



# STATE OF MINNESOTA

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ST. PAUL 55155

WENDELL R. ANDERSON  
GOVERNOR

December 5, 1972

The Honorable Wendell R. Anderson  
The Capitol  
St. Paul, Minnesota

Dear Governor Anderson:

I am pleased to submit to you the report of the Special Task Force on Corrections Security, created by your Executive Order 36 of July 24, 1972.

You will note that our conclusions are summarized at the beginning of the report. I sincerely hope that our report will assist you in your efforts to improve the corrections system in Minnesota, especially in the area of institutional security.

On behalf of all of the Task Force members, I express our appreciation for your selection of us, thereby permitting us to participate in this important and timely matter of concern. We hope that our report justifies the confidence you placed in us.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Leonard J. Keyes".

Leonard J. Keyes, Chairman  
Special Task Force on  
Corrections Security

LJK:dsn

Attachment

REPORT  
of the  
Governor's Special Task Force  
on  
Corrections Security

Leonard J. Keyes, Chairman

Sister Alberta Huber

William B. Dosland

Howard Fortier

Richard J. Heaney

Keith F. Hughes

John MacGibbon

Richard Rowan

George M. Scott

Greg J. Sertich

Edward G. Westphal

Charles H. Williams, Jr.

Eugene W. Wilson

Paul Zillgitt

Joseph M. Hart, Executive Secretary

Dorothy S. Newcomb, Staff Secretary

## SUMMARY

In total perspective, the Task Force has concluded that, with the slight modifications now being made in the physical structures and with the improvement in and addition of electronic surveillance and communications equipment and devices, the three adult correctional institutions are basically secure and adequately meet the incarceration requirements of the state's correctional system.

However, much more can and must be done to bolster the institutional staffs in their difficult task of controlling other human beings in an unnatural and often volatile environment. It was obvious to us that the Stillwater breaks in July resulted from human rather than architectural failure. In a lesser degree, bad judgment can also be ascertained in the escapes from inside St. Cloud and Shakopee. Even in the case of some "walkaways" it would appear that poor judgment and inadequate surveillance were contributing factors. Therefore, the recommendation of substantial improvement in institutional staff and departmental personnel programs constitutes the main thrust of our report. We recognize that an awareness of these needs exists in the Department of Corrections and some movement has been made towards fulfillment. We believe, however, that the design, development and implementation of a comprehensive personnel program should be accelerated.

As to the quality of communications between the institutions and state and local law enforcement officers, we found that any past deficiencies have been greatly ameliorated; they are now quite adequate.

We also found that no additional funding is necessary for architectural, equipment, or staffing, except to provide for a needed modification of state retirement policies. With this exception, adequate financial resources are currently available or already included in the Department's budget requests now under consideration.



We recommend, suggest, and observe as follows:

A. Recommendations:

1. Improve and expand the electronic surveillance and communications systems, particularly at Stillwater and St. Cloud.
2. Mobilize and utilize all available state organizational technical staff to assist the Department of Corrections in mounting an aggressive attack on the drug problem at all institutions.
3. Carefully analyze and evaluate the group visitor policies and practices and issue guidelines for fair and realistic controls over visiting groups consistent with the rehabilitative needs of the inmates.
4. Make secure the window bars of the security unit at Shakopee.
5. Finalize and issue the new guidelines (now in draft form) for outside activities of inmates as soon as possible.
6. Expedite the study being made by the Department of Corrections concerning the custodial manpower needs of the institutions.
7. Adopt new salary alignment and scales for custodial personnel now in process of negotiation.
8. Modify the state retirement system to provide optional early and physical disability retirement of custodial personnel, also now in process of negotiation.
9. Develop and implement a modern, positive, comprehensive professional personnel program within the Department of Corrections with particular emphasis on its application to the institutional custodial forces.
10. Develop and conduct a comprehensive, penetrating, objective inspection system by the Department of Corrections to afford periodic appraisal of conditions at, and the effectiveness of the management of, the institutions.



B. Suggestions:

1. Reevaluate the physical inspection practices of the institutions to include obscure, remote passages, openings or possible escape routes from inside the institutions.
2. Modify the state's personnel policies so that loss of time from duty by custodial personnel resulting from assaults or line-of-duty disabilities are not charged to sick leave, and so that injured personnel receive full pay until returned to duty.

C. Related Observations:

1. A Task Force should be created to study and evaluate the present parole system, its policies and practices.
2. Both male penal institutions should remain open with the option reserved as to which will become the maximum and which the minimum security institution.

## INTRODUCTION

The Special Task Force on Corrections Security was created by Executive Order No. 36, dated July 24, 1972. Governor Wendell R. Anderson directed the Task Force to make a thorough examination of:

- a. The custody failures which have occurred during the past year in Minnesota.
- b. The administration of custody and security in our corrections institutions.
- c. The resources that are required to carry out prison reform without compromising public safety, as opposed to the resources presently available.
- d. The quality of communication between our corrections institutions and state and local law enforcement officers when escapes occur or inmates are released into society.

The Governor appointed the following Task Force members:

Leonard J. Keyes, Attorney, Briggs and Morgan,  
St. Paul, Chairman

Sister Alberta Huber, President, College of  
St. Catherine, St. Paul

William B. Dosland, Attorney and State Senator,  
Moorhead

Howard Fortier, Secretary-Treasurer, Teamster's  
Joint Council 34, Minneapolis

Richard J. Heaney, former Deputy Director,  
U. S. Bureau of Prisons, St. Paul

Keith F. Hughes, Attorney and State Senator,  
St. Cloud

John MacGibbon, Sherburne County Attorney,  
Elk River

Richard Rowan, Chief of Police, St. Paul

George M. Scott, Hennepin County Attorney,  
Minneapolis

Greg J. Sertich, St. Louis County Sheriff,  
Duluth

Edward G. Westphal, Washington County Sheriff,  
Stillwater

Charles H. Williams, Jr., Assistant Ramsey  
County Public Defender, St. Paul

Eugene W. Wilson, Deputy Chief of Police,  
Minneapolis

Paul Zillgitt, Goodhue County Sheriff,  
Red Wing

#### MODUS OPERANDI

The Task Force directed its attention to the three adult correctional institutions. The following committees were appointed by the chairman:

Stillwater Prison, chaired by Mr. Scott;

St. Cloud Reformatory, chaired by Mr.  
MacGibbon;

Shakopee Correctional Institute for Women,  
chaired by Sister Alberta; and

Budget Committee, chaired by Senator  
Dosland.

A major part of the Committee's preparatory activities consisted of on-site visits to and critical inspections of each of the three correctional institutions, during which staff members were interviewed. In addition, David Fogel, Commissioner of Corrections; Richard Ericson, Executive Director, Minnesota Citizens' Council on Delinquency and Crime; Al Lortz, Correctional Sergeant, St. Cloud Reformatory; LeRoy Phillippi, member of the custodial staff, Stillwater Prison; Richard McCormick, chairman of the LEAP Task Force on Corrections; Harold Higgins, Superintendent, Division of Criminal Apprehension, Department of Public Safety; and Clinton Lomis and Roger Nelson of the Telecommunications Division, Department of Administration, appeared before the Task Force. These



persons presented information of great assistance in examining questions relative to institutional security. Also, key staff officials of the Department of Corrections, the Department of Civil Service, the Commission on Alcohol Problems, and the Drug Abuse Section of the State Planning Agency were interviewed.

Written research materials and data were compiled and studied by the Task Force. Among them were a report of his Stillwater Prison study by Dr. Lloyd McCorkle, former Director, Division of Correction and Parole, Department of Institutions and Agencies for New Jersey, now a consultant in the field of corrections; portions of a report being made by the Corrections Task Force of LEAP; material furnished by the Minnesota Citizens' Council on Delinquency and Crime; policy issuances of the Federal Correctional Institution at Sandstone; comparative statistical data from the Iowa State Penitentiary; and a national study of Correctional Programs by Donald H. Goff, General Secretary of the Correctional Association of New York.

#### CUSTODIAL FAILURES

During the period between August 1, 1971, and July 31, 1972, there were 50 escapes from the three institutions. Of those 50, 21 were from maximum security (i.e., breakouts from within the walls of the institutions). The remaining 29 were "walkaways" (i.e., from outside activities, such as jobs, athletic and cultural engagements, medical visits, job interviews, and similar minimum security situations).

The following table shows the custody failures at each institution for the period involved:

	<u>From Maximum Security</u>	<u>From Minimum Security</u>	<u>Total</u>
Stillwater	10	15	25
St. Cloud	7	8	15
Shakopee	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>
	21	29	50

## ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM CUSTODY FAILURES

It is significant that all escapes from maximum security were through barred windows or openings. The 10 escapes at Stillwater and the 7 at St. Cloud involved the sawing of bars; the 4 at Shakopee involved the removal of bars.

Three major factors affect maximum custody failures: the physical institutional plant; the availability and inmate use of drugs; and the human custodial factor.

### PHYSICAL INSTITUTIONAL PLANTS

The Stillwater and St. Cloud institutions, although old and lacking in many modern architectural design features, are sufficiently secure to fulfill their expected confinement purpose. Although the Shakopee institution is necessarily of different architectural design and lacks more modern physical features, it is otherwise sufficiently secure structurally to meet its expected custodial purpose. Corrective steps have been taken at each institution structurally to remedy those physical defects availed of in the recent escapes. These appear to be sufficient to prevent repeated egress at those particular sites.

We are aware that a study of the Stillwater institution is being made by an outside architectural firm. That study, which is primarily in preparation for consolidation of male adult corrections, is still incomplete. We are, therefore, not in a position to evaluate its possible security aspects.

Another physical element is the availability and utilization of electronic devices, apparatus and equipment. Prior to the major breaks at Stillwater on July 8 and 9, 1972, some electronic communications and detection devices were in use. They were patently inadequate. For instance, the electronic walk-through device at the main entrance at Stillwater was virtually useless. This condition is known to the prison staff and, no doubt, to the inmates and their visitors. We have been informed that a more sensitive device is on order. Its installation is essential for the surveillance of persons who enter the secured area of the prison.



Perhaps the most noteworthy development since the escapes has been the conduct of a vigorous, extensive survey regarding the utilization of modern electronic communications and surveillance systems and devices at the institutions. The emphasis on this survey is at Stillwater, which presents the most difficult security problem of the three institutions. We are satisfied that the contemplated additions of and improvements to the electronic equipment and systems at Stillwater, as well as at the other institutions, will be a substantial improvement over the existing systems. Consequently, we heartily endorse those efforts. We recommend that they be expedited and extended consistent with the maximum current availability of financial resources, or those sought and justified in the forthcoming departmental budgetary requests.

#### AVAILABILITY AND USE OF DRUGS

Another condition that acutely and adversely affects security enforcement at all three institutions is the availability and use of drugs and other chemical dependency substances by inmates. This problem must be met aggressively and positively. In our visits to the institutions, the problem was fully and openly discussed by officials and staff personnel. It was emphatically confirmed by the Superintendent of the Division of Criminal Apprehension, and by those members of our Task Force who, because of their responsibilities as law enforcement officers, work closely with institutional officials on a continuing basis. The seriousness of this problem varies among the institutions: At Stillwater, it is perhaps the most challenging day-to-day problem confronting the staff. At St. Cloud, the problem is of lesser custodial significance than at Stillwater. At Shakopee, while the use of drugs exists, it is a much less serious problem than at the two male institutions.

The inmates' sources of the drugs are well identified by the institutional officials and staff: internally, primarily through medical and pharmacy facilities, and externally, primarily through visitors. We believe that internal controls are currently being improved. How to stem the latter source both puzzles and mystifies the correctional forces. We were, in fact, struck by a prevailing attitude of dismay, frustration, and hopelessness among correctional forces in reducing, if not eliminating, the drug condition within the institutions. The most prevalent philosophy is, "As long as drugs are freely



available on the outside, they will be available on the inside." While there is, no doubt, some validity to that philosophy, we believe that much more can and must be done to rectify this condition.

We offer no panacea for the drug problem; we do, however, have some recommendations. We recognize that the Department of Corrections and the institutions are fully aware of and are endeavoring to control this condition. However, we do not sense the earnest, skillful, and accentuated endeavor necessary for problem control. Consequently, we recommend that this drug matter be given the highest priority in correctional programming. We are certain that there is sufficient knowledge, talent and technical skill available within the Department of Corrections, Department of Public Safety, State Planning Agency, Commission on Alcohol Problems, Department of Public Welfare, and perhaps others, that, if properly mobilized and coordinated by the Department of Corrections, an effective practical program can be developed and implemented to rectify the present deplorable drug abuse conditions in the institutions.

The foregoing proposal is long-range. Allied with it is a current contributing condition which must be reappraised within the framework of its intended rehabilitative purpose. This condition concerns the size and makeup of visiting groups, particularly at Stillwater. We are satisfied that it is virtually impossible to inspect, manage, control, and maintain adequate surveillance over the large groups who are permitted to visit the institutions. We are also satisfied that these large groups are primarily responsible for the illicit transportation of drugs and contraband into the institutions.

We do not quarrel with the purposes or objectives of group visits, especially by those groups whose efforts and goals are wholesomely intended to supplement the institutions' rehabilitative efforts. We do, however, question the necessity of groups consisting of 40 or 50 persons entering the institutions on a regular basis, particularly when the same persons often are members of several visiting groups. This situation tends to create an aura of suspicion about such persons and groups which reflects unwholesomely and possibly unfairly on all groups.

We recommend that the Department of Corrections issue an overall policy statement with definite, nondiscriminatory guidelines for each institution regulating visiting privileges, the size and membership of groups, qualifications for admission, and the nature and extent of the conduct of personal searches.



## HUMAN CUSTODIAL FACTOR

We find that some of the escapes, both from maximum and minimum security, resulted from a breakdown of the human custodial factor. For example, focussing on Stillwater, we find: The two major breaks at this institution involved 10 people (6 on the evening of July 8, and 4 on the afternoon of July 9). Both resulted from sawing window bars. The windows through which the July 9th multiple escape occurred were in an area somewhat screened from the view of security personnel. However, the windows through which the July 8 multiple escape occurred were within an open and visually unobstructed area.

We understand that five of the Stillwater custodial staff have been disciplined and one reprimanded because of these breaks. This remedial action pinpoints the breaks' cause as human failure in performance of duty.

The "saw-out" breaks at St. Cloud occurred at more remote, obscure sites. On October 4, 1971, three inmates sawed through bars at the top of a ventilator shaft, thereby gaining access to the roof of the new dining room. From there they were able to cross to the edge of the building and descend to the ground. On April 2, 1972, four more escaped through a skylight in the roof of the food service building after sawing overhead bars. The Reformatory staff found no dereliction on the part of the security personnel; no disciplinary actions were taken. On the other hand, we found that, although a general physical inspection of possible escape routes is made monthly, such inspections may often omit remote, isolated and obscure structural openings such as those utilized in the cited two escapes. We doubt the efficacy of this type of inspection.

At Shakopee, on December 31, 1971, two inmates removed the window bars on the second floor of the security cottage and escaped. On June 16, 1972, two inmates similarly removed bars from the second floor windows of a minimum security cottage and escaped. Because these bars were merely bolted to the window frames, inspections of the security cottage windows were made hourly, even on the night of the escape. Since it required little mechanical skill to remove the bars, the inmates could remove them quite easily in a matter of minutes and thereby gain access to the outside. Again staff investigation produced no basis for disciplinary measures. Pursuant to an architectural evaluation, a request has been approved for the correction of this structural deficiency in the security unit. Funds for this are currently available. We recommend that such action be expedited if it has not yet been effected.



Shakopee is a generally open institution with a low profile of restrictive confinement. There is an intelligent concern for the inmates and evident good cooperation between and among the administration, the staff, and inmates. Security at Shakopee in the minimum security cottages, although requiring constant vigilance, does not approach the problem that exists at Stillwater and St. Cloud. We take no exception to the minimal corrective structural action recommended and being taken at Shakopee.

#### ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM CUSTODY FAILURES

While our main thrust was directed to maximum security failures, some observations and comments are in order regarding minimum security violations. We find that escapes from minimum custody generally involved individuals who were progressing satisfactorily towards rehabilitation, would not constitute a potential danger to society, and, therefore, varying degrees of liberty were warranted. In several specific instances, however, we find that serious errors of custodial judgment and surveillance occurred. We seriously question the wisdom and judgment of the institutional officials responsible for the authorization of the participation of certain escapees in certain outside programs. In particular, the well-publicized Stillwater broomball "caper," and the walkaway from the Guthrie Theater by a St. Cloud ward are examples of erroneous judgment.

We recognize the need for outside activities in the rehabilitative role of the institutions. We question the adequacy of inmate participant screening, particularly in the cited examples.

Even more, we question certain other custodial lapses, such as the walkaway by a Stillwater ward at a Minneapolis job interview on August 20, 1971, and the walkaway by two Stillwater wards from the University Hospitals on January 12 and July 31, 1972, while presumably under one-on-one custodial coverage. We are satisfied that inattentiveness approaching dereliction of duty contributed to these escapes.

The Department of Corrections has drafted new guidelines for outside group activities of inmates which we feel are reasonable, objective, and clearly stated. We trust that they will provide a workable framework to guide classification and custody personnel in the execution of their most important responsibilities.

We recommend that these guidelines, substantially as drafted, be completed and implemented as soon as possible.



## SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF CUSTODY FAILURES

In summary, we find that, while there is little evidence of serious personnel failures involved in the St. Cloud and Shakopee episodes, those at Stillwater reveal a significant collapse of security staff performance. Consequently, the ensuing discussion will be directed principally to Stillwater. Because of the make-up of its inmates, it is unquestionably the most complex and difficult of the three institutions to manage in every way, including security.

## OVERVIEW OF THE PERSONNEL FACTOR

We have concluded that the most serious impediment to the establishment, implementation, and conduct of a substantially adequate and effective custodial program is in the personnel management area of the Department of Corrections. Corrections systems by their very nature consist of the intimate and constant interrelationship of one set of humans (custodians) with another (inmates) in an unnatural setting of stress and tension. Moreover, today's inmates at all three institutions are increasingly hostile, unstable and assaultive. Consequently, a more aggressive and positive total personnel management program is essential for successful custodial operation of the institutions. While effective personnel management is essential for optimum program success of any organization, the need for a positive personnel program is necessarily more acute in prisons. Much more than is currently being done must be done in Minnesota.

Following is a discussion of the various aspects of the personnel picture at the respective institutions:

Staffing: At each institution administrators and employees recommended the need for additional custodial personnel to improve security. We know, however, that when untoward events occur, we often point to a need for more people as a solution to the problem. Because we did not make an analytical appraisal of staffing needs and utilization, we cannot unhesitatingly agree or disagree with the institutional analysis. However, we seriously question whether there has been an optimum utilization of present custodial personnel. We regret that no serious schematic manpower staffing patterns have been developed for any institution. The existing organization and staffing charts are not supported by numeric requirements of given functions predicated on objective manpower analyses. We



are pleased to note that this situation may be ameliorated by a professional management analyst on loan to the state from General Mills, and that the Corrections Task Force of LEAP is also concerned in this area. Consequently, we do not recommend the need for additional custodial staff at any institution except Shakopee. There, we recommend that at least one trained male custodial officer is needed around the clock to respond to emergency calls from the female custodial officers in the cottages. Perhaps even this need can be met through normally occurring personnel vacancies. In summary, we find that an objective manpower study of accurate custodial staffing needs of the institutions is long overdue; we are pleased that it is now being conducted.

Pay: Of equal concern is the matter of an adjustment in occupational alignment of custodial personnel within the organizational structure and a concomitant adjustment in salary schedules. We are pleased that positive action in this regard has been taken by the Departments of Correction and Civil Service during the past several years and that such is currently given high priority. Also, we understand that a comprehensive survey has recently been made of comparable positions in nearby state correctional institutions, in local and state law enforcement systems, and in other related service activities. From this, a new pay schedule for custodial personnel has been developed, approved by the state Civil Service Board, and referred to the proper state officials as part of a package to be negotiated with employee organizations. We are unaware of the extent of the adjustments. We do understand that they are substantially in keeping with governing economic stabilization guidelines and budgetary policies. Although we believe that a salary adjustment for custodial personnel is warranted and long overdue, we believe it would be improper to inject ourselves into the negotiations by anything more specific.

Retirement: Also of acute concern to both administrators and custodial personnel is the matter of early or allowable physical disability retirement. We concur with the general view of Corrections Department officials, institution administrators, custodial personnel, and employee organization spokesmen that adjustments in the state's retirement policies and system should be made to allow full annuity retirement of custodial personnel at age 55, or earlier in case of disability incurred in line of duty. Moreover, we urge that custodial personnel not be required to take sick leave when assaulted or otherwise disabled from line of duty offenses. Substantial supportive data



for our position have been developed and are available. In the interest of conciseness, we forego a tedious repetition of their contents. Moreover, we understand that revisions of the retirement system are contained in a proposal drafted by the Department of Corrections and will be included in the package to be negotiated with employee organizations. We endorse this action, again without improperly injected specifics.

Personnel Selection: The qualification and selection policies for correctional and custodial personnel, most of which have been recently developed, make sense and are well structured. Generally, we concur in the policy of cautiously hiring some well screened, qualified ex-convicts for custodial employment. Our concurrence is guarded, however. We recognize possible causally related disciplinary problems that might arise and the possibility of attack on the employee's credibility in subsequent court appearances as witnesses.

Personnel Advancement: The new promotional ladder for custodial and correctional personnel appears to be feasible and in keeping with modern personnel program policies. If this system is conscientiously managed, it will be of considerable assistance in creating confidence within the custodial forces.

Personnel Training: We view the Lino Lakes Academy training program with some satisfaction. It will be of long-range value in the development of a competent custodial complement. However, it appears that the manner in which the graduates of the academy have been and are being integrated into the custodial forces is open to question. It also appears that there is need for more on-site training at the institutions themselves. Consequently, we believe that the Department staff should make a positive study and evaluation of the on-site training needs at the institutions, particularly as they relate to the integration of Lino Lake graduates, and develop positive programs to satisfy those needs. Perhaps a free tuition policy to encourage specialized advanced academic training could also be instituted.

Performance Evaluation: During the course of our study, we were unable to ascertain whether or not custodial personnel performance was evaluated periodically. Our inability stemmed from vague and uncertain responses to our inquiries. If any effort is being made to make such appraisals on a planned schedule, it falls far short of the objective purpose of an effective personnel



management practice. Without elaborating on the necessity for such an evaluation policy, we submit that an objective employee performance evaluation system, if properly administered, is a valuable basic tool for the successful conduct of employee selection, advancement, and training. We urge that careful consideration be given to the development and implementation of an effective performance evaluation system.

Employee Relations: Morale of the custodial staff at Stillwater is poor; at St. Cloud, fair; at Shakopee, fairly good. The underlying reasons given for these relative situations were: frequent changes in management staff and policies, poor communications, unwarranted judicial interference in disciplinary matters, and failure of the management to back up on-line employees in their management of inmates. Whether or not these reasons are justified is not as important as their existence. We did not exhaustively sample custodial personnel to obtain statistically reliable conclusions. We hesitate to elaborate further upon these observations except to recommend again that it would be wise for the Department to make a careful, professional examination into employee morale at all the institutions. Based upon its findings, we recommend an effective employee-management relations program be developed.

Stability of Custodial Forces: One of the most critical conditions adversely affecting the attainment and maintenance of a competent custodial program is high absentee and turnover rates. A contributing factor to the multiple breaks at Stillwater on July 8 and 9, was a severe staff shortage on both those dates. While we have not been furnished data on general personnel absentee rates at the institutions, the following table reveals quit rates for correctional officers and counselors:

	<u>Quit Rates</u>	
	<u>Correctional Officers</u>	<u>Correctional Officers and Correctional Counselors I &amp; II</u>
	<u>1971</u>	<u>January-June 1972</u>
Stillwater	10.43%	12.1%
St. Cloud	7.4%	11.6%
Shakopee	15.0%	22.4%

(Explanatory notes on following page.)

Note: Shakopee's rate should be considered in light of its small staff (20).

Note: January-June 1972 rates for Correctional Counselors II are:

Stillwater	-	7.0%
St. Cloud	-	10.0%
Shakopee	-	9.0%

These rates are excessive; they can be brought into reasonable proportion through better personnel management methods. We were disappointed to learn that no exit interviews are conducted nor objective analyses made of these quit rate data to determine reasons for employee resignations. We recommend that aggressive action should be started immediately to stabilize the high degree of staff terminations.

#### SUMMARY OF THE PERSONNEL SITUATION

While there is some progressive, positive management action being taken to modernize the Department's institutional personnel programs, much more can and should be done. Until a modern, positive, comprehensive personnel program is developed and implemented, the effectiveness of the custodial forces at the institutions will be retarded. If the esprit de corps of custodial personnel can be elevated to and maintained at a high level, it will contribute substantially to an atmosphere conducive to more responsiveness, better cooperation, and less restiveness on the part of the inmates. It is hoped that their custodial management will become less difficult and hazardous, perhaps even reducing escape motivation. We strongly recommend the development and implementation of a comprehensive, professional personnel program for each institution.

#### QUALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

There are good to excellent communications between the staffs of the institutions and state and local law enforcement officers. Such communications at Shakopee are excellent. At St. Cloud, they are very good. At Stillwater, they are greatly improved from the communications breakdown after the multiple escapes in July. Nothing further need be done at this time in this area.



## INSPECTIONS

The local administrators of the institutions possess a rather high degree of autonomy -- of delegated authority and responsibility. We approve of this. However, we recommend that two actions be taken by the Department to strengthen local administration. First, we reiterate that there is a serious need for updated statements of Department guidelines regarding outside group visitors. Second, the Department should establish an inspection system, preferably on an unscheduled basis, for the periodic, comprehensive appraisal of conditions and the effectiveness of the management at each institution. The conscientious pursuit of such a policy will be invaluable in the maintenance and timely adjustment of policies and procedures required for the successful operation of a complex corrections system.

## RESOURCES REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT PRISON REFORM

With the exception of the possible addition of several male custodians to the Shakopee staff, we find no current need for further custodial funds. Virtually all recommended structural alterations and installation and improvements in the electronic surveillance and communications systems are being met from current resources or are included in current budget estimates. Virtually all of the other corrective actions we have discussed and proposed can be effected through organizational and staff adjustments without additional funding. The most significant potential budgetary item is the funding of the proposed modification in the retirement system to provide for early and other retirement benefits for certain custodial personnel. We are informed that the preliminary estimates of the immediate cost of this revision will be about \$4 million. We believe this figure to be modest in comparison to the expected consequences of such a modified system, i.e., a physically, intellectually, and emotionally competent correctional force competent to meet demands for humane, rehabilitative, yet secure, management of our penal institutions.

## MISCELLANEOUS TASK FORCE RELATED OBSERVATIONS

The following areas are not immediately and directly related to institutional custodial security. Their examination was not a specific part of our charge from



Governor Anderson; we have not, therefore, made an in-depth study of them. However, we do believe that they are at least tangentially related to custody problems. Hence, we express the following observations:

The Parole System: While the administration of the parole system is intended to function quite independently from the corrections system, nonetheless it is often viewed as a part of corrections. We, like many of our fellow citizens, strongly feel that a critical study into all aspects of the parole system is a compelling and timely need. Further erosion of public confidence in the administration of the total corrections system must be stemmed. Therefore, it is urged that a competent investigative body be created and empowered to conduct the proposed comprehensive study and, at the conclusion thereof, submit its recommendations.

Closing of St. Cloud Reformatory: We submit that whether either of our male penal institutions is to be closed -- or the function of either is to be drastically altered -- is a policy decision to be made at the legislative rather than the administrative level. We are aware of complex problems concerning the: (1) relative quality and location of the institutions, (2) mixing of inmate populations (involving both age and character), and (3) possible inaccuracy of inmate population projections. We recommend that the two male penal institutions remain open, with the option reserved as to which is to be utilized for maximum, and which for minimum, security.