



# Opposition to Minnesota 340B legislation



# The Cost of the 340B Program Part 1: Self-Insured Employers

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## Key Points

**Importance:** The 340B program is sometimes described as something that does not cost taxpayers anything. Given its rapid evolution in terms of legislative changes, changes in pharmaceutical industry practice, and judicial decisions, it is important to understand its true cost.

**Objective:** This IQVIA study estimated the cost of the 340B program to self-insured employers. These entities employed 103.4M non-elderly individuals in the U.S. in 2021.

**Design:** IQVIA built a financial model to quantify the financial impact of the 340B program on healthcare costs. The model included 340B eligibility, manufacturer


rebates, and lost rebates due to product purchased through the program.

**Data sources:** IQVIA estimated model parameters using national samples of consumers, payers, products, and providers.

**Results:** The model estimated drug costs for self-insured employers and their workers are 4.2% higher than they otherwise would have been if the program did not exist due to lost rebates. This corresponds to an annual increase of \$5.2B in healthcare costs for self-insured employers and their workers.

**Conclusions:** In light of these findings, the narrative that “the 340B program costs taxpayers nothing” should be reconsidered. If the same rebate dynamic is true for Medicare and Medicaid, the 340B program may also be increasing costs for state and federal programs.

Employers and workers pay more for drugs when 340B is used, but hospitals profit. A self-administered drug costing \$100 at WAC is purchased without the 340B program (left-hand side) and using the 340B program (right-hand side).



# BY THE NUMBERS: 340B IS DRIVING UP HEALTH CARE COSTS

The 340B Drug Pricing Program was designed to help vulnerable patients access medications at safety-net facilities. Since the program was created in 1992, manufacturers have provided tens of billions of dollars each year in steep discounts on outpatient medicines to safety-net clinics and qualifying hospitals expecting those entities would use the savings to ensure vulnerable patients have access to needed medicines. But the [340B program has strayed](#) far from its safety-net purpose. Instead, it creates incentives that drive up health care costs and it boosts the bottom lines of hospitals and for-profit pharmacies instead of helping patients.

## Here's a look at how 340B is driving up patient costs, by the numbers:



The prescribing practices of 340B hospitals are driving up costs for patients, payers and the health care system as a whole.

**7X**

340B hospitals [collect 7 times as much](#) as independent physician offices for the sale of medicines administered to commercially insured patients.

**150%**

The average cost of an outpatient medicine administered at a 340B hospital was more than [150% higher](#) than the average cost of an outpatient drug administered at a non-340B hospital.

**\$5.2B**

340B [increases medicine costs for self-insured employers](#) by 4.2%, relative to if the program didn't exist. This translates into annual increased health care costs of \$5.2 billion.

There is little evidence that the 340B program is improving health care access for patients most in need.

**65%**

An analysis found 65% of 340B disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) [provide less charity care](#) than the national average for all hospitals.

**1.4%**

An analysis of contract pharmacy claims for brand medicines only found evidence that patients were directly receiving a discount for [1.4% of prescriptions eligible for 340B](#).

**38%**

Multiple studies confirm that [the expansion of 340B entities tends to be in less diverse, higher income neighborhoods](#) – not in areas with high unmet medical needs. Just 38% of 340B DSH hospitals are in medically underserved areas.




For-profit companies and large consolidated hospital systems benefit more from 340B than patients.

**50%+**

[More than half](#) of the top 20 companies on the Fortune 500 generate profit from 340B.

**37%**

340B nonprofit hospitals' average profitability was estimated to be [37% higher than the average across all hospitals](#).



After factoring in the steep 340B manufacturer discounts, the net price 340B hospitals pay for medicines can be as low as one penny. The problem? The difference between the gross price and net price is kept by hospitals and others in the supply chain. We need to fix 340B so it helps more patients as it was originally intended.

# How the 340B Program Became a PBM Giveaway

In 1992, the federal 340B drug pricing program was created for certain safety-net hospitals and clinics (like community health centers) to help low-income and otherwise vulnerable patients more affordably access medicines. Flash forward to today, and you'll find pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) have found a way to siphon money out of the program for their own financial benefit.

The 340B program works by letting hospitals and clinics buy outpatient medicines at a reduced price. Hospitals often still charge patients and insurers based off an undiscounted price of medicines though - meaning they are reimbursed at a higher price than they paid for the medicine. **Hospitals pocket as profit the difference between the amount they are reimbursed and the discounted 340B price they paid.**

While pharmacies were not mentioned in the law, today they are also profiting from the program by contracting with 340B hospitals and clinics. **These contract pharmacies leverage their arrangements within the 340B program to boost their own bottom lines because they share in any profit hospitals generate from 340B medicines.** These contract pharmacies have even been known to **charge uninsured patients the full cost** of a medicine even if the hospital bought it for the contract pharmacy at a 340B discount.

Today, **large pharmacy corporations have flooded the program.** Currently, over 33,000 distinct pharmacies participate in the 340B program. More than half of all 340B profits retained by contract pharmacies are **concentrated in four companies**: Walgreens, Walmart, CVS and Accredo.

**That's where PBMs come in.** Because of vertical integration in the supply chain, PBMs now own the vast majority of pharmacies, meaning they also make a profit from contract pharmacy arrangements.

- Today, 46% of contract pharmacy arrangements are between 340B covered entities (hospitals and clinics) and pharmacies affiliated with one of the three largest PBMs (ESI, Optum, Caremark).
- The big three PBM-owned specialty pharmacies account for 26% of contract pharmacy arrangements.
- Nearly half of the top 25 companies on the Fortune 50 today generate profit from 340B.

**Policymakers should be asking themselves: How did a program meant for safety-net hospitals and clinics become a PBM giveaway?**

Comprehensive fixes are needed to make the 340B program work better for patients, and that includes policies that prevent for-profit corporations like PBMs from profiting off the program. Read more about our proposed changes [here](#).

Learn more at [PhRMA.org/340B](https://PhRMA.org/340B)

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


# 340B Contract Pharmacy Participation Has Increased Dramatically



The number of contract pharmacy arrangements has grown by more than 5,000% since the 2010 guidance. Currently, more than 30,000 distinct pharmacies participate in the 340B program, and each one may have arrangements with multiple entities.

## 340B Hospital Contract Pharmacies and Pharmacy Arrangements\*



\*A contract pharmacy may have multiple contracts with multiple 340B hospitals.

Learn more at [PhRMA.org/340B](https://PhRMA.org/340B)

BRG analysis of HRSA OPA registrations. <https://340bopais.hrsa.gov/ContractPharmacySearch>

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# Contract Pharmacies Have Growing Financial Stake in 340B

There is no clear evidence 340B discounts are helping patients access medicines.

## Massive Profit Margins

Non-340B medicines dispensed through independent pharmacies

22%

72%

340B medicines dispensed through contract pharmacies

Berkeley Research Group, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program," October 2020.

## Concentrated Corporate Profits


>50%



More than half of 340B profits retained by contract pharmacies are **concentrated in four pharmacy companies**

Berkeley Research Group, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program," October 2020.

## PBM-Owned Pharmacies Wield Negotiating Power



40% of arrangements are between 340B entities and pharmacies **associated with one of the three largest PBMs**

Drug Channels analysis of HRSA Office of Pharmacy Affairs daily contract pharmacy database. Published April 2022.

Learn more at [PhRMA.org/340B](https://PhRMA.org/340B)

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# A Closer Look at 340B in Your Community

The 340B Drug Pricing Program was designed to help vulnerable patients access medications they might not be able to afford. To achieve this, manufacturers provide tens of billions of dollars each year in steep discounts on outpatient medicines to safety-net clinics and qualifying hospitals. The expectation is that those entities would use those savings to ensure vulnerable patients' access to medicines.

**But the 340B program is broken.** Today, it has become less about patients and more about boosting the bottom lines of hospitals and for-profit pharmacies, which are mostly owned by middlemen, known as pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).

## Here's what the program looks like across the country and in **Minnesota**.



### Fast Facts: 340B Nationwide


- 57% of all hospitals in the United States participate in the 340B program.
- Discounted 340B purchases reached nearly \$54 billion in 2022 nationwide – 23% higher than in 2021.
- The number of contract pharmacies has grown nationwide by more than 8,000% since 2010.
- 46% of contract pharmacy arrangements are with pharmacies associated with one of the three largest PBMs.



### Fast Facts: 340B in Minnesota

- 113 hospitals in Minnesota are part of the 340B program.
- 2,173 contracts between Minnesota 340B hospitals and pharmacies nationwide.
- Only 35% of contract pharmacies are located in medically underserved areas.
- 81% of 340B hospitals in Minnesota are *below* the national average for charity care levels.

## Locations of 340B Contract Pharmacies – and Middleman Involvement – in **Minnesota**, 2023



Did you know that Minnesota 340B hospitals have nearly 1,200 contracts with pharmacies outside the state? Because of vertical integration in the supply chain, for-profit middlemen like PBMs and chain pharmacies also now make a profit from this safety-net program.

## Are Minnesota's 340B hospitals providing adequate **charitable care**?

- Charitable care is the free or reduced-cost care provided to qualifying patients.
- Unfortunately, 77% of nonprofit hospitals nationwide spent less on charity care than they gained from tax breaks.
- The top performing 340B hospitals nationwide collected nearly \$10 in total profit for every \$1 they invested in charity care in 2021.
- In Minnesota, the charity care rate at 340B hospitals is 0.8%. This is below the national average of 2.5% (which includes both 340B and non-340B hospitals).
- In total, hospitals in Minnesota make 8.2 times as much from 340B as they spend on charity care.

# For-Profit Pharmacies Make Billions Off 340B Program Without Clear Benefit to Patients

A recent Berkeley Research Group analysis explored the staggering side effects of contract pharmacy expansion on the 340B program over the past 10 years. The misguided guidance that allowed 340B entities to contract with an unlimited number of for-profit retail pharmacies ultimately allowed for-profit vendors, pharmacies and pharmacy benefit managers to exploit the program.

**\$13 Billion**

generated in estimated gross profits for 340B covered entities and their contract pharmacies from 340B purchased medicines in 2018.

**>5,000%**


growth in contract pharmacy arrangements since 2010.

**>50%**

of 340B profits generated by contract pharmacies are retained by four for-profit corporations.




## Here's an example of how it works:




**Patient often doesn't see any of the discount**

## Average Profit Margin



## Contract Pharmacy Arrangements



Berkeley Research Group, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program," October 2020.

Berkeley Research Group analysis of Health Resources and Services Administration Office of Pharmacy Affairs registrations, January 2022.

Reforms are needed to ensure the program reaches the vulnerable and uninsured patients it was intended to help.

Learn more at [PhRMA.org/340B](https://PhRMA.org/340B)



**In Opposition to Minnesota House File 4991/Senate File 5159**  
**340B Contract Pharmacy Mandate**  
**April 2024**

**Position:** The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) respectfully opposes Minnesota House File 4991 (HF 4991)/Senate File 5159 (SF 5159). HF 4991/SF 5159 would require biopharmaceutical manufacturers to ship 340B drugs to all pharmacies that contract with 340B “covered entities” and by extension offer 340B pricing at these locations. This type of provision not only raises constitutional concerns, but also exacerbates existing problems with the 340B program without ensuring that vulnerable patients needing discounted medicines will benefit.

Additionally, the Minnesota Department of Health just received initial data from 340B health care entities the beginning of April 2024 that the state is currently evaluating. The Minnesota Legislature should evaluate this data before enacting additional legislation related to the 340B program.

**HF 4991/SF 5159 would mandate that manufacturers ship 340B drugs to all pharmacies that contract with 340B covered entities and by extension offer 340B pricing at these locations.**

The 340B program is a comprehensive federal program that is governed exclusively by federal law. States do not have the authority to create new requirements that are not in the federal statute or that conflict with the statute. Whether manufacturers can be required to ship drugs to contract pharmacies for 340B providers is currently being litigated in several federal courts across the country.

At least three cases have found that the 340B statute is silent on how drugs must be distributed under the 340B program, which supports the assertion that the statute does not require any specific action with respect to covered entities’ contract pharmacies. In January 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that “[s]ection 340B [of the federal statute] does not require delivery to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies” and “Congress never said that drug makers must deliver discounted Section 340B drugs to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies.” *Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 58 F.4th 696 (3d Cir. 2023).

Despite the ongoing legal activity at both the federal agency and in the federal courts, Arkansas and Louisiana have enacted legislation similar to HF 4991/SF 5159 that have serious constitutional defects and are being challenged in federal court.

**Congress created the 340B drug discount program in 1992 to help vulnerable and uninsured patients access prescription medicines at safety-net facilities.**

Through the program, biopharmaceutical manufacturers provide tens of billions of dollars in discounts each year to qualifying safety-net hospitals and certain clinics (“covered entities”), but patients are often not benefitting. Today, large hospital systems, chain pharmacies, and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are generating massive profits from the 340B program even though its intended beneficiaries were true safety-net hospitals and clinics and the low-income and vulnerable patients they treat. The 340B program has

strayed far from its safety-net purpose, and Congress needs to fix the program to ensure that it is reaching its intended populations.

**There is little evidence to suggest that patients have benefited from contract pharmacy growth.**

An analysis of contract pharmacy claims for brand medicines only found evidence that patients were directly receiving a discount for 1.4% of prescriptions eligible for 340B. Additional studies have found that 65 percent of the roughly 3,000 hospitals that participate in the 340B program are not located in medically underserved areas,<sup>1</sup> and in Minnesota, only 35% of contract pharmacies are located in medically underserved areas. Research has also found that more than two-thirds of 340B hospitals provide less charity care than the national average for all hospitals, and they often spend less on charity care and community investment than the estimated value of their tax breaks as nonprofits. In fact, 81% of 340B hospitals in Minnesota are below the national average for charity care levels.

**The prescribing practices of 340B hospitals are driving up costs for patients, payers, and the health care system as a whole.**

Based on a recent analysis by IQVIA, the 340B program increased drug costs for self-insured employers and their workers by 4.2% or \$5.2 billion due to the manufacturer rebates that are lost when drugs are purchased at the 340B discounted price.<sup>2</sup> Increased drug costs for employers and their workers from the 340B program is a result of 340B hospitals collecting the spread between the price they are reimbursed by insurers and patients and the discounted 340B price they paid for their medicines. Thus, the claim that “the 340B program costs taxpayers nothing” is inaccurate if it is driving up the cost of prescription drugs for employers and their workers.

**HF 4991/SF 5159 will line the pockets of PBMs, pharmacy chains, and large hospitals.**

Since 2010, the number of contracts with pharmacies has grown by more than 8,000%, with roughly 33,000 pharmacies participating in the program today. Many contract pharmacies may often charge a patient a drug’s full retail price because they are not required to share any of the discount with those in need.<sup>3</sup> Big-box retailers such as Walgreens, CVS Health, and Walmart are major participants in the 340B program through contract pharmacy arrangements. Because of vertical integration in the supply chain, PBMs now own the vast majority of pharmacies, meaning they also make a profit from contract pharmacy arrangements. In fact, the five largest for-profit pharmacy chains comprise 60 percent of 340B contract pharmacies, but only 35 percent of all pharmacies nationwide.<sup>4</sup> 340B covered entities and their contract pharmacies generated an estimated \$13 billion in gross profits on 340B purchased medicines in 2018, which represents more than 25% of pharmacies’ and providers’ total profits from dispensing or administering brand medicines.<sup>5</sup>

**PhRMA respectfully opposes the provisions outlined above and appreciates your consideration prior to advancing HF 4991/SF 5159.**

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*The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the country’s leading innovative biopharmaceutical research companies, which are devoted to discovering and developing medicines that enable patients to live longer, healthier and more productive lives. Over the last decade, PhRMA member companies have more than doubled their annual investment in the search for new treatments and cures, including nearly \$101 billion in 2022 alone.*

<sup>1</sup> Alliance for Integrity & Reform. “340B – A Missed Opportunity to Address Those That Are Medically Underserved.” 2023 Update. Access: [https://340breform.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/340B\\_MUA\\_July23-4.pdf](https://340breform.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/340B_MUA_July23-4.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Chuan, S., Shanyue, Z. & Martin, R. The Cost of the 340B Program Part 1: Self-Insured Employers. IQVIA. Mar. 2024. <https://www.iqvia.com/locations/united-states/library/white-papers/the-cost-of-the-340b-program-part-1-self-insured-employers>.

<sup>3</sup> Conti, Rena M., and Peter B. Bach. “Cost consequences of the 340B drug discount program.” *Jama* 309.19 (2013): 1995-1996.

<sup>4</sup> Government Accountability Office, “Drug Discount Program: Federal Oversight of Compliance at 340B Contract Pharmacies Needs Improvement,” GAO-18-480, June 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Berkeley Research Group. For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program. October 2020.

# 5 Questions with Sayeh Nikpay: The 340B Drug Pricing Program

A periodic feature by Cornerstone Research, in which our affiliated experts, senior advisors, and professionals, talk about their research and findings.

*We interview Professor Sayeh Nikpay of the School of Public Health, University of Minnesota, to gain her insights into the 340B program, its role in the healthcare safety net, implementation challenges, and related legal matters.*

## The 340B program is an active area of research and litigation that is top of mind for policymakers and lawmakers. Can you give us an overview of this program?

The 340B Drug Pricing Program is a federal program that allows qualifying providers (also known as covered entities) to buy discounted outpatient prescription drugs and bill insurers to generate revenue to expand care for low-income and uninsured patients. Specifically, this program can generate revenue for covered entities because discounts for prescriptions dispensed to privately insured or Medicare patients are not typically reflected in insurer reimbursement rates for prescription drugs. That is, covered entities can purchase discounted prescription drugs and bill insurers at higher rates that do not reflect these discounts.

The 340B program intends to “enable covered entities to stretch scarce federal resources to reach more eligible patients, and provide more comprehensive services.” In other words, the federal government hopes that covered entities will use 340B revenues to expand care for safety-net patients through programs and services that are typically unprofitable, such as community health improvement, obstetrics, or substance abuse care. However, there is no explicit requirement to do so, and the federal government does not track 340B revenues.

Covered entities that are allowed to participate in the 340B program include hospitals that serve a large proportion of Medicaid or low-income Medicare patients (also known as Disproportionate Share Hospitals), certain types of rural hospitals, cancer hospitals, pediatric hospitals, and various federally supported safety-net clinics such as Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs). Whether covered entities pass on discounts to their safety-net patients remains unknown. While many federally supported clinics are required to provide discounted care on a sliding fee scale, hospital covered entities face no such requirements.

Covered entities can only dispense outpatient prescription drugs purchased through the 340B program to “eligible patients.” The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) defines eligible patients to be those who:

1. Have an established relationship with the covered entity (e.g., the covered entity maintains the patient's healthcare records),
2. Have received healthcare services from a healthcare professional employed by the covered entity, and
3. Have received healthcare services consistent with services that the covered entity typically offers. Eligible patients can receive outpatient prescription drugs purchased through the 340B program

at the covered entity's outpatient clinics (called child sites), in-house pharmacies, or contract pharmacies, which are external pharmacies that contract with the covered entity.

## How has the 340B program expanded over time?

Since 2010, the number of drugs dispensed under the 340B program has grown dramatically. Two major program changes led to this increase. First, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded the types of covered entities that qualify for the 340B program. After 2010, critical access hospitals, sole community hospitals, rural referral centers, and freestanding pediatric and cancer hospitals became eligible. This expansion, driven primarily by the participation of critical access hospitals, increased the percentage of hospital covered entities from 10% in 2004 to over 60% in 2020.

Second, the HRSA issued guidance allowing covered entities to establish unlimited contract pharmacies. Before 2010, covered entities without an in-house pharmacy could only contract with one external pharmacy. After the limit was removed, the number of contract pharmacies participating in the 340B program increased more than tenfold. Current 340B revenues are estimated to be over \$50 billion.

## You are a health policy expert with deep knowledge of healthcare safety-net programs. Based on your research, can you explain why the 340B program has become controversial?

Expanding the 340B program has raised questions about whether it is being used as Congress intended. If hospital covered entities generate significant revenue by dispensing drugs purchased through the 340B program to privately insured or Medicare patients yet fail to increase access and care for safety-net patients, the program is not functioning as intended.

My research finds that the 340B program creates perverse incentives for covered entities. I have used large, nationally representative, administrative datasets to show that:

1. Hospitals that begin participating in the 340B program do not meaningfully increase their safety-net engagement.
2. The 340B program's eligibility criteria poorly target safety-net providers.
3. Contract pharmacies are less likely to be located in medically underserved areas, or areas with higher uninsured rates.

Additionally, in one of my recent publications, I show that nearly half of all retail pharmacies have at least one contract with a 340B covered entity. The number of contracts per pharmacy has grown over time. However, these 340B contract pharmacies are less likely to contract with hospitals and clinics that care for many patients who rely on the safety-net. In forthcoming research, I also find a large share of retail contract pharmacies concentrated among the four retail pharmacy chains with the highest market share by prescription volume.

## **What are some proposed changes that policymakers can enact to help the 340B program better serve its intended purpose?**

One proposed change would be to define program eligibility criteria better, so 340B discounts primarily benefit covered entities that serve safety-net patients. For example, the criteria currently used to qualify hospitals for the program are not based on uninsured patient volume, charity care, or community benefit spending. As a result, the same 340B discounts can be provided to hospitals—regardless of their safety-net engagement—as long as the hospital qualifies as a covered entity. Better aligning the program's eligibility with demonstrated care for the uninsured and charitable care can strengthen the healthcare safety-net and improve access for patients who rely on it.

Another proposed change is to increase transparency and oversight of the 340B program. As I discuss above, 340B hospitals are not required to report revenues generated by the program, nor compelled to demonstrate how they use the generated revenue to expand care for safety-net patients. Because of the lack of transparency and oversight, it is unclear whether the hospital covered entities are using the discounts as Congress intended. Mandating that all covered entities regularly report average prices paid for 340B drugs, their programs' savings, how the savings are used, and the patients/programs served from the savings would improve oversight and shed light on whether the program is improving care for low-income patients. New legislation passed in both Maine and Minnesota in the summer of 2023 established transparency requirements for covered entities in those states.

## **The 340B program has been at the center of legal challenges involving drug manufacturers. Why are manufacturers concerned about the program's expansion?**

Manufacturers must provide 340B discounts if they want Medicaid and Medicare Part B patients to use their drugs. Such patients include a large population with chronic illnesses. However, there are challenges associated with accurately tracking and reporting 340B discounts, and manufacturers are concerned that payors will use 340B discounts on patients who have already benefited from another price concession on the same drug.

One way this can occur is through a duplicate discount. The manufacturer sells drugs to a covered entity at the 340B price and later pays a Medicaid rebate on the same drug. While HRSA prohibits this type of duplicate discount, identifying and preventing it from occurring can be challenging due to poor coordination among covered entities, contract pharmacies, and state Medicaid agencies.

Multiple price concessions can also occur through a "stacked" discount. The manufacturer provides a 340B discount on a commercial claim that also received a rebate negotiated between a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) and a manufacturer. Although not explicitly prohibited, stacked discounts could violate agreements between PBMs and the manufacturers. They can occur if the patient is privately insured and qualifies as an "eligible patient" as defined by HRSA.

In addition to duplicate and stacked discounts, manufacturers are concerned about drug diversion. Diversion occurs when a 340B discount is used on a patient who does not meet HRSA's definition of an eligible patient. Drugs dispensed through contract pharmacies are particularly

susceptible to diversion, as pharmacists are often unaware whether a patient's prescription qualified for 340B.

Several legal challenges stem from manufacturers' concerns over duplicate discounts, stacked discounts, and diversion. Beginning in 2021, drug manufacturers filed six lawsuits that challenged HRSA's authority to issue warnings and fees in response to the manufacturers' decision to restrict the availability of 340B discounts for drugs dispensed through contract pharmacies. In these lawsuits, manufacturers claim that the expansion of contract pharmacies has increased duplicate discounts. The trial courts sided with HRSA in four of these disputes and with manufacturers in two. Several appeals are ongoing as a result of these rulings. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently sided with manufacturers in one of these appeals.

A recent decision in the U.S. District Court of South Carolina has called into question HRSA's authority to enforce a patient definition that is more restrictive than that described in 340B's enabling legislation. This definition requires a covered entity to initiate the services resulting in the relevant prescription. The court's decision—while consistent with the Third Circuit ruling that HRSA has overreached at times in its regulation of the 340B program—considers the initiation of services irrelevant and takes a broader view of who may be considered a patient. As a result, this decision may increase discounts available for prescriptions previously flagged as diversion (i.e., a primary care covered entity whose patient receives cancer treatment from a different healthcare facility may now be able to use 340B discounts on that patient's cancer drugs). Notably, several drug manufacturers filed amicus briefs supporting HRSA's ability to limit 340B discounts on these prescriptions in the South Carolina case. Given these recent decisions, litigation will likely continue to challenge other 340B policies and guidelines that HRSA has implemented, rather than being directly legislated by Congress.

To track and reduce the incidence of stacked discounts, and as a condition to receive discounts, manufacturers have required many covered entities to submit prescription claims data for drugs dispensed through contract pharmacies through a third-party contractor called 340B ESP. The 340B ESP platform is not without its own controversy, however, as covered entities have expressed concerns over reporting requirements and delays in restoring 340B discounts.

Even as pharmaceutical manufacturers take steps to reduce the incidence of diversion, duplicate discounts, and stacked discounts, whether such efforts will be fruitful and how they will affect the size of the 340B program remains to be seen.

## **Interviewee**



**Sayeh Nikpay**  
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# DID YOU KNOW?

## PBMs and Health Insurers Top the Fortune 500 List

Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) and health insurance companies consistently rank higher on Fortune 500 lists than other health care industries, including pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device companies, health technology firms and hospital systems.

### TOP 10 FORTUNE 500 RANKINGS (2023)

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Walmart              | 6. CVS Health ●       |
| 2. Amazon               | 7. Berkshire Hathaway |
| 3. Exxon Mobil          | 8. Alphabet           |
| 4. Apple                | 9. McKesson ●         |
| 5. UnitedHealth Group ● | 10. Chevron           |

● Health Insurer, PBM and Pharmacy  
● Wholesale Distributor

### TOP RANKED HEALTH INSURER-PBM CONGLOMERATES

- 5. UnitedHealth Group
- 6. CVS Health
- 15. The Cigna Group
- 42. Humana

### TOP RANKED BIOPHARMA COMPANIES


- 38. Pfizer
- 40. Johnson & Johnson
- 69. Merck

## Health Insurer and PBM Consolidation

Just Three PBMs Control 80% of the Market and Either Own or Are Owned by Health Insurers

- |   |                                 |
|---|---------------------------------|
| ● CVS Caremark (CVS Health)                             | ● OptumRX (United Health Group) |
| ● Evernorth, formerly Express Scripts (The Cigna Group) | ● All Other                     |

TOP 3 MARKET SHARE:  
**80%**



CVSHealth.

UNITEDHEALTH GROUP®

THE CIGNA GROUP™

PBM	CVS caremark®	Optum Rx®	EVERNORTH HEALTH SERVICES
INSURER	aetna	United Healthcare	Cigna.