

Report prepared for  
The State of Minnesota  
by

**miller dunwiddie**  
ARCHITECTURE

State Project G02RC02VA004  
MDA Project MIN1302

## MINNESOTA STATE CAPITOL COMPLEX – PHYSICAL SECURITY STUDY

# FINAL REPORT

25 JUNE 2014

**PUBLIC**





## INDEX

### **1. PROJECT SUMMARY**

- 1) Security Information Determination
- 2) Project Scope
- 3) Security Design Approach
- 4) Next Steps
- 5) Table of Buildings, Glossary of Terms, and Map
- 6) Summary of Project Scope Costs

### **2. PROJECT BACKGROUND**

- 1) Project Approach
- 2) Previous Studies
- 3) Precedent Studies
- 4) Project Participants
- 5) Consultant Team

### **3. PROJECT REVIEW REQUIREMENTS**

- 1) Multiple Agencies Having Jurisdiction

### **4. PROJECT DELIVERY**

- 1) Procurement Recommendations

( This page is intentionally left blank )

## 1. PROJECT SUMMARY



## 1. SECURITY INFORMATION DETERMINATION



### **Security Information Determination Minnesota State Capitol Complex – Physical Security Study, Final Report**

Under Minnesota Statutes 13.64, Subdivision 2, certain data maintained by the Department of Administration are not public, specifically "Security features of building plans, building specifications and building drawings of state-owned facilities and non-state-owned facilities leased by the state..."

In addition to the data already classified as not public under that section, I have determined that data related the conditions and vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure the Minnesota State Capitol Complex are "security information" within the meaning of Minnesota Statute 13.37, Subdivision 1(a). Disclosure of the Data "would be likely to substantially jeopardize the security of information, possessions, individuals or property against theft, tampering, improper use, illegal disclosure, trespass, physical injury, or destruction.

The information included in sections 5 and 6 of this report provide specific information on the vulnerabilities of the Capitol Complex buildings and infrastructure. Access to this information would allow individuals or groups (including terrorists and common criminals) to use this data to harm or interfere with Capitol Complex buildings, which could compromise State property, operations, workers, visitors, and/or the health, safety and/or well-being of private citizens relying on the State services provided from those buildings.

It is my determination that the information in sections 5 and 6 of this report be classified as nonpublic security information data under Minnesota Statutes 13.37, Subdivision 1(a).



---

Spencer Cronk, Commissioner

6.18.14

---

Date

## 2. PROJECT SCOPE

This Report is an assessment of the physical security of the building exteriors and public lobby entries at fifteen (15) structures and the connecting pedestrian tunnel system at the Minnesota Capitol Complex. This report identifies building and infrastructure vulnerabilities / physical threats at these locations and includes a narrative that describes a recommended mitigation improvement that responds to each threat, with a budget estimate of cost. All vulnerabilities / physical threats with mitigations are then combined into a prioritized list of proposed future projects.

This report does not include the State Capitol building, as its security assessment is being completed as part of the Capitol Restoration project. The evaluation of the 15 buildings and tunnel in this report are based on their use and occupants as of the winter of 2013, and does not include those tenants who will be relocated during the Capitol Restoration project.

This report specifically addresses the issues of intentional injuries and crime against state resources and their occupants. This report excludes the assessment of security staff or operations, safety-related accidents, weather events, and unintentional injuries.

## 3. SECURITY DESIGN APPROACH

The successful development of secure and safe buildings (minimized danger or risk of harm) continues to be the goal for the State of Minnesota Departments of Administration and Public Safety. Achieving this goal is a challenge due to funding limitations, resistance from the occupants due to impacts on operations, productivity and accessibility, and the impacts on the Capitol environment. Perimeter security, target hardening, and standoff requirements can contribute to a less-than-friendly environment if not carefully planned. Understanding the impact site security has on the overall security of each building is important. A balance between the security and safety goals and the operational objectives and needs of each facility can be attained.

The establishment of an integrated design process where all of the design team members understand each other's goals can aid in overcoming these challenges and will continue to lead to the development of solutions that address all of the State's requirements today and in the future. Understanding the interrelationship with the other design objectives (i.e. sustainability, aesthetics, cost-effectiveness, historic preservation, accessibility, etc.) early in the review process is an essential step in overcoming the obstacles commonly encountered in the achievement of secure and safe buildings.

Designing buildings for security and safety requires a continuing proactive approach that anticipates and then protects the building occupants, resources, structure, and continuity of operations from multiple hazards.

The first step in this process is to understand the various risks they pose. The chart that follows identifies, in general terms, those risks that occur to one degree or another around the Capitol complex. There are times when design requirements addressing all the various threats will pose conflicts when arriving at acceptable design and construction solutions. Examples include blast resistive glazing, which may impede emergency egress in case of fire; access control measures that prevent intrusion that may restrict emergency egress; and Buildings Benchmarks and Beyond (B3) light pollution reductions that may compromise security lighting objectives. Conversely, site design and security can complement each other such as the design of a storm water management requirement that doubles as a vehicle barrier.

Good communication between the assessment team and many varied State employees and staff was key through the entire process to achieve the common goal of planning for safe and secure State buildings and facilities.

Most security measures involve a balance of operational, technical, and physical safety methods. For example, to protect the State Office Building from unwanted intruders, a primarily operational approach might stress the deployment of additional security officers around the clock; a primarily technical approach might stress camera surveillance and detection technology; while a primarily physical approach would stress locked doorways and vehicle barriers at building perimeters. In practice, a combination of approaches is necessary to some degree and a deficiency in one area may be compensated by a greater emphasis in the other two. The work of this project did not include operational assessments in greater detail than needed to understand how things actually work at each facility.

#### 4. NEXT STEPS

This report is an initial step toward the State's goal to develop a secure and safe Capitol Complex. The identified threats, mitigations and costs can be further refined by stakeholders to develop various project scopes, budgets and funding sources.

This document needs to be reviewed annually by these stakeholders to accommodate changes in building occupants, operations within buildings, and changes in potential threats and vulnerabilities. Even if no changes are necessary or recommended annually, such comments should be dated and included as an attachment. Of course, if threat conditions change dramatically during any calendar year, they must be addressed immediately and cited for record.



## 5. TABLE OF BUILDINGS, GLOSSARY OF TERMS, AND MAP

Security Risk level	
	Building Name
H	Administration Building
H	Ag/Health Lab Building
H	Capitol Loading Dock Building
H	Centennial Building
H	Judicial Center Building
H	Stassen Building
H	State Office Building
H	Tunnels
H	Veterans Services Building
M	Andersen Building
M	Freeman Building
M	MN History Center
M	MN History Center Loading Dock
M	Transportation Building
L	PMD Shops Building
L	Retirement Systems Building

### SECURITY RISK LEVELS

Risk is defined as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. The process is described in Section 2.1.

**H = High:** These Risks may result in high loss of life and costly or irreplaceable physical assets; they could significantly violate, harm, or impede operations. Controls that prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective.

**M = Medium:** These risks may result in a loss of human and physical assets; they could harm or impede operations but are less likely to cause injury or death. Controls are in place that may impede a successful exercise of the vulnerability.

**L = Low:** These risks may result in the loss of some assets or may noticeably affect operations but to a lesser degree. Controls are in place to prevent or significantly impede the vulnerability from being exercised.

### CRITERIA FOR RISK DETERMINATION

Three primary factors were considered in determining the Security Risk Level and Priorities assigned to each building.

The first criterion was observed vulnerability of the physical building with respect to potential threat sources, such as adjacent public parking or unsecured public entrances.

The second criterion was criticality, based on the level of disruption to the State's ability to function if the operations of that building were compromised.

The third criterion was based on past level of threats/incidents identified during interviews with the Security Staff at each building, which provided an understanding of the types and frequencies of threats received by, or actual incidents at each location. Those buildings that had received more threats/incidents were identified as being High Risk. It must be clearly understood that this exercise is highly subjective and was defined by extensive discussions with consultants and state staff. The combined experience of these groups led to this order of ranking.

## **GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

Exclusive Standoff: As determined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); vehicles that are authorized to enter these areas should be limited to select personnel, maintenance, delivery, and/or disabled parking. This area has a controlled perimeter limiting access with entry control point(s) that are either staffed, and/or automated via access cards. If a controlled perimeter is in place, you can allow vehicles to park as close to a facility as **82 feet**.

Non-Exclusive Standoff: As determined by the U.S. DHS; the non-exclusive standoff zone is used for general employee or public parking. If possible, measures should be used to minimize the number and size of vehicles that can park inside the non-exclusive zone. When a controlled perimeter is not in place, then vehicles must park at a minimum of **148 feet** from a facility.

Trash Receptacle / Vegetation: Trash containers and vegetation located near the Capitol Complex buildings allow an adversary to place man portable improvised explosive devices that cannot be easily detected by security forces or employees. The U.S. DHS has determined that establishing a clear zone of **33 feet** around a structure provides a minimum level of protection from these man portable explosive devices.

Vulnerability: A physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. An example is the installation of vehicle barriers to remove a vulnerability related to attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

## MINNESOTA STATE CAPITOL COMPLEX - SITE PLAN



## 6. SUMMARY OF PROJECT SCOPE COSTS

See the following page for summary of project scope costs.

Summary of Project Scope Costs In April 2014 Dollars

Risk Based Breakdown

Risk Level	Building Name	Priority 1 Scope Recommendations			Priority 2 Scope Recommendations			Priority 3 Scope Recommendations			TOTALS
		Construction Costs	Soft Costs	Total	Construction Costs	Soft Costs	Total	Construction Costs	Soft Costs	Total	
H	Administration Building	\$748,911	\$224,673	\$973,584	\$28,035	\$8,411	\$36,446	\$1,680	\$504	\$2,184	\$1,012,213
H	Ag/Health Laboratory Building	\$813,082	\$243,925	\$1,057,007	\$7,140	\$1,911	\$8,281	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$1,068,564
H	Capitol Loading Dock Building	\$10,290	\$3,087	\$13,377	\$18,480	\$5,313	\$23,023	\$2,100	\$630	\$2,730	\$39,130
H	Centennial Office Building	\$876,399	\$262,731	\$1,138,500	\$6,300	\$1,659	\$7,189	\$840	\$252	\$1,092	\$1,146,781
H	Judicial Center Building	\$936,543	\$280,963	\$1,217,506	\$40,110	\$12,033	\$52,143	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$1,272,925
H	Stassen Building	\$2,221,496	\$666,449	\$2,887,945	\$6,300	\$1,890	\$8,190	\$1,680	\$504	\$2,184	\$2,898,319
H	State Office Building	\$1,430,567	\$429,170	\$1,859,737	\$49,140	\$14,742	\$63,882	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$1,926,895
H	Tunnels	\$2,330,408	\$699,122	\$3,029,530	\$141,120	\$42,336	\$183,456	\$13,440	\$4,032	\$17,472	\$3,230,458
H	Veterans Services Building	\$1,099,169	\$329,751	\$1,428,920	\$42,945	\$12,884	\$55,829	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$1,488,025
	High Risk Building Totals	\$10,466,866	\$3,139,871	\$13,606,107	\$339,570	\$101,178	\$438,438	\$29,820	\$8,946	\$38,766	\$14,083,311
M	Andersen Building	\$1,040,445	\$312,134	\$1,352,579	\$4,500	\$1,350	\$5,850	\$23,100	\$6,930	\$30,030	\$1,388,459
M	Freeman Building	\$1,065,750	\$319,725	\$1,385,475	\$3,870	\$1,161	\$5,031	\$23,520	\$7,056	\$30,576	\$1,421,082
M	Minnesota History Center	\$1,101,797	\$330,539	\$1,432,335	\$4,620	\$1,386	\$6,006	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$1,441,617
M	History Center Loading Dock	\$120,280	\$36,084	\$156,363	\$900	\$270	\$1,170	\$2,280	\$684	\$2,964	\$160,497
M	Transportation Building	\$1,655,785	\$496,735	\$2,152,520	\$5,145	\$1,544	\$6,689	\$1,680	\$504	\$2,184	\$2,161,393
	Medium Risk Building Totals	\$4,984,056	\$1,495,217	\$6,479,273	\$19,035	\$5,711	\$24,746	\$53,100	\$15,930	\$69,030	\$6,573,048
L	PMD Shops & Power Plant Building	\$187,772	\$56,331	\$244,103	\$17,850	\$5,355	\$23,205	\$2,520	\$756	\$3,276	\$270,584
L	Retirement Services Building	\$1,185,341	\$355,602	\$1,540,943	\$5,250	\$1,575	\$6,825	\$22,260	\$6,678	\$28,938	\$1,576,706
	Low Risk Building Totals	\$1,373,112	\$411,934	\$1,785,046	\$23,100	\$6,930	\$30,030	\$24,780	\$7,434	\$32,214	\$1,847,290
	TOTALS	\$16,824,034	\$5,047,021	\$21,870,425	\$381,705	\$113,819	\$493,214	\$107,700	\$32,310	\$140,010	\$22,503,649

Priority 1 Potential Project Breakdowns

Risk Level	Building Name	Control Site Access		Lobby Protection		Control Site Parking		Loading Dock Protection		Glass Protection		Vent / Utility Protection		Office Suite Protection		TOTALS
		Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	Scopes	Total	
H	Administration Building	0.01, 0.02	\$274,248	0.03	\$77,805	0.04	\$273,890	N/A	\$0	0.07	\$140,704	.08, .09	\$28,256	0.06	\$178,681	\$973,584
H	Ag/Health Laboratory Building	0.01	\$222,965	NA	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.02	\$828,009	0.03	\$6,033	N/A	\$0	\$1,057,007
H	Capitol Loading Dock Building	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.01	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.03	\$13,377	N/A	\$0	\$13,377
H	Centennial Office Building	0.01	\$248,004	0.02	\$106,470	0.03	\$126,792	0.04	\$87,633	0.07	\$197,789	.08, .09	\$18,755	0.06	\$353,057	\$1,138,500
H	Judicial Center Building	0.01	\$122,850	0.02	\$243,789	0.03	\$126,792	0.04	\$164,466	0.07	\$201,638	0.08	\$4,914	0.06	\$353,057	\$1,217,506
H	Stassen Building	0.01	\$1,031,550	0.02	\$195,195	0.03	\$126,792	0.04	\$145,509	0.05	\$1,366,747	.06, .07, .08	\$22,152	N/A	\$0	\$2,887,945
H	State Office Building	0.01	\$1,105,650	0.02	\$53,235	N/A	\$0	0.03	\$138,608	0.06	\$63,882	.07, .08, .09	\$47,814	0.05	\$450,548	\$1,859,737
H	Tunnels	0.01	\$308,949	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	.02, .03	\$2,720,582	N/A	\$0	\$3,029,530
H	Veterans Services Building	0.01	\$574,392	0.02	\$155,610	0.03	\$126,792	0.04	\$164,466	0.07	\$186,732	.08, .09	\$28,938	0.06	\$191,990	\$1,428,920
	High Risk Buildings Totals		\$3,888,607		\$832,104		\$781,058		\$700,682		\$2,985,501		\$2,890,820		\$1,527,334	\$13,606,107
M	Andersen Building	0.01	\$663,390	N/A	\$0	0.02	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.03	\$689,189	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	\$1,352,579
M	Freeman Building	0.01	\$122,850	0.02	\$54,600	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.03	\$1,194,921	.04, .05	\$13,104	N/A	\$0	\$1,385,475
M	Minnesota History Center	.01, .02	\$688,370	N/A	\$0	0.03	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.04	\$401,146	0.06	\$0	0.05	\$342,820	\$1,432,335
M	History Center Loading Dock	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.01	\$126,792	N/A	\$0	.04, .05	\$29,571	N/A	\$0	\$156,363
M	Transportation Building	0.01	\$1,130,220	0.02	\$139,230	0.03	\$166,230	0.04	\$125,280	0.07	\$207,698	.08, .09, .10	\$30,805	0.06	\$353,057	\$2,152,520
	Medium Risk Building Totals		\$2,604,830		\$193,830		\$166,230		\$252,072		\$2,492,954		\$73,481		\$695,877	\$6,479,273
L	PMD Shops & Power Plant Building	0.01	\$55,345	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	N/A	\$0	0.05	\$23,342	0.03	\$165,416	\$244,103
L	Retirement Services Building	0.01	\$614,250	0.02	\$53,235	0.03	\$141,884	0.04	\$190,800	0.06	\$314,496	.07, .08	\$47,598	0.05	\$178,681	\$1,540,943
	Low Risk Building Totals		\$669,595		\$53,235		\$141,884		\$190,800		\$314,496		\$70,939		\$344,097	\$1,785,046
	TOTALS		\$7,163,032		\$1,079,169		\$1,089,172		\$1,143,553		\$5,792,951		\$3,035,240		\$2,567,308	\$21,870,425



## 2. PROJECT BACKGROUND

## 1. PROJECT APPROACH

The consultant team began the Capitol Complex Physical Security Assessment project by meeting with members of the Plant Management, Capitol Security, and Real Estate and Construction Services Divisions to identify and gather existing available information related to site and building drawings, as well as in-place security systems. This meeting was also an opportunity for the team to discuss and confirm with State representatives the various types and levels of security threats and potential concerns/vulnerabilities that should be anticipated by this assessment. Documents with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - Exempt (High 2) Information - Restricted Distribution were forwarded electronically to the team's Security Planning Consultant. These files will be returned at the end of the project.

The consultant team then completed visual and photographic assessments at the exteriors and public lobbies for each of the fifteen buildings and connecting tunnels to identify/document specific potential physical security threats. The findings of these assessments were then reviewed and discussed with the representatives from the Capitol Security, Plant Management, and Real Estate and Construction Services to ensure consensus among State staff and officials and the consultant team.

The Security and Architectural Representatives of the consultant team conducted individual interviews with each of fifteen building's security team representatives to discuss their concerns and desires related to physical security at their facilities. Draft minutes of these interviews were prepared and forwarded to the interviewees for their verification. Those verified meeting minutes are included in Appendix A1 of this document, but are classified as nonpublic security information data under Minnesota Statutes 13.37, Subdivision 1(a). The findings from these interviews were discussed with representatives from the Capitol Security, Plant Management, and Real Estate and Construction Services.

The consultant team began to develop preliminary design concepts of appropriate security improvements for each building. Initial prioritized list of phased future improvements were also developed and reviewed with the State. Preliminary construction cost estimates were then prepared for the individual security improvements.

The consultant team assembled a draft report document that included the security improvements, and prioritized list of phased individual security improvement projects with costs for the entire Capitol Complex. This draft document was distributed to Capitol Security, Plant Management, and Real Estate and Construction Services for review.

The consultant team presented security improvements, costs and list of priorities for identified security improvements, and facilitated discussions to gain consensus among the State staff on developing a preliminary comprehensive prioritized approach to phased security improvements for the Capitol Complex. The consultant team completed a Final Draft of our Security Assessment Report, based on direction provided by the Department of Administration and Department of Public Safety, and distributed the Final Draft of the report for final comments.

## 2. PREVIOUS STUDIES

During the initial meeting with the State, two primary documents were cited as recent Security Studies for the Capitol Complex:

1. The 2006/2007 Minnesota National Guard Assessments of individual buildings in the Capitol Complex (A document protected under the Freedom of Information Act)
2. The May 2009 Office of the Legislative Auditor Evaluation Report – Complex Security.

The National Guard completed individual assessments for twelve (12) of the buildings in this report; none were completed for the Capitol Loading Dock, Retirement Systems or Veterans Services. These assessments identified physical vulnerabilities as well as a lack of planning and response plans and procedures.

The Legislative Auditor's Evaluation Report identified a general need to provide Capitol Complex buildings with improved physical protection, but more so identified needs related to staff levels, training, and procedures. Their analysis noted that recurring recommendations of past reports focused on two topics: "Several past reports recommended that Minnesota Capitol Security officers have police training and authority" and "Prior reports recommended the establishment of organizational structures that could ensure ongoing attention to Capitol Complex security needs." This second report also identified that "Over the past 40 years, several committees and task forces have discussed how to improve security in the Capitol Complex. We reviewed reports issued in 1972, 1973, 1982, 1990, and 2000."

### PRECEDENT STUDIES

To determine if other States were conducting similar studies of their Capitol Complex, Plant Management Division contacted the National Association of State Administrators (NASFA) and requested that other state members respond to the following three questions:

1. Has your State conducted Security studies on your Capitol Building and or Capitol Complex/ Campus?
2. If so, was it for physical, operational or cyber security?
3. Also, when was it completed?

Ten (10) States responded, and their answers to the questions are summarized as follows:

1. All 10 had completed security studies, some multiple times since 2010.
2. All did include physical security, some also included operational and cyber security.
3. Many studies were completed around 2010, with the newest completed this year and the oldest in 2001.

The states that responded were: CT, FL, ID, IL, KY, MI, NM, TN, VT & WV. They did not reveal any details of their efforts.

## 4. REPORT PARTICIPANTS

The stakeholders involved in this report were as follows:

Department of Administration, Real Estate and Construction Services (RECS)

Paul Gannon

Department of Administration, Plant Management Division (PMD)

Chris Guevin	Gordy Specht
Jerry Larson	Scott Miron

Department of Public Safety, Capitol Security Division (CAPSEC)

Bob Meyerson	Rochelle Schrofer
Don Marose	Adam Flynn

Consultant Team

Miller Dunwiddie Architecture – John Mecum  
James L. Johnson Associates Security Planning – Jim Johnson  
LKPB Mechanical and Electrical Engineering – Allen Theisen and Victor Powell  
Damon Farber Associates Landscape Architecture – Tom Whitlock

## 5. CONSULTANT TEAM BACKGROUND

The consultant team was led by Miller Dunwiddie Architecture (MDA), a Minnesota firm that has worked in the design of public buildings for the State of Minnesota and institutions of higher education. MDA has worked continuously for 50 years at commercial airports creating design solutions that address campus wide and individual building exterior and interior security. MDA worked closely with the Airport Police, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Security for the design of T2 - Humphrey Terminal campus at the Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport. MDA has continued working at T2 and is just completing the upgrading the existing security check point and adding a second security checkpoint. MDA is currently working on, or recently completed, designs for security improvements at airports in Cedar Rapids, IA, Sioux Falls, SD, and Bemidji, MN.

James Johnson, President of James L. Johnson and Associates, served as the consultant team's Security Planning Consultant. Mr. Johnson had over 14 years of professional law enforcement experience prior to starting his security business. His law enforcement assignments were varied from patrol to administration. Jim had completed many specialized programs at nationally recognized institutions including graduation from the 134th session of the FBI National Academy. Representative projects include:

- **US Army Corps of Engineers** – Adelphi (MD) Laboratory Center: Identified vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure at high-tech warfare research center.
- **Cargill Corporation:** Perform assessment and overall security for headquarters and facilities including executive office building, buildings and grounds, overall control of access for extensive corporate campus and air operations at MSP airport.
- **St. Paul Regional Water Service:** Perform ongoing security review and updates to all security systems for this critical utility.
- **Securian Financial Group:** Perform penetration testing of key access points for corporate headquarters.

### 3. PROJECT REVIEW REQUIREMENTS



## 1. MULTIPLE AGENCIES HAVING JURISDICTION

### **A. BUILDING CODE PLAN REVIEW**

The Capitol Complex of buildings will require review and permitting from the City of St Paul Code Review.

### **B. ST PAUL HERITAGE PRESERVATION COMMISSION (HPC)**

Since the buildings do require a City of St Paul permit all buildings will be reviewed by the St Paul Heritage Preservation Commission Staff or the Commission.

### **C. STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE (SHPO)**

The SHPO has authority to review work at all buildings on the Capitol Complex as mandated by State Statute 138. When a project has been determined and begins design, a letter of intent should be filed with the state compliance office so that a file for the project can be opened. Once a file has been opened the project design documents should be distributed for review at 30% - 60% and 90% completion. The timeline for this review should be discussed early with SHPO as some reviews can take up to 60 days and may impact design or construction schedules.

### **D. CAPITOL AREA ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING BOARD (CAAP BOARD)**

The CAAP Board will review work for all work on the buildings. They have zoning approval within the State Capitol Complex of buildings. The City will not issue a permit without confirming plans meet approval of the CAAP Board.

## 4. PROJECT DELIVERY

## 1. PROJECT DELIVERY

### A. PROCUREMENT

It is recommended that this project be procured utilizing a Construction Manager at Risk (CM@R), based on the following:

- Limited staging areas on multiple sites will require significant preplanning during the design process to maintain security and minimize disruption to the operations of the offices during the phased construction.
- Phased construction will require communication early on with user groups to understand construction method.

### B. MEANS AND METHODS

It is anticipated that all buildings will remain occupied throughout these projects, unless improvements can be incorporated into individual building renovations, such as the State Office Building. The CM@R will need to develop explicit schedules for coordinating the construction in these occupied buildings.

( This page is intentionally left blank )

