituencies to hold together on policy. Also, there is little threat that the opposition party will take advantage of majority divisions and assume control. Before 1954 Minnesota had a legal no-party system, and the political-environmental conditions for a moderate one-party system. But legislative caucus organization and cohesion developed even more rapidly than one would predict from increasing legislative competition. This is especially surprising since the formal

non-partisanship should have retarded the development of caucus factions. But, especially in the latter periods, the caucus factor became a better predictor of legislative support for the governor than urban/rural divisions, legislative tenure, or the legislator's strength in his own constituency. Program success especially seems to depend on the proportion of seats held by the caucus "affiliated" with the governor. And the crucial element is whether the "governor's caucus" controlled or not. Caucus conflict, then, was a moderately strong element in deciding the governor's program success, especially after 1955. This affected DFL governors more than Republican governors. The DFL legislators were always more closely affiliated with the external party system than were their Conservative counterparts. Also, the DFL caucus developed a much stronger philosophical commitment to the party responsibility model than did the Conservatives. The close connection to caucus was seldom beneficial to program success to the DFL governors. They could acquire caucus support, but their caucus never completely controlled the legislature. For DFL governors at least "divided control" had a strong negative affect on program success. Caucus control meant less to the success of Republican governors, with the possible exception of Harold Levander. By the time of his administration the Republican party had become much more active in legislative recruitment. And there were then many young party loyalists within the Conservative ranks.

A final deviation from expectations was the lack of clear cut differences in gubernatorial leadership styles by period.

Based on political and environmental changes both formal and informal powers should have increased from 1945 to 1969. Administrative powers should have been weak in the earlier period. And party resources should have been almost absent. It was predicted that in a moralistic culture the governor would have to rely most of all on his ability to create supportive public opinion. Secondly, his success would hinge very much on his own personal resources. As the environment changed and competition increased, it was felt that the governor would adopt an administrative-political style more typical of Western governors. The public opinion resource would not diminish absolutely, but only relatively to the added resources. Party resources should have increased little due both to weak organization and non-partisanship. However, the use of formal administrative powers changed very little. There might have been a slightly greater reliance earlier on public opinion and personality as a resource. But this was not very noticeable. And it would be due mainly to the style adopted by Governor Youngdahl. Caucus did become a more significant factor in the later period. So the party oriented style became more important, at least for DFL governors. But this was usually a liability for program success. In all there may have been a slight increase in the governor's potential power both from caucus and legal changes. But the political climate was such that program success was actually slightly lower in the post 1955 period.

The variables that have generally been thought to be associated with gubernatorial influence have not proved very

useful in predicting variations in program success among Minnesota governors. The general level of success was approximately that one would expect given the total resources available. But the specific factors do not differentiate well among specific governors. Nor does the success level and leadership style consistently change in the expected direction with changes in the environment and political conditions. The forces associated with gubernatorial program success seem to be much more complex than the explanatory theories about the process developed so far by the discipline.

The Minnesota experience would suggest that it is most useful to talk about different styles used by individual governors. And no one of these styles leads to program success under all circumstances. The first style takes a low key approach to the legislature with few attempts to bring public opinion pressure. This seemed to work best when there was no divided control. The governor could afford the low key approach because "his" caucus held large majorities. Representative of this type would be Edward Thye, Harold Levander, and C. Elmer Anderson. The first two were successful, the last was not. The second style was pursued by DFL governors, more so by Freeman than by Rolvaag. They favored an activist role that was willing to use public opinion as one resource. Their partisan approach handicapped program success because they labored under legislative minorities. Youngdahl and Andersen present slight variations of these styles. The first adopted the hard driving, public oriented style, but he enjoyed, formally at least, large

majorities in the legislature. Under these conditions he turned the assertive approach to program success. Governor Andersen had a low key, less public oriented approach. But unlike other Republican governors, the legislature during his administration was under divided caucus control. He was much less successful than Thye, Levander, or Youngdahl. But he was also more successful than the aggressive Freeman or Rolvaag.

Neither the "hard line" nor "soft line" approach guarantee quantitative program success or failure. The Anderson administration would suggest that self-abnegation under the latter approach has its lower limits. The Freeman experience in 1959 would suggest that gubernatorial aggressiveness can be pushed much too far. The variable of unified political control seems to be a crucial element also. This is rather surprising in the formally non-partisan legislative system. But neither style nor political control are definitive determinants of success. For given their situation, Freeman and Rolvaag might have had much less success if they had chosen to pursue a soft line. Harold Levander or Elmer L. Andersen might have been much more successful if they had chosen to pursue a hard line. Finally, one should be cautious about prescribing either style. The style used depends not only on the circumstances, but what the governor wishes to accomplish. As defined here, program success has meant high quantitative achievement. A governor who seeks mainly to achieve a few very major programs, to define success quantitatively, may choose a style that sacrifices quantitative success to quality.

## Chapter 10- Footnotes

1. This is based mainly on interviews with Governor Luther Youngdahl, June 21, 1967; Governor Orville Freeman, June 21, 1967; Governor Elmer L. Anderson, March and April, 1966; Governor Karl Rolvaag, August, 1969; Governor Harold Levander, October 3, 1969, and David Durenberger, executive secretary to Governor Levander, August, 1969; written sources include Inaugural Messages of the Governors of Minnesota, 1945-1969, (St. Paul: State of Minnesota); Thomas Flinn, Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget (Interuniversity Case Series, No. 60, 1961) pp. 3-4, 11-12; Thomas Flinn, The Policy Process: The Minnesota Governor and the Legislature in 1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957), pp. 158-63, 173-82, 191-99, 210-9, 245-65; and James Seitz, Administrative Agencies as Formulators of Legislative Policy in the 1965 Session of the Minnesota Legislature (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1961), pp. 58-9.
2. Interview with Elmer Andersen, op. cit.
3. Seitz, op. cit., pp. 24, 45-6, 69, 75, 87, 92.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Interviews with Senator Dosland, August 4, 1969, Senator Dunlap, July 3, 1969, Senator Schultz, July 18, 1969, Senator Knudsen, August 4, 1967.
6. Seitz, op. cit., pp. 88, 106, 126, 129.
7. Interviews with Levander, op. cit., Durenberger, op. cit.
8. Interviews with D.D. Wozniak, July 23, 1969, Senator Gritton March 27, 1967, Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Kalina, April 3, 1967, and Senator Thuet, July 22, 1969; It must be kept in mind that my contacts with younger party oriented Conservatives were extremely limited.
9. Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 240-1, 251.
10. Representative of this attitude would be Representative R.W. Johnson (Cons.), July 18, 1969, and Representative Sabo (DFL), August 18, 1969.
11. Flinn, 1957, op. cit., pp. 251, 256, 262.
12. Ibid., pp. 158-9, 190-1, 220.
13. See Floyd O. Flom, The Legislative Process: A Case Study of the Passage of the Minnesota Youth Conservation Act (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1957), p. 361.
14. Interview with Governor Andersen, op. cit.; Seitz, op. cit., pp. 4, 33, 58-60.
15. Interview with David Durenberger, op. cit., 1967.
16. Based on interviews with Representative Mueller, March 22, 1967, Representative Renner, August 15, 1969, Representative Langen, June 23, 1967, Representative R.W. Johnson, op. cit., Representative Allen, August 21, 1969, Representative Overgaard, August 23, 1969, Representative Prifrei, August 4, 1967, Speaker Chilgren, August 6, 1969, Senator Holmquist, April 6, 1967, Senator Sinclair, April 6, 1967, Senator N.J. Larson, March 20, 1967, Senator Coleman, August 20, 1969, Senator Nelsen, June 21, 1967, and Senator

16. (continued) Fraser, June 21, 1967.
17. Interview with Representative Overgaard, op. cit.
18. The following emphasized getting a balance: Governor Andersen, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Senator Fraser, op. cit., Speaker Chilgren, op. cit., and Senator Rudy Hanson, August 23, 1969. The following emphasized majority dominance: Governor Rolvaag, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., Representative Wozniak, op. cit., Senator Salmore, August 7, 1969, Representative Cina, March 20, 1967, and Representative Schulz, August 26, 1969.
19. Interview with Senator Salmore, op. cit., Senator Dunlap, op. cit., Governor Freeman, op. cit., Governor Rolvaag, op. cit., Representative Cina, op. cit., Representative Wozniak, op. cit., Speaker A.I. Johnson, August 4, 1969, Speaker Chilgren, op. cit., Representative Renner, op. cit., Representative Yetka, August 6, 1969, Senator Fraser, op. cit., Senator Grittner, op. cit., Senator Schultz, op. cit., Senator Thuet, op. cit., Senator N.W. Hanson, April 4, 1967, Senator Mosier, April 5, 1967, Representative Schulz, op. cit.
20. Interviews with Governor Youngdahl, op. cit., Governor Andersen, op. cit., Representative P.K. Peterson, August 21, 1969, Senator Mullin, July 17, 1969, Representative Schulz, op. cit., Senator Erickson, January 1966, Speaker Hall, August 18, 1969, Representative Allen, op. cit., Representative Haeg, July 18, 1969, Senator Sinclair, op. cit., Senator Rosenmeier, March 21, 1967, Senator Wright, March 20, 1967.
21. Those for Youngdahl would be Senator Mullin, Senator Almen, Senator Wahlstrand, Senator Andersen, Representative P.K. Peterson, Representative Holmquist. Those for Andersen included Senator Westin, and Senator Holmquist.
22. Interview with Senator Holmquist, op. cit.; Representative Overgaard performed this function in the House.
23. Interview with Senator Salmore, op. cit., Senator Knudsen, op. cit., and Representative Langen, op. cit.; See also, Seitz, op. cit., pp. 24, 45-8, 56, 75, 87, 93.
24. Interview with Levander, op. cit., and Durenberger, op. cit.
25. Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party", American Political Science Review (Vol. LX, 1966), pp. 926-30.
26. Flinn, 1957, op. cit.
27. McCally, op. cit., pp. 928-30

## APPENDIX I

Forty-eight State Rankings onubernatorial Power Variables-  
Expressed in Quartiles

States	Industrialization Urbanization	Cultural- Affluence	Political Culture	Governor's Competition	Participation	Party Organization
Connecticut	1	1	IM	2	1	S
Rhode Island	1	3	I	2	1	S
Massachusetts	1	2	I	1	1	M-S
Pennsylvania	1	3	I	2	2	M-S
New York	1	2	I	3	2	M-S
New Jersey	1	2	I	1	2	M-S
Delaware	1	1	I	1	1	I
Indiana	2	3	I	1	1	S
Ohio	1	2	I	1	2	M-S
Illinois	1	2	I	1	1	M
Maryland	1	3	I	2	4	M
Michigan	1	2	M	1	3	M-S
Missouri	2	3	IT	4	3	M-W
Colorado	3	1	M	1	2	M-W
Utah	3	1	M	1	1	M-W
Wyoming	4	1	IM	2	1	W
Montana	4	1	MI	3	1	W
Idaho	4	2	MI	2	1	M-W
Nevada	4	1	I	1	2	W

States	Formal Powers	Divided Control	Malapportionment	Legislative Competition	Legislative Organization	Legislative Professionalization
Connecticut	2	4	2	1	S	2
Rhode Island	4	4	1	2	S	4
Massachusetts	3	4	1	1	S	1
Pennsylvania	1	4	1	1	M-S	1
New York	1	3	1	2	M-S	1
New Jersey	1	4	2	2	S	1
Delaware	4	3	3	1	M-S	3
Indiana	3	4	2	2	M-S	4
Ohio	2	2	1	2	M	1
Illinois	1	4	1	2	M-W	1
Maryland	1	3	2	3	M	2
Michigan	2	4	2	2	M-S	1
Missouri	1	1	2	2	M	2
Colorado	2	2	2	1	M-W	2
Utah	1	4	2	1	W-M	4
Wyoming	1	4	3	2	W-M	4
Montana	1	4	3	1	M-W	4
Idaho	2	2	4	1	M-W	4
Nevada	2	4	4	1	W-M	3

States	Industrialization Urbanization	Cultural Affluence	Political Culture	Governor's Competition	Participation	Party Organization
Oregon	3	1	M	3	2	W
Washington	2	1	MI	1	2	W
California	1	1	MI	2	2	M-W
Wisconsin	2	3	M	3	3	M
Minnesota	2	2	M	2	1	
Vermont	3	3	M	3	3	M-W
Maine	3	4	M	2	3	W
New Hampshire	2	3	MI	3	2	M
Iowa	3	2	MI	2	3	W
North Dakota	4	3	M	2	2	W
South Dakota	4	3	MI	3	1	W
Kansas	3	1	MI	3	2	W
Nebraska	4	1	IM	3	3	W
Arizona	4	2	TM	1	3	M-W
New Mexico	4	2	TM	2	3	M-W
Oklahoma	4	3	TI	3	3	W
West Virginia	3	4	TI	3	3	M
Virginia	2	4	T	4	4	S
Kentucky	3	4	TI	3	3	M
Tennessee	2	4	T	4	4	M-W

States	Formal Powers	Divided Control	Majority Control	Legislative Competition	Legislative Organization	Legislative Professionalization
Oregon	1	3	1	1	W-M	2
Washington	1	4	1	1	M-W	3
California	1	1	3	1	M-W	1
Wisconsin	3	2	1	2	M	1
Minnesota	2	3	3	2		2
Vermont	4	2	2	3	M-W	3
Maine	3	3	2	3	W-M	1
New Hampshire	4	2	1	3	W-M	4
Iowa	3	2	4	2	M	4
North Dakota	4	3	3	3	W-M	3
South Dakota	3	1	3	3	W-M	4
Kansas	3	2	4	3	M	3
Nebraska	3		3		W	1
Arizona	4	3	3	2	M-S	3
New Mexico	3	3	4	3	M	3
Oklahoma	2	2	4	4	M	2
West Virginia	4	2	2	3	M-S	4
Virginia	1	1	2	4	M	4
Kentucky	2	1	3	3	W	3
Tennessee	2	1	4	3	W	2

States	Industrialization Urbanization	Cultural - Affluence	Political Culture	Governor's Competition	Participation	Party Organization
Alabama	3	4	T	4	4	M-W
Louisiana	2	4	T	4	4	M
Georgia	2	4	T	4	4	M-W
North Carolina	2	4	T	4	4	M-W
Mississippi	4	4	T	4	4	W
Arkansas	4	4	T	4	4	W
South Carolina	2	4	T	4	4	W
Florida	3	2	TI	4	4	W
Texas	3	3	TI	4	4	M-W

States	Formal Powers	Divided Control	Malapportionment	Legislative Competition	Legislative Organization	Legislative Professionalization
Alabama	2	1	4	4	W-M	3
Louisiana	2	1	1	4	W	2
Georgia	3	1	4	4	W	4
North Carolina	4	1	3	4	W	4
Mississippi	4	1	4	4	W-M	3
Arkansas	3	2	3	4	W-M	3
South Carolina	1	1	3	4	M-S	2
Florida	4	2	4	4	M-S	2
Texas	4	1	4	4	M	1

For an explanation of variables see Chapters 1 and 2. A 1 indicates the top quartile. For divided-control 1 indicates the least division. For malapportionment 1 indicates the best apportioned.

## APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

The interview procedure used was open ended. The list of questions below for the governors and the legislators were often only a starting point. One question might open a whole line of thought that was pursued as far as possible. Since time was limited in many cases not all of the questions were used for every interviewee (sessions lasted from thirty minutes to three hours). In some cases the interviewee had special insights into a specific question and most of the time was devoted to that (i.e. with former speakers the discussion centered on that office).

Interview Questions: Minnesota Governors

- A. Demands for Leadership
  - 1. Did you feel a pressure for greater action and programs because of the growth and increasing complexity of Minnesota's economy and social climate? (urbanization, industrialization, wealth, growth, minorities).
  - 2. Were there any unexpected crises during your administration that called for gubernatorial initiative?
  - 3. What do you feel that the Minnesota public expects of its governor? How did this shape your view of the office and its responsibilities?
- B. Constitutional Resources
  - 1. What advantages does the governor derive from his Constitutionally designated powers? What disadvantages are imposed on him by Constitutional limitations? (Messages, veto power, appointment and removal).
- C. Institutional Resources
  - 1. Did you use administrative experts and private commissions in developing your programs? Did this give you any advantages over the legislature?
  - 2. a) Did the organization of administrative departments enhance or hinder your control and influence over officials?  
b) Were there any strong potential centers of resistance to your program? (elective officers,

- agency-clientele alliances, historical independence, federal grants).
3. I would like to know something about your personal staff: size, duties, degree of specialization.
    - a) How effective were they in establishing liaison with the legislature?
  4. Does Minnesota have an executive budget? That is, can the governor make most of the budgetary decisions?
    - a) How effective are such facets of the machinery as the central budget office, gubernatorial staff, and expenditure control?
    - b) Do exemptions and earmarking limit the degree of gubernatorial control?
  5. Governor's program
    - a) What was your procedure for the preparation of the program?
    - b) What were the major sources for program ideas? (legislators, agencies, interest groups, party committees, previous programs).
    - c) What provisions did you make to tie your program into the legislative process? What are the strategies for selecting legislative sponsors? What are the strategies for guiding the bills?
- D. Political Resources
1. Did you have to appeal to a different type of constituency as governor than did the legislature? Did this create any barriers between you and the legislators?
  2. What use did you make of communications media to influence public opinions? Are these efforts resented by legislators?
  3. What were your relationships with the party as governor? Does party affiliation help or hinder your relations with the legislature?
- E. Personal Resources
1. How had your past experiences and values prepared you for the position of governor?
    - a) What was your philosophy as to the governor's role?
    - b) What was your philosophy as to what the relationship with the legislature should be?
- F. Legislative Organization and Setting
1. What ability has the governor in this state to affect the distribution of legislative power? (leadership and committee positions).
  2. What were your most successful techniques in dealing with the legislature? (informal conferences, persuasion, deals).
  3. Bases for voting on administration bills
    - a) Were some of your programs presented as administration bills and the voting done on this basis?

- b) What were the usual patterns of support?  
(caucus, urban-rural, individual).

### Interview Questions with Minnesota Legislators

#### A. Organization of the Legislature

1. Does the caucus organization do more than shape agreement on candidates for leadership posts and the rules?
  - a) policy stands
  - b) recruitment
2. The steering committee (speaker) has the major responsibility for assigning legislators to committees, and for selecting committee chairmen. What factors are paramount in making these assignments?
3. What is the role of seniority? Is a small group dominant, or is authority decentralized?
4. What is the role of committee chairmen?
5. What is the role of the rules committee and the floor leaders?
6. Which legislative committees would you consider to be most important? (Most important in terms of the substantive issues handled and for the legislator; they were allowed to name as many as they chose to).

#### B. Voting Behavior

1. What are the major forces that determine the outcome of votes on bills? (forces that apply to the legislature as a whole, or forces that impinge on any individual legislator as he makes his decisions: caucus, governor-administration bills, personal philosophy or ideas, urban-rural divisions, constituency, interest groups, party).

#### C. Relations with the Governor

1. Are bills presented in the legislature as being part of the "governor's program?" Is the Inaugural Address viewed as being a reliable expression of this program?
2. What were the primary strengths or weaknesses of \_\_\_\_\_ (particular governor) that enhanced or hindered the passage of his program? (selection and use of liaison staff, selection of legislative sponsors, use of informal conferences, breakfasts, and dinners, selection of legislative leaders, use of public appeals, use of party appeals).

#### Executive Respondents Name

#### Position

#### Date Served

Luther W. Youngdahl  
Orville L. Freeman  
Elaer L. Andersen  
Karl F. Rolvaag

Governor  
Governor  
Governor  
Governor

1947-1951  
1955-1960  
1961-1963  
1963-1966

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date Served</u>
Harold Levander	Governor	1967-1970
David Durenberger	Executive Secretary	1967-1970

### Legislative Respondents

<u>Name</u>	<u>Highest Legislative Position</u>	<u>Date Served</u>
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#### Senate Conservatives

Elmer L. Andersen	Rules; Chairman-Public Welfare	1949-1958
William B. Dosland	Rules; Chmn.-Local Gov't.	1959
Robert R. Dunlap	Rules; Chmn.-Education	1953-1966
Chris L. Erickson	Rules; Chmn.-Elections	1951-1962
Daniel S. Feidt	Rules; Chmn.-Commerce	1937-1962
Walter J. Franz	Comm. on Committees; Chmn.- Public Welfare	1955-1970
Arthur Gillen	Rules (House	1951-1957 1943-1950)
Rudy Hanson	Comm. on Comm.; Chmn-Education	1955-1970
Henry M. Harren	Rules; Chmn. Civil Admin.	1955-1970
Val Imm	Comm. on Comm.; Chmn. Finance	1935-1966
Norman Larson	Comm. on Comm.; Chmn. Public Highways	1939-1970
Clarence C. Mitchell	Comm. on Comm.; Rules	1947-1966
Gerald T. Mullin	Rules	1931-1958
Ancher Neisen	Rules	1935-1948
Gordon Rosenmeier	Chmn. Comm. on Comm.; Chmn.-Judiciary	1941-1970
Donald Sinclair	Comm. on Comm.; Chmn.-Finance	1947-
Donald O. Wright	Chmn. Comm. on Comm.; Chmn.-Taxes	1935-1970
Stanley W. Holmquest	Majority Floor Leader (House	1955- 1947-1954)

#### Senate Liberals

Nicholas D. Coleman	Asst. Minority Floor Leader	1963-
Jack Davies	Finance, Civil Admin.	1959-
Donald M. Fraser	Taxes, Judiciary	1955-1962
Karl F. Grittner	Minority Floor Leader (House	1959-1970 1953-1958)
Norman W. Hanson	Finance, Public Highways	1955-
C. E. Johnson	Taxes, Education, Public Highways	1935-1962
Harol Kalina	Taxes, Judiciary	1955-
Raphael Salmore	Taxes	1951-1966
Harold W. Schultz	Minority Leader	1951-1962
Paul Thuet	Minority Leader	1959-1966

<u>Name</u>	<u>Highest Legislative Position</u>	<u>Date Served</u>
<u>House Conservatives</u>		
Claude Allen	Rules; Chmn-Appropriations (Senate	1937-1958 1959-1966)
Harold J. Anderson	Rules; Chmn-Taxes; Chmn- Judiciary	1951-
Aubrey W. Dirlam	Majority Leader	1941-
Lloyd L. Duxbury	Speaker	1953-1970
Richard W. Fitzsimons	Rules; Chmn-Appropriations	1953-
Lawrence Haeg	Rules; Taxes	1941-1954
John A. Hartle	Speaker	1935-1968
M. K. Hegstrom	Rules; Chmn-Health and Welfare	1957-1970
Stanley W. Holmquist	Rules; Chmn-Education	1947-1954
Lawrence W. Hall	Speaker	1935-1948
Odin Langen	Minority Leader	1951-1958
Robert W. Johnson	Rules; Chmn-Judiciary	1963-
August B. Mueller	Rules; Chmn-Public Highways	1941-
Paul P. Overgaard	Taxes; Civil Administration	1963-1968
P. Kenneth Peterson	Chmn-Civil Administration	1947-1954
Robert G. Renner	Rules; Chmn.-Gov't. Operations	1957-1970
Roy Schulz	Rules; Chmn-Education	1951-1970
<u>House Liberals</u>		
E. J. Chilgren	Speaker	1927-1964
Fred A. Cina	Majority Leader	1947-1968
A. I. Johnson	Speaker	1941-1958
Eugene P. Knudsen	Chmn-Welfare (Senate	1955-1962 1963-1966)
Leo D. Mosier	Rules; Chmn-Appropriations (Senate	1949-1962 1963-1970)
Joseph Prifrel	Taxes; Civil Administration	1939-
Martin O. Sabo	Minority Leader	1961-
Donald D. Wozniak	Assistant Majority Leader	1951-1966
Lawrence Yetka	Rules; Chmn-Judiciary	1951-1960

## APPENDIX III

## LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS OF MINNESOTA GOVERNORS, 1945-1969

Subject	Senate Bill-Author	House Bill-Author
Governor Edward J. Thye-1945		
A. Post War Planning		
1. Official Post War Council	820-Galvin	1152-Dernek, Dunn
2. State capitol war memorial	261-Orr	313-Memmer
B. Human Resources		
1. Veterans aid (bonus)	877-Masek	773-Meilhofer
2. Extend soldier's absentee voting law	872-Richardson	737-Rines
3. Increase ADC payments	18-Steining	736-Ottinger
4. Old Age Assistance		
a) Increase medical supplement; exclude up to \$100 in gifts in determining eligibility	67-Steining	308-A.A. Anderson
C. Public Institutions Building Program		
1. Current Building; 310 million to update	1170-Iam	1149-Hart
2. Deferred Building Program, 35 million	766-Sullivan	818-Dunn
D. Education		
1. Build Mayo Memorial at the Univ. of Minn.	260-Richardson	282-Burdick
E. Government		
1. State Employee Retirement Fund	1125-Wright	1201-Hartle
2. New state civil service pay schedule	266-Sullivan	990-Hartle
F. Labor (vetoes)		
1. Anti-secondary boycott bill	107-Statvold	147-French
2. Public employee labor dispute settlement	347-Galvin	337-Fitzsimmons
G. Taxation		
1. Omnibus tax bill prohibit certain tax levies transfer money from income tax school fund replace certificates of indebtedness rural credit deficiency		800-Dunn

2.	Reduce income tax (opposed)	39-Galvin	1220-Schwanke
3.	Education Fund		
	a) Distribution of school income tax fund	567-Neumeier	611-Dunn
	b) Combined efficiency aid; property tax increase	1333-Almen	1411-Allen
4.	Continue suspension of money and credit tax	331-Neumeier	453-Dunn
5.	Iron Ore Taxes		
	a) occupation tax (opposed)	70-	174-Zwach
	b) royalty tax (opposed)	69-	173-Zwach
6.	Increase state property tax (opposed)		1412-Allen

## Governor Luther Youngdahl-1947

A. Education			
1.	State aids	256-Almen	1552--Herseth
2.	Minimum teachers salary	326-Zwach	364-Aune
3.	Greater amount to teacher retirement fund		
	a) additional levies	72-Imm	141-Hartle
	b) added annuities	604-Almen	694-Herseth
4.	Scholarships for prosp- ective teachers		
5.	An administrative head under state college board to integrate education	961-Sullivan	1011-Hughes
B. Housing			
1.	Urban redevelopment local public housing state housing commission	1050-Mullin	293-Root 1172-Root
2.	State rent control	1383-Mullin	1543-Dunn
3.	Prevent eviction in hardship cases	4-Dnn	6-Dunn
C. Treatment for Mentally disturbed children			
		1315-Wright	
D. Social Welfare			
1.	ADC-increased maximum payment	163-Wright	96-A.A. Anderson
2.	Liberalize aid to blind	162-Wright	97-Hughes
E. State employees-cost of living salary adjustment			
			1128-Hartle
F. Health			
1.	State aid-county public health nurses	151-Wahlstrand	4-Burnap

	2. Multi-county health depts.	27-Nright	150-Hughes
G.	Youth Conservation Act	337-Stetvold	352-French
H.	Law Enforcement		
	1. Uniform closing hours	539-Burdick	511-Lee
	2. Forbid spiking of beer	630-Butler	660-Holmquist
	3. Liquor Control Commissioner		
	a) power to revoke on sale licenses	629-Wahlstrand	775-Ilstrup
	b) arrest powers	628-Wahlstrand	618-Cummings
	4. Anti-slot machine bill	643-Almen	698-A.A. Anderson
	5. Prevent book-making by telephone		606-Clem
	6. Governor may remove local law enforcement officials for non- or mal-feasance	544-Almen	514-Rundquist
I.	Veterans' Bonus		
	1. Compensation fund (opposed)		1184-Wegner
	2. Constitutional Amend. (against)	1395-Feidt	1557-Windmiller
J.	Fair Employment Practice Commission	622-Rosenmeier	806-Flom
K.	Business Research Dept.	1037-Stetvold	1175-French
L.	Management-Labor		
	1. Constitutional Amendment against closed shop (opposed)	102-Stetvold	428-French
	2. Civil suits against unions (opposed)	361-Johanson	396-Memmer
	3. Anti-public employee strikes (opposed)	92-Neumeier	1061-Legvold
M.	Reorganization		
	1. School District consolidation	347-Almen	1125-Herseth
	2. Legislative Research Commission	14-Feidt	1-Hall
	3. Party Designation in legislature	73-Lightner	17-Welch
	4. Supreme Court rules for civil suits	879-Stetvold	
	5. Reapportionment		
	a) Constitutional amendment	166-Baughman	
	b) Substantive reapportionment	67-Lightner	152-Gillen
N.	Financing		
	1. Increase liquor tax to \$2 per gallon		710-Bergerud
	2. 2% cigaret tax	620-Stetvold	550-Ernst
	3. 20% theatre admission tax		1473-Lyse

4.	Iron Ore Occupation Tax		
	a) occupation tax	232-Johnson	1569-Schwanke
	b) royalty tax	233-Johnson	1568-Schwanke
	c) combined		1570-Schwanke
5.	Utilities earning tax	631-Burdick	1004-J. A. Johnson
6.	Create county supervisor of assessments	485-Neumeier	706-Martinson
7.	Municipalities levy taxes subject to referendum	1279-Burdick	797-Dunn
8.	Sales tax (opposed)	619-Neumeier	1482-French
0.	Vetoes		
1.	Local liquor option in municipalities	319-Spokely	372-Letnes
2.	Liquor bill	1107-Dietz	735-Kinzer
3.	Hours of liquor sales for villages over 10,000	1273-Almen	910-Windstrand
4.	Liquor license in villages of special census	956-Miller	1065-Haeg
5.	Sale of liquor in cities of 4th class	832-O'Brien	911-Chilgren
6.	Closing hours for liquor sales-cities of 3rd and 4th class contiguous to cities of 1st class	863-Dennison	1148-Gillen

## Governor Luther Youngdahl-1949

A.	Mental Health		
1.	Omnibus bill	1217-Sullivan	1397-Dunn
2.	Wing for emotionally disturbed children at Anoka	34-Nright	12-Allen
B.	Education		
1.	State aids	956-Almen	700-Herseth
2.	Amend school re-organization act	675-Almen	
3.	Minimum two year teaching certificate	1477-Almen	1323-Tucker
4.	Minimum teachers salary		173-Rutter
5.	Teacher scholarships		324-A. I. Johnson
C.	Youth Conservation		
1.	Revise YCC act-diagnostic program, women on governor's council	729-Stetvold	769-Rundquist
2.	Transfer school for girls and school for boys to YCC	928-Stetvold	952-Rundquist
3.	Funds for YCC camp at St. Croix park	1658-Sullivan	

D.	Social Welfare		
	1. County welfare boards may put children up for adoption	35-Wright	13-Allen
	2. ADC-based on need	38-Pedersen	394-Nelson
	3. OAA-based on need	37-Pedersen	362-Flom
	4. Increased state aid for local T.B. sanatoriums	166-Wright	332-Gillen
	5. Allow discontinuance of sanatoriums	319-Burdick	275-O'Brien
	6. Commission to select hospital for aged ill site	1379-Dahlquist	1795-Memmer
	7. Commission to study Indian Problems	1364-Dahlquist	302-Memmer
	8. State wide county welfare board system	99-Pedersen	537-Lundrigan
	9. Commission to study divorce laws	1118-Wright	1379-Ottfing
	10. BB guns used only under parental supervision	791-Siegal	930-Memmer
	11. Director of social welfare to supervise displaced persons	36-Wright	97-Ottfing
E.	Public Health		
	1. Multiple county health bill	352-Wahlstrand	628-Istrup
	2. Inspection of hotels and restaurants	285-Wahlstrand	1121-Istrup
	3. Health and safety of industrial workers	80-Mullin	168-Sheran
F.	Human Relations		
	1. FEPC Law	82-Mullin	148-Langley
	2. Integration of national guard	10-Novak	145-Fodgorski
G.	Housing		
	1. Revise 1947 Housing Act	424-Mullin	576-D'Aquilla
	2. Rent control and anti-eviction	635-Mullin	767-Haeg
	3. Veterans emergency housing and homestead exemption	639-Novak	763-Welch
H.	Law Enforcement		
	1. Uniform closing hours	836-Miller	871-Herseth
	2. Liquor Control Commissioner enforcement powers	354-Wahlstrand	606-Oberg
	3. Liquor Control Commissioner approves on sale licenses	1289-Welch	1632-D'Aquilla

- |                     |   |                                     |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| I. Labor-Management |   |                                     |
| 1.                  | Increase unemploy-<br>ment compensation                                   | 233-Welch 323-Gillen                |
| 2.                  | Raise workmen com-<br>pensation benefits                                  | 107-Mullin 151-Sheran               |
| 3.                  | Special compensation<br>funds   | 128-Mullin 213-Prifrei              |
| 4.                  | Protection for minors   | 81-Mullin 221-Prifrei               |
| 5.                  | 40 hour work week for<br>state employees                                  | 703-O'Brien 885-O'Brien             |
| 6.                  | Bar closed shop<br>(opposed)  | 711-Sletvold                        |
| 7.                  | Constitutional amend-<br>ment for open shop<br>(opposed)                  | 712-Neumeier                        |
| J. Conservation     |   |                                     |
| 1.                  | License fees-wild<br>animals  | 1292-Welch 1386-Wegner              |
| 2.                  | Conservation edu-<br>cation in the schools                                | 531-Almen                           |
| K. Miscellaneous    |   |                                     |
| 1.                  | Party designation   | 727-M.H. Anderson 105-P.K. Peterson |
| 2.                  | Reapportionment, con-<br>stitutional amendment                            | 1093-Imm 827-Gillen                 |
| 3.                  | Constitutional re-<br>vision by commission                                | 659-Mullin 810-Christie             |
| 4.                  | Iron Range Rehabili-<br>tation  | 1622-Dahle 1803-Root                |
| L.                  | Veterans Bonus  | 1316-Dougherty 1504-Windmiller      |
| M.                  | Public Buildings, de-<br>ficiency appropriation                           | 1275-Sullivan 1543-Allen            |
| N. Revenues         |   |                                     |
| 1.                  | Divert \$3 million an-<br>nually from income tax<br>school fund           | 1838-Dunn<br>1834-Dunn              |
| 2.                  | Interim commission on<br>state and local<br>finances                      | 1641-Rosenmeier 1793-Ernst          |
| 3.                  | Additional revenues   |                                     |
|                     | a) 2¢/pack cigaret tax  | 1838-Dunn                           |
|                     | b) Increase \$1 on<br>barrel of beer                                      | 1040-Holmquist                      |
|                     | Increase of 1¢<br>per bottle  | 1778-Holmquist                      |
|                     | c) Increase of \$1 per<br>gallon on liquor                                | 805-Mullin 353-Bergerud             |
| 4.                  | Pay for soldiers'<br>bonus  |                                     |
|                     | a) increase iron ore<br>royalty and occu-<br>pation tax from<br>11 to 15% | 161-Carey 30-Dickinson              |

	b) Railroad tax		1267-Holmquist
	c) Gross receipts tax (opposed)		1309-Ernst.
0.	Vetoes		
1.	Increase number of liquor licenses in Winona	435-Dernek	912-Lejk
2.	Liquor license for Ottertail County		658-Dunn.
3.	Falcoln Heights liquor bill	1448-Andersen	1535-Allen
4.	Cities of 4th class on sale liquor licenses to restaurants	1055-Wagener	1371-Moriarty
5.	Maintain the same number of private liquor licenses in cities with municipal stores	819-Dernek	996-Memmer
6.	School district merger-Wayzata and Minnetonka	402-Miller	397-Matchan
7.	Validate overpayment for ditch work in 7 counties	1131-Sinclair	1307-Olson
8.	Change name of Department of Business Research to Research and Publicity	1276-Sletvoid	
9.	Increase charges for grain storage	649-Davis	662-Halverson

## Governor Luther Youngdahl-1951

A.	Home and Family		
1.	Family Courts	506-Mullin	654-P.K. Peterson
2.	Marriage laws	507-Welch	652-P.K. Peterson
3.	Divorce and alimony	509-Mullin	650-P.K. Peterson
		512-Mullin	648-P.K. Peterson
4.	Child support and custody	510-Welch	647-P.K. Peterson
		511-Welch	651-P.K. Peterson
		517-Andersen	653-P.K. Peterson
5.	Adoption	508-Welch	646-P.K. Peterson
		513-Mullin	645-P.K. Peterson
B.	Mental Health		
1.	Interim commission on new school for mentally retarded	1498-Lofvegren	1695-Letnes
2.	Interim commission on alcoholism	780-Andersen	979-A.I. Johnson
3.	Change committment proceedings for mentally ill	541-Andersen	644-P.K. Peterson

C. Education		
1. Increase school aids	1406-Almen	1705-Holmquist
2. State aids for handi- capped children	195-Almen	162-Holmquist
3. Permanent in-service teacher training	582-Almen	163-Holmquist
4. Teacher retirement		
a) higher contri- butions	76-Imm	
b) wider benefits	77-Imm	1524-Holmquist
5. Minimum teachers salary		1664-Tucker
6. Building fund for hard pressed districts	929-Mattson	714-Enestvedt
7. Adjust per capita limit on taxes, iron range cities	1313-Peterson 314-Peterson	311-Cina 320-Cina 1750-Cina
D. YCC officers for probation and parole	1009-Erickson	1377-R. Kennedy
E. Fair Employment Practices	69-Mullin	74-Langley
F. Social Welfare		
1. Commission on Aging	207-Wright	1670-Ottinger
2. OAA		
a) based on need	480-Peterson	231-Murk
b) raise minimum	1287-Pedersen	533-Legvold
c) raise property limit for eligibility	590-Dahlquist	451-Legvold
3. Mandatory county admin- istration of welfare	9-Pedersen	30-Day
4. Counties may establish nursing homes	602-Pedersen	708-Ottinger
5. Federal program for disabled	525-Pedersen	1306-Ottinger
6. Shorten waiting period for ADC	875-Pedersen	1310-Ottinger
7. State employees under new social security laws	1055-Welch	1053-H.R. Anderson
8. Commission on TB laws	601-Wahlstrand	816-Ilstrup
9. Social welfare director greater authority over displaced persons	264-Almen	141-Allen
G. Public Health		
1. Separate revenues for county nursing		818-Holmquist
2. Health department regulate children's camps	58-Andersen	24-Wegner
3. Streamline inspection by Board of Health	798-Mullin	900-Madden

- H. Labor
1. Workmen's compensation
    - a) recodify law 1516-Mullin 1569-Prifrel
    - b) liberalize occupational disease benefits 147-Mullin 263-Prifrel
  2. Protect miners from hazards 1370-Vukelich 1600-Rutter
  3. Maximum working hours, women and children 424 -Mullin 98-Prifrel
  4. Liberalize unemployment compensation benefits 465-Peterson 385-Prifrel
  5. Liberalize voluntary attendance at board meetings for apprentices 265-Duemke 426-P.K. Peterson
  6. Liberalize garnishment 371-M.H. Anderson 147-Wozniak
  7. Ban public employee strikes (opposed) 135-Sietvold 144-French
  8. State labor conciliator 91-Duemke
- I. Housing
1. Anti-eviction for hardship cases 49-Mullin 39-Haeg
  2. Rent controls 57-Mullin 40-Haeg
- J. Law Enforcement
1. Liquor Control Commissioner-arrest powers 149-Wahlstrand 226-Oberg
  2. Liquor Control Commissioner-suspend municipal licenses 1047-Siegel 414-Mueller
  3. Prohibit use of telephones for gambling 1430-Welch 1583-P.K. Peterson
  4. Anti-bribery law for athletic contests 1508-Child 1721-Ottinger
- K. Constitutional Revision 10-Mullin 22-Holmquist
- L. Conservation
1. Soil conservation 478-Welch
  2. Water conservation districts 1212-Dahlquist 1410-Day
  3. Anti-water pollution 1203-Ryan
  4. Forest fire prevention 559-Dickinson
  5. Game and Fish program appropriations 687-Sinclair 863-Chilgren
  6. Revise laws on state iron ore leases 1448-O'Brien 1542-Moore
  7. Topographic mapping 156-Andersen
- M. Agriculture-expand brucellosis program 722-Carey

N.	Increase highway patrol	820-Rosenmeier	
O.	Salary adjustment-state employees	2-Wahlstrand	
P.	Extend filing date for veterans	1280-Grottum	1512-Illsley
Q.	Miscellaneous		
	1. Lobbyist registration	1131-Root	806-Dirlam
	2. Party designation	140-Dageng	9-Oberg
	3. Reapportionment	122-Andersen	976-Bergerud
R.	Civil Defense		
	1. Civil Defense Act	678-Rosenmeier	1748-Dunn
	2. Air raid shelters	1543-Rosenmeier	1749-French
S.	Resolution to support U.N.	539-Mullin	
T.	Revenue		
	1. Increase exemptions on state income tax	155-Andersen	175-Beanblossom
	2. Emergency tax levy for Minneapolis schools		1173-French
	3. Beer tax		927-Cummings
	4. Sales tax (opposed)		1554-Omtvedt
U.	Vetoes		
	1. Rice harvesting license		432-Basford
	2. Arrest powers for railroad police	231-Grottum	363-Windmiller
	3. Cities of 3rd class, liquor license	144-Wefald 1365-Vukelich	227-Bouton 1398-Silvola
	4. Income tax credits for blind	320-Carr	450-Murk
	5. Tonnage tax on international shipping	603-Sinclair	569-Chilgren
	6. Branch offices, savings and loans	1463-A.A. Anderson	1663-Wegner
	7. Acquisition of historical site-Hastings spiral bridge	1477-Gillen	1665-Gallagher
	8. Powers of county surveyors in counties over 150,000 pop.		1556-O'Malley
	9. Limits on parking at the Capitol		250-Gibbons

## Governor C. Elmer Anderson-1953

A.	Mental Health-Research and personnel training	1553-Wefald	1743-Howard
B.	Law Enforcement		
	1. Liquor Control Commissioner arrest power	302-Wahlstrand	424-Holmquist

- |    |   |                                    |                              |
|----|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. | Liquor Control Com-<br>missioner suspend muni-<br>cipal liquor licenses           | 465-Burdick                        | 219-Oberg                    |
| 3. | Curb liquor sales to<br>minors  |                                    |                              |
|    | a) Required I.D. cards  | 216-Schultz                        | 1147-Otto                    |
|    | b) Serve penalties for<br>purchase of liquor<br>or beer by minors                 | 341-Erickson                       |                              |
|    | c) Greater penalties<br>for selling liquor<br>to minors                           | 370-Lofvegren                      |                              |
|    | d) Penalties for<br>operation of motor<br>vehicles by minors<br>while intoxicated | 322-Duerke                         |                              |
| 4. | Strong drug control<br>laws   |                                    |                              |
|    | a) Double penalty for<br>giving narcotics<br>to minors                            | 230-Grottum                        | 254-Forbes                   |
|    | b) Severe penalties<br>for narcotics<br>violations                                | 460-Johanson                       | 384-P.K. Peterson            |
| 5. | Department of Public<br>Safety  | 1576-Andersen                      | 1188-P.K. Peterson           |
| 6. | State consultant on<br>alcoholism   | 1084-Andersen                      | 1183-H.R. Anderson           |
| D. | Human Welfare   |                                    |                              |
| 1. | Remove OAA maximums   | 15-Rogers                          | 45-Warwick                   |
| 2. | Vocational training<br>for fathers in ADC<br>families                             | 99-Wefald                          |                              |
| 3. | Federal program for<br>permanently disabled                                       | 1535-Pedersen                      | 1523-Ottinger                |
| 4. | T.B. program  | 1157-Wahlstrand<br>1158-Wahlstrand | 1136-Langley<br>1134-Langley |
| E. | Veterans-Extend bonus to<br>Korean war veterans                                   | 23-Duff                            | 72-Holtan                    |
| F. | Education   |                                    |                              |
| 1. | Scholarships for pro-<br>spective teachers  | 1603-Almen                         | 1823-V.C. Johnson            |
| 2. | Increase teacher re-<br>tirement benefits   | 261-Imm                            | 668-Windmiller               |
| 3. | School district re-<br>organization   | 1721-Almen                         | 1916-Holmquist               |
| 4. | Commission on edu-<br>cational television   | 951-Almen                          | 1093-Holmquist               |
| 5. | School aids increase  | 1631-Almen                         | 1873-Holmquist               |
| G. | Parole and Probation-<br>Coordinate two boards<br>with a secretary                | 1626-Rosenmeier                    | 1781-P.K. Peterson           |

H.	Agriculture		
	1. State wide flood control authority	1497-Sinclair	1699-Thompson
	2. Grain weighing and livestock licensing to Dept. of Agriculture	711-Zwach	230-Dirlam
	3. Brucellosis Eradication	383-Carey	505-Dirlam
I.	Labor		
	1. Minnesota Development Council	1397-Andersen	1911-P.K. Peterson
	2. FEPC	622-Mullin	518-Langley
	3. Amend state civil service laws on race		430-P.K. Peterson
J.	Metropolitan Problems		
	1. Metropolitan authority	890-Andersen	1132-Welch
	2. Public Transportation (against)	93-Root	1123-Welch
K.	Highways-Commission survey highway system	702-Sletvold	6-Halsted
L.	Elections		
	1. Amend Presidential Primary		
	a) opposed	19-Lauerman	
	b) for	1398-Mitchell	495-P.K. Peterson
	2. Amend absentee ballot law	161-Salmore	409-O'Dea
M.	Reorganization		
	1. Constitutional convention	128-Mullin	100-Holmquist
	2. Reapportionment	805-Miller	525-Bergerud
	3. Party Designation	367-Sageng	329-P.K. Peterson
	4. Department of Welfare	881-Baughman	1081-Ottinger
	5. Public Utilities Commission	1044-Burdick	1269-P.K. Peterson
	6. Post audit function to the legislature	90-Sletvold	1-French
	7. Abolish teacher's college board	356-Almen	418-Holmquist
	8. Department of Commerce	1577-Andersen	1634-Croswell
	9. Enlarge powers of tax commission	1366-Miller	1316-Schwanke
N.	Lobbyist Registration	713-Zwach	803-Dirlam
O.	Revenue		
	1. Tax reform study	1386-Wright	1568-Schwanke
	2. Abolish property Tax on household goods	255-M.H. Anderson	473-P.K. Peterson

3.	Increase personal credits on income tax	1215-Vukelich	709-Tweten
4.	Revise labor credits on occupation tax		1931-Holmquist
5.	Increase 21/2% iron ore tax		
	-royalty	45-Dickinson	1718-W.N. Nelson
	-occupation	44-Dickinson	
6.	\$1/barrel beer tax		1329-P.K. Peterson
7.	Sales tax (opposed)		1824-Dunn
P.	Vetoes		
1.	Employee promotion in civil service	218-Duemke	537-Prifrei
2.	Terminate federal rent control	433-Butler	574-Welch
3.	Salaries of judges	867-Welch	1288-Welch
4.	Duties of banks on stop orders		
		350-Julkowski	1431-Oberg
5.	Metropolitan Transit Commission		1788-Wozniak

## Governor Orville Freeman-1955

A.	Taxes		
1.	Omnibus bill	1165-Schultz	1353-Chilgren
2.	Omnibus fee	901-Schultz	1050-Chilgren
3.	Motor Vehicle fee	1142-Schultz (2)	570-Chilgren
4.	R.R. tax amendment	1493-Fraser	1678-Wozniak
5.	Withholding	1523-Schultz	691-Wozniak
6.	Mills plan	1522-Salmore	807-Cina
7.	Decrease income tax credits	1722-	
8.	Iron ore occupation tax	913-Fraser	959-Cina
9.	Limit corporate deductions	741-Schultz	483-Chilgren
10.	Limit corporate property payroll deductions		484-Chilgren
11.	Remove \$500 corporate deductions		486-Chilgren
12.	Redefine out-of-state sales for corporate income tax		883-Chilgren
13.	"Head tax" (opposed)		486-Chilgren
14.	Ungraded income tax (opposed)		486-Chilgren

15.	Compromise tax plan		(2)-Cina
16.	Property tax		(4)-Cina
17.	Investment of U trust funds	1581-Schultz	1858-Cina
B.	Agriculture		
1.	Butter labeling	434-Zwach	
2.	Memorialize Congress on high supports for farm- ers; family farm	411-Wiseth	214-Enestvedt
3.	Legal action on milk marketing practices	1069-Mitchell	1248-
C.	Building		
1.	Interim commission on model building code	143-Butler	622-
2.	Highway dept. bld.		1406-
3.	Interim commission on state government needs	1047-Root	1255-
4.	Funding for welfare, education	1635-Imm	1580-
D.	Business Development		
1.	Development Credit Corp.	959-Westin	1488-
2.	Property tax relief	1360-Andersen	1510-
E.	Civil Service		
1.	Director appointed by governor	32-Vukelich	158-Wozniak
2.	OAST-state employees	965-Mullin	1031-Shipka
3.	Pay raise	776-Wahlstrand	864-Cina
4.	Civil service to Department of Adminis- tration	949-Wefald	1099-Wozniak
5.	Limit veterans pre- ference	950-Wefald	1120-Wozniak
F.	Conservation		
1.	Create water policy bd.	868-Sinclair	1052-
2.	Create Watershed districts	1875-Rosenmeier	1803-
3.	Increase power of soil conservation districts	488-Zwach	686 -
G.	Constitutional Convention	23-Holmquist	65-Karth
H.	Duluth Port Authority	1341-Butler	1561-Wanvick
I.	Education		
1.	Basic aids	1652-Imm	1790-Reed (1)
2.	Interim commission on higher education	756-Mullin	1242-Shipka
3.	Interim commission on state aids and district organization	1300-Fraser	1198-Grittner
4.	Distressed districts- constitutional amend- ment for more loans from state	1452-Carr	1524-Grittner

	5. Distressed districts- revolving fund for loans	1263-Carr (5)	1250-Griffner
	6. Consolidation of school districts	1039-Zwach	791-
J.	Elections		
	1. Party designation	14-Vukelich	12-Griffner
	2. Presidential preference primary		1293-
	3. Strengthen campaign spending regulation	1053-Gillen	1291-
	4. Repeal presidential primary		929-
	5. Reapportionment		279-Bergerud
	6. Candidates for state office filed by petition	1105-Quie	1292-
K.	FEPC	722-Mullin	778-Prifrei
L.	Omnibus Reorganization Act	1206-Schultz	1233-Wozniak
M.	Highways		
	1. Contract for engineer services	391-Butler	675-
	2. Drunken driver tests	90-Root	77-
	3. Absolute speed limits	10-Burdick	177-
	4. Impound license plates	48-Dunlap	87-
	5. Inspection of vehicles	830-Salmore	1000-
	6. Increase penalties	1287-Welch	1495-
	7. Redefine right of way	96-Root 134-Schultz	592-
	8. Require lighting of farm vehicles	550-Heuer	720-
N.	Labor		
	1. Improve child labor laws	246-Schultz	111-
	2. Arbitration for hospital employees	101-Gillen	320-
	3. Arbitration for public employees	493-Schultz	205-
	4. Amend Union Suability Act	130-Schultz	174-
	5. Substitute "conciliation notice" for "strike notice"	948-Carr	877-
	6. Unemployment compen- sation increased	596-Peterson	435-
	7. Unemployment compen- sation extended	424-Root	433-
	8. Workmen compensation increased	425-Mullin	241-
O.	Limited arrent power to state liquor control agents (opposed)	722-Imm 287-Wahlstrand	920-
P.	Increase legal interest rate on small loans (opposed)	664-	

## O. Welfare

- |  |                |       |
|--|----------------|-------|
| 1. Extend coverage for aid to disabled       |                | 1160- |
| 2. Incorporation of health coops             | 426-C. Johnson | 491-  |
| 3. OAA increased                             | 1174-Andersen  |       |
| 4. Repeal OAA lien laws                      | 6-Rogers       | 2-    |
| 5. Require uniform county welfare program    |                | 1213- |
| 6. Sandstone Hospital as an alcoholic center | 198-Peterson   | 207-  |
| 7. Increase salaries of superintendents      | 843-Wefald     | 1014- |

## Governor Orville Freeman=1957

## A. Education

- |   |                 |                |
|---|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. State Foundation Aid   | 1437-Fraser     | 1451-Reed      |
| 2. Alter tax and bond debt limits for local districts               | 1381-Zwach      | 993-Grittner   |
| 3. Higher Education   |                 |                |
| a) State aid to junior colleges, \$200/pupil                        | 155-Vukelich    | 295-Rutter     |
| b) State college administration                                     |                 |                |
| i. State colleges under U of M board of regents                     | 1144-Fraser     | 1298-Shipka    |
| ii. State college board elected by the legislature (opposed)        | 830-Wefald      | 992-E. Johnson |
| 4. Scholarship Loan Fund  | 1692-C. Johnson | 1585-Grittner  |
| 5. School teachers under federal social security                    | 802-Peterson    | 410-Shipka     |
| 6. County commissioners to appoint County superintendent of schools | 291-E. Anderson | 457-Battles    |
| 7. Rural library service aids- federal matching                     | 12-Dunlap       | 107-Shipka     |

## B. Welfare

- |  |                  |                 |
|--|------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Aid to local mental health outpatient clinics   | 246-E. Andersen  | 257-Luther      |
| 2. State aid for court probation and YCC agents  | 1503-Dunlap      | 806-Prifrei     |
| 3. Remove OAA ceiling  | 1101-E. Andersen | 1097-Luther     |
| 4. Training for public assistance workers  | 696-Franz        |                 |
| 5. Governor's Advisory Council on Aging; special assistant; aging program- county services coordinator | 1368-Schultz     | 1373-E. Johnson |

## C. Minority Groups

- |  |             |                 |
|--|-------------|-----------------|
| 1. Prohibit discrimination in housing    | 1351-Fraser | 1454-Prifrei    |
| 2. Office of Indian Economic Development | 1765-Welz   | 1352-Wichterman |

- D. Civil Defense
1. Employee under civil service 477-Murray 216-Goodin
  2. Acquire land for airbase 1671-Butler 1842-LaBrosse
- E. Natural Resources
1. Water Pollution Control  
Commission-hearings on  
Industrial pollution 1306-O'Loughlin 1776-Wetzel
  2. No substance harmful to animals  
may be placed in water 217-Basford
  3. Wetlands Acquisition Fund 877-Lofvegren 1319-Gerling
- F. Shoplifter Bill (opposed) 366-Weich 415-Mosier
- G. Business Development- state  
planning services for  
municipalities 1063-Lofvegren 1105-Newhouse
- H. Agriculture-Change market regulations  
that restrict markets for  
milk products 1570-Wiseth 1753-Eneestvedt
- I. Labor
1. Child Labor Laws 817-E.L. Andersen
  2. Employee welfare funds  
supervised by the state 648-Dunlap 790-Karth
  3. Workmen's compensation 703-Gillen 1229-Prifrei
  4. Unemployment compensation 1416-Peterson 105-Wozniak
- J. Highways
1. Use of Highway User's tax 1411-Miller 1510-Halsted
  2. Recodify drivers' license laws 287-Popovich
  3. Cooperate with federal  
highway program 733-N. Larson 49-Halsted  
(4)-Halsted
- K. Reapportionment 401-Gillen 450-Bergerud
- L. Party Designation 705-Quie 41-Grittner
- M. Constitutional Convention 289-Karth
- N. Government Reorganization
1. Electronic Data  
Processing Center 439-Schultz 909-Wozniak
  2. Chauffeur's license to  
Highway Department 1868-Schultz 2037-Wozniak
  3. Omnibus Reorganization 921-Schultz 984-Wozniak
- O. State Employees
1. Retirement
    - a) under OASI 1218-Fraser 1312-Shipka
    - b) OASI for teacher's retirement (7)-Child  
state employees, public employees  
teachers (11)-Child

1.b) state employees	(12)-Child	
public employees	(13)-Child	
2. New pay rates-high level civil service		619-Cina
3. Department head salary increases	1385-Schultz	1553-Cina
P. State Agencies		
1. non-recurring activities fund	1643-Schultz	1641-Popovich
2. Minnesota Academy of Science	775-Burdick	1376-Popovich
3. Korean Veteran's Bonus	45-Child	52-Tiemann
4. Veteran's Centennial Commission	763-Schultz	770-Cina
5. Art Society Commission	1195-Fraser	1244-Goodin
Q. Taxation		
1. Governor's Plan		
a) withholding	1053-Schultz	838-Wozniak
b) repeal \$5 head tax	666-Peterson	3-Cina
c) Omnibus bill	1423-Schultz	1568-Chilgren
2. Bills with part of governor's plan		
a) Increase dependent credit	528-Rogers	607-Peterson
b) Personal Property Tax Replacement Fund	1433-Schultz	1569-Chilgren
c) State teachers college out of income tax school fund	1432-Schultz	1572-Chilgren
d) Carry forward-carry back for corporations	849-Wright	1958-Chilgren
3. Liberal Omnibus Bill	1891-Schultz	2060-Cina
4. (Omnibus Bill)		(1)-Cina
R. Vetoes		
1. Small loans	181-	
2. Wholesale liquor bill		758-Reed
3. Telephone exchange		1397-Basford
4. Surface damage compensation in mining	1635-	
5. Standard time		2016-McGill
S. 1958 Special Session		
1. Korean Bonus		
a) payments moved up		2-Cina
b) payment July 1	1-Child	10-Grussing
2. Unemployment		
a) conservation projects in distressed areas	7-Carr	3-Cina
b) Department of Welfare-aid to distressed areas	4-O'Brien	
c) Public Relief Act for distressed areas	9-Rosenmeier	

## 3. Unemployment compensation benefits

- |   |           |          |
|---|-----------|----------|
| a) Adopt federal law plus 6 weeks of benefits | 8-Schultz | 1-Cina   |
| b) Comply with federal laws                   | 3-Root    | 7-French |

Governor Orville Freeman=1959

## A. Education

- |   |                             |                                     |
|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Extend state aids  | 1605-Grittner               | 1848-Reed                           |
| 2. State loans  |                             |                                     |
| a) School construction loan fund  | 1243-R.W. Johnson           |                                     |
| b) State school loan commission and fund                                  | 725-Fraser<br>(69)-Grittner | 290-Wichterman<br>(64)-Reed         |
| c) Aid to schools where debt service tax levies exceed reasonable maximum | 1545-Allen<br>(119)-Allen   | 1702-Wichterman<br>(124)-Wichterman |
| 3. State school loan commission on scholarships                           | 1446-Grittner               | 1430-Reed                           |
| 4. State aid for junior college construction                              | 390-Shipka<br>(68)-Peterson | 379-Basset<br>(67)-Basset           |

## B. Welfare

- |  |              |              |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Remove ceiling on OAA                             | 228-Davies   | 310-Knudsen  |
| 2. Remove ceiling on aid to disabled                 | 218-Peterson | 225-Knudsen  |
| 3. State aid to counties for administrative expenses | 570-Keith    | 517-Basford  |
| 4. State grants for nursing homes                    |              | 859-Nurminen |

## C. Economic Development

- |   |              |              |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Consumer Protection                    |              |              |
| a) Consumer Counsel Office                | 1414-Davies  | 1427-Wozniak |
| b) Loans and credit rates-simple interest | 1010-Keith   | 1060-Mosier  |
| 2. Increase unemployment compensation     | 882-Schultz  | 1024-Prifrel |
| 3. Workmen's Compensation                 |              |              |
| a) benefits                               | 502-Schultz  | 32-Wozniak   |
| b) Compensation revolving fund            | 1279-Schultz | 579-Prifrel  |
| 4. Maximum interest on small loans        |              | 452-Prifrel  |

## D. Fair Housing and Employment

849-Fraser	1023-Luther
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## E. Improving Minnesota Government

## 1. Reapportionment

a) redistricting 261-Bergerud 492-Popovich  
(10)-Bergerud (28)-Popovich

b) Constitutional Amendment  
(opposed) 614-Nelson 30-Iverson  
(29)-Iverson

## 2. Party designation

120-Griffner 61-Luther

## 3. Constitutional convention

86-Holmquist 181-Mosier

## 4. Ethics in Government

## a) Conflict of interest

758-Fraser 763-Wangensteen

b) Public Service Ethics  
Commission

613-Thuet

(64)-Thuet

612-Thuet

(73)-Thuet

626-Latz

## c) Regulation of lobbyists

5. Simple majority to amend  
home rule charter

328-Fraser

651-Popovich

6. State Atomic Energy  
Commission

610-Novak

817-Parish

## F. Government Reorganization

1. Electronic Data Processing  
Center

410-Schultz

373-R. Nelson

## 2. Omnibus Bill

430-Schultz

638-Yatka

(74)-Schultz

3. Chauffeurs' licensing to  
Highway Department

805-Schultz

225-Prifrei

## 4. Department of Corrections

285-Feidt

419-Shovell

## G. Highway Safety

## 1. Implied consent

564-Wahlstrand 814-Day

2. Eye exam for driver  
license renewal

1068-Schultz 1113-Mann

3. Double the drivers'  
license fees

1067-Schultz 1114-Mann

## H. Miscellaneous

1. State Art Society  
Appropriation

1547-Keith

1695-Popovich

## I. Taxation

## 1. Sales tax (opposed)

108-Root

128-French

2. Change alternative allocation  
formula for corporations

286-Wozniak

3. Accelerated depreciation allowances  
for new investments

1633-Fraser

1522-Wozniak

- |                                      |  |                               |                               |
|--------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 4.                                   | Small business 20% first year depreciation allowance                                       |                               | 691-Wozniak                   |
| 5.                                   | Property Tax Reform-personal property tax on equalized basis                               | 1629-Fraser                   | 1470-Wozniak                  |
| 6.                                   | Commissioner of Taxation appraises commercial, industrial, and manufacturing property      | 1611-Fraser                   | 1816-Wozniak                  |
| 7.                                   | Governor's Omnibus Bill  |                               | 588-Wozniak<br>(1)-Wozniak    |
| <br>J. Vetoes                        |  |                               |                               |
| 1.                                   | Property exempt from garnishment or sale on final process                                  | 226-Root                      |                               |
| 2.                                   | Any city of 4th class or less to give notice of intent to establish municipal liquor store | 892-Keller                    |                               |
| 3.                                   | Appropriation to Veterans' Compensation Fund-Korean Bonus                                  | 1522-Harren                   | 1709-Tiemann                  |
| 4.                                   | Liquor license to certain clubs  |                               | 790-Tiemann                   |
| <br>Governor Elmer L. Andersen- 1961 |  |                               |                               |
| A. Constitutional Revision           |  |                               |                               |
| 1.                                   | Reapportionment of Legislature   | 1128-Sinclair                 | 73-Popovich                   |
| 2.                                   | State debt limit   | 535-Westin<br>(97)-Westin     | 773-Popovich<br>(77)-Popovich |
| 3.                                   | Investment of state trust funds  | 312-Josefson<br>(14)-Josefson | 264-Basset<br>(18)-Basset     |
| 4.                                   | Interim Legislative Commission for Constitutional Revision                                 | 936-Holmquist                 | 1334-Popovich                 |
| <br>B. Ethics in Government          |  |                               |                               |
| 1.                                   | Conflict of interest   | 496-Root                      | 130-Wangensteen               |
| 2.                                   | Lobbyist Registration  | 492-Holmquist                 |                               |
| 3.                                   | Campaign contributions   | 577-L. Larson                 |                               |
| <br>C. Metropolitan Problems         |  |                               |                               |
| 1.                                   | Metro Sanitary District  | 932-Westin<br>(24)-Westin     | 1053-O'Dea<br>(2)-O'Dea       |
| 2.                                   | Local property tax relief  | 1246-Rosenmeier               |                               |
| 3.                                   | Local home rule  | 33-Westin<br>(68)-Fraser      | 51-Popovich<br>(35)-Franke    |
| 4.                                   | Metro Transit Commission   | 542-Davies                    | 1850-Sabo                     |
| <br>D. Education                     |  |                               |                               |
| 1.                                   | Foundation school aids   | 725-Holmquist                 |                               |

2. Exceptional children
- a) demonstration research project for handicapped and gifted
 

943-Holmquist	208-Basset
(174)-Holmquist	(202)-Basset
  - b) remedial reading
 

182-Holmquist	239-Wangenstein
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  - c) gifted children
 

1487-Westin	
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3. Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled in Dept. of Education
 

228-Holmquist	216-Warke
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4. Personnel and Salaries- Dept. of Education
 

1274-Holmquist	1109-Basset
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5. Liaison Committee on Higher Education
 

911-Westin	
482-Griffner	491-Basset
6. Southwestern Minnesota College
 

308-Zwach	303-Kelly
(143)-Zwach	(151)-Kelly
7. Scholarship
  - a) Indian students
 

419-Walz	398-Basford
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  - b) Nursing
 

83-Dunlap	
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  - c) Student loans for higher education
 

380-McGuire	67-Popovich
(98)-Westin	(86)-Popovich
  - d) Student scholarship fund and commission
 

	48-Popovich
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8. Junior colleges-state aid
 

90-Ukkelberg	68-Karvonen
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- E. Conservation
  1. Topographic mapping
 

233-Keith	238-Wangenstein
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  2. Fort Snelling Park
 

271-Westin	279-Popovich
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- F. Traffic Safety
  1. Increase number of highway patrolmen
 

213-Keller	270-Halsted
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  2. Implied consent
 

327-Holmquist	330-Halsted
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  3. Driver education
 

340-Anderson	318-Prifrel
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  4. Annual motor vehicle inspection
 

424-Allen	482-Prifrel
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  5. Required seat belts
 

408-Butler	456-Beedle
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  6. Vision test for driver's license renewal
 

208-Keller	331-Mann
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  7. Confiscation of car; arrest for drunk driving after license revocation
 

473-Keller	507-Prifrel
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  8. Billboards: standards by Commissioner of Highways
 

336-Westin	268-Wozniak
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- G. Public Welfare
  1. OAA based on need
 

469-Keith	43-Knudsen
-----------	------------
  2. Glen Lake sanatorium
 

1206-Root	1151-Volstad
(175)-Franz	(196)-Volstad

- |  |                 |                             |
|--|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| 3. Homestead tax exemption for those over 65                                     | 88-Novak        | 361-Prifret                 |
| 4. Vocational rehabilitation in-service training                                 | 1726-Holmquist  |                             |
| Training program for state hospital employees                                    | 976-Keith       |                             |
| 5. Pilot project; community center for mentally retarded                         | 385-Gritiner    | 728-Warke                   |
| 6. Commission to study site for mentally retarded children facility( iron range) | 146-Vukelich    | 430-Cina                    |
| 7. Aid to disabled; based on need  | 468-Keith       | 87-Knudsen                  |
| 8. Distressed areas work projects  | 16-Vukelich     | 4-Cina                      |
| 9. State aid to county boards for Indian relief                                  | 1577-Shipka     |                             |
| 10. Governor's Council on Aging  | 493-Keith       |                             |
| 11. Special pay rates for doctors in state service                               | (57)-Walz       | (58)-Fugina                 |
| H. Human Rights  |                 |                             |
| 1. Commission on discrimination in housing                                       | 750-Fraser      | 867-Franke                  |
| 2. Commission to study problems of migrant workers                               | 1048-Grittner   | 1135-Beedle                 |
| I. Workmen's Compensation  |                 |                             |
|  | 1537-Schultz    | 1675-Wozniak<br>400-Wozniak |
| J. National milk sanitation law  |                 |                             |
|  | 122-Holand      | 202-Hofstad                 |
| K. Congressional Districts   |                 |                             |
|  | (2) -Erickson   |                             |
| L. State Personnel Salary Plan   |                 |                             |
| 1. Salary increase for officers  |                 | 1601-Popovich               |
| 2. Salary increase -department heads   | 575-Walz        | 737-Enebo                   |
| M. Abolish Board of Grain Appeals  |                 |                             |
|  | 524-Josetson    | 693-Diriam                  |
| N. Taxes   |                 |                             |
| 1. Constitutional amendment to stabilize taxes on taconite                       | 1750-Rosenmeier | 1801-Cina                   |
| 2. Withholding   |                 | 1-Wozniak                   |

3. Income and excise tax changes; cigarette tax,  
corporate income, 3% tax on new vehicles 1833-Wozniak

Governor Karl F. Rolvaag - 1965

A. Education

1. Higher education facilities  
commission 1083-Grittner 1155-Fugina
2. Match federal funds, loans to  
college students 949-Imm 1156-C.A. Johnson
3. School consolidation 1528-House
4. University status for  
Mankato State (opposed) 572-Imm 635-Schulz

B. State Economy

1. State Participation in  
Economic Opportunity Act 1258-Perpich 1243-Cina
2. Workmen's Compensation
  - a) increase 1992-W.Anderson 1663-Fudro
  - b) occupational disease 256-Mosier 362-Prifrel
3. Unemployment Compensation 825-W.Anderson 879-Cina
4. Lower minimum wage for employees  
of rural newspaperers (opposed) 304-Harren 586-McGowan

C. Civil and Human Rights

1. abolish discriminatory wages  
by sex 160-Thuet 800-Ashbach
2. Continue Governor's Commission  
on the Status of Women 1436-Coleman 1385-McMillan
3. Discrimination laws extended to  
employers of fewer than 8 persons 1330-L.Larson 1391-France
4. Discrimination in public  
accommodations 1269-R.Hanson 1405-Klaus
5. Discrimination in Housing 1294-H.S. Nelson 1407-Latz
6. Discrimination by business  
and labor organizations 1310-Blatz 1432-Schwarzkopf
7. Resolution on federal  
intervention in Alabama Sen. Res. 5-Coleman H. Res. 10-  
Cina

D. Handicapped

1. State in federally aided construction  
of community mental  
health centers 1274-Franz 515-Becklin
2. State grants to daytime activity  
centers 473-Holmquist 510-Kucera
3. Long term sheltered  
workshops 925-Holmquist 981-S.Adams

4. Improve state commitment laws  
 a) commitment of indigent 1773-Dostand 1962-Yngve  
 b) hearings 1769-Westin
5. Tax relief for elderly  
 a) reduce real estate taxes for those ove 65 2614-Novak 200-S. Adams  
 b) income tax credits for those over 65 263-N. Hanson 216-Nurminen
6. Repeal old age lien laws 261-N. Hanson 115-Nurminen  
 923-Grittner 871-Beedle
7. Remove maximum from OAA 12-Wanvick 3-O'Brien
8. Vocational training and rehabilitation in state reformatories and prisons 498-McGuire
9. Aid to disabled  
 a) remove maximum payments 421-Holmquist 511-Long  
 b) increase limit on value of home for eligibility 340-Franz 409-H. J. Anderson  
 c) Removal of age limit 425-Holmquist
10. ADC  
 a) unemployed parent receives aid 640-Vukelich 1009-Fugina  
 b) children under 21, aid to either parent 714-Vukelich 1026-Fugina  
 c) unemployed fathers 1814-Sabo
- E. Efficiency in Government  
 1. State employees pay plan 627-Popham 563-J. T. Anderson  
 2. Employees health and life insurance  
 a) state pays insurance 399-Dunlap 497-W. F. Gustafson  
 b) Employees group health plan 1713-Dunlap 2000-W. F. Gustafson  
 3. Statewide planning agency 1716-Rosenmeier 1775-Dirlam
- F. Reapportionment  
 1. DFL plan 1283-Thuet 1387-Letz  
 2. Conservative plan (opposed) 102-Sinclair 725-Klaus
- G. Department of Highways  
 1. Traffic Safety  
 a) driver's license-eye exam 172-N. Larson 815-White  
 b) annual motor vehicle inspection 122-Farmer  
 c) Driver improvement clinics 368-Hoium 214-Bang  
 d) Driver training schools-licensed by the state 1507-Coleman 1682-Ashbach

## 2. Increased penalties for violations

- a) Driving under influence of alcohol
  - 30 day penalty 1204-E.Anderson 1205-Rutter
  - 90 day penalty 474-Richie
- b) Drivers education required for those under 18 663-Duntap 224-White

## H. Natural Resources and Recreation

- 1. Appropriation 25-Zwach 21-Dirlam

## I. Sunday Closing (opposed) 1356-Olson 1645-Humphrey

## J. Taxes

- 1. Speed up collection of corporate taxes 519-Thuet 552-Wozniak
- 2. Personal property tax on livestock, farm machinery, retail inventory 1438-Thuet 1586-Cina
- 3. 1% increase, individual income tax 613-Thuet 658-Cina
- 4. Lower corporate rate to 6%; eliminate federal corporate income tax deduction 597-Thuet 657-Cina  
699-Thuet 694-Cina
- 5. 3% excise tax on new cars and trucks 611-Thuet 659-Wozniak
- 6. 3% sales tax (opposed) 1308-Krieger 1767-Overgaard
- 7. Omnibus tax bill 1075-Wright 854-R.W. Johnson

## K. Vetoes Bills

- 1. Examiners and deputy examiners of titles of land 46-Allen
- 2. Claims bill 251-Parks 236-Yngve
- 3. Bear bounties 191-McKee 127-Dickinson  
2016-Dickinson  
277-Duxbury
- 4. tax reciprocity
- 5. Retired judges of supreme court- assigned to supreme or district court 795-R.Nelson
- 6. Board of Trustees of Braille School 116-Sundet 318-Kucera
- 7. Reorganization of Conservation Department 748-Rosenmeier 838-O'Brien
- 8. Settlement of teachers' disputes 1563-Holmquist 1504-Hall
- 9. Fox bounties 164-Dickinson
- 10. Probationary employment for school teachers 753-Hall
- 11. Judicial Council appointments by the Supreme Court 1094-R.Nelson

- |  |              |             |
|--|--------------|-------------|
| 12. Issuance of certificate of title for<br>motor vehicles |              | 1260-Kucera |
| 13. Reapportionment  | 102-Sinclair | 725-Klaus   |

## Governor Harold Levander- 1967

## A. Civil and Human Rights

- |  |               |             |
|--|---------------|-------------|
| 1. Department of Human Rights  | 1287-K.Hughes | 1545-Flakne |
| 2. Expand Fair Housing Laws to include<br>privately financed dwellings | 1287-K.Hughes | 1545-Flakne |
| 3. Grants to assist groups such as TCIC                                |               | Budget      |
| 4. Advance industrial development in<br>Indian communities             |               |             |

## B. Crime

- |  |                   |               |
|--|-------------------|---------------|
| 1. Law Enforcement   |                   |               |
| a) Mandatory training for all<br>law enforcement officers              | 240-Kirchner      | 142-Nelson    |
| b) State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension-<br>develop a computer center |                   | Budget        |
| 2. Corrections   |                   |               |
| a) Diagnostic Center   | 533-Nyquist       | 439-Scherer   |
| b) Group juvenile foster homes   | 1518-J.T.Anderson | 748-Hall      |
| c) County Reimbursement for foster<br>home facilities                  | 1519-Leiseth      | 832-Hall      |
| d) Commission of Corrections establish<br>new prison industries        | 835-Brown         | 929-Barrettie |
| e) Inter-transfer of federal<br>and other state inmates                | 699-Franz         | 903-Bell      |
| f) Terminate some YCC<br>jurisdiction                                  | 747-K.Hughes      | 741-Hall      |
| g) Vocational training in<br>women reformatory                         | 656-Davies        |               |
| h) Selected work release   | 459-Popp          | 409-Flakne    |

## C. Economic Conditions

- |   |               |              |
|---|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Business Development   |               |              |
| a) Economic Development Dept.   | 802-Kirchner  | 957-Everson  |
| b) Regional Development   | 1159-Ashbach  | 1446-Cina    |
| c) State Planning Agency to<br>administer 701 funds                   |               | Budget       |
| d) Safeguards for government credit<br>in industrial revenue bond law |               |              |
| 2. Consumer Protection  |               |              |
| a) Attorney General enforces<br>Fair Trade Law                        | 1158-Sommer   | 1301-Everson |
| b) Minnesota Consumer Council   | 1342-Grittmir | 850-         |
| c) Regulate charities   | (5)-Welter    |              |

3. Employment Security-Labor
- a) Workmen Compensation (50)-McCarty (70)-Overgaard
  - b) Unemployment Compensation 689-Frenzel
4. Sunday Liquor Bill (opposed) 615-Ogdahl 749-R. Johnson
5. Sunday Closing 439-Blatz 369-Everson
6. Insurance Reform
- a) Insurance Commissioner term con-  
current with governor 1395-Sommer 1738-Schwarzkopf
  - b) Equalize fees of domestic and  
foreign agents 1354-Gage 1756-Bang
  - c) Professionalism in agents 808-Sundet 515-Bang
  - d) Require offering of insurance  
to uninsured motorist 335-Popham 380-Bang
  - e) Gaurenty fund against  
insolvent insurer 1636-Johnson 2517-Flakne
  - f) Increase minimum capital and  
surplus requirements 1497-Leiseth 595-Hall
  - g) Interstate notification of  
penalties on insurance co. 1522-Welter 1941-Cook
  - h) Conditions for nonsancellation  
of policies 276-R. Hanson 322-Tomczyk
  - i) NAIC credit, life, accident,  
and health insurance 1891-Kirchner 1891-Gearty
  - j) Increase fees for  
department services 1758-Schwarzkopf
  - k) Require examinations of all  
insurance companies 1428-Glewwe 1764-N. Johnson

#### D. Education

- 1) Higher Education
  - a) State scholarships 215-Dosland 273-Searle
  - b) Expand powers of Liaison and  
Facilities Commission 660-J. Anderson 818-Morris
  - c) Student loan program 972-Krieger 820-Christensen
- 2. Elementary and Secondary Education
  - a) 50% support for public  
education by the state 1550-Holmquist 2507-
  - b) Strengthen teacher tenure  
laws 390-Dosland 335-
  - c) Professional bargaining agents 1148-Kirchner 750-Hall  
609-Ashbach

#### E. Government Operations

- 1. Executive Reorganization
  - a) Government Reorganization  
Study Commission 2052-Josefson 2467-Overgaard
  - b) Governor and Lt. Governor  
on the same ticket 13-Holmquist 9-Kvam
  - c) Retirement program for  
Constitutional officers 1358-Ogdahl 2093-Anderson

- d) State planning under governor 2208-Rosenmeier 2421-Everson  
 e) Department of Commerce 2048-McKnight 2281-
2. Legislative Branch
- a) Annual sessions 117-Frenzel  
 b) Party designation 1659-Brown 1055-Scherer  
 c) Permanent study and financing commission 1394-L. Larson
3. Judicial Reform-Missouri  
 Plan for selection 961-Johnson 1174-Overgaard
4. Personnel
- a) Civil Service salary 366-Popham 338-Klaus  
 b) Insurance benefits 721-Dosland 684-Gustafson
5. Constitutional amendment -  
 18 year old vote 900-Brown 56-Frenzel
- F. Health and Welfare
1. Mental Health
- a) Revise commitment 301-Dosland 395-Yngve  
 b) Industrial therapy at state institutions 1475-Sommer 130-Christensen  
 c) Remove per capita limitation on Mental Health Center 85-Dosland 161-Renner  
 d) Remove per capita limit on state support of day time activity centers 318-Holmquist 457-Flakne  
 e) Director of Mental Retardation in Welfare Department 1854-Srieg 2123-
2. Commission on Alcohol Problems unit on alcoholism in Dept. of Health 580-Johnson 421-O'Neill
3. Welfare
- a) Repeal old age lien law 100-Dosland 219-Sillers  
 b) Old Age Assistance 2072-J.Anderson 1654-R.V.Paviak  
 c) Exempt children's earnings in determining grant 417-Olson 699-Erickson
- G. Highways
1. Construction
- a) \$100 million highway bonds 285-McKnight 562-Overgaard  
 b) 1/2 gas tax increase 443-Olson 573-Mueller  
 c) Change incumbrance procedure 1076-Wright 1228-Gustafson  
 d) Increase motor vehicle fees by 13% 631-Sundet 1479-White
2. Highway Safety
- a) Periodic examination of all drivers 594-White  
 b) Strengthen implied consent 23-McKnight 25-Overgaard  
 c) Periodic motor vehicle inspection 212-McCarty 751-White

- d) Reduce presumptive level of blood alcohol 22-McKnight 24-Overgaard
- e) Increase drivers' license fee 288-Popham
- f) Denial of driver's license to blind and near blind 1081-Kirchner 1400-Morris
- g) Repeal 15 year old motor scooter license 82-Hughes 194-White
- h) Require safety equipment for cyclists 935-Nelson
- i) Increase size of highway patrol; higher salaries 299-Dostand 426-Mueller

#### H. Metropolitan and Urban Affairs

- 1. Metro Area Service Council 1264-Ogdahl 1508-Frenzel
- 2. Modify unanimous consent law 233-Kirchner 273-White
- 3. State aid to municipalities 955-Grieg 1043-Overgaard
- 4. Metro Transit Commission 281-Kirchner 359-White
- 5. Metro sewer bill (8)-Ashbach 638-

#### I. Natural Resources

- 1. State Pollution Control Agency 485-Rosenmeier 1061-
- 2. Game and Fish
  - a) Free fishing license for over 70 740-Ukkelberg 882-Larson
  - b) Commission to set all seasons and limits 938-McKnight 91-Albertson
  - c) Authorize spending on private lands for habitat improvement (66)-L.Larson
- 3. Flood plain zoning 1617-Nelson 603-Schumann

#### J. Taxes

- 1. Property tax relief for senior citizens 923-France 1125-Schwarzkopf
- 2. 50% of teachers' retirement to Income Tax Fund 952-Josefson 1139-Dirlam
- 3. 25% reduction of personal property on livestock, farm machinery, wholesalers and manufacturers inventories 1112-Glewwe 1334-Overgaard
- 4. Full and true at 1/3 market value 977-Bergerud 1183-France
- 5. 35% reduction of home owner's local real estate taxes (43)-Wright (27)-Hartle
- 6. Department of Taxation to give tax forms to set forth credits against tax and show income tax liability
- 7. Endorse tax refund of federal government 783-Holmquist 873-Dirlam

8. Special Session Program (70)-Brown
- a) luxury tax on tourists
  - b) increase corporate income tax 1%
  - c) homestead credit \$60 per year real estate relief to elderly
  - d) \$5 per capita to municipality
  - e) no personal property tax on livestock and manufacturer's inventories
  - f) 50% reduction in personal property tax- farm machinery, inventories
  - g) property disclosure provision and market values on tax statements
  - h) improve assessment procedure

K. Vetoes

1. Time limit on submitting appointments to the Senate 81-McCarty 184-
2. Exempt an employce of MAC from retirement benefits 1806-Coleman 2381-
3. Increase in per diem compensation for YCC members 988-Johnson 805-Barrette
4. Increase per diem compensation of Adult Corrections Commission 986-Johnson 803-Barrette
5. Sales Tax 1079-Wright 1292-Hartle  
(43)-Wright (27)-Hartle

Governor Levander-1969

A. Consumer Protection

1. Promotion and Selling
  - a) Prohibit referral selling 293-Holsten 348-Scherer
  - b) Unordered merchandise a gift 147-Ukkelberg 149-Larson
  - c) Prohibit misleading solicitation in the guise of invoices 1000-Nyquist 580-Brandt
  - d) Regulate door to door sales 1415-Bang
  - e) Regulate deceptive trade practices 2496-Glewwe 2897-S.Adams
  - f) Regulate sale of franchise agreements 556-M. Hansen 465-Wolcott
  - g) Registration of securities as non-profit organization 426-Kirchner 402-Bang
  - h) Remove registration exemption from securities of less than 6 months 1158-Sommer 1531-Wolcott
  - i) Immediate termination of outstate licenses when home state terminates 1112-C. Jensen 1244-Craw
  - j) Allow Insurance Commissioner's decisions to be enforced through state courts 1320-Kirchner 2069-Bang
  - k) Prohibit peddlers from pretending disability 328-Sundet 662-Chamberlain

## 2. Payments by Customers

- a) Reform garnishment law 607-Lindstrom
- b) Regulate debt prorating agencies 626-Popham 2367-committee
- c) Remove liability from unsolicited credit cards unless use authorized 679-C.Jensen 826-D.Fisher
- d) Regulate collection agencies 881-Nyquist 516-O'Neil
- e) Prohibit use of negotiable instruments other than checks on consumer sales; assignee subject to buyer's defenses 2809-Schwarzkopf
- f) Prohibit extortionate extensions of credit 2812-Schwarzkopf
- g) Uniform Consumer Credit Code 254-Kirchner -Frenzel  
Includes: Prohibit seller from charging buyer for attorney fees; prohibit confession of judgement on a claim for consumer sale or lease; restrict deficiency judgements on consumer sales of \$5,000 or less 2381-Scherer  
: Require creditors to disclose terms and cost of credit sales  
: Limit security interest taken in consumer sale to item sold; restrict deficiency judgement

## 3. Performance

- a) Registration by Board of Health of Persons fitting hearing aids 175-Gage 91-C. Johnson
- b) Require hotel and restaurant to report to Board of Health when employee has communicable disease 583-Brown 112-Albertson
- c) Study on pesticides 607-L.Larson
- d) Commissioner of Agriculture sets rules for pesticide use 1212-Metcalf 1341-Schafer
- e) Pesticide section in Department of Agriculture 1103-L.Larson 1342-Wingard
- f) Regulate meat production 281-Nelson 386-Long
- g) Retail meat markets to be inspected 631-Nelson 822-DeGroet
- h) Inspection of egg processing 1119-Stone
- i) Regulate private trade schools 396-M.Hansen 572-H.Anderson
- j) Ombudsman 113-Brown 16-Albertson

## B. Crime

## 1. Law Enforcement

- a) police training
  - i. eliminate exemption for towns under 1,000 1979-Krieger 2218-Nelson
  - ii. Expand weeks required Budget
  - iii. Funds for academy 1864-Krieger 2218-Nelson
- b) hand gun control 1513-Ogdahl 1702-H.Anderson

- c) Protect police-increase penalties for obstruction 1157-R.L.Pavlak
- d) Claims commission to consider injury or damage to those assisting police 1203-Brown 1248-O'Neill
- e) Tighten auto theft law 275-Krieger 230-Keefe
- 2. Courts
  - a) Lower court reorganization 2665-Rosenmeier 861-W.Gustafson
  - b) Model Juvenile Court Act
    - i. Personal serving on parents of delinquency hearing notice 804-N.Johnson
    - ii. Early appointment of counsel 2118-Popham 802-N.Johnson
    - iii. Department of Corrections receive notice when juvenile in jail 1956-Nyquist 2302-Frenzel
  - c) County Attorney
    - i. Expand district prosecutor pilot program -Gage -C.Johnson
    - ii. Attorney General call biennial training 709-Knutson
  - d) Increase Penalties
    - i. Misdemeanor to \$300 maximum or 90 days 152-Gage 139-R.Pavlak
    - ii. New class of petty misdemeanors 487-Keefe
  - e) Require pre-sentence investigation for sex offenders 286-Welzer 226-Scherer
  - f) Joint trials for jointly accused 93-Davies 22-Scherer

### C. Education

- 1. Legislative committee to determine impact of decline of private schools 1417-K.Hughes 1807-Dirlam
- 2. Improved teacher retirement 32-Ogdahl 1-Larson

### D. Health and Welfare

- 1. Drug information unit 1090-K.Hughes 1369-Schwarzkopf
- 2. Narcotics Enforcement Division in Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Budget
- 3. All school districts conduct a census of school age children 2038-Krieger 2462-Walcott
- 4. Cost of care for mentally retarded 613-Holmquist 711-Dirlam

### E. Highway and Job Safety

- 1. Drivers in fatal accident must submit to alcohol test 312-Krieger 484-D.Fisher
- 2. Raise penalties for drunken driving 311-Gage 483-White
- 3. Annual vehicle inspection 313-McCarty 409-Frenzel
- 4. Visual examination upon driver license renewal 314-Gage 486-White
- 5. Violations of safety regulations a gross misdemeanor 300-Holsten 417-Walcott
- 6. Extend moratorium on highway sign removal (opposed) 330-

## F. Job and Economic Opportunities

- |   |              |            |
|---|--------------|------------|
| 1. Uniform Monday Holiday Law                                 | 91-Holsten   | 69-Nelson  |
| 2. Remove 5 year spread from \$100 million highway bonding    | 538-L.Larson | 797-Weaver |
| 3. Raise per capita limit on county promotion spending to 15¢ | 2168-Olson   |            |

## G. Metropolitan Council

- |  |               |                   |
|--|---------------|-------------------|
| 1. Metro Council operating authority on sewage         | 237-Ashbach   | 335-Newcome       |
| 2. Metro Council in highway planning-local consent     | 941-Gage      | 1177-Weaver       |
| 3. Metro Council oversee solid waste                   | 681-Glewwe    | 964-Humphrey      |
| 4. Metro Council planning authority for zoo            | 167-Wolfe     | 730-O'Neill       |
| 5. Metro Transit Commission                            | 287-Kirchner  | 1420-Frenzel      |
| 6. \$10 million bonding program for metropolitan parks | 1680-L.Larson | 1806-W.Custaf-son |
| 7. Airport zoning                                      | 2628-Ogdahl   | 3037-Weaver       |
| 8. Support experimental city                           |               | Budget            |

## H. Natural Environment

- |   |               |               |
|---|---------------|---------------|
| 1. Crystal Waters                                 |               |               |
| a) Statewide bonding program for sewer facilities | 1541-Ogdahl   | 1019-France   |
| b) Lakeshore and Lake use                         | 807-M.Hansen  | 1205-Becklin  |
| c) Reclaim polluted lakes                         | 1326-Leiseth  | 1818-Gimpl    |
| 2. Conservation curriculum                        | 561-McKnight  | 1675-Haeven   |
| 3. Floodplain management                          | 1155-McKnight | 1841-Schumann |
| 4. User fee for public waters                     |               |               |

## I. Reorganization

- |  |                |              |
|--|----------------|--------------|
| 1. Revise HECC                                     | 872-Krieger    | 1063-Renner  |
| 2. Mediation and Industrial Relations Department   | 875-Glewwe     | 1063-        |
| 3. Department of Natural Resources                 | 1068-Ukkelberg | 1063-        |
| 4. Department of Agriculture, added functions      | 1113-C. Jensen | 1063-        |
| 5. Department of Health and Social Services        | 2499-Dosland   | 1063-        |
| 6. Department of Commerce                          | 876-Ogdahl     | 1063-        |
| 7. Department of Public Safety                     | 874-Harren     | 1063-        |
| 8. Department of Revenue                           | 273-Blatz      | 1063-        |
| 9. Department of Transportation                    | 1029-Ashbach   | 1063-        |
| 10. Department heads coterminous with the governor | 1442-Holmquist | 1063-        |
| 11. Executive reorganization                       | 1728-Wolfe     | 1066-Frenzel |
| 12. Governor and Lt. Governor on the same ticket   | 100-Glewwe     | 82-Erdahl    |
| 13. Department of Personnel                        | 1727-Wolfe     | 1066-Frenzel |
| 14. Dept. of Community Affairs                     | 2167-Pouham    | 2492-Frenzel |

15. Regional Planning 2231-Rosenmeier -Renner
16. Governor appoints education commissioner
17. State Urban Affairs Council under State Planning Agency
18. Abolish Minnesota Veterans' Home Board of Trustees -Regstrom
19. Division of Consumer Services 876-Ogdahl 1063-Renner
- J. Constitutional Amendment-lower voting age to 18 18-Brown 16-Frenzel
- K. Tax Program
1. Increase cigarette tax by 3¢ a pack 2358-L.Larson 2517-H.Anderson
2. Increase tax on wine and liquor 2352-Wolfe 2516-France
3. Continue all temporary taxes and surtaxes- 2 years 2362-Holmquist 2518-France
4. Transfer payments to counties from Property Tax Relief Fund from June 15 to July 15 1382-Holmquist 2037-France
5. Tax study 2575-Higgins 2994-S.Adams
6. Citizens League fiscal disparities proposal 2543-Poeham 2871-Weaver
7. Federal-State tax sharing
8. Property tax relief for elderly 41-J.Anderson 2-O'Neill
9. "Smorgasboard" and cigarette tax 2695-J.Johnson
- L. Vetoes
1. Eliminate the state share of revenue from sale or rental of tax forfeited lands
2. Champlin township could be incorporated with voter approval
3. \$40 rate for school bus licenses
4. Salary increase 2281-

## APPENDIX IV

## 1. Minnesota Senate: Comparison of Vote for Party Governatorial Candidates in Senatorial Districts to Legislative Caucus Victories in Those Districts, 1944-1966.

Legis- lative Caucus	% Vote for Republican Governatorial Candidate					
	67% +	66.9-55%	54.9-50%	50-45.1%	45-33.1%	Under 3%
1944						
Cons.	26	21	1	5	3	1
DFL	1	2	1	2	4	0
1946						
Cons.	22	19	5	7	1	1
DFL	0	2	2	2	2	2
1948						
Cons.	8	27	11	4	5	2
DFL	0	3	0	2	3	2
1950						
Cons.	21	21	3	4	1	1
DFL	3	6	1	1	4	1
1952						
Cons.	13	23	7	5	4	1
DFL	3	4	1	0	4	4
1954						
Cons.	2	11	11	12	9	3
DFL	0	2	2	2	8	5
1956						
Cons.	0	18	8	11	10	1
DFL	0	2	3	2	7	5
1958						
Cons.	1	5	10	9	14	4
DFL	0	0	1	3	8	12
1960						
Cons.	0	22	13	3	5	0
DFL	0	1	4	4	11	4
1962						
Cons.	2	19	11	3	8	0
DFL	0	1	2	7	7	7
1966						
Cons.	2	27	9	2	5	0
DFL	0	2	5	2	9	4

II. Minnesota House: Comparison of Vote for Party Gubernatorial Candidates in House Districts to Legislative Caucus Victories in Those Districts, 1944-1968.

Legis- lative Caucus	% Vote for Republican Gubernatorial Candidate					Under 33%
	67% +	66.9-55%	54.9-50%	50-45.1%	45-33.1%	
1944						
Cons.	57	30	3	10	7	0
DFL	1	4	0	8	9	2
1946						
Cons.	45	40	6	6	5	3
DFL	0	5	3	12	3	3
1948						
Cons.	15	42	15	5	5	4
DFL	0	13	8	5	13	6
1950						
Cons.	44	33	5	1	3	1
DFL	7	8	8	10	7	3
1952						
Cons.	33	35	9	2	4	2
DFL	2	11	7	2	15	9
1954						
Cons.	3	30	12	11	9	0
DFL	0	5	7	11	25	18
1956						
Cons.	3	33	14	5	4	2
DFL	0	6	6	14	31	13
1958						
Cons.	0	15	17	14	12	1
DFL	0	1	4	4	30	33
1960						
Cons.	4	29	16	5	4	0
DFL	0	8	17	10	31	7
1962						
Cons.	1	38	17	12	12	0
DFL	0	4	6	7	23	14
1964						
Cons.	1	39	15	14	7	2
DFL	0	2	8	5	29	12

Legis- lative Caucus	% Vote for Republican Gubernatorial Candidate					
	67% +	66.9-55%	54.9-50%	50-45.1%	45-33.1%	Under 33%
1966						
Cons.	7	44	24	6	11	1
DFL	1	7	6	4	17	7
1968						
Cons.	8	43	19	6	9	0
DFL	0	8	11	3	20	8

III. Tenure of Legislators Elected in Districts Carried by the  
Opposing Party Governor; Minnesota Senate.

Legis- lative Terms	% Vote By Governor Of Opposing Party					
	67% +		55-66.9%		50-54.9%	
	Cons.	DFL	Cons.	DFL	Cons.	DFL
1	1	5	13	17	24	10
2	2	0	18	4	13	7
3	3	0	8	1	15	3
4	4	0	11	1	3	1
5	1	0	6	2	4	2
6	2	0	7	0	4	0
7	1	1	3	0	1	0
8	0	0	0	0	1	0
	<u>14</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>23</u>

IV. Tenure of Legislators Elected in Districts Carried by the  
Opposing Party Governor; Minnesota House.

Legis- lative Term	% Vote By Governor Of Opposing Party					
	67% +		55-66.9%		50-54.9%	
	Cons.	DFL	Cons.	DFL	Cons.	DFL
1	4	3	28	29	21	28
2	2	2	20	20	23	17
3	2	0	12	12	13	14
4	2	3	10	4	13	8
5	1	1	9	9	8	10
6	1	0	6	5	7	4
7	2	1	4	1	5	2
8+	2	1	4	3	7	6
	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>89</u>

## APPENDIX V

I. Relationship Between the Metropolitan or Rural Character of a Legislative District and the Caucus Membership of its Legislator. A Metropolitan District is any District Within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area or Duluth.

SENATE							
Year	Caucus	Metro	Rural	Year	Caucus	Metro	Rural
1945	Cons.	15	42	1947	Cons.	14	43
	DFL	3	7		DFL	4	6
1949	Cons.	14	43	1951	Cons.	15	36
	DFL	4	6		DFL	5	11
1953	Cons.	15	37	1955	Cons.	13	35
	DFL	5	10		DFL	7	12
1957	Cons.	13	35	1959	Cons.	9	34
	DFL	7	12		DFL	11	13
1961	Cons.	9	34	1963	Cons.	12	31
	DFL	12	12		DFL	14	10
1965	Cons.	12	31	1967	Cons.	20	25
	DFL	14	10		DFL	10	12
1969	Cons.	20	24				
	DFL	10	13				

HOUSE							
Year	Caucus	Metro	Rural	Year	Caucus	Metro	Rural
1945	Cons.	23	84	1947	Cons.	23	82
	DFL	12	12		DFL	12	14
1949	Cons.	19	67	1951	Cons.	19	68
	DFL	16	29		DFL	18	26
1953	Cons.	16	69	1955	Cons.	12	53
	DFL	21	25		DFL	25	41
1957	Cons.	13	48	1959	Cons.	10	49
	DFL	24	46		DFL	27	45
1961	Cons.	11	47	1963	Cons.	25	55
	DFL	28	45		DFL	25	29
1965	Cons.	27	52	1967	Cons.	41	52
	DFL	23	32		DFL	20	22
1969	Cons.	38	47				
	DFL	23	27				

## II. Relationship Between Legislative Caucus Strength and Regions in Minnesota.

### Congressional Districts 1945-1962

1st= Southeast                      3rd= suburbs                      6th= North Central  
 2nd= South Central                4th= St. Paul                      8th= Northeast  
 7th= Southwest                      5th= Minneapolis                9th= Northwest

### Congressional Districts 1963-1970

1st= Southeast                      3rd= suburbs                      8th= Northeast  
 2nd= Southwest                      4th= St. Paul                      7th= Northwest  
 6th= West Central                    5th= Minneapolis

The percentage figure shows the % of the legislative delegation from that district going to the Conservative Caucus.

SENATE										
Year	Total	1st	2nd	7th	3rd	4th	5th	6th	8th	9th
1945	85%	90%	100%	88%	93%	67%	100%	91%	46%	79%
1947	85	100	100	85	93	67	75	94	46	79
1949	85	100	100	88	93	67	75	94	46	79
1951	76	90	80	100	80	50	75	67	46	86
1953	78	90	80	100	80	50	75	70	54	86
1955	72	100	89	88	40	67	50	70	46	50
1959	64	90	80	88	40	50	50	67	23	64
		1st	2nd	6th	3rd	4th	5th		8th	7th
1963	64	30	88	71	60	38	56		33	80
1967	67	67	100	70	100	44	67		25	86
House										
Year	Total	1st	2nd	7th	3rd	4th	5th	6th	8th	9th
1945	82%	100%	100%	95%	71%	58%	75%	94%	51%	69%
1947	80	100	100	74	57	58	75	100	69	75
1949	66	87	87	64	57	58	63	67	31	69
1951	66	87	94	64	57	50	63	72	23	69
1953	65	87	87	64	43	42	50	83	31	75
1955	49.6	80	74	49	43	25	50	56	8	50
1957	47	73	68	44	36	25	50	61	15	32
1959	45	80	81	39	30	17	50	50	8	44
1961	44	87	81	28	21	17	50	56	8	44
		1st	2nd	6th	3rd	4th	5th		8th	7th
1963	59	75	83	55	80	50	44		31	65
1965	58	75	94	45	80	44	44		44	55
1967	69	71	94	69	83	60	56		50	69
1969	63	71	82	50	72	50	61		44	69

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